Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today that is intended to chart what I believe to be the proper course for the future of the nation's human space flight programs. This bill would provide…
Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today that is intended to chart what I believe to be the proper course for the future of the nation's human space flight programs. This bill would provide an alternative to the Administration's proposed course of ending the government role in Human Space Flight and avoid the complete reliance on other nations or an as-yet-unproven commercial capability to launch American astronauts and scientists into space. It would also reaffirm the goals of moving beyond low-earth orbit and restore the kind of exciting vision that will help inspire young people to excel in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. The bill echoes the decision of the Obama administration to support the International Space Station, ISS, through at least the year 2020, as we endorsed in our NASA Authorization Act, passed in 2008. But the administration's proposal does nothing to ensure that we can fully maintain and utilize the space station, especially during the next 5 years. This bill would correct that, and ensure that full use of the space station is not an empty promise.
Since the release of the fiscal year 2010 Budget last year, the future of human space flight programs has been in question. As part of that Budget Request, the administration announced it would establish an independent review panel, chaired by my good friend Mr. Norman Augustine, to review U.S. Human Space Flight Plans and provide options for how those programs should proceed in the future.
The Augustine Panel completed its review in late August of last year, and provided its Summary Report to NASA, the White House, and the Congress on September 8, 2009. Shortly thereafter, the Subcommittee on Science and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a hearing on the report with Mr. Augustine appearing as our witness. The Augustine Panel released its full report at the end of September, and we have all been awaiting the response of the Obama administration to the report.
When the fiscal year 2010 Budget was submitted in 2009, the budget request for Exploration Systems included a notation that the amount requested was a ``placeholder'' number, and that, once the Human Space Flight Plans Review Committee completed its work, the Administration would submit an amended budget request to support the programmatic decisions made as a result of that report. That never happened. Instead, the response to the Augustine Panel Report was left to the fiscal year 2011 Budget request, which we received on February 1st. Because of the administration's failure to offer a budgetary blueprint until the fiscal year 2011 budget, we will now experience yet another year's delay in undertaking the steps necessary to advance beyond the uncertainty about the future of human space flight programs that prompted the review.
The Augustine Panel provided five basic options for consideration, with an additional two options that were modifications of these five basic options. The Augustine Panel thus provided a total of seven approaches that could be taken to ensure America's continued leadership in space--to establish a space program ``worthy of a great nation,'' as suggested by the title of their final report. None of those options leapt out as the obvious, consensus answer to the mix of vehicle development options and strategies necessary to meet the challenges of the next generation of human space flight. There was, however, a clear consensus on two important points.
First, the Panel found that, without a significant increase in the total amount of funding made available to NASA, none of the options presented could be expected to succeed--including the current plans and programs for developing the Ares 1 and Ares V launch vehicles and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. The Panel's conclusion underscored what we in the authorizing committees have been saying for the past five years, and which formed the basis for the funding levels that we authorized in both our 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts, which would have led to a more timely and successful level of development for the vehicles to replace the space shuttle systems. The Bush administration, however, simply never requested that level of funding. In fact, the prior Administration even reduced the level of funding for those programs that had been projected in the run-out estimates included in the fiscal year 2005 Budget Request, which initiated the ``Vision for Exploration'' announced by President Bush on January 14, 2004.
Second, the Panel recommended that a decision be made to formally extend U.S. plans to operate and utilize the ISS through at least the year 2020. This was also consistent with guidance the authorizing committees provided in the 2008 NASA Authorization Act, where we directed NASA to take no steps to preclude operations of ISS through at least 2020, and directed the Agency to provide a plan which would outline how they would prepare to support and utilize the space station for that extended period of time. Up to that point, NASA's internal planning--and budget guidance from the Office of Management and Budget--was to cease operations aboard the space station in 2015, just five years after its assembly and outfitting would finally be completed by the remaining space shuttle flights.
Some of the good news in the fiscal year 2011 Budget Request is that the Obama administration agrees with the need to continue supporting the space station to at least 2020, and to expand and increase its utilization for research. That is welcome news. The problem is that the request does not provide the means to ensure that the extension and full utilization of the space station can be realized.
It is worth noting that after the budget reductions were made for Exploration in the 2006 Budget Request, the number of flights planned to complete space station assembly were reduced--at the direction of OMB for purely budgetary reasons--from 28 remaining flights to 17 flights, plus an optional added flight to conduct a final mission to service the Hubble Space Telescope. The effect of those reductions was to force NASA to change the planned payloads for those remaining 17 flights to try to accommodate the most important spare parts and replacement parts from the 10 ``cancelled'' flights, for ensuring the safe and effective operation and utilization of the station. Ten flights' worth of flight-ready payloads--averaging between 40,000 to 50,000 pounds per flight--were essentially relegated to storage warehouses where most of them remain today, ready to fly, ready to use, but with no guaranteed ``ticket to ride'' to be of any use to the station. Over 1,400 parts and pieces of equipment, Mr. President! What is most important to remember, is that the decisions about which instruments and equipment to swap into the remaining flights were based on the internal assumption of the need to support the ISS through 2015--not through 2020.
The result of this is that we do not know how many, or which, of those ``grounded payload'' items might actually be needed in order to ensure the station can be supported and maintained until 2020. Not only that, we do not know which, or how many, of them are simply too large or too heavy to be carried to orbit by any existing vehicle other than the space shuttle. And finally, we do not know what additional items might need to be ordered, manufactured and delivered in the future, or what launch vehicle capacity will be needed to deliver them to the station.
This is not the way a great nation should conduct its civil space program. This is not the way to ensure that a decision and pronouncement to continue operations through 2020 will not become an empty gesture due to the deterioration, damage, or failure of equipment and systems vital to providing the oxygen, water, power to make the ISS habitable and to support scientific research in the period following 2015.
This is just one example of the type of considerations that preparations that the Obama administration appears to have ignored while preparing its response to the Augustine panel Report. It is an issue I propose to address, among many, in the legislation being introduced today.
Since last May, when the President announced the appointment of a Committee to review U.S. Human Space Flight Plans, we have all been waiting for clear policy direction based on the report of that Committee, which was released in late September. Throughout that time, at my direction, my committee staff carefully followed the public meetings and briefings of the Augustine panel, and considered the implications of the various options discussed and eventually included in the panel's final report.
In the course of that ongoing review, as well as our Committee hearing last September, I began forming my own conclusions about the correct path for the future of U.S. human space flight programs, as is my responsibility as the Ranking Republican on the policy and oversight committee for NASA. The key factors driving my position regarding that path forward have been: the need to maintain U.S. leadership in space exploration, which I believe is essential to our economic and national security; the need to ensure we do not lose the skills, expertise and industrial capacity that are necessary to conduct space exploration; the need to ensure, as our Committee has in the previous two NASA Authorization bills we have developed and seen enacted into law, that NASA has both a balanced range of activities across its full mission responsibilities, and was authorized the funds needed to carry out that range of activities; and the need to protect--and capitalize on--our massive investment in the ISS, which, along with our international partners, is close to $100 billion. Now that it is almost completed and has a six-person permanent crew, we can begin to conduct the research that we have anticipated all these years during its construction. Research that has the potential to fundamentally change and enhance our understanding of physical processes, vaccine development, and a whole host of other research.
In order to meet those needs, we must first take steps to ensure we do not have an extended period of time during which there is no capability within the United States to launch humans into space, whether to the space station or any other destination. The easiest, most logical and obvious answer in the short term is to continue to use the one launch vehicle that already exists, has a proven history of 98.7 percent probability of success for each mission, and upon which the space station was designed, assuming the shuttle's availability throughout the station's on-orbit lifetime to provide support and maintenance.
Prematurely and voluntarily ending the space shuttle program without a near-term U.S.-built alternative on the horizon simply seems irresponsible, and that is an issue that I believe the Congress must address. While the Space Shuttle will never be completely safe, just as with any vehicle that must carry humans into the harsh environment of space, it is currently flying as safely, if not more safely, than it ever has.
The legislation I am introducing today would ensure that a final decision on the timing of the space shuttle retirement, or even the number of missions it might still be required to fly, would not be made until the issues involved are fully considered and resolved and we are fully convinced that the shuttle's capability is no longer needed. In particular, we must answer the question of how we support, maintain, and fully utilize the ISS, not just in 5 or more years, when any new commercially-developed vehicle might be available, but right now, as we are about to cut the ribbon on it as a finally completed research facility.
I have already mentioned the lack of complete information regarding the ability to adequately ensure the availability and deliverability of spare and replacements parts needed between now and 2020 to keep the space station fully and safely functional. All this is to underscore that the issue of whether to continue flying the shuttle, and the number of additional shuttle flights that are needed, is not simply a matter of shortening the gap between shuttle retirement and the availability of its replacement, or protecting a vitally important workforce. This issue also requires policy makers to understand what the space shuttle can do--and possibly do exclusively in the case of large, heavy replacement systems and structures--to ensure that the promise to extend the ISS to 2020 can actually be fulfilled. We must be certain the ISS can be kept alive and fully functioning over the next 10 years. Again, the administration's Budget Request offers no answers to how we will be able to deliver all the equipment necessary to extend the life of the ISS if the shuttle is not available.
I am also very concerned about the proposal to simply cancel the Constellation programs of Ares 1, the low-earth orbit crew launch vehicle, the Ares V Heavy Lift vehicle for enabling flights beyond low- Earth orbit, and the
Orion Crew Exploration capsule to carry the crews for both of those missions. It is very clear that many of my colleagues are also deeply concerned about this part of the President's budget. I simply believe any decision to terminate those projects needs much more consideration than I believe it has gotten during the preparation of the Obama administration's proposal for NASA.
The approach of the administration--their so-called ``bold new initiative''--is to turn to an entirely new approach based exclusively on the development of commercially-developed crew launch systems. There appears to have been little thought given to how we might leverage the $9 billion already spent on the Constellation vehicles in the identification of potential providers for those commercial systems. I believe that is wasteful and irresponsible and all but guarantees that commercial developments will start from scratch--and therefore take much longer to develop and be much more costly, in the long run, to the American taxpayers.
Another concern with this new approach is that we do not yet have any details about how the $6 billion proposed in the Budget Request for commercial space flight over the next 5 years will be allocated and what it will be expected to support. We don't know whether this will be a collaborative program, creating incentives for matching funding from the private sector, or whether it will represent more of a government subsidy to develop systems for which there may not be a sustainable market for those services beyond what NASA would purchase. I am philosophically and fundamentally opposed to such government subsidies, particularly when it is not clear that taxpayer funding for an approach like this won't have to be followed by even more taxpayer dollars to keep the systems available to meet the needs of the space station, or other government space projects.
The legislation I am proposing will address that issue by directing NASA to consider ``commercial'' options that include the possibility of agreements not only with the ``entrepreneurial'' start-up companies like SpaceX, which represent an exciting but still unproven set of vehicles designed to service a still non-existent commercial market, but also with other, longer-standing and experienced commercial companies. The key aerospace companies with whom NASA currently has development contracts might well be able to jointly develop a new launch system as a modification of their existing contracts under the Constellation program. They could combine their expertise and capability to transition their efforts toward developing a new launch capability based on existing shuttle main engines, external tank manufacturing capability, solid rocket motors, and the Orion crew vehicle. Something like that has been, I am told, a subject of informal conversations among those companies for some time. I believe we need to ensure through legislation that such an alternative will be fully evaluated and considered as one possible approach to the new ``commercial'' space systems development. We have not been given details of this possible approach, because those discussions are apparently still ongoing. But I believe we need to make sure there is a legislative underpinning that would at least allow the full consideration of that approach.
I would not view such an approach as precluding the continued pursuit of the current COTS, Commercial Orbital Transportation Systems, activities being pursued with SpaceX and Orbital Sciences Corporation for cargo delivery services for the Space Station. I have consistently supported that development and believe we should continue to do so. My concern, one I know that of a number of my colleagues share, is to ensure we have redundant and alternative means of providing U.S. human spaceflight capability. If one of those can be more fully commercial in nature, and something that can stand on its own without the taxpayers being responsible for their success, so much the better.
I will be working with my colleagues in the Senate, and reaching out to our counterparts in the House of Representatives, to ensure all of these issues are put on the table for discussion, using the vehicle of this legislation to provide an alternative view to that proposed by the Obama Administration.
This legislation actually tracks closely with the President's request, in terms of the amounts authorized for NASA. It authorizes programs largely at funding levels already enacted for fiscal year 2010, with some very minor exceptions, and at the same base account levels requested by the administration for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
What my legislation adds is the authorization levels necessary to implement the potential continuation of space shuttle flights, at a greatly reduced annual level of flights and associated costs, as well as modest increases in the short-term for the establishment and support of an enterprise to be developed to manage and operate the U.S. National Laboratory.
The greatest difference, as I have indicated, is that this legislation points the way to what I believe is a more measured and reasoned approach that ensures the best use of investments we have already made, provides the Congress and the administration with necessary information to inform our judgments on alternative launch vehicle developments, and provides a means of avoiding severe economic dislocations in the aerospace industry and the highly skilled and dedicated workforce that has provided the capability for this nation to be the world leader in space exploration.
I strongly encourage my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.