Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we set aside consideration of the Burr amendment and that I be able to call up amendment No. 1657. Mr. President, I understand the difficulties Senator…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we set aside consideration of the Burr amendment and that I be able to call up amendment No. 1657.
Mr. President, I understand the difficulties Senator Levin has, but we are moving to final passage. Cloture has been filed. It is important that this amendment be considered. I get a little nervous when things are not moving along in a way that I think they should or at least in a way that could cause this amendment not to be considered. I wish to speak briefly about it so it will be clear what it is we are talking about.
The amendment I sought to bring up would preempt any Federal Executive, that is Presidential, requirement that our troops in the field, in Afghanistan and Iraq, read Miranda warnings to al-Qaida terrorists whom they capture.
The amendment would also clarify that nothing in Federal law requires that our soldiers read Miranda warnings or give any other kind of warning to captured terrorists, and it preempts any efforts to enforce such a requirement through an exclusionary rule. That is, denying admissibility of evidence if it does not occur.
Miranda is the warning, as most watchers of television detective programs know, in which an individual who is detained by a police officer in the United States on suspicion of some crime is told they have a right to remain silent and they have a right to have a lawyer, or have one appointed for them.
The question is, How did we get to the point that we are now having soldiers in the field being asked to give Miranda warnings?
One person, I think, who would agree with me--although recent activities cause me concern--is our Commander in Chief, President Obama. In a recent interview on the TV show ``60 Minutes,'' he was asked about the terrorist detainees, and this is what President Obama said:
Do these folks deserve Miranda rights? Do they deserve to
be treated like a shoplifter down the block? Of course not.
``Of course not.'' I couldn't have said that with more clarity myself. Of course, we should not be giving Miranda warnings to captured terrorists on the battlefield. Unfortunately, not all of the subordinates in the current administration seem to understand this message.
A recent article in the magazine the Weekly Standard describes why the amendment is necessary. As this article explains, the current administration appears to be requiring our soldiers to read Miranda warnings to terrorists whom they capture in the field in Afghanistan. And the article further notes, according to former CIA Director George Tenet, who was appointed originally by President Clinton and served under President Bush, that we would not have obtained the valuable information we did from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the planner of the 9/11 attacks, if he had been given his Miranda rights--or been given Miranda rights, not his, because we have never given Miranda rights to captured soldiers in any kind of conflict in the history of the Republic.
The following is from the Weekly Standard:
When 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured on
March 1, 2003, he was not cooperative. ``I'll talk to you
guys after I get to New York and see my lawyer,'' he said,
according to CIA Director George Tenet. Of course, Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed did not get a lawyer until months later,
after his interrogation was completed, and Tenet says that
the information the CIA obtained from him disrupted plots and
saved lives. ``I believe none of these successes would have
happened if we had had to treat KSM like a white-collar
criminal--read him his Miranda rights and get him a lawyer,
who surely would have insisted that his client simply shut
up.
That was Mr. Tenet's view as stated in his memoirs just a couple of years ago.
If Mr. Tenet is right, it is a good thing KSM was captured before President Obama became President, for the Justice Department has quietly ordered the FBI to read Miranda rights to high-value detainees captured and held at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan.
According to a senior Republican on the House Intelligence Committee:
The administration has decided to change the focus to law
enforcement. Here's the problem. You have foreign fighters
who are targeting U.S. troops today--foreign fighters who go
to another country to kill Americans. We capture them, and
they're reading them their rights--Mirandizing these foreign
fighters.
That was a quote from Representative Mike Rogers, who recently met with the military and intelligence and law enforcement officials on a factfinding trip to Afghanistan.
Rogers, a former FBI special agent and a U.S. Army officer, says the Obama administration has not briefed Congress on the new policy. He is quoted as saying:
I was a little surprised to find it taking place when I
showed up because we hadn't been briefed on it. I didn't know
about it. We're still trying to get to the bottom of it, but
it is clearly a part of this new global justice initiative.
Representative Pete Hoekstra, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, said this:
When they Mirandize a suspect, the first thing they do is
warn them that they have the right to remain silent. It would
seem the last thing we want is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed or any
other al-Qaida terrorist to remain silent. Our focus should
be on preventing the next attack, not giving radical
jihadists a new tactic to resist interrogation--lawyering up.
According to Mike Rogers, that is precisely what some human rights organizations are now advising detainees to do. He says:
The International Red Cross, when they go into these
detention facilities, has now started telling people--``Take
the option. You want a lawyer.''
And Rogers adds:
The problem is you take that guy at 3 in the morning off of
a compound right outside of Kabul, where he's building bomb
materials to kill U.S. soldiers, and read him his rights by
4, and the Red Cross is saying take the lawyer, you have now
created quite a confusion amongst the FBI, the CIA and the
United States military. And confusion is the last thing you
want in a combat zone.
This is from Congressman Rogers, a former FBI agent and a former Army officer.
So one thing is clear: A detainee who is not talking cannot provide information about future attacks. Had Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had a lawyer, Tenet wrote in his book, `` . . . I am confident that we would have obtained none of the information he had in his head about the eminent threat against the American people.''
Mr. President, one thing we have to get straight in our minds is that we are in a state of war against al-Qaida types and others around the world, and that calls for an entirely different approach to dealing with the people you capture. In fact, before you capture them, you have the authority to shoot them and kill them. We have the ability to drop bombs on them, which results in death. You don't do that in law enforcement situations against drug dealers or against white-collar criminals. These are not criminals, they are unlawful enemy combatants. They are not lawful because they do not operate according to the rules of war.
The Geneva Conventions require that a lawful combatant, an enemy soldier, or any kind of soldier from any country wear their uniform so that you can identify them by their uniform and do not target civilian personnel gratuitously. Among other requirements, these are some of the rules of war. But they have never been given the rights of a common criminal.
So I feel strongly about this issue. And I would note parenthetically that the Supreme Court has not held that Miranda is even a constitutional requirement. They passed it as a prophylactic policy to help police officers do a better job, the Court thought, in doing their work. It is not a requirement. So
it is a big mistake. I believe it is a road we should not go down, requiring these warnings, and if we do, it is an absolutely clear signal that we are confused about the nature of the deadly enterprise in which we are engaged, which is defending this country and our allies from attack by a violent, determined enemy.
I thought after 9/11 there was a consensus in this body that terrorists and enemy combatants were different from criminals. I thought the 9/11 Commission went into that, and I thought there was a bipartisan consensus on that. So I am concerned about it. It suggests to me that we are confused about the nature of this life-and-death struggle we are in. We are confused about the risk our soldiers are being subjected to every day on the battlefield. And they ought not to be placed in a situation where an additional burden is put on them that is not justified by law or common sense.
So I hope we get a vote on this, and I hope we are able to send the message that this is not the right policy and we need to make sure we stop it and nip it in the bud.
I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I wish to join my colleague, Senator Lieberman, in introducing amendment No. 1744, concerning the deployment of missile defenses in Europe, and also thank him for his leadership on this issue over many years. He is clearly one of the most effective spokesmen for clear and strategic thinking and has helped us for many years to establish good defense policy for our Nation.
As Senator Lieberman has explained, this amendment would state it is the sense of the Congress that the administration should continue to develop the planned missile defense deployment through Poland and the Czech Republic, even as it considers other alternatives.
Further, it would state that any alternative to the current plan must be as effective and affordable, and, most important, must be able to defend the United States as well as Europe against long-range ballistic missiles.
This amendment is important at this time because the administration is now considering alternatives to the plan long pursued by the Bush administration to station ground-based interceptors in Poland, a missile-tracking radar system in the Czech Republic. Both Poland and the Czech Republic have signed agreements to host these missile defense assets after being told by the United States that we believed the plan is important to protect Europe and the United States from rogue states, more specifically, Iran's developing missile capability.
After much effort and political capital has been expended, both in the United States and by our Polish and Czech Republic allies and friends, now the project has been put in somewhat of a limbo, I am afraid.
Russia and the domestic left opposed this plan from the beginning. They lobbied the people and members of Congress in Poland and the Czech Republic to not do it. But they have gone forward with it today. If the objections of the United States to this system arise from Czech reasons, then I would refer my colleagues to a February 2009 CBO study Senator Lieberman cited, ``Options for Deploying Missile Defense in Europe,'' which came to the conclusion that a ground-based interceptor deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic is the most effective and affordable option available for the foreseeable future.
The CBO concluded: ``This is the most effective and affordable option for the foreseeable future.''
Other options apparently now under consideration include the deployment of a land- or sea-based version of the Standard Missile 3, SM-3 which is now deployed on Aegis ships of the United States.
The CBO found that this option, the SM-3, will not available until late in the next decade, is no less expensive than the GBI option and does not provide protection for the United States against long-range Iranian missiles. In other words, while the deployment of a land- or sea-based version of SM-3 may be suitable to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range missile threats, it would not contribute to the defense of the United States which could occur from the launch of an ICBM, an intercontinental ballistic missile, which would travel at a much higher altitude.
Likewise, Admiral Stavridis, the new commander of the U.S. European Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee during a hearing last month:
Sea-based and transportable land-based assets are integral
components of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense
system but cannot defeat the entire range of threats by
themselves. Sophisticated sensors are required for early
acquisition and target determination, and ground-based
interceptors are needed to defeat longer-range missiles.
The missile Iran seeks to develop, and is moving forward to develop, would be capable of hitting the United States. Now they are seeking to develop ICBMs, and they are actively pursuing nuclear weapons, as we all know.
Why, I would ask my colleagues, would we want to consider alternatives to the proposed GBI deployment in Europe that would not save any money and would not provide additional protection for the United States?
I would recall the comments former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a few years ago about missile defense and whether we should deploy. His comment was: I have never heard of a nation whose policy it is to keep itself vulnerable to attack.
Well, we do not need to be kept vulnerable to attack. We have the capability to defend ourselves and protect against incoming missiles. Some have suggested that such additional protection is not needed, that current ground-based interceptors deployed at our missile defense site in Fort Greely, AK, can provide complete protection for the United States against Iranian threats.
But that argument does not tell the complete story. The truth is, deploying GBIs in Europe would provide an early opportunity to intercept Iranian missiles headed to the east coast, which could then be followed by an intercept attempt by Alaska, providing the United States an extra layer of protection. Just 10 missiles could provide a great additional protection for the United States. That is what is needed, an integrated, layered, ballistic missile defense shield that effectively protects America and her allies from rogue attack.
Most Americans think we are adequately protected. I do remember a townhall meeting I held, and I asked the people there: What would happen if a missile was launched at the United States? They said: We would shoot it down. Well, that was before our system was up and running in Alaska, and it was not accurate. People think we do have a fully operational system, but we only have a few of those missiles up in Alaska, and we need this additional shield in Europe.
Without the site in Poland, the United States would have only one opportunity to engage Iranian missiles headed for certain portions of our country. Why should we take that risk?
Although the search for alternatives may please the Russians, it would perversely send the wrong message to our NATO allies and, in particular, to our friends in Poland and the Czech Republic who, despite pressure and threats from Russia, have agreed and stood firm and expressed their willingness to host these missile defense assets on their territory.
I would remind my colleague that NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful defense treaty in the history of the world, endorsed the current plan at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit and noted in their declaration:
We therefore recognize the substantial contribution to the
protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be
provided by the planned deployment of European-based United
States missile defense assets.
I also understand the Polish and Czech Parliaments have yet to ratify the agreements, and the ambivalence presented by the Obama Administration now regarding what was a firm policy of the United States, means, frankly, it is unlikely they will do so until our administration completes its consideration of alternatives. This has placed our situation in limbo. I am not happy with that. I think it was a mistake.
After all, why should those parliaments take up an agreement that the United States may pull off the table? This unfortunate event was obvious from the beginning when we backed away from our plan and started showing uncertainty. It is obvious the political support in Central Europe may erode.
I am left to conclude that the reason the administration is pursuing alternatives in this current plan is its hopes it will address Russian objections about the proposed deployment as part of a grand strategy to reset relations with Russia and conclude a follow-on to the START nuclear reduction agreement. I am not confident in this effort. In fact, it seems to, instead of moving our relations forward, have moved them backward.
Let me make note of some recent events. Just days after the United States and Russia reached a broader agreement on arms reductions and missile defense cooperation at the July 6 Moscow summit, Reuters News Agency reported, on July 10, 4 days later, that Russian President Medvedev threatened the United States that if it did not reach agreement with Russia on our joint NATO/Polish/Czech plans for
missile defense systems, Moscow would deploy rockets in an enclave near Poland.
Typical Russian bluster, threat. Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has threatened to end arms control talks with the United States if we pursue cooperation with our allies on missile defense, a system that in no way threatens Russia's massive nuclear capability, and they know it.
Ten interceptors of the United States in Europe are going to somehow have a capability to stop the thousands of Russian missiles and nuclear weapons that they have? Russia knows that our defenses would be no match.
As reported by the Associated Press, just 1 day after the summit, Lavrov stated:
If our partners make a decision to create an American
missile defense system with global reach, then that will
doubtless place a big question mark over the prospects for
further reduction in strategic offensive weapons.
Again, this is, unfortunately, a regressive approach by Russia on issues that I do not think is justified. It seems we are falling back into a darker approach to world affairs with threats instead of working together to build a more peaceful and prosperous, harmonious world.
If, in fact, there were technical arguments in favor of alternative deployments, which there are not, Russian belligerence would now indeed be an argument for proceeding, nevertheless.
The former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Mirek Topolanek, put the issue in its proper perspective when he stated:
The moral challenge is clear and simple: If we are not
willing to accept in the interests of the defense of the
Euro-Atlantic area such a trifle as the elements of a missile
defense system, then how shall we be able to face more
difficult challenges that may come?
That is an important statement. Are we losing confidence in ourselves? He is not alone in that view. Just last week, 22 prominent Eastern European political figures of important historic importance, including Poland's Lech Walesa and the Czech Republic's Vaclav Havel, published an open letter to President Obama expressing their uneasiness over U.S. maneuvers with Russia. This letter was sent to address their concerns in light of what appears to them to be Russia's attempt to reassert its influence over Russia's former Eastern European satellites. These are independent nations. They have been freed from Soviet domination. It is not their desire to kowtow to Russia and to have to seek Russia's permission over whether to put a radar site in their country. They are sovereign nations.
These leaders noted in their letter that America's planned missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic have become ``a symbol of America's credibility and commitment in the region.'' They further warned that:
The Alliance should not allow the issue to be determined by
unfounded Russian opposition. Abandoning the program entirely
or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting
Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of
the United States across the whole region.
I don't think that is no small matter. These are historic figures in Eastern Europe who suffered under the Communist boot. They do not want to go back. They are sending us a message. They are great American allies. They believe in freedom and democracy. This is not an academic matter to them, it is very real.
I ask unanimous consent to have this letter printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
On March 5, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ``applaud[ed] the decision by the people of the Czech Republic and their government--as well as the people and Government of Poland--for proceeding with missile defense on their soil.'' That was just in March of this year. The United States should honor this commitment by proceeding with the missile defense deployment as planned and not be affected by Russia's unfounded objections. I remain baffled by their objections, other than, perhaps, this is a way they think they can extract concessions from the United States as a bargaining chip.
As the CBO study referenced above makes clear:
Only the Polish and Czech deployments can protect the
United States and Europe. Any other option costs more and
defends the U.S. less, if at all.
I ask my colleagues to support this message. It will be good for our country to be clear on this question and for Congress to speak up.
I express a concern about what has happened in this budget to national missile defense. It represents a major reduction in spending for missile defense. We intend to deploy 44 missiles in Alaska. The budget proposes, I believe, now just 30. It was proposed and part of the agenda for the last number of years to place a multikill vehicle on top of these interceptors so it could take out dummies and decoys and multiple missiles. That was zeroed out, ended in this budget. For a number of years, we have been funding research and development of the kinetic energy interceptor. That is a high-speed system that can take out missiles in the launch phase, which is the best phase to do so. That was zeroed out. There was the airborne laser which has the capability of shooting down missiles in their launch phase when they have so much heat coming out of them. It is funded for 1 more year, and it will be ended, apparently. Of course, now the 10 interceptors in Europe are in question.
We need to be sure we understand how seriously we are impacting the long-term strategy of the United States. We have spent $20 billion to develop a system that will actually work at incredible rates of speed, with hit-to-kill technology to knock down an incoming missile. After all of these investments and all these years, for $1 billion we could complete the program. We are saving about $150, $200 million this year that would have kept us on track. Maybe we can keep the system going forward. I hope so with this resolution and some other things.
But the American people need to know that we are not talking about a minor retrenchment of national missile defense in the budget that has come forward out of our committee. It represents the biggest reduction of missile defense funding during my time in the Senate, over 12 years.
I hope that as the months go along we will be able to reevaluate what we are doing and make sure we don't abandon the progress we have made and take full advantage of decades of research and development that has produced a system that will work to protect us.
I yield the floor.
[July 15, 2009]
Exhibit 1
An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern
Europe
(By Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav
Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi,
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Alexandr
Vondra, Lech Walesa)
We have written this letter because, as Central and Eastern
European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers, we care
deeply about the future of the transatlantic relationship as
well as the future quality of relations between the United
States and the countries of our region. We write in our
personal capacity as individuals who are friends and allies
of the United States as well as committed Europeans.
Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many
of us know firsthand how important your support for our
freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years.
U.S. engagement and support was essential for the success of
our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty
years ago. Without Washington's vision and leadership, it is
doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.
We have worked to reciprocate and make this relationship a
two-way street. We are Atlanticist voices within NATO and the
EU. Our nations have been engaged alongside the United States
in the Balkans, Iraq, and today in Afghanistan. While our
contribution may at times seem modest compared to your own,
it is significant when measured as a percentage of our
population and GDP. Having benefited from your support for
liberal democracy and liberal values in the past, we have
been among your strongest supporters when it comes to
promoting democracy and human rights around the world.
Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see
that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at
the heart of American foreign policy. As the new Obama
Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities, our region
is one part of the
world that Americans have largely stopped worrying about.
Indeed, at times we have the impression that U.S. policy was
so successful that many American officials have now concluded
that our region is fixed once and for all and that they could
``check the box'' and move on to other more pressing
strategic issues. Relations have been so close that many on
both sides assume that the region's transatlantic
orientation, as well as its stability and prosperity, would
last forever.
That view is premature. All is not well either in our
region or in the transatlantic relationship. Central and
Eastern Europe are at a political crossroads and today there
is a growing sense of nervousness in the region. The global
economic crisis is impacting on our region and, as elsewhere,
runs the risk that our societies will look inward and be less
engaged with the outside world. At the same time, storm
clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon.
Like you, we await the results of the EU Commission's
investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But
the political impact of that war on the region has already
been felt. Many countries were deeply disturbed to see the
Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core
principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris,
and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member
of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euroatlantic
Partnership Council--all in the name of defending a sphere of
influence on its borders.
Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new
members, NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many
of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant--
and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question
whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense
in some future crises. Europe's dependence on Russian energy
also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance.
President Obama's remark at the recent NATO summit on the
need to provide credible defense plans for all Alliance
members was welcome, but not sufficient to allay fears about
the Alliance's defense readiness. Our ability to continue to
sustain public support at home for our contributions to
Alliance missions abroad also depends on us being able to
show that our own security concerns are being addressed in
NATO and close cooperation with the United States.
We must also recognize that America's popularity and
influence have fallen in many of our countries as well.
Public opinions polls, including the German Marshall Fund's
own Transatlantic Trends survey, show that our region has not
been immune to the wave of criticism and anti-Americanism
that has swept Europe in recent years and which led to a
collapse in sympathy and support for the United States during
the Bush years. Some leaders in the region have paid a
political price for their support of the unpopular war in
Iraq. In the future they may be more careful in taking
political risks to support the United States. We believe that
the onset of a new Administration has created a new opening
to reverse this trend but it will take time and work on both
sides to make up for what we have lost.
In many ways the EU has become the major factor and
institution in our lives. To many people it seems more
relevant and important today than the link to the United
States. To some degree it is a logical outcome of the
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. Our
leaders and officials spend much more time in EU meetings
than in consultations with Washington, where they often
struggle to attract attention or make our voices heard. The
region's deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome
and should not necessarily lead to a weakening of the
transatlantic relationship. The hope was that integration of
Central and Eastern Europe into the EU would actually
strengthen the strategic cooperation between Europe and
America.
However, there is a danger that instead of being a pro-
Atlantic voice in the EU, support for a more global
partnership with Washington in the region might wane over
time. The region does not have the tradition of assuming a
more global role. Some items on the transatlantic agenda,
such as climate change, do not resonate in the Central and
Eastern European publics to the same extent as they do in
Western Europe.
Leadership change is also coming in Central and Eastern
Europe. Next to those, there are fewer and fewer leaders who
emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced
Washington's key role in securing our democratic transition
and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation
of leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and
follow a more ``realistic'' policy. At the same time, the
former Communist elites, whose insistence on political and
economic power significantly contributed to the crises in
many CEE countries, gradually disappear from the political
scene. The current political and economic turmoil and the
fallout from the global economic crisis provide additional
opportunities for the forces of nationalism, extremism,
populism, and anti-Semitism across the continent but also in
some of our countries.
This means that the United States is likely to lose many of
its traditional interlocutors in the region. The new elites
replacing them may not share the idealism--or have the same
relationship to the United States--as the generation who led
the democratic transition. They may be more calculating in
their support of the United States as well as more parochial
in their world view. And in Washington a similar transition
is taking place as many of the leaders and personalities we
have worked with and relied on are also leaving politics.
And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia. Our
hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that
Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty
and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been
fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power
pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and
methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most
issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-
a-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one.
It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences.
It asserts a privileged position in determining our security
choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare,
ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated
investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to
advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic
orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.
We welcome the ``reset'' of the American-Russian relations.
As the countries living closest to Russia, obviously nobody
has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in
Russia and better relations between Moscow and the West than
we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want
to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western
interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia.
Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and
the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for
a ``Concert of Powers'' to replace the continent's existing,
value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's
creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region
could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the
region. There are differing views within the region when it
comes to Moscow's new policies. But there is a shared view
that the full engagement of the United States is needed.
Many in the region are looking with hope to the Obama
Administration to restore the Atlantic relationship as a
moral compass for their domestic as well as foreign policies.
A strong commitment to common liberal democratic values is
essential to our countries. We know from our own historical
experience the difference between when the United States
stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did
not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to
``realism'' at Yalta. And it benefited when the United
States used its power to fight for principle. That was
critical during the Cold War and in opening the doors of
NATO. Had a ``realist'' view prevailed in the early 1990s,
we would not be in NATO today and the idea of a Europe
whole, free, and at peace would be a distant dream.
We understand the heavy demands on your Administration and
on U.S. foreign policy. It is not our intent to add to the
list of problems you face. Rather, we want to help by being
strong Atlanticist allies in a U.S.-European partnership that
is a powerful force for good around the world. But we are not
certain where our region will be in five or ten years time
given the domestic and foreign policy uncertainties we face.
We need to take the right steps now to ensure the strong
relationship between the United States and Central and
Eastern Europe over the past twenty years will endure.
We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe
need to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship. We also
believe this is a time when the United States and Central and
Eastern Europe must reconnect around a new and forward-
looking agenda. While recognizing what has been achieved in
the twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is
time to set a new agenda for close cooperation for the next
twenty years across the Atlantic.
Therefore, we propose the following steps:
First, we are convinced that America needs Europe and that
Europe needs the United States as much today as in the past.
The United States should reaffirm its vocation as a European
power and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on
the continent even while it faces the pressing challenges in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and Asia.
For our part we must work at home in our own countries and in
Europe more generally to convince our leaders and societies
to adopt a more global perspective and be prepared to
shoulder more responsibility in partnership with the United
States.
Second, we need a renaissance of NATO as the most important
security link between the United States and Europe. It is the
only credible hard power security guarantee we have. NATO
must reconfirm its core function of collective defense even
while we adapt to the new threats of the 21st century. A key
factor in our ability to participate in NATO's expeditionary
missions overseas is the belief that we are secure at home.
We must therefore correct some self-inflicted wounds from the
past. It was a mistake not to commence with proper Article 5
defense planning for new members after NATO was enlarged.
NATO needs to make the Alliance's commitments credible and
provide strategic reassurance to all members. This should
include contingency planning, prepositioning of forces,
equipment, and supplies for reinforcement in our region in
case of crisis as originally envisioned in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act.
We should also re-think the working of the NATO-Russia
Council and return to the practice where NATO member
countries enter
into dialogue with Moscow with a coordinated position. When
it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more
determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only
strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead
Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well.
Furthermore, the more secure we feel inside NATO, the easier
it will also be for our countries to reach out to engage
Moscow on issues of common interest. That is the dual track
approach we need and which should be reflected in the new
NATO strategic concept.
Third, the thorniest issue may well be America's planned
missile-defense installations. Here too, there are different
views in the region, including among our publics which are
divided. Regardless of the military merits of this scheme and
what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has
nevertheless also become--at least in some countries--a
symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region.
How it is handled could have a significant impact on their
future transatlantic orientation. The small number of
missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia's strategic
capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide
the future of the program as allies and based on the
strategic plusses and minuses of the different technical and
political configurations. The Alliance should not allow the
issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition.
Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too
deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic
can undermine the credibility of the United States across the
whole region.
Fourth, we know that NATO alone is not enough. We also want
and need more Europe and a better and more strategic U.S.-EU
relationship as well. Increasingly our foreign policies are
carried out through the European Union--and we support that.
We also want a common European foreign and defense policy
that is open to close cooperation with the United States. We
are the advocates of such a line in the EU. But we need the
United States to rethink its attitude toward the EU and
engage it much more seriously as a strategic partner. We need
to bring NATO and the EU closer together and make them work
in tandem. We need common NATO and EU strategies not only
toward Russia but on a range of other new strategic
challenges.
Fifth is energy security. The threat to energy supplies can
exert an immediate influence on our nations' political
sovereignty also as allies contributing to common decisions
in NATO. That is why it must also become a transatlantic
priority. Although most of the responsibility for energy
security lies within the realm of the EU, the United States
also has a role to play. Absent American support, the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would never have been built. Energy
security must become an integral part of U.S.-European
strategic cooperation. Central and Eastern European countries
should lobby harder (and with more unity) inside Europe for
diversification of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit
routes, as well as for tough legal scrutiny of Russia's abuse
of its monopoly and cartel-like power inside the EU. But
American political support on this will play a crucial role.
Similarly, the United States can play an important role in
solidifying further its support for the Nabucco pipeline,
particularly in using its security relationship with the main
transit country, Turkey, as well as the North-South
interconnector of Central Europe and LNG terminals in our
region.
Sixth, we must not neglect the human factor. Our next
generations need to get to know each other, too. We have to
cherish and protect the multitude of educational,
professional, and other networks and friendships that
underpin our friendship and alliance. The U.S. visa regime
remains an obstacle in this regard. It is absurd that Poland
and Romania--arguably the two biggest and most pro-American
states in the CEE region, which are making substantial
contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan--have not yet been
brought into the visa waiver program. It is incomprehensible
that a critic like the French anti-globalization activist
Jose Bove does not require a visa for the United States but
former Solidarity activist and Nobel Peace prizewinner Lech
Walesa does. This issue will be resolved only if it is made a
political priority by the President of the United States.
The steps we made together since 1989 are not minor in
history. The common successes are the proper foundation for
the transatlantic renaissance we need today. This is why we
believe that we should also consider the creation of a Legacy
Fellowship for young leaders. Twenty years have passed since
the revolutions of 1989. That is a whole generation. We need
a new generation to renew the transatlantic partnership. A
new program should be launched to identify those young
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who can carry forward
the transatlantic project we have spent the last two decades
building in Central and Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the onset of a new Administration in the
United States has raised great hopes in our countries for a
transatlantic renewal. It is an opportunity we dare not miss.
We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how important
the relationship with the United States has been. In the
1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting
Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the
United States was critical to locking in peace and stability
from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the goal must be to
keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist,
and Atlanticist part of our broader community.
That is the key to our success in bringing about the
renaissance in the Alliance the Obama Administration has
committed itself to work for and which we support. That will
require both sides recommitting to and investing in this
relationship. But if we do it right, the pay off down the
road can be very real. By taking the right steps now, we can
put it on new and solid footing for the future.
Will the Senator yield for a question?
I know my colleague has given more time and effort to studying the sickness that is affecting our Congress with regard to how we spend money than anyone in this body, and he has taken a lot of heat for standing up and raising these issues. I salute him for it.
But the amendment that is before us, it seems to me, is absolutely typical of how out of step Congress is. This may be a swell amendment for whoever benefits from it, but the people who are paying for it are not aware that the money they have earned from the sweat of their brow is now going to somebody who got a better health care plan, a better retirement plan and higher pay than they get, and more job security than they get.
In my home county, the unemployment rate is over 20 percent. Then we have people with so much better jobs wanting more money. This is what, a $2 billion amendment? I would ask you, is this not sort of a pretty egregious example of the tendency we have to try to reward one group and ignore the cost that everybody else is going to have to pay?