Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, every year thousands of violent crimes are committed out of hate, but just as many violent crimes, if not more, are motivated by…
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, every year thousands of violent crimes are committed out of hate, but just as many violent crimes, if not more, are motivated by something other than hate--greed, jealousy, desperation or revenge, just to name a few. An individual's motivation for committing a violent crime is usually complex and often speculative.
Every violent crime is deplorable, regardless of its motivation. Every violent crime can be devastating, not only to the victim and their family, but also to the larger community whose sense of safety has been violated. That's why all violent crimes should be vigorously prosecuted.
Unfortunately, this bill undermines one of the most basic principles of our criminal justice system--equal justice for all. Under this bill, justice will no longer be equal. Justice will now depend on the race, gender, sexual orientation, disability or other protected status of the victim. It will allow different penalties to be imposed for the same crime. This is the real injustice.
One of the most troublesome aspects of this bill is that it divides America. It divides America by race, again, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other status. We should focus on the opposite, uniting America, not dividing our country.
The bill also could have a chilling effect on the words of religious leaders or members of religious groups. For example, religious individuals who feel strongly about some values may hesitate to discuss their personal beliefs about homosexuality or gay marriage for fear of criminal investigation.
Some of my colleagues on the other side claim that the bill protects religious speech. But religious leaders could still be subjected to criminal investigations and be reluctant to preach the teachings of their faith as a result of this bill.
In addition, the bill itself is probably unconstitutional and will be struck down by the courts. There is little evidence to support the claim that hate crimes impact interstate or foreign commerce, an important consideration for any Federal court reviewing the constitutionality of this legislation.
In 2000, the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison struck down a prohibition on gender-motivated violence. In that case the court specifically warned Congress that the commerce clause does not extend to ``noneconomic, violent criminal conduct'' that does not cross State lines.
Nor is the proposed legislation authorized under the 14th and 15th Amendments. Those amendments extend only to State action and do not cover the actions of private persons who commit violent crimes.
While the 13th Amendment reaches private action such as individual criminal conduct, it is difficult to argue that one's religion or national origin constitutes a ``badge'' or ``incident'' of slavery, the subject of the 13th Amendment.
Also this bill purports to federalize crimes that are being successfully prosecuted by our States and local governments. Furthermore, FBI statistics show that the incidence of so-called hate crimes has actually declined and substantially declined over the last 10 years. In 2007, for example, of the approximately 17,000 homicides that occurred in the U.S., only nine of the 17,000 murders were determined to be motivated by bias.
This legislation blurs the lines between violent belief, which is constitutionally protected, and violent action, which is not. If we go down this road, where does it end? With speech monitors and thought police?
I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), a former chairman of the Judiciary Committee and now the ranking member of the Constitution Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), who is the vice ranking member of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), a member of the Judiciary Committee and a former ranking member of the Crime Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. McClintock).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe), a former judge and now the deputy ranking member of the Crime Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz), who is a member of the Judiciary Committee and the deputy ranking member of the Court Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), former judge, and now the ranking member of the Crime Subcommittee.
I yield the gentleman an additional minute.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Akin).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), who is a member of the Judiciary Committee and who is also deputy ranking member of the Administrative Law Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts), who is also the chairman of the Values Action Team.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Judiciary Committee and the ranking member of the Immigration Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to reserve my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, criminals who kill certain people will be punished more harshly than people who kill a police officer, a member of the military, a child, or a senior citizen.
Is a murder motivated by hatred for something other than the victim's membership in a particular group any less devastating or tragic? All crime victims should have equal worth in the eyes of the law. Ordinarily, criminal law does not concern itself with motive, why a person acted, but rather with intent, whether the perpetrator intended or knew that they would cause harm. If someone intends to harm a person, no motive makes them more or less culpable for their conduct.
This legislation will force law enforcement officials and prosecutors to gather evidence about the offender's thoughts and words regardless of the criminality of their actions.
When the government starts to punish thoughts, this is a dangerous road to travel. And where does it end? With thought police?
Mr. Speaker, we cannot legislate away hate, nor should we criminalize a person's thoughts, no matter how much we might disagree with them. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence), who is also chairman of the Republican Conference.
(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit the following letter from four members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights who are opposed to H.R. 1913:
United States Commission
on Civil Rights,
Washington, DC, April 29, 2009.
Re: H.R. 1913
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Steny H. Hoyer,
Majority Leader, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. James E. Clyburn,
Majority Whip, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. John Boehner,
Minority Leader, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Eric Cantor,
Minority Whip, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Speaker and Messrs. Boehner, Cantor, Clyburn and
Hoyer: We write today to urge you to vote against the
proposed Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act
(H.R. 1913) (``LLEHCPA''). Although time does not permit this
issue to be presented for formal Commission action, we
believe it is important for us to write as individual members
to communicate our serious concerns with this legislation.
We believe that LLEHCPA will do little good and a great
deal of harm. Its most important effect will be to allow
federal authorities to re-prosecute a broad category of
defendants who have already been acquitted by state juries--
as in the Rodney King and Crown Heights cases more than a
decade ago. Due to the exception for prosecutions by ``dual
sovereigns,'' such double prosecutions are technically not
violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. But they are very much a violation of the
spirit that drove the framers of the Bill of Rights, who
never dreamed that federal criminal jurisdiction would be
expanded to the point where an astonishing proportion of
crimes are now both state and federal offenses. We regard
the broad federalization of crime as a menace to civil
liberties. There is no better place to draw the line on
that process than with a bill that purports to protect
civil rights.
While the title of LLEHCPA suggests that it will apply only
to ``hate crimes,'' the actual criminal prohibitions
contained in it do not require that the defendant be inspired
by hatred or ill will in order to convict. It is sufficient
if he acts ``because of someone's actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity or disability. Consider:
Rapists are seldom indifferent to the gender of their
victims. They are virtually always chosen ``because of their
gender.
A robber might well steal only from women or the disabled
because, in general, they are less able to defend themselves.
Literally, they are chosen ``because of their gender or
disability.
While Senator Edward Kennedy has written that it was not
his intention to cover all rape with LLEHCPA, some DOJ
officials have declined to disclaim such coverage. Moreover,
both the objective meaning of the language and considerable
legal scholarship would certainly include such coverage. If
all rape and many other crimes that do not rise to the level
of a ``hate crime'' in the minds of ordinary Americans are
covered by LLEHCPA, then prosecutors will have ``two bites at
the apple'' for a very large number of crimes.
DOJ officials have argued that LLEHCPA is needed because
state procedures sometimes make it difficult to obtain
convictions. They have cited a Texas case from over a decade
ago involving an attack on a black man by three white
hoodlums. Texas law required the three defendants to be tried
separately. By prosecuting them under federal law, however,
they could have been tried together. As a result, admissions
made by one could be introduced into evidence at the trial of
all three without falling foul of the hearsay rule.
Such an argument should send up red flags. It is just an
end-run around state procedures designed to ensure a fair
trial. The citizens of Texas evidently thought that separate
trials were necessary to ensure that innocent men and women
are not punished. No one was claiming that Texas applies this
rule only when the victim is black or female or gay. And
surely no one is arguing that Texans are soft on crime. Why
interfere with their judgment?
We are unimpressed with the arguments in favor of LLEHCPA
and would be happy to discuss the matter further with you if
you so desire. Please do not hesitate to contact any of us
with your questions or comments. The Chairman's Counsel and
Special Assistant, Dominique Ludvigson, is also available to
further direct your inquiries at dludvigson@usccr.gov or at
(202) 376-7626.
Sincerely,
Gerald A. Reynolds,
Chairman.
Gail L. Heriot,
Commissioner.
Todd Gaziano,
Commissioner.
Peter N. Kirsanow,
Commissioner.