I rise in opposition, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, I yield myself 3 minutes. This is an effort to exempt companies under $250 million. Now the JOBS Act, which was recently passed with broad support,…
I rise in opposition, Madam Chair.
Madam Chair, I yield myself 3 minutes.
This is an effort to exempt companies under $250 million. Now the JOBS Act, which was recently passed with broad support, said that a start-up company for its first 5 years would be exempt from this. This now would do away with that 5-year restriction without having had the kind of committee consideration that it seems to me it ought to have. It does it in this way, and I differ with my colleague from Pennsylvania when he says that it doesn't change the law. If it didn't change the law, they wouldn't offer it. He's not up here at 9 p.m. just to get exercise. It changes the law in a very significant way and sets a very bad precedent.
The underlying legislation to which this would be an amendment requires a cost-benefit analysis. This cooks the books. This is not content to let it be an unbiased cost-benefit analysis; but it says, it instructs the SEC to take into account the heavy burdens--and let me get the exact words--the large burden of such regulation. In other words, it's an effort to tip the scales of the very cost-benefit analysis.
And we know that, by the way, as to intent because the original version of this amendment was just a straight exemption of 250. But for parliamentary reasons, because that's not this committee's jurisdiction, it had to be redone. So if the gentleman really wanted to just exempt everybody under 250 from Sarbanes Oxley forever, as opposed to a 5-year exemption for a start-up, he had to amend it.
So he amended it in a way, as I said, that unfortunately impugns the integrity of the cost-benefit analysis because it puts a thumb on the scales. It says, oh, the cost-benefit analysis here should take into account the large burden. Well, it is already supposed to do it. Adding this is an instruction to the SEC essentially to find that they should be exempt.
We have had a rash of Chinese companies buying small American companies and converting them and people investing in them and getting taken. And the problem is that Chinese accounting is very opaque. What this bill would do is to prevent the United States authorities from applying Sarbanes Oxley to protect those investors.
I don't doubt that there is a very good company--I agree there is a very good company in his district, although he says it is above the limit. But you can't legislate for just one good company. This is part of this nostalgia for a time when we had no regulation.
Sarbanes Oxley has improved the integrity of our capital markets. It has improved the confidence of investors. We did exempt small start- ups, so for the first 5 years as a start-up, up to $250 million, they didn't have to do this. This says, in effect, by instructing the SEC to find that the cost outweighs the benefit no matter what, this gives a permanent exemption de facto for companies up to 250, which would include people who might be scamming, in the case of the Chinese companies. And as I said, it sets a bad precedent.
If we are going to have cost-benefit analysis, and I think that can be overdone, let's have it in an honest and open way. Let's not put the thumb in the scales, as this does, by instructing the SEC, in effect, to find that the cost always outweighs it.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I guess I am in a position of being disagreeable to some of my friends on the committee. The gentleman from Tennessee cited the company that's about to go public, but they're already exempted.
The jobs bill that we passed and was signed into law exempts start- ups for the first 5 years until they go public, so this has no relevance to the start-ups.
It has relevance to companies that have been in existence for more than 5 years as public companies. Again, we have got an exemption already for the first 5 years. And it says, in effect, don't give us this unbiased cost-benefit analysis. We'll tell you what cost-benefit analysis does.
And as to IPOs, I will insert into the Record an article by Mr. Davidoff in the The New York Times talking about the advantages we have in IPOs these days; how the soccer team from England came here to do an IPO because our corporate governance laws are more favorable to them in allowing different classes of stock.
I'm sorry to see this continuing repudiation of the legacy of George W. Bush. I know he's not going to come to the convention. But, gee, everything's being torn down. George Bush signed Sarbanes Oxley. Oxley, by the way, is Mike Oxley, my predecessor as chairman of our committee. George Bush was very proud of Sarbanes Oxley. It's an accounting requirement, and what this does is to take another chunk out of that regulation.
Now, maybe we hear different people. My friends say the American people are crying out for an end of regulation. Every indication I have of public opinion is that people are tired of irresponsibility by a few, not everybody, but they are tired of people being scammed. And, in fact, the notion that what we need in the financial area is less regulation is an odd one. It comes from people, I guess, who just slept through the last few years, didn't see the crisis we had because Sarbanes Oxley, of course, itself came about after Enron.
So I would align myself with President Bush. I think he got this one right. I think Mike Oxley got this one right. Yes, for start-ups and for people about to go public, they have a $250 million exemption. But to give a permanent exemption to companies at $250 million and above is a mistake. And don't, please, start monkeying with cost-benefit analysis.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[From the New York Times, July 10, 2012]
In Manchester United's I.P.O., a Preference for American Rules
(By Steven M. Davidoff)
Manchester United, the English soccer team with an adoring
fan base in Europe and Asia, is filing to go public in the
United States.
But the initial public offering is not a reflection of
Americans' increasing love of soccer. Instead, it is a
reflection of American regulators' light touch.
I'm not kidding. The United States, which has long been
criticized for its harsh rules surrounding I.P.O.'s, is now
the place where foreign companies go to avoid regulation.
Manchester United may be the world's most popular soccer
club, with 659 million fans according to the team's own
estimates. In 2005, the American businessman Malcolm Glazer
and his family bought control of the team, loading it up with
hundreds of millions of dollars in debt. Now, the company is
selling shares to raise money and reduce its debt, which
stands at about $655 million.
But the Glazers do not want to give up voting control
since, among other reasons, Manchester United fans appear
eager to buy back the team from the still-unpopular family.
In 2010, a prominent group of Manchester United fans were
said to have tried to form a consortium to repurchase the
club. The Glazers have uniformly given the same response: the
team is not for sale. Now, the Glazers are venue-shopping for
their stock.
They passed over the Hong Kong Stock Exchange because it
would not give the team a waiver to allow two classes of
shares, with different voting rights. The London Stock
Exchange also does not allow such share structures, perhaps
the reason this natural home was skipped over by the Glazers.
Manchester United declined to comment for this article.
The Singapore Exchange seemed more amenable to the Glazers'
plan to list Manchester United and keep control through a
dual-class structure. But after the exchange delayed final
signoff on the dual-class shares and the Asian markets
cooled, the Singapore plans were derailed, according to an
article in Reuters.
The soccer team has recently found a home for its stock in
the United States. Manchester United filed the papers this
month for its initial public offering on the New York Stock
Exchange, and the Glazers are taking advantage of the
country's willingness to be more flexible when it comes to
shareholder rights. Manchester United is proposing a
corporate structure that would give the Glazers shares with
10 votes apiece. Public investors would receive one vote for
each share.
While the Securities and Exchange Commission tried to ban
this type of dual-class voting stock in the 1980s, a federal
appeals court struck down the rules. Since then, the
structure has become increasingly common. Facebook, LinkedIn
and Google all have dual-class shares. The New York Times
also has a dual-class voting structure. In 2011, 28 offerings
featured dual-class structures that gave greater voting
rights to certain shareholders, according to the research
firm Dealogic.
The Manchester United offering is a case study in how the
American markets have evolved toward deregulation in the past
decade.
The company is a beneficiary of the newly enacted Jumpstart
Our Business Start-Ups Act, known as the JOBS Act, designed
to help private companies raise capital and go public.
Although the team was founded in 1878, the JOBS Act
classifies Manchester United as an emerging growth company
since it has less than $1 billion in revenue. As such, the
company, which is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, does
not face the same hurdles as American businesses.
The JOBS Act builds on earlier efforts by the S.E.C. to
loosen the rules governing I.P.O.'s of foreign companies.
Under pressure from stock exchanges and other market players,
the agency has exempted foreign issuers like Manchester
United from large parts of American securities laws.
Manchester United will not need to file quarterly reports,
report material events, file proxy statements or disclose
extensive compensation information, all of which American
companies must do. Under a different S.E.C. rule adopted in
2008, Manchester United also does not need to report
financials under the generally accepted accounting principles
used in the United States, but can instead rely on
international financial reporting standards.
Because Manchester United will be a controlled company, it
does not need to follow the New York Stock Exchange rules
adopted in 2003 that require a public company to have a board
composed mainly of independent directors. The board of
Manchester United will have four directors, two of Malcolm
Glazer's sons and two executives of the company.
The legal environment, which investment bankers and lawyers
have long argued deterred I.P.O.'s, also appears to be more
conducive. This may be because securities litigation reforms
put in place by Congress and the Supreme Court have meant
fewer cases in recent years. Even after the financial crisis,
only 16 companies on the Standard & Poor's 500 were subject
to this type of litigation in 2011, the lowest number since
2000, according to the Stanford Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse.
It's all a bit unsettling.
After the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,
critics claimed that the new regulation was driving away
foreign companies, although at least one academic study
rebutted this claim. But as regulators have slowly loosened
the rules, the American markets are attracting foreign
issuers seeking watered-down rules.
This does not mean that this deregulation is wrongheaded.
The JOBS Act and other initiatives may not have been
designed to attract the likes of Manchester United, but such
I.P.O.'s do provide work for investment bankers, lawyers and
the exchanges. They also build up American prestige by
bringing well-known foreign companies to the United States.
At the same time, the deregulation effort means lower
compliance costs for businesses. Presumably, that extra money
can be invested, bolstering the economy.
The question is whether deregulation is worth the price.
I have little sympathy for investors who buy Manchester
United shares. The risks are mainly disclosed.
The bigger question is whether lowering the bar for foreign
issuers will come back to haunt the American markets.
Even before the JOBS Act, Chinese companies took advantage
of new S.E.C. rules and started going public en masse in the
United States. While some of the I.P.O.'s have worked out,
there are now more than 100 newly public Chinese companies
facing accusations of fraud by either investors or
regulators.
The risk is that American exchanges will become more like
London's Alternative Investment Market, a lightly regulated
stock exchange that has fostered some spectacular flops. If
so, investors may lose faith in American markets, and the
United States may end up sacrificing long-term stature for
short-term gain.
Either way, the next time someone calls the American
markets overregulated, you might want to point them to the
Manchester United I.P.O.--and remind them that the English
soccer club came to the United States to avoid more
burdensome foreign rules.
This post has been revised to reflect the following
correction:
Correction: July 12, 2012.
The Deal Professor column on Wednesday, about the soccer
team Manchester United's public offering in the United
States, misstated the year that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
enacted. It was 2002, not 2001.
Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
The gentleman says the SEC wasn't on the Madoff thing for many years. That's true. I have to say that, while I supported the Bush administration on Sarbanes Oxley, I am critical of their administration of the SEC. For almost all of that time, we had an SEC that was not inclined to enforce. And I do not think the current SEC, under a very good chairman, Mary Schapiro, with a much more vigorous approach ought to be taxed for the failures that were ideologically driven by the previous SEC.
So I don't think it is valid to say, well, because they didn't catch Madoff--the SEC during the Bush administration reflected an unfortunate philosophy of non-regulation, of ceding to the company more autonomy than they should have, and it is not a good basis on which to legislate going forward.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
First of all, a large percentage of the people in this room would be too; but, secondly, the fact is that the gentleman from Florida is who started pointing fingers. When I talked about who was in charge of the SEC, all of a sudden he is above any criticism. But he's the one who impugned the SEC. He's the one who said that the SEC sat and did nothing under Madoff. So, if you're going to accuse the agency, then it becomes relevant as to who was running it. I didn't raise the issue of who was to blame and who was at fault. I was simply responding to my committee colleague from Florida.
I thank the gentleman.
Madam Chair, I rise to oppose the amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
I understand that the banks in America don't like this because they would like to continue to be a place where people can come from other countries or send their money from other countries and not have it reported back home. The problem is that in America, we suffer a much greater loss right now from Americans who evade their taxes. Most Americans don't. But taxes being parked in the Cayman Islands, which was just mentioned and elsewhere, are a problem. We passed in 2010 a bill to try and get money owed to the United States paid to the United States. That requires the cooperation of other governments.
Members are aware of the negotiations with Switzerland and other tax havens. What this says is: we the United States want you to help us collect taxes owed to us, but we won't do the same. It is the tax evaders' bill of rights. The gentleman from Florida says they're law abiding citizens. Most of them probably are. How does he know they all are? Why do people in the Cayman Islands want to put money in American banks? Maybe they are perfectly good reasons. Maybe they want to come visit their money some day.
The fact is that people who send money to other countries include people who evade taxes. What this says to the United States is we basically are going to have to abandon the effort to collect taxes owed to us in foreign countries because we are telling the foreign countries we will not cooperate with them. We have tax treaties that we're pursuing. This basically aborts that.
Americans who want to send their money elsewhere and not pay taxes, they like this idea. With regard to the American banks, people have said they'll send their money elsewhere. The notion that we should compete in a race to the bottom, the notion that we should match other countries in an absence of rules is a philosophy that gets us in trouble. I believe that if we work hard, we will get a number of countries that will work with us on this. That's the essential point.
If Members favor a vigorous effort by the United States Government to recover taxes owed to us from elsewhere, they should reject this amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield myself the balance of my time.
In fact, we suffer more from taxes evaded in the U.S., I believe, than the money we have here. The point, however, is--and I will submit the comments from the Department of the Treasury--we will not be sending this to countries with which we don't have a tax treaty. There are strong statutory and regulatory requirements that prevent this information from being sent to countries that abuse it.
Maybe Members think that's not strong enough. If the gentleman from Florida would like to submit legislation to strengthen those statutory requirements to make it clear that some countries qualify and some don't--for example, I'm informed Venezuela today would not qualify for obvious reasons, because of the brutal, corrupt nature of that government.
So the question is, because some governments would abuse it, should we protect every tax evader who wants to use the United States as a haven from having their money reported, at the price of not getting cooperation ourselves? That doesn't mean everybody puts their money here as a tax evader. If you're not a tax evader, then there's no problem with having this reported. As far as the Pentagon being hacked, yeah, people have been hacked. If the IRS was going to be hacked, a lot more would have happened.
The fact is that the security of tax returns in America is one of the best things about our government. Administrations of both parties from time immemorial have protected the security of tax returns. We have a very good record as a government. We shouldn't just denigrate it with no basis in protecting the integrity of tax returns. People have filed tax returns and have had great privacy in them. This is the central point, because some of the banks would like to get this money and not care whether people are tax evaders or not.
The gentleman says we can do it case by case. That's an impossible task, case by case to decide. Then the IRS becomes more intrusive. Do you want to do a frisk of each individual to decide whether he or she has his returns done? Case by case is the way you destroy privacy.
Here's the fundamental point. We are making efforts to collect taxes owed to us by people who have hidden the money elsewhere, and we know that's been a problem. This would make it impossible to do that with any efficiency. As I said, there are very clear statements of policy against sending this information to Venezuela, against sending it to other places where it wouldn't be secure. This is the question: Are we going to allow American standards, in trying to impose taxes that are legitimately owed here, to be eroded by other countries?
The gentleman mentioned the Cayman Islands. I don't want the Cayman Islands to set the standard for American tax collection. The gentleman mentioned that the Cayman Islanders are sending money here. I don't want the Cayman Islanders and their desire to get shelter to be setting the standard for American tax collection practices, for the need of America to do the right thing.
Those people who are lawfully investing money will not be frightened by this, and America's ability to get taxes owed to us would be destroyed by this amendment.