Appeal Time Clarification Act of 2011

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2633) to amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the time limits for appeals in civil cases to which United States officers or employees are parties, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 2633, as amended, currently under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the ranking member of the Courts Subcommittee, Mr. Cohen, the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, and the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Conyers, the distinguished gentleman from Michigan, for their having cosponsored the bill.

I introduced the bill, H.R. 2633, at the behest of the United States Judicial Conference. It addresses a small problem that must be fixed or attended to prior to December 1 of this year.

Under the existing Rules Enabling Act, the Judicial Conference may develop changes to existing Federal rules of procedure and evidence. The Supreme Court submits any agreed-upon amendments to Congress no later than May 1 of a given calendar year. The changes take effect on December 1 unless Congress intervenes during the interim.

This year, as part of its rules package, the Supreme Court submitted proposed amendments to Appellate Rule 4 that clarify the treatment of the time to appeal in civil cases involving a United States officer or employee. Because the time to appeal in a civil case is set not only by Appellate Rule 4 but also by section 2107 of title 28 of the U.S. Code, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has proposed that the Judicial Conference seek legislation to make the same clarifying change to section 2107.

Appellate Rule 4 and section 2107 currently provide that the time to appeal is 30 days for most civil cases, but that the appeal time for all parties is 60 days when the parties to the case include ``the United States,'' a United States ``officer,'' or a United States ``agency.'' The problem is that current law is not clear concerning the applicability of the longer period in cases in which the Federal party is a United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity. The proposed amendments in H.R. 2633 simply clarify that the longer period applies to such an individual or employee, just as it does to the United States Government or a United States agency.

A lawsuit against a Federal officer or employee under these conditions requires the Federal Government to decide whether to represent that individual. This requires time, as the government must evaluate the case, determine whether an appeal should be taken, and ultimately obtain the Solicitor General's approval.

The proposed revisions to Appellant Rule 4 are on a glide path to December 1. It's important to promote the consistency between the rules and title 28 by ensuring that we enact H.R. 2633, which also takes effect on December 1.

The only change to the bill as reported by our committee is the inclusion of ``findings'' language developed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The main point of this text is to clarify that the 60-day period applies to cases involving article I litigants, including Members of the House of Representatives and Senators. This addition is entirely consistent with the legislative history of the bill and is fully supported by the Judicial Conference. This will also help to expedite passage of H.R. 2633 by the other body.

Mr. Speaker, this is bipartisan legislation devoid of controversy. It treats Federal litigants fairly under the Appellate Rules and assists the courts in correctly interpreting those rules. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2633, and I reserve the balance of my time.

I thank my friend from Michigan for his kind words.

Mr. Speaker, I also yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I begin by congratulating Howard Coble of North Carolina, a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, who is the sponsor of this bill, and agree with him entirely. It was reported by our committee by voice vote and no amendment. His explanation was thorough, and I appreciate his inclination for detail which had us make this important modification of appeal time clarification.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2633, the ``Appeal Time Clarification Act of 2011,'' as amended.

This noncontroversial legislation simply clarifies the time for filing an appeal in federal civil cases.

It does so by amending section 2107 of title 28 of the United States Code to provide that current or former officers or employees of the United States who are sued in their individual capacities for acts or omissions in connection with the performance of their federal duties are entitled to 60 days from the entry of a judgment, order, or decree to file their appeals, rather than the normal 30 days.

The bill resolves an ambiguity in current law as to whether officers or employees of the United States who are sued in their individual capacities--as opposed to their official capacities--are entitled to the 60-day period.

The amendments made by H.R. 2633 would make it clear that they are indeed entitled to the longer appeal period.

This change would also bring section 2107 in line with a pending revision to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, which also governs the time for appeals in civil cases.

The amendment to Rule 4 was approved by the Supreme Court in April and is set to take effect on December 1, 2011.

H.R. 2633's amendment to section 2107 will avoid confusion and inconsistency between the two provisions that pertain to the time to file an appeal in civil cases.

Finally, the change made by H.R. 2633 is consistent with the policy that underlies the longer appeal period involving federal parties generally.

If the United States represents a federal party, the government typically needs time to review the case, determine whether an appeal should be taken, and secure the Solicitor General's approval for that appeal.

The same concern applies when the United States--through the Justice Department or some other federal litigating entity such as the House Office of General Counsel or the Senate Office of Legal Counsel-- decides to represent a current or former officer or employee sued in his or her individual capacity.

Therefore, making it clear that the 60-day time period to file an appeal is available in such cases serves that policy goal.

H.R. 2633 was reported by the Judiciary Committee without amendment by voice vote. The version of the bill we are considering today is identical, but for the addition of certain findings made at the Senate's recommendation.

For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense legislation.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2633, the Appeal Time Clarification Act of 2011. This legislation provides an important clarification to the law.

Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the law allows 60 days to file a notice of appeal for civil cases if the United States or a federal officer is a party. However, the legislation fails to disclose whether the 60 day period applies to current and/or former federal employees who are sued in an individual capacity.

The Appeal Time Clarification Act of 2011 performs as a means to clarify the discrepancies created by the initial policy. It essentially amends the federal judicial code requirements concerning the time limits for the filing of appeals to any judgment, order, or decree in a civil action, suit, or proceeding.

According to the Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, as ordered by the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. 2633 would have no significant impact on the federal budget. The CBO estimates that enacting the bill ``would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.''

There are no solid concerns that have been raised in the House regarding this legislation. However, the Senate Judiciary Committee has expressed its observation that the bill's language regarding individual capacity lawsuits

may be read in such a way as to exclude those cases where the individual is represented by the Senate Legal Counsel or the House Office of General Counsel rather than the Department of Justice (for example, in a lawsuit between the legislative and executive branches concerning executive privilege).

Summarily H.R. 2633 extends the 60 day filing deadline to any civil action, suit, or proceeding in which one of the parties is ``a current or former U.S. officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act. This amendment provides the government with the time it needs to review the case, determine whether an appeal should be taken, and secure the Solicitor General's approval for that appeal. These same policy reasons apply in a case where the United States--through DOJ or some other federal litigating entity--decides to represent a current or former officer or employee sued in his or her individual capacity.

I applaud my friend from Michigan, Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee for introducing this important legislation to protect past and present federal employees. I urge my colleagues to lend their support to the bill.

Mr. Speaker, yesterday, September 12, I was detained in my State on official business.

On rollcall vote 699 on the motion to suspend the rules and agree to H.R. 2076, to amend the United States Code regarding providing of investigatory assistance, I would have voted ``aye.''

On rollcall vote 700 on the motion to suspend the rules and agree to H.R. 2633, to amend the United States Code regarding time limits for appeals, I would have voted ``aye.''

On rollcall vote 701, H.R. 1059, to protect the safety of judges by extending the authority of the Judicial Conference to redact sensitive information on financial disclosure reports, and for other purposes, I would have voted ``aye.''

Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the Chair regarding my absence from rollcall votes 699-701 on Monday, September 12, 2011.

For rollcall vote, 699, on motion to suspend the rules and agree to H.R. 2076, ``To amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the statutory authority for the longstanding practice of the Department of Justice of providing investigatory assistance on request of State and local authorities with respect to certain serious violent crimes, and for other purposes,'' I would have voted ``aye.''

For rollcall vote 700, on motion to suspend the rule and agree to H.R. 2633, ``To amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the time limits for appeals in civil cases to which United States officers or employees are parties,'' I would have voted ``aye.''

For rollcall vote 701, on motion to suspend the rules and agree as amended to H.Res 1316, ``To protect the safety of judges by extending the authority of the Judicial Conference to redact sensitive information contained in their financial disclosure reports, and for other purpose,'' I would have voted ``aye.''

Mr. Speaker, on September 12, 2010, I missed the following rollcall votes because I was unavoidably detained out of town: rollcall vote No. 699--on motion to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 2076, the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2011; rollcall vote No. 700--on motion to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 2633, the Appeal Time Clarification Act of 2011; and rollcall vote No. 701--on motion to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 1059, to protect the safety of judges by extending the authority of the Judicial Conference to redact sensitive information contained in their financial disclosure reports, and for other purposes.

If present, I would have voted ``aye'' on all three rollcall votes.