Mr. President, I am tempted to ask the minority leader, while he is on the floor, whether he might help us proceed to overcome the objections of Senator Vitter and achieve the promotion that was…
Mr. President, I am tempted to ask the minority leader, while he is on the floor, whether he might help us proceed to overcome the objections of Senator Vitter and achieve the promotion that was offered 6 months ago but since has been blocked for a distinguished soldier. I guess I will withhold on that and wait for another moment.
But let me indicate quickly--and I will be happy to respond to a question then--the Outfall Canals/Pump to the river, which my colleague is so significantly criticizing the Corps of Engineers for--let me read specifically:
The Corps will conduct a supplementary risk reduction
analysis as part of the detailed engineering feasibility
study, including the NEPA compliance documentation, for
options 2 and 2a, if Congress appropriates funds for the
study.
Congress has actually voted on these funds through the Appropriations Committee and said: No, we would not do that.
So my colleague knows that holding up the promotion of a soldier is not going to achieve his ends. The Appropriations Committee has already voted.
I am happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia for a question.
Mr. President, I would say to the Senator from Virginia, there are no reasons with respect to this person's military service. I have not heard any reasons from the Senator from Louisiana. He is not holding up his promotion because he thinks the man is unfit or didn't earn the promotion; he is holding up the promotion because he says he is demanding other things from the Corps of Engineers.
Despite my irritation, let me say I don't dislike my colleague from Louisiana. I intensely dislike what he is doing, and I expect most informed soldiers in this country should dislike what he is doing because I believe it puts a soldier in the position of being a pawn as between the demands of a U.S. Senator and some agency.
I will go through at some point--the Senator, I know, is leaving this afternoon, and that is why I, as a matter of courtesy, told him when I would come to the floor. But at some point later when others aren't waiting, I will go through and describe the issues, responses to the issues, because the rest of the story is much more compelling than the half story given to us by the Senator from Louisiana.
The Ouachita River levees, the authorization for that Ouachita River and tributaries projects specifies that levee work is a nonfederal responsibility. Congress has not enacted a general provisional law that would supplant this nonfederal responsibility and allow the corps to correct levee damages not associated with flood events.
As much as a person--as someone here--doesn't like that answer, that is the answer. Again, my colleague is saying--if you strip away all the bark, my colleague is saying: I demand we spend more money on something that will give us less flood control. Well, look, the Senate Appropriations Committee has been confronted with that, and the Senate Appropriations Committee said: No way, we are not going to do it.
One final point, and then I will come back at some later point and the Senator from Louisiana will respond and I will respond to him and, hopefully, someday he will decide there are other ways for him to achieve the means to an end rather than use the promotion of this dedicated soldier as a pawn in this effort he is making.
This Congress has appropriated $14 billion to help the people of New Orleans and Louisiana. How do I know that? Because I chair the appropriations subcommittee that funds these things. I chair that subcommittee. I have been willing and anxious to help the people of Louisiana and New Orleans. I have been willing to do that because I saw what they were hit with: an unbelievable tragedy. I saw it. But I think it is pretty Byzantine to come to the floor and hear the relentless criticism of the Corps of Engineers that has stood with the people of Louisiana and New Orleans, and even today is helping rebuild with that $14 billion. I think there is a time when you wear out the welcome of certainly this Senator and others who have been so quick and so anxious to help, and you wear out the welcome of agencies such as the Corps of Engineers when you suggest somehow that they are a bunch of slothful bureaucrats who can't do anything right.
I have seen people wear out their welcome, and I tell my colleagues this: This exercise in using this soldier as a pawn in this little game, trying to misread the law and the authorities of the Corps of Engineers to demand that they do what they can't do in order to satisfy one Senator, it is the wrong way to do business in this Senate.
I have not convinced my colleague to release his hold and allow, after 6 months, this soldier's career to move forward. I know this is just one. There are 100 of them on the calendar. This is one, but it is one that is unusual. It is one that is unusual because one soldier's career that has been recommended for promotion by Republicans and Democrats alike is being held up by only one person. I have not heard one other person come to this Chamber and say: I think it is a good idea to use a soldier's promotion as a pawn to try to get what I want. There is not one other person who has done that, and I don't think there is another Senator who would do it. If there is, let's hear from them.
I will come back later. I know my colleague wishes to speak. Had he wanted me to yield, I certainly would have yielded, even though he would not yield to me. There are certain things we shouldn't do around here. Again, I don't dislike him, but I certainly dislike what he is doing because I think it is so fundamentally wrong and undermines the kinds of circumstances in which we have always evaluated the merit of promotions for soldiers who have served this country.
I yield the floor.
Let me just quickly say I intend to work with everybody in this Chamber who comes here to work in good faith to solve problems. But in my judgment, it is an unbelievable mistake to use the promotion of soldiers as a pawn in these circumstances.
I would say that as chairman of the subcommittee that funds all of these projects and all of these issues, I have been pleased to send all of that money--$14 billion--down to Louisiana. But as I said, my friend is fast wearing out his welcome. I think my friend might want to learn the words ``thank you,'' thank you to this Chamber, thanks to the rest of the American people who said to some people who were hit with an unbelievable tragedy: You are not alone. You are not alone. This country cares about you and is going to invest in your future. But I also think thank you to the Corps of Engineers. It is quite clear they have probably made some mistakes in all of our States. It is also clear that it would be a pretty difficult circumstance for a State or for people in any State to fight these battles without the experience and the knowledge and the capability of the Corps of Engineers.
I just think from time to time constructive criticism is in order. I think also from time to time a thank-you is in order. I also think in every case--in each and every case, the truth is in order. I will go through and in every single circumstance describe where the Senator from Louisiana has said the Corps of Engineers has the authority and has the funding, and I will show him that he is dead wrong, and I think he knows it.
But if this impasse continues, my colleague, Senator Reid, the majority leader, does have the capability to take 2 days of the Senate's time to file a cloture motion, and my expectation would be that the vote would be 99 to 1 because I don't know of one other Member of the Senate who wants to hold up the promotion of soldiers in order to meet demands that a specific Federal agency cannot possibly meet.
I yield the floor.
Madam President, are we in morning business?
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for as much time as I may need.
Madam President, I have come to speak about the New START Treaty--Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--with the Russians. I wish to talk about that in some detail.
A week ago, I and other colleagues were in Russia at a site near Moscow looking at a facility that we in the United States are funding to try to make this a safer world, to safeguard nuclear materials and nuclear warheads in the Soviet Union. I wish to talk a bit about this program as it relates to this new START Treaty.
Some of my colleagues have expressed concern and are determined that they are not necessarily supportive of the START arms reduction treaty unless other things are done. I wish to talk about that just a bit.
First, I will describe the unbelievable succession of something we have been doing called the Nunn-Lugar program, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We talk about what doesn't work and what fails, but we don't talk so much about what does work. I will do that for a moment.
I ask unanimous consent to show three things I have had in my desk drawer.
This is a wing strut from a backfire bomber, a Soviet backfire bomber. This is a bomber that would have carried nuclear weapons that would threaten this country as a potential adversary. This is from this airplane. As you can see, this airplane, this backfire bomber, doesn't exist anymore. We didn't shoot it down. I have the wing strut because we sawed it up as part of an arms control and reduction treaty reducing delivery vehicles. This bomber don't exist and carry nuclear weapons because the Nunn-Lugar program helped dismantle that bomber under agreements we have had with the Soviet Union and now with Russia.
This photo is of a typhoon-class ballistic missile submarine the Soviets had. It carried missile launch tubes. This is a missile tube from that submarine. You will see that these tubes don't exist in the submarine anymore. They are now scrap metal. This is copper wire that comes from that Soviet submarine that used to prowl the seas with nuclear weapons threatening our country. This ground-up copper wire from that submarine was not because we sank the submarine but because we have a program by which we reduced the delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. We and the Soviets--now the Russians--have agreed to a systematic reduction of weapons and delivery vehicles.
This photo is of a missile silo in the Ukraine. This is an SS-18 missile silo. It was blown up as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This is what is left of the scrap metal.
I have a hinge here from this particular site in the Ukraine that housed a missile that had a nuclear warhead aimed at our country. Instead of a missile being on the ground in the Ukraine, there is now a field of sunflowers. A field of sunflowers is now planted where a missile that carried a nuclear warhead once existed.
This is unbelievable success, in my judgment, and something we ought to celebrate. With the help of the Nunn-Lugar program Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are now nuclear weapons-free. Albania is chemical weapons-free; 7,500 deactivated nuclear warheads; 32 ballistic missile submarines gone; 1,419 long-range nuclear missiles gone; 906 nuclear air-to-service missiles gone; 155 nuclear bombers gone. We didn't shoot them down. We didn't destroy them in air-to-air combat or undersea warfare. We paid some money in a program called Nunn-Lugar with the Soviets and Russians to saw the wings off bombers and grind up the metal in submarines and take out missile silos in the Ukraine with missiles aimed at our country. Therefore, it is a safer world. The question is, How much safer and what more do we need to do?
I have previously read a portion of something into the Congressional Record. I will do it again ever so briefly.
On October 11, 2001--not many Americans know this--1 month after the 9/11 attack, George Tenet, Director of the CIA, informed the President that a CIA agent, code-named ``Dragonfire,'' had reported that al-Qaida terrorists possessed a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the Russian arsenal. According to Dragonfire, the CIA agent, this nuclear weapon was now on American soil in New York City. That was 1 month after 9/11. The CIA had no independent confirmation of this report, but neither did it have any basis on which to dismiss it. Did Russia's arsenal include a large number of 10-kiloton weapons? Yes. Could the Russian Government account for all the nuclear weapons the Soviets built during the Cold War? No. Could al-Qaida have acquired one of those weapons? It could have. If a terrorist had acquired it, could they have detonated it? Perhaps. Smuggled it into an American city? Likely.
So in the hours that followed this report on October 11, 2001, 1 month after 9/11, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice analyzed what strategists then called the ``problem from hell.'' Unlike the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union knew that an attack against the other would elicit a retaliatory strike in greater measure and therefore perhaps destroy both countries, the al-Qaida terrorist organization had no return address and had no such fear of reprisal. Even if the President were prepared to negotiate, al-Qaida had no phone number to call.
This comes from a book that was published by Graham Allison, a former Clinton administration official. I first learned about the incident from a piece in Time magazine, on March 11, 2002. The book that describes the detail of it is pretty harrowing. It is a pretty frightening prospect. I will not read more of it. I have read a fair amount of it.
After some while, it was determined that this was not a credible intelligence piece of information. But for a month or so, there was great concern about the prospect of a terrorist group having stolen a nuclear weapon, smuggled it into an American city, and being able to detonate it. Then we were not talking about 9/11; we were talking about a catastrophe in which hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people would be killed and life on Earth would never be the same. When and if ever a nuclear weapon is detonated in the middle of a major city on this planet, life will change as we know it.
That brings me to this question of nuclear reduction treaties and the work that has gone on. We have about 25,000 nuclear warheads on this planet. I have just described the apoplectic seizure that existed in October of 2001 because one CIA agent suggested he had credible evidence or a rumor that one terrorist group had stolen one small 10- kiloton nuclear weapon. Think of the angst that caused for about a month, which most Americans don't know about. But that was one weapon. There are 25,000 on this Earth--25,000 nuclear weapons. Russia probably has around 15,000.
This is not classified, by the way. This is from a recent estimate by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Most people say it is accurate. The United States has 9,400. China has 240. France has 300. Britain has 200.
The loss of one to a terrorist group--the detonation of that nuclear warhead in a major city would change life as we know it on planet Earth. So the question is, What do we do about that? We struggle to try to accomplish two goals--one, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to others who don't now have it, to prevent terrorists from ever acquiring it, and working very hard to accomplish both even while we again try a systematic reduction of nuclear weapons from the 25,000 level and particularly among those that have the most nuclear weapons. We understand it is very difficult to reach these agreements, and when reached, it is very difficult to get them agreed to, get the support by what is necessary in the Senate.
About 95 percent of the nuclear weapons are owned by the United States of America and by Russia. There are a lot of groups in this world that are very interested in acquiring one nuclear weapon with which to terrorize this planet.
We are now operating under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the Moscow Treaty. It requires the United States and Russia to have no more than 2,200 deployed nuclear weapons--there are many more than that; I am talking about deployed in the field--by 2012.
The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty we are now operating under does not restrict any nuclear delivery vehicles at all--airplanes, missiles, and so on--and it does not have any verification measures and it expires in 2012.
A few weeks ago in Prague, the Czech Republic, President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed a new strategic arms control treaty. It is called START. I compliment the administration for successfully completing this treaty. I was part of a group in the Senate that continued to meet with and review with the negotiators the progress of their work. Their work was long and difficult, but they reached an agreement with the Russians.
It limits each side to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which is 30 percent lower than the Moscow Treaty under which we are now operating.
It limits each side to 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers--these are all delivery vehicles-- equipped for nuclear armaments. That is one-half of what the START treaty allowed.
It sets a separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers that are equipped for nuclear weapons.
The treaty, in addition, has a verification regime, which is very important. You can have a treaty with someone, but if you cannot verify and inspect, then you have a problem. This treaty with the Russians has onsite inspections and exhibitions, telemetry exchanges, data exchanges and notifications, and provisions to facilitate the use of a national technical means for treaty monitoring.
This, in my judgment, is a good treaty that will strengthen this country. It will reduce by 30 percent the number of strategic nuclear warheads that Russia could possess and target at the United States. It allows our country to determine our own force structure and gives us the flexibility to deploy and maintain our strategic nuclear forces in a way that best serves our own national security interests.
The new Nuclear Posture Review, as my colleagues know, says the United States will maintain the nuclear triad of land-based missiles, ballistic missile submarines, as well as bombers. The Obama administration has said as long as nuclear weapons exist, this country will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and to protect our allies.
This new START treaty gives us an important window into Russia's strategic arsenal and to ensure that Russia will not be able to surprise us and try to change that balance.
This treaty contains no limits on our ability to continue developing and fielding missile defenses. Our country is doing some of that. Frankly, I have some questions about the cost and the effectiveness of some of what we are doing. Nonetheless, there is no limitation on that in this treaty.
As was done in the case of START, Russia has made a unilateral statement regarding missile defenses. Its statement is not legally binding and does not constrain us in any of our U.S. missile defense programs.
In my judgment, this treaty is very important. It is a very important first step--only a first step--because much more needs to be done. But it is important in terms of enhancing our security and world security. This will bolster, in my judgment, the Nonproliferation Treaty. It demonstrates that the United States and Russia are living up to their part of the deal under the NPT to begin reducing arms. I think it will strengthen Washington's hand in a tighter nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially at the May NPT conference.
Some Senators have said, as would be the case, I suppose, with any treaty: We are concerned about this because we think it weakens America's hand; we think it cuts our nuclear arsenal too deeply. I think they are wrong on that point. They are wrong. We have plenty of nuclear weapons. Not enough nuclear weapons is not among our problems; we have plenty. So do the Russians. We can blow up this planet 150 times and more. We have plenty of nuclear weapons. The question is, How do we and the Russians and others begin to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and, most important, how do we stop the spread of nuclear weapons?
Let me put up a chart that shows what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said last month:
I, the Vice Chairman, and the Joint Chiefs, as well as our
combatant commanders around the world, stand solidly behind
this new treaty, having had the opportunity to provide our
counsel, to make our recommendations, and to help shape the
final agreements.
This is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He says he and the Joint Chiefs believe this represents our country's best national security interest.
Here is what some others are saying. Douglas Feith, not particularly unexpected. I can pretty much guess what he will say on anything dealing with security if I saw his name tag, I guess. Doug Feith, a former Defense official under the previous administration, says:
Since the administration is so eager for [the treaty], the
main interests of conservatives--
Meaning him and his friends, neo-cons among other things--
will relate to modernization. Republicans are interested in
the U.S. nuclear posture, the political leverage they have
will be the treaty . . . One of the hot issues is going to be
the replacement warhead . . .
What does he mean? We are going to use this treaty as leverage to force the government to develop a new nuclear warhead program called the RRW, the Reliable Replacement Warhead.
I am chairman of the subcommittee that funds that program. We stopped funding that warhead. That warhead was an outgrowth of the Congress deciding we are not going to fund the provision before it for another nuclear warhead. We remember the provision: Now we have to build earth- penetrating, bunker-buster nuclear weapons. That was the thing about 5 years ago.
The Congress said: We are not going to build earth-penetrating, bunker-buster nuclear weapons. There is no end to the menu of nuclear weapons some people want. We are not going to do that. That morphed into Reliable Replacement Warhead, RRW, that was to begin replacing our existing stock of warheads in a big program with the Navy, Air Force, and so on. We stopped that as well. We did not stop it because we did not have the money or anything like that. We stopped it because it is not necessary.
We have a process by which we certify that the current nuclear stockpile works, that it is effective. We have a process by which we do that. We have a lot of interest by other groups that have weighed in on the science of this, saying our existing stock of nuclear weapons will last much longer than some had suggested without spending hundreds of billions of dollars for replacement. Yet some will never be satisfied.
Here are statements by some Senators who also will want to use the ratification of this START treaty as leverage. One Senator said:
Well, I can tell you this, that I think the Senate will
find it very hard to support this treaty if there is not a
robust modernization plan.
That is the need to design and build new nuclear weapons.
Another one said:
The success of your administration in ensuring the
modernization plan is fully funded in the authorization and
appropriations process could have a significant impact on the
Senate as it considers the START follow-on treaty.
And another one:
My vote on the START treaty will thus depend in large
measure on whether I am convinced the administration has put
forward an appropriate and adequately funded plan to sustain
and modernize the smaller nuclear stockpile it envisions.
As chairman of the Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, I can tell my colleagues that the proposed budget for nuclear weapons, which is in my subcommittee, for fiscal year 2011 from this administration is more than enough to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons; sufficient so that any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can say with confidence and authority whose requirement it is to certify each year, that we have a nuclear arsenal that can be maintained as reliable and safe for the long-term future.
The National Nuclear Security Agency, the agency that oversees nuclear weapons, would see a 13-percent or $1.3 billion increase under this President's proposal. There are some who have argued this budget increase and planned future increases may not be sufficient to maintain the current stockpile. But that is just not the case. If we look at the budget request, the administration's budget request includes $7 billion for nuclear weapons activities. That is an increase of $624 million in this coming year. It invests significant money in what is called life extension programs. The nuclear weapons in our arsenal are not just the old nuclear weapons. We spend money all the time on life extension programs to make sure they are reliable.
I can go on and talk about the budget. The fact is, this President has sent us a budget that does what he thinks is necessary for the life extension programs and the additional funding. At a time when we have significant financial problems, he is proposing additional funding in this area.
This is a quote from Linton Brooks, who was the NNSA Administrator from 2003 to 2007 under George W. Bush, in February of this year:
START, as I now understand it, is a good idea on its own
merits, but I think for those who think it's only a good idea
if you only have a strong weapons program, I think this
budget ought to take care of that.
Coupled with the out-year projections, it takes care of the
concerns about the complex and it does very good things about
the stockpile and it should keep the labs healthy. . . .
That is what he said. That is important to understand when my colleagues come to the floor of the Senate and say: I don't know that I can support arms reductions because we want to make sure we have more money spent on nuclear weapons to build a whole class of new nuclear weapons.
Understand, there is nothing partisan here. The person who last headed this agency under George W. Bush said this budget takes care of that. It will give us the confidence we need.
The September 2009 ``Report on the Lifetime Extension Program'' by the JASON Program Office, which is a very respected group of scientists, said this:
JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of changes
incurred from aging and life extension programs have
increased risk to certification of today's deployed nuclear
warheads.
Simple.
Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for
decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using
approaches similar to those employed in the life extension
programs to date.
We have people around here who are just unbelievably anxious to get moving to begin building an entire new class of nuclear weapons. Yet we have evidence from the science of nuclear weapons that the existing stock of nuclear weapons can be maintained with life extension programs for decades. Why would we do that?
I wish to make a concluding point. I wanted to talk about the START program because it is so important to the future of our relationship with Russia. But much more important than that, it is important for the world.
I pulled out of my desk a wing strut from a backfire bomber and ground-up copper from a Russian submarine. I have taken a hinge from a missile silo in the Ukraine that had an SS-18 with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States. I have all those in my desk just to remind me every day there is a way to reduce the number of nuclear weapons: reduce the delivery vehicles without having air-to-air combat, without firing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and without detonating nuclear warheads. It is the kind of program we have engaged in, the Nunn-Lugar program, the Global Threat Reduction Program, and it is also treaties such as the START treaty.
If it is not our responsibility and if it does not fall on our shoulders to provide the world leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, who else is going to do that? Who else? If you read the book by Graham Allison or understand the consequences of both 9/11 and also October 11 of the same year and the report by a CIA agent code named Dragonfire, that a terrorist group had stolen a 10-kiloton weapon and would detonate it in an American city, if that doesn't send chills down your spine for the future of this world, then there is something fundamentally wrong with your system.
We have to understand if we do not back away from this difficult specter of a new world in which terrorists are trying very hard to acquire nuclear weapons--they don't have to acquire very much. They have to acquire the equivalent of perhaps a 2-liter bottle of highly enriched uranium. Think of one of those 2-liter Coke bottles at the gas station that sits on the counter the next time you go past, 2 liters of soft drink. Think of 2 liters of highly enriched nuclear material to produce one nuclear weapon.
Some of my colleagues, at least some folks kind of made light of, and some commentators on the radio made fun of the very large group of foreign leaders that was called to this town a week ago to deal with this question of how we get our arms around and begin securing loose nuclear materials that exist around the world. That was nothing to laugh at. That was a historic opportunity by this administration, a big deal by this President to say: You know what. That leadership is our responsibility, and we are going to call leaders from all around the world to talk about these loose nuclear materials that can be acquired by a terrorist organization and made into a bomb, and we are going to secure these materials. We are spending money to do that. We are spending money in our budget to do that. But this President said: Let's work much harder. Let's rededicate ourselves, and not just us, let's all of us rededicate ourselves to gather and secure the loose nuclear material and prevent access to that material by a terrorist organization.
Again, this responsibility falls to us. It is our responsibility to lead, to help stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It is also our responsibility, hopefully, to lead toward where the nonproliferation treaty insists we go; that is, to fewer and fewer and fewer nuclear weapons on this planet.
I understand we will not and should not disarm unilaterally. I fully understand that. But I also understand that
having 25,000 nuclear weapons stored in various locations on this planet is not healthy for the long-term prospect of life on Earth. So it is our responsibility. It is an important step, a step only in the direction because it is not the giant step. But an important first step is to ratify this START treaty.
The Russians and the Americans worked very hard to construct a treaty that I think has great merit and will provide for a safer world. Following the ratification of this treaty, then there is even more work to do, much more work to do. But this is the step along the way that is important for all of us to embrace.
I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.