To amend the Federal Power Act to provide additional authorities to adequately protect the critical electric infrastructure against cyber attack, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5026) to amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States from cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the Record.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Right now, Mr. Speaker, America's electric grid is vulnerable to cyber or other attacks by terrorists or hostile countries. Our adversaries are actively probing these weaknesses and already have the capacity to exploit them. The consequences of such an attack could be devastating. The commercially operated grid provides 99 percent of the power used by our defense facilities. Every one of our Nation's critical civilian systems--water, communications, health care, transportation, law enforcement, and financial services--depends on that grid. Classified Member briefings have underscored the urgency of this threat.

The GRID Act, which has been produced out of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee, working with Mr. Upton, the ranking member of the subcommittee, passed by a unanimous 47-0 vote. It is the product of months of bipartisan work led by Chairman Waxman and Ranking Members Barton and Upton. It reflects important work by Mr. Barrow and other members of the Energy and Commerce Committee and by Chairman Thompson, Representative Clarke-- Chairwoman Clarke--and others on the Homeland Security Committee. And it shows that when it comes to the nexus between national security and energy, all Americans agree that we must chart a more secure path.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the chairman of the full Energy and Commerce Committee, the gentleman from the State of California (Mr. Waxman).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barrow), to whom Chairman Waxman has already made reference. Mr. Barrow is probably the longest-standing Member who has been working on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), who, in the last Congress, was the chair of what is now the Emerging Threats Subcommittee on the Homeland Security Committee. I have worked with him under his leadership on these issues for years.

(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The GRID Act has three basic components.

First, it establishes Federal authority to address emergency situations. If the President identifies an imminent threat to the bulk power system or to other parts of the grid that serve critical defense facilities, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission can issue an emergency order requiring measures to protect against this threat. This authority covers threats from cyberattacks, from electromagnetic weapons, from direct physical attacks, or from solar storms.

However, in many cases, we will not know about a cyberattack or other threat to the grid until it's too late. Accordingly, the GRID Act establishes measures to protect the grid against key vulnerabilities so that, if and when an emergency does happen, we are already prepared.

Most importantly, if FERC identifies a vulnerability to a cyber or to an electromagnetic attack that has not adequately been addressed, it has the authority to require intrameasures to protect the bulk power system.

The legislation also requires FERC, within 6 months of enactment, to establish measures to protect against the Aurora vulnerability to cyberattack. That vulnerability was identified nearly 3 years ago, but the current standard-setting process has not addressed it. That is unacceptable. It must be fixed.

Ranking Member Upton and other members of our committee sat through a top secret briefing last October with regard to the threat that this Aurora vulnerability and that other vulnerabilities pose as potential threats to our country and which could be exploited by other countries or by subnational groups or by domestic terrorists. This is something that we must close. I think every Member in that top secret briefing left, having experienced a sobering moment in their lives, realizing the great responsibility we have to pass legislation that can deal with this problem.

The GRID Act also deals with other critical vulnerabilities. Solar flares cause geomagnetic currents that can destroy large electric transformers. Experts agree that it is only a matter of time before we experience a solar storm large enough to bring down a large portion of the grid, potentially causing trillions of dollars in damage. In addition, the grid is highly vulnerable to attack because the large transformers upon which it relies are built overseas and can take years to replace. The GRID Act addresses these issues by requiring the development of reliability standards to protect against geomagnetic storms and to ensure the availability of adequate backup supplies of large transformers.

Finally, the GRID Act gives FERC the authority to protect portions of the grid that serve the top 100 critical defense facilities against a cyber or an electromagnetic weapons attack.

The amended version of the bill now before the House makes one change to the version reported out of committee. In order to make the bill deficit neutral, the amended bill exempts the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority from requirements other than cyberprotections during the first 11 years after enactment. With this change, the Congressional Budget Office has determined that the bill will not affect direct Federal spending. The amended bill does not score.

Colleagues, the electric grid's vulnerability to cyber and to other attacks is one of the single greatest threats to our national security. This bipartisan legislation is critical to empowering the Federal Government and the private sector with the capacities they

will need to protect us against that threat.

There are people plotting right now that, if they could, would exploit this vulnerability.

I urge all Members to vote ``yes'' on the GRID Act. It is a moment that we must all come together in order to protect our country.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

I thank the gentleman from Michigan for working with the majority in such a cooperative fashion. National defense is an area where we should be trying to cooperate, and this bill is a preeminent example of that happening in this Congress. And I want to thank him and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton) for creating that atmosphere which made it possible.

I think that this is a historic piece of legislation. Mr. Waxman and I and all of the Members on our side really do believe that this is the way Congress should work. I congratulate the gentleman for his work on it.

I have no further requests for time, and I reserve the balance of my time.

I yield back the balance of my time with the urging of an ``aye'' vote by the Members.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I, too, want to compliment the members on our committee, both Republican and Democrat, not only in our subcommittee that Mr. Markey chairs and I'm the ranking member, but also Chairman Waxman and Ranking Member Barton.

This has been a multiyear effort; it really has. This bill is a product of that work. We've had a number of classified hearings and discussions and briefings over the last couple of years with Members attending for hours at a time. We've had some public hearings as well; and this bill is a product of that, which is exactly why the bill passed out of full committee 47-0 on a roll call vote.

The security of our Nation's energy infrastructure from attack is one of the most important issues that this Congress might address this year, and it's not an issue that we can take lightly. Energy, as we know, electricity literally powers our economy in everything that we do. Even small price spikes and supply disruptions can wreak havoc on our economy for perhaps who knows how long, and it is imperative that the security of our Nation's energy infrastructure gets all of the attention that it deserves. This legislation is a step in the right direction

to protect our critical energy and defense infrastructure.

Let me tell you a couple of things that this bill does. As it relates to cyber- and electromagnetic weapons, it gives FERC the authority to establish standards to protect the bulk power system against vulnerabilities to malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic weapons.

Geomagnetic storms: The bill requires FERC to direct NERC to submit for approval a reliability standard under section 215 to protect the bulk power infrastructure. And for large transformers, the bill requires FERC again to direct NERC to submit for approval a reliability standard under section 215 to require adequate availability of large transformers to ensure the reliability of the bulk power infrastructure in the event of a physical or other attack with a geomagnetic storm.

I would like to cite just a few words in a letter that was signed by some real national security experts--James Woolsey, Stephen Hadley, John Hamre, Rudy de Leon, James Schlesinger, William Perry, and Willy Schneider, Jr. It's an official-use only letter, so I cannot submit this letter for the Record or read more than just a few words.

They say together: We strongly endorse the timely passage of this legislation in recognition that the electricity grid is a critical national security asset, the backbone of defense capability in modern civilization and also in recognition that the grid is vulnerable.

The letter goes on: We don't want a vulnerable grid. We, as a society, cannot live with a vulnerable grid. This bill corrects many of the flaws in what could otherwise be standard operating procedure.

Again, I applaud and thank Chairmen Waxman and Markey, Ranking Member Barton, and all of the members of our committee who have spent many hours to address this situation with this legislation.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I know that we have one other Member who wishes to speak, but I do not see him on the floor; so I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

In seeing that the Member is not here, I would ask again for a strong ``yea'' vote, and I would hope that our Senate colleagues are listening so that they will be able to move this legislation as quickly as possible.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to reclaim the balance of my time.

I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett), who is in support of the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton), in support of the bill.

I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I just want to say, this is an issue that we sat down together for the last, actually, couple of years examining the facts. Many of us that particularly live in areas--for me, the Midwest, coming from Michigan, we had a devastating tornado come through this weekend, and for many of us, myself included, our electricity went out for a number of hours. And then a number of times, particularly during the winter and even in the summer where these electric storms that come through, sometimes the electricity may be out for a couple of days.

We look to our friends down in Haiti who, many of them still may not have electricity after the devastating earthquake that hit there a number of months ago. Can you imagine if that happened here in this country, where, because of our grid vulnerabilities, you could be perhaps out of electricity for a year or 2, trying to get gasoline to get out of there, trying to get refrigeration for your food, trying to have a job, take care of your family?

Some of us read the book ``The Road.'' Lots of different scenarios that are out there. We need to be prepared. This bill moves us down that road.

And I again want to compliment my friend, Mr. Markey, to make sure that this legislation did move through. We had a lot of bipartisan support, a lot of eyes opened and ears too, particularly as we sat through some of those classified briefings. Let's hope that the Senate moves quickly, the President signs it swiftly, and, in fact, we can see legislation move to make sure that those scenarios remain that way and don't become realities.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 5026, legislation to protect our national electric grid system. I would particularly like to thank Chairman Markey for his outstanding leadership and dedication to this important national security issue. I know he has given great time and effort and thought to this, and I thank him for that.

I would also like to thank Chairman Waxman for his attention to this issue.

I would also like to recognize and to thank my good friend Mr. Thompson, chairman of the full Homeland Security Committee, for working with me in 2008 to hold hearings and to closely examine what actions our country must absolutely take to prevent attacks on our national security electric grid.

Two years ago, I testified before Chairman Markey's subcommittee about the threats to our bulk power system from cyberattack. In the 110th Congress, as chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I conducted a detailed and thorough examination of cyberthreats to our critical infrastructure, and I want to reiterate what I made clear in my testimony.

I believe that America is still vulnerable to a cyberattack against the electric grid, which would cause severe damage, not only to our critical infrastructure, but also to our economy and

to the welfare of our citizens. The vast majority of our critical assets is in private hands. In many sectors, private entities are largely self-regulated and are responsible for developing and for implementing their own standards according to their own priorities.

This bill will ensure that serious threats to our electric grid are addressed by giving the Federal Government the ability to require strong safety measures in our electric power system. It has the foresight to not only specifically focus on cyberthreats but also to focus on other potentially devastating issues, such as electromagnetic interference. These measures will help to ensure that we prepare for the worst case scenarios and that we protect our citizens in the case of a devastating attack or accident.

So, again, I really want to thank Chairman Markey for his attention to this important issue, and I look forward to working with the Energy and Commerce Committee in continuing to raise awareness about securing our critical infrastructure and in protecting our citizens from cyberattack.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5026, legislation to protect our national electric grid system. I would like to thank Chairman Markey for his leadership on this important national security issue. I would also like to recognize my good friend and Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Mr. Thompson, for working with me in 2008 to hold hearings and closely examine what actions our country must take to prevent attacks on our national grid.

Two years ago, on September 11, 2008, I testified before Chairman Markey's Subcommittee about the threats to our bulk power system from cyber attack. In the 110th Congress, as Chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, I conducted a detailed and thorough examination of cyber threats to our critical infrastructure, and I want to reiterate what I made clear in my testimony. I believe America remains vulnerable to a cyber attack against the electric grid that would cause severe damage to not only our critical infrastructure, but also our economy and the welfare of our citizens.

The vast majority of our critical assets are in private hands. In many sectors, private entities are largely self-regulated and are responsible for developing and implementing their own standards according to their own priorities. This bill will ensure that serious threats to our grid are addressed by giving relevant government agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the ability to require strong safety measures in our electric power system. The bill also has the foresight to not only specifically focus on cyber threats but also on other potentially devastating issues such as electromagnetic interference. The scope of the bill includes the bulk power system, which should also protect critical distribution systems in major cities, like New York and Washington, DC from a cyber attack. Additionally, by empowering the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, this legislation goes a long way to enabling a faster response by both government and industry in case of an imminent threat. These measures will help ensure that we prepare for worst-case scenarios and protect our citizens in the case of a devastating attack or catastrophe.

I applaud the attention being focused on this issue by the Congress, and I want to once again thank Chairman Markey for his attention to this important issue. I look forward to working with the Energy and Commerce Committee and to securing our critical infrastructure and protecting our citizens from cyber attack.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5026, the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense--or GRID-- Act.

As Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, I am well aware of the need to protect our Nation's critical infrastructure.

Our Committee has held numerous classified briefings and public hearings on threats to the electric grid. Again and again, we received testimony from expert witnesses that our Nation's electric grid has inadequate protections against cyber attacks and against significant disruptions from electromagnetic threats, EMP, such as solar storms and radio frequency devices.

Further, the Federal Government does not have the authority to ensure its security, nor has it partnered effectively with the private sector to do so.

Protecting our electric grid from EMP will require the best efforts from both government and industry. To date, the electric sector has had a difficult time protecting their assets from EMP threats because although the potential impacts are huge, the frequency of their occurrence is very low.

This is one of those cases where government intervention seems necessary to protect our most important national critical infrastructure.

Last year, I, along with my ranking member Peter King and many other bipartisan members of our Committee introduced H.R. 2195 to give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authority to require protections to be put in place for high impact, low frequency events.

H.R. 5026 is the product of collaborative work between this Committee and our colleagues on the Energy and Commerce Committee, most notably Chairman Waxman and Representatives Markey and Barrow.

Our electric grid is currently strained to capacity.

We saw during the Northeast Blackout of 2003 what can happen when the strained system finally breaks. That blackout interrupted electricity delivery to 55 million people in the U.S. and Canada. Luckily, major outages only lasted a day or so.

But just imagine what would happen if the power did not come back on for a week, or a month, or several months. What would happen?

An elecromagnetic pulse could make such an incredible scenario a reality.

The one that most people have heard about is from a high altitude burst of a nuclear weapon.

Also of concern are smaller radio or microwave devices, usually termed ``Intentional Electromagnetic Interference'' or ``IEMI''.

Of particular concern are ``geomagnetically induced currents'', GIC, caused by solar activity.

A 2008 National Academy of Sciences report warned that our Sun will inevitably inflict a severe geomagnetic storm with the largest geographic footprint of any natural disaster. The damage caused by this event could be $1 trillion to $2 trillion, and recovery could take 4 to 10 years.

The next period of maximum solar activity is only two years away.

From a homeland security perspective, it is important that we take an ``all hazards'' approach to the risk and increase preparedness for both intentional and naturally occurring events.

While some may argue that the threat of a high-altitude nuclear weapon burst perpetrated by a rogue state or a terrorist group is remote, I do not discount it. Given the high-consequence nature of such an attack, I take it very seriously.

On the other hand, scientists tell us that the likelihood of a severe naturally occurring geomagnetic event capable of crippling our electric grid is 100 percent. It will happen; it is just a question of when.

GIC is a natural occurrence just like earthquakes, wildfires, tornadoes or hurricanes.

Similarly, geomagnetic storms occur from time to time as part of the natural activity of the Sun. One such storm, in 1989, disrupted power throughout most of Quebec, and resulted in auroras as far south as Texas.

With the significant investments we are making in ``Green Energy'' and the ``Smart Grid'', we find ourselves at an opportune moment to protect our grid from an EMP and cyber attacks.

As we expand and improve our grid, we must also build in physical and cyber protections from the start, and we must retrofit key elements of the existing grid in order to protect it.

Federal authority and funding are needed if this effort is to succeed. H.R. 5026 represents a critical step forward in our efforts to meet these homeland security challenges and deserves support from this House.

Therefore, I urge Members to join me and support H.R. 5026.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 5026, the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act, and urge my colleagues to support it. I thank my colleague Chairman Markey for bringing this important legislation to the floor.

The GRID Act empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in the event of a Presidential emergency declaration, to take actions needed to protect our grid.

I have said this before but it bears repeating: A modern society is characterized by the presence of three things: clean available water, properly functioning sewage and sanitation services, and electricity.

I would further assert that the way our present systems function, electricity is needed to power those other critical systems. So at a minimum, we rely on electricity to function as a modern society.

It is our very reliance on this infrastructure that makes it an obvious target for attack. We know that many of our adversaries--from terrorist groups to nation states--have and continue to develop capabilities that would allow them to attack and destroy our grid at a time of their choosing.

There are two significant threats to the electric grid. One is the threat of cyber attack. Many nation states, like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, have offensive cyber attack capabilities, while terrorist groups like Hezbollah and al Qaeda continue to work to develop capabilities to attack and destroy critical infrastructure like the electric grid through cyber means.

If you believe intelligence sources, our grid is already compromised. An April 2009 article in the Wall Street Journal cited intelligence sources who claim that the grid has already been penetrated by cyber intruders from Russia and China who are positioned to activate malicious code that could destroy portions of the grid at their command.

The other significant threat to the grid is the threat of a physical event that could come in the form of a natural or manmade Electromagnetic Pulse, known as EMP. The potentially devastating effects of an EMP to the grid are well documented.

During the Cold War, the U.S. government simulated the effects of EMP on our infrastructure, because of the threat of nuclear weapons, which emit an EMP after detonation. Though we may no longer fear a nuclear attack from Soviet Russia, rogue adversaries (including North Korea and Iran) possess and test high altitude missiles that could potentially cause a catastrophic pulse across the grid.

These are but two of the significant emerging threats we face in the 21st century. Our adversaries openly discuss using these capabilities against the United States. According to its ``Cyber Warfare Doctrine,'' China's military strategy is designed to achieve global ``electronic dominance'' by 2050, to include the capability to disrupt financial markets, military and civilian comunications capabilities, and the electric grid prior to the initiation of traditional military operations.

Cyber and physical attacks against the grid could both be catastrophic and incredibly destructive events, but they are not inevitable. Protections can--and must--be put in place ahead of time to mitigate the impact of these attacks.

The time for action is now, support the GRID Act and help ensure America's future.