Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 76) expressing the sense of the Congress regarding executive and employee bonuses paid by AIG and other…
Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 76) expressing the sense of the Congress regarding executive and employee bonuses paid by AIG and other companies assisted with taxpayer funds provided under the Troubled Assets Relief Program of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, there is a great deal of anger in the Nation, and it is reflected in this House, which is representative of the Nation, about retention bonuses given to people who worked at AIG. Retention bonuses in this situation, Mr. Speaker, strike me as a form of legalized extortion. These are not performance bonuses. I was unclear about that and misspoke about it to some extent. These are bonuses paid solely so that people who had been employed at AIG would not leave AIG as it became clear the company was in trouble.
Specifically, we were told that these retention bonuses go to employees who were engaged in complex financial transactions. Now it is, in sum, these complex financial transactions that caused the company the problem. The insurance entities, regulated by State insurance regulators, caused no problem. In fact, they generated the resources and the revenues that allowed these other people to get themselves in trouble.
According to Mr. Liddy, who was appointed to head AIG after the failure, a decision was initiated by the Federal Reserve last September to lend them money and then make a change in the company's management. Mr. Liddy said he was afraid--and he is genuinely sincere about this-- he was afraid that some of these people who had been working at the company and who had intimate knowledge of these complex transactions would leave the company and might, in fact, even use their knowledge in ways that would be adverse to the company.
That is a very sad commentary on them. These are people who were engaged in these transactions, the effect of which was to put the company in trouble. And we are told that they have to be bribed not to abandon the company in their time of trouble.
Now, I am skeptical that the best way to get out of the hole that those
people dug was to let them get extra pay for wielding the shovel. I believe there could have been other people hired. My colleague, Mr. Capuano, did some good questioning in this. We were told AIG felt, no, they had to pay the bonus. I think that is a very grave error.
My own preference is, and I have urged this on the administration, my preference is that they bring a lawsuit on behalf of the U.S. as the major shareholder so that we can recover here; that is, it is not a case of us as a regulator intruding on a contract by others. This is a case where we are the major owners of this company. And I believe that it is a grave error to enrich people who have apparently threatened to leave the company, abandon it and not help them get out of the problems they created unless they are given these bribes called ``retention bonuses.'' We have a resolution here which talks about several things.
First, it does express our determination to prevent these from happening in the future. We have already done some of that. We should note, this provision here, this decision was made unilaterally by the Federal Reserve system under a 1932 statute. There was no congressional input whatsoever into the decision last September to do this. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Paulson, accompanied me, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Mr. Bernanke, and they came to Congress, and they said that Mr. Bernanke had decided to give a loan of $85 billion to this company. No restrictions were put on the company. Two days later, the same two gentlemen asked us to enact legislation providing for $700 billion in authority.
At that point, we said, among other things, there has to be some restrictions on the compensation paid. Now we didn't get all the restrictions we wanted because we were in the negotiation process. But it was instructive that when the Fed did it on its own with the Secretary of the Treasury's support, there were no restrictions on compensation. Two days later, we immediately raised that, had a debate and got some of them. Now, we have gone further.
I would make this contrast. We have AIG without any restrictions. Under the TARP program, which Congress voted and which is now being administered by the current administration, we have not only imposed restrictions, we are now being criticized in the press and by some of the recipients for being too tough on them. In the New York Times last week, there was a front page article that said the banks are going to have to give the money back because we are too tough on compensation, lavish entertaining and too much pressure to make loans. There was an article in the Washington Post business section 3 days ago making the same point. I welcome that kind of criticism. I welcome the recognition that we have now become very tough. The problem is that these bonuses were granted under an authority that the Federal Reserve gave before Congress got into the situation and were able to put on the restrictions. This resolution is a beginning of what we will be doing.
There is also, I hope, going to be a lawsuit. I have been pressing the administration for a shareholders' lawsuit to recover the bonuses that have already been paid. And there will be other legislative vehicles. I hope that the Committee on Financial Services will mark up a bill next week which will embody much of what is in this resolution. We will have a markup in committee. I hope we will be able to bring a bill to the floor that will deal with this both prospectively and retroactively. At this point, this is a statement of intention which I think is appropriate because people in this country want to know what we are doing. It will be followed up by a markup in committee.
We have had several hearings on the subject of compensation and a big one on AIG, obviously, yesterday. And we will have another AIG hearing next week with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. But we will be marking up legislation next week in committee and voting on it the final week before the recess so that what we state here as our intention I hope will become law.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield myself such time as I may consume to say I learn a lot in this job. Now, I have learned about a theory called creationism which in some cases holds that the world was created 4,000 years ago or 7,000 years ago by calculating what the Bible said. But I now am astounded to see a new and more compressed theory of when the world was created. It apparently was created at noon on January 20, 2009.
You just heard someone say, ``it is Obama's fault.'' In September of 2008--and I regret that we are getting into this kind of political discussion--but the gentleman from Alabama raised it. In September of 2008, two appointees of George Bush came to the Congress and said, Mr. Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who had previously been on the Bush economic advisory staff, and Mr. Paulson, the Secretary of the Treasury, and they said, ``we are going to lend $85 billion through the Federal Reserve to AIG.'' They didn't ask us.
Yes.
No, I'm sorry. I will yield to talk about what I am talking about. I take back my time.
Mr. Speaker, please instruct someone who should know better about the rules. I took back my time. The point is this: He had the chance to make his argument. He wanted to make it political. Yeah, there was something in the stimulus package. Before the stimulus package, there was September of 2008. It does exist. Your revisionism doesn't work.
I would say to my friends on the other side, Mr. Speaker, in September--I note, Mr. Speaker, how sensitive the subject is that I raised. I got one sentence into describing the role of the Bush administration, and up comes my colleague from Alabama, because they don't want this to be discussed.
In September of 2008, George Bush's two top economic appointees came, and Mr. Bernanke informed us that he was going to lend $85 billion to AIG. I said, at the time, because he said ``we have obligations all over the world here, and we have to make our foreign partners know that this is not going to be a default on them.'' I said, ``well, are they contributing?'' I asked them at the time, ``will there be any contribution from foreign banks to make up what AIG owes?'' The answer was ``no.'' So from September of 2008 until January 20, 2009, the Bush administration was in charge of this.
I will yield again to your sensitivity.
January 20, yes.
Yes. I will reclaim my time to say that the gentleman has just reaffirmed what I said. I said it was the during the Bush administration.
I just reclaimed my time. Do Members not understand the rules on the other side? I yielded twice. I reclaimed my time, Mr. Speaker.
I got briefly into my response. Two of my colleagues have now jumped up because they don't want the story to be told. I said that it was under the Bush administration.
The gentleman from New Jersey got up, and, frankly, I thought he was going to say, ``Oh, no, that was the Federal Reserve, they are not technically the Bush administration.''
Instead, what he wanted to do was to drive home my point and say it wasn't just the Federal Reserve, it was the Department of Treasury in November 2008. Who was running the Department of Treasury? Bush appointees. So I accept the gentleman's correction. I should have been more clear that it wasn't just the Federal Reserve, it was also the Secretary of the Treasury and there was a restructuring.
The Bush administration was in control from September of 2008 until January. The decision to lend the money with no restrictions on compensation was a Bush administration decision.
Now, when we had to vote on the rescue plan, we did insist on some compensation restrictions. They were grudgingly applied. Under the current administration, we have greatly expanded these. If, in fact, we had covered the restrictions--well, the restrictions, let's just put it this way, that are now in place on the rescue plan are so tough that people want to give us the money back. The recovery plan, we said they could give the money back.
But the point is that yes, in November of 2008 it became even more of a Bush administration situation because Treasury had a larger role.
I would yield again to the gentleman.
The answer is the gentleman appears to have forgotten. How did it go through? Yes, the TARP legislation, requested by the Bush administration, did pass the House with the support of a majority of Democrats and a minority of Republicans, but supported by the Republican leadership.
Excuse me.
Mr. Speaker, let me explain to the gentleman, when you are recognized, you can speak. If you are not the one who is recognized, you ask someone to yield. If he yields, as I have done to you twice, you can speak. If he doesn't yield, you wait until someone does. It is an orderly process.
Now, again, I understand that this is an unusual degree to which I am being asked to yield because the Members on the other side want to make a partisan attack and not have the facts. The facts are--no, I will not yield to a continued kind of pattern of interruption because Members don't want the story told. I listened to the gentleman. He asked about how the TARP bill was passed. The Bush administration lobbied for it strongly. The Republican leadership of the House supported it, although a slight majority of the Members voted against it. A heavy majority of Republicans in the Senate passed it. So the TARP bill did pass with a majority of Republicans in the Senate, the Republican leadership in the House, and Democratic majorities in both Houses, and the Bush administration. It was genuinely bipartisan.
It included some restrictions on compensation, less than I would have liked because Republicans in the Senate, working with the Bush administration, resisted them.
We have since increased both the types of restrictions and the levels. So the answer to the gentleman's question: yes, the TARP bill did pass at the request of the Bush administration with support from the House Republican leadership, which I notice is conspicuously off the floor now to avoid embarrassment, and the majority of Republicans in the Senate. But that's the point, Mr. Speaker, this was initiated by the Bush administration, and the decision to give the TARP money without any restrictions came from the Bush administration.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to a member of the Financial Services Committee, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kilroy).
I will continue to reserve.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to correct the gentleman from New Jersey.
I have long thought that I pay closer attention to our colleague from Texas (Mr. Paul) than his Republican colleagues. He talked about legislation, but he was talking about, in part, the legislation that gives the Federal Reserve the ability to do this.
The gentleman from New Jersey is incorrect. This was not created by the TARP legislation which the Congress passed at the request of President Bush, it was under legislation passed in 1932 which gave the Federal Reserve the authority. Mr. Bernanke was acting under that authority. So it is true that the actual loan was made under the administration of George Bush, but he was acting under authority signed by another great Republican President, Herbert Hoover.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
I will confess, Mr. Speaker, I was not paying as close attention to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Would he rephrase the question?
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds to say that if the gentleman wants to ask me a question--I had said I hadn't heard it--if he would rephrase it, I will try to answer it.
Mr. Speaker, I guess I will never get to answer that question, so I will yield, instead, 1 minute to the Speaker of the House.
Well, Mr. Speaker, I would say to my friend from Ohio that last remark was kind of bewildering. It wasn't my time. He was out of time. He seemed to be annoyed that I hadn't answered his question, but how I don't know how I could have done that except by sign language, in which I am not proficient. In my time I will address the question. For him to ask me a question as his time expires and then express indignation at my failure to answer it puzzles me.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Reserving the right to object, I'm not
going to be told I have only 15 seconds to answer a question.
I thank the gentleman. I will use it and then reserve the balance of my time.
I was not a member of the conference committee. The Financial Services Committee was not directly involved in this. We were more constrained by what we thought was the germaneness to the recovery bill. So the answer is I am not familiar with whatever the reasons were as to why this was put in.
I will say this: If there had been no language whatsoever, we still wouldn't have had the authority. In other words, what did survive was additional authority. Now, if there had been no bill whatsoever, we wouldn't have come even this close. But as to the specific question, the answer is I was not involved.
I would also just say, as chairman of the Financial Services Committee, I monitor pretty closely what goes on. I am not aware of any Republican member of the Financial Services Committee who has approached us and asked us to toughen up compensation restrictions. This interest in compensation restrictions is a fairly new interest. I commend people. I think later in life, it's good to take up new things so you don't get stale. But I do want to note that it is a fairly newfound hobby of my colleagues on the other side. In fact, in September when the Bush administration said they were going to make the loan with no restrictions and we pushed for it----
I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.
Reclaiming my time, we now have the nub of it. How dare I mention September of 2008. We're talking about February. I thought the world began on January 20. Apparently it started on February 1.
The fact is that you cannot look at this out of context. It was under the Bush administration that they initiated this loan to AIG. It was under the Bush administration that they asked for TARP and for our efforts to try to restrict compensation.
Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, we have passed from creationism to fantasy. It's interesting.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert) was very critical, in fact, of the actions of the Republican leader. He said we begged people not to vote for the TARP. The Republican leader in the House last fall worked very hard to get it passed. So did the other members of his leadership.
So did the other Members of his leadership, and now he is being denounced for that. So I guess he broke even on his side, which these days, if you are in the minority, may be a pretty good day.
But the fact is this, the gentleman from New Jersey says, well, the Democrats were in the majority--though he said Democrat majority. Pardon me, for not getting his inflection absolute. Yes, the President of the United States, George Bush, came and asked us to do this, and his two top economic advisers said if you don't do it, there will be a crisis.
But, in fact, that's not directly relevant to the AIG issue. AIG was granted money.
And, by the way, the gentleman from New Jersey again misstates the relevant statute. The statute that we are referring to, that the gentleman from Texas referred to, is not the original one creating the Federal Reserve, it's the 1932 statute that gave them the power to lend money as they wish, signed by another great Republican President, Herbert Hoover.
But the point is that it was the Republican administration that said we had to do this. Yes, there was cooperation, the Republican leadership in the
House, the majority in the Senate, believing that there would have been a terrible problem if it wasn't there.
I do want to reiterate that I am now pleased, as Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, that there is this interest on the Republican side in restricting compensation. It has not previously been a strong part of their argument.
However, we will return to the subject of this resolution. The resolution isn't binding, but it is a forerunner of what will be binding.
The Committee on Financial Services will vote next week on binding legislation, and it will bring it to the floor the week after, which will embody much of this, and it will include an effort to deal with this retroactively. There will be legal questions raised, but the fact is that we will have binding legislation to embody this.
This is an important statement. I would say this in closing, Mr. Speaker. We have people now at AIG deciding whether or not they are going to give their money back. The more they give back to us, the better we will be. It won't be totally conclusive.
But to defeat this resolution because it says nice things about President Obama would be a grave error.