VETS Dogs Act of 2011

Mr. President, I am pleased to join with Senators Collins and Akaka today to introduce the bipartisan SECURE Facilities Act of 2011 to modernize and transform an important but often overlooked agency within the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, responsible for protecting 9,000 Federal buildings across the country.

The agency I refer to is the Federal Protective Service, FPS, where 1,200 full time employees and about 15,000 contract guards safeguard not just the buildings, but the one million people who work at and visit these buildings each year.

Unfortunately, the threat to government workers and property is all too real. In 1995, a massive bomb decimated the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. The Pentagon was one of the targets of the 9/11 terrorists. A wing of the building was leveled and 184 people died. Last year, a man flew a small plane into a building in Austin, TX, that housed an IRS and other government offices. An IRS manager was killed. Earlier this year, our friend and colleague, Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was critically shot at a public forum. Most recently, a man planted an improvised explosive device outside the McNamara Federal building in Detroit. A dozen or so other violent incidents have occurred at federal buildings in the last 3 years. Protecting the people who work and visit federal buildings is critical to maintaining the integrity of our democracy.

Security at these buildings, however, is not where it should be. Poor management, serious budget shortfalls, and operational challenges have diminished FPS' effectiveness and undermined public trust. FPS guards were famously caught sleeping on the job, putting an infant in its carrier through an X-ray machine, and failing to detect bomb-making materials on investigators who passed through security.

The Federal Protective Service must be turned around, which is why we are introducing this legislation to strengthen the agency's management, provide it with the necessary resources to fulfill its mission, and help it function at a higher level.

I want to single out for praise the Government Accountability Office, GAO, whose excellent work has significantly informed our legislation.

At a July 8, 2009, hearing before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, GAO unveiled the results of a year-long investigation conducted at the Committee's request. GAO visited 6 of 11 FPS regions throughout the country and observed the guard inspection process; interviewed managers, inspectors, and guards; analyzed guard contracts, training and certification requirements, and instruction documents. GAO's special investigations unit conducted its own covert tests at 10 high security Federal facilities in several different cities, some of which house district offices of our House and Senate colleagues.

What did GAO find? A seriously dysfunctional agency. FPS lacks focus and strategies for accomplishing its mission; contract guards don't have adequate training; FPS personnel suffer from low morale; oversight of contract guards is poor; and many standards that guide federal building security are outdated.

GAO revealed that some guards lacked basic security or x-ray machine training. The FPS was hard pressed to identify which guards were qualified or effective. One guard used a government computer to run an adult website during his shift, while another allowed a baby in a carrier to pass through an x-ray machine. A third guard was photographed asleep at his station.

GAO investigators smuggled through security at one building readily available components to make a liquid-based improvised explosive device. The investigators then made a bomb in a public restroom and moved throughout the federal building undetected. I note that while the components of the IED were real, the actual explosive liquids were diluted to ensure the bomb was not functional.

FPS didn't come to this point overnight. In fact, its problems multiplied when it was folded into DHS in 2003. At that point, the agency lost access to supplemental funding from its previous parent agency--the General Services Administration, GSA, and because of that, immediately ran into trouble. FPS fell behind in paying its bills, budget cuts hurt employee training and other functions, and personnel cuts diminished the agency's overall performance. At the same time, FPS was given more responsibilities, and the previous administration was working to downsize the agency workforce by 1/3.

Reform legislation is very clearly needed, and the SECURE Facilities Act of 2011 addresses many of the shortcomings detailed by GAO.

In particular, our legislation addresses four major challenges:

First, the bill would help the FPS carry out its mission by adding almost 150 law enforcements and support personnel. The agency has assumed increased responsibilities since it joined DHS but has done so with fewer personnel, and that is unsustainable.

Second, our legislation would tackle deficiencies within the contract guard program. FPS contract guards are the first line of defense at Federal facilities, so we must ensure they are held to high standards and are prepared and equipped to face the varied threats to which federal buildings are vulnerable.

Third, the bill would ensure the FPS is prepared to address the threat of explosives. The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City occurred 16 years ago, but FPS has been slow to deploy sufficient countermeasures to detect and deter that type of attack.

Fourth, our bill would recognize the delicate balance between public access and security. We have worked to put the emphasis on securing Federal facilities but we also support avenues of appeal if a building tenant believes a security measure unduly hinders public access. If the Federal Protective Service is to be held accountable--by Congress, the administration, and the American people--it should no longer be forced to defend federal agencies that choose less costly and potentially less effective security for their buildings.

On the question of resources, our bill, for the first time, would formally authorize the FPS and the interagency government body responsible for establishing security standards for all federal facilities, the Interagency Security Committee. We would provide additional funding for the agency by directing OMB to increase the building security fees paid by other agencies. We would provide resources for FPS to hire 146 full time employees. We would ensure that FPS employs 1,200 full time employees or more at all times--a conservative number that may require future increases.

Many of the additional employees would be law enforcement officers, but FPS would also have the flexibility to hire administrative and support personnel to improve its overall management, strengthen its oversight of contract guards, monitor contractor performance, and share contract assessments throughout the agency. The legislation also would provide retirement benefits to FPS officers to help the agency recruit and retain quality personnel.

Recognizing that the nation's fiscal health and our unsustainable deficits demand budget tightening, it is especially critical that we make wise budget decisions. I believe the evidence clearly demonstrates the need for additional spending for FPS.

With regard to improved standards, our legislation would require FPS to conduct overt and covert testing to assess guard training, test the security of Federal facilities, and establish procedures for retraining or terminating poor performing guards. The bill would also require that basic documents and manuals describing the responsibilities of security guards are up to date and periodically reviewed.

On explosives, we would require DHS to establish performance-based standards for checkpoint detection technologies for explosives and other threats at Federal facilities. Our bill would also allow FPS officers to carry firearms off duty, as most other Federal law enforcement officers can, allowing them to respond to incidents more quickly. And, finally, the bill includes several reporting requirements--on agency personnel needs, retention rates of contract guards, the feasibility of federalizing the contract guard workforce, and additional methods for preventing and detecting explosives in federal facilities.

Based on the Committee's and GAO's oversight work over the past several years, it is clear that Congress must move quickly to address the remaining security vulnerabilities associated with our Federal buildings.

I am confident that this comprehensive, bipartisan legislation will foster meaningful reform, modernize the Federal Protective Service, and improve the security of our Federal facilities across the country. I urge my colleagues to support the bill and I thank Senator Collins, Senator Akaka, former Senator Voinovich, and their dedicated staffs for helping to get this bill introduced today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Tribal Gaming Eligibility Act with my friend and colleague from Arizona, Senator Jon Kyl.

This bill requires that Indian tribes demonstrate both an aboriginal and a modern connection to the land before it can be used for gaming.

The bill responds to growing concerns and frustrations about the number of ``off-reservation'' casinos proposals in California and across the nation.

As of May 2010, the U.S. Department of Interior was considering 35 of these proposals. Eleven of them are in my home State.

Casinos strain local governments, increase violent crime, and increase bankruptcies. Gambling regulations are poorly enforced, largely because deficit-plagued state governments have cut enforcement staff down to the bone. Even when enforcement officials are present, highly protective ``State Compacts,'' protect tribal casinos from true scrutiny and legitimate oversight.

The fact is that some tribes have abused their unique right to operate casinos by taking land into trust miles away from their historical lands and miles away from where any tribal member resides. This is done to produce the most profitable casino, often with little regard to what is most beneficial to tribal members.

This unbridled reservation shopping is occurring with little to no input from local governments or neighboring tribes.

The result: 58 casinos in California; 11 more in the approval process; and a very real potential for an additional 50 casinos in the coming years.

That is why I am introducing the Tribal Gaming Eligibility Act. This legislation addresses the problems that arise from off-reservation casinos by requiring that tribes meet two simple conditions if they wish to game on lands acquired after the passage of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

First the tribe must demonstrate a ``substantial direct modern connection to the land.''

Second, the tribe must demonstrate a ``substantial direct aboriginal connection to the land.''

Simply put, tribes must demonstrate that both they and their ancestors have a connection to the land in question.

In 2000, California voters thought they settled the question of casino gaming when they passed Proposition 1A. This proposition authorized the governor to negotiate gambling compacts that would make Nevada-style casinos possible for ``federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands.''

The words ``on Indian lands'' were key to Proposition 1A. This made it clear that gaming is appropriate only on a tribe's historical lands, and voters endorsed this bargain with 65 percent of the vote.

But fast-forward 10 years and this agreement is being put to the test. In the last decade, the Department of the Interior has received dozens of gaming applications; some for casinos nowhere near a tribe's historic lands. Many of these requests have been granted and California has become ground zero for tribal casinos. We have 58 Las Vegas style casinos all across the State--from within miles of the Mexican border, to within miles of the Oregon border.

The problem is only going to get worse. There are 67 tribes currently seeking Federal recognition in California who will have the ability to take ``initial lands'' into trust for gaming. This ``initial lands'' exemption gives landless tribes carte blanche when it comes to picking a spot for their casino--urban areas, environmentally sensitive areas, you name it! That is a real concern to me and my constituents.

As of May 2010, there were 11 applications for off-reservation or restored lands casinos in California pending at the Department of the Interior. These include projects near San Francisco, Barstow, and Sacramento.

It also includes applications for casinos in San Diego and Riverside Counties, where there are already 21 existing casinos.

By seeking to open casinos in urban areas close to the greatest number of potential gamblers, instead of on historical lands, these tribes are ignoring the will of California voters and the intent of Congress when it passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

Unfortunately, without a legislative fix such as the Tribal Gaming Eligibility Act, Californians have no power to stop these tribes from opening unwanted casinos in their back yards.

But voters are still trying to make their voices heard, rejecting the idea of reservation shopping. At one location, in Richmond, CA, a city of nearly 100,000 in the middle of the Bay Area--a tribe proposed taking land into trust to open a 4,000-slot-machine casino. Proponents tout it as a major economic engine for a depressed area.

On November 2, Richmond voters made it clear how they feel: by a margin of 58 to 42 percent, voters overwhelmingly rejected the advisory Measure U on the Richmond casino and they elected two new city council members who strongly oppose the casino. It was an unambiguous rejection of this off-reservation gaming proposal.

Some people have tried to tell me that this is just a California problem, and that we just need a California-solution. I am afraid this is not the case.

The Department of the Interior is considering gaming applications for tribes in Washington, Oregon, Mississippi, Nevada, and Massachusetts just to name a few. I urge my colleagues to ask your constituents and your community leaders if they have were consulted about these proposals. Did they have any input? Were the needs of the cities, counties, and neighboring tribes considered?

As a former mayor, I know the financial pressures that local governments face, especially in these tough times. The temptation to support large casinos can be strong. But I also know the heavy price that society pays for the siren song of gambling. This price includes addiction and crime, strained public services and increased traffic congestion.

Some Indian gaming proponents, often backed by rich out-of-state investors and gambling syndicates, would have us believe that these off-reservation gaming establishments are a sign of growth and economic development.

In 2006 the California Research Bureau compiled research on the effects of casinos on communities, and they released a report entitled Gambling in the Golden State. The results were staggering.

The development of new casinos is associated with a 10 percent increase in violent crime and a 10 percent increase in bankruptcy rates.

New casinos are also associated with an increase in law enforcement expenditures of $15.34 per person.

California already spends an estimated $1 billion to deal with problem-gamblers and pathological-gamblers, 75 percent of which identify Indian casinos as their primary gambling preference.

This report confirmed what many local elected officials and community activists already knew: casinos may create a few jobs, but they come with a tremendous cost.

One reason for the high costs casinos is the woefully inadequate oversight at Indian gambling facilities.

In California, gaming oversight officials are responsible for over twice as much economic activity per inspector compared to their counterparts in states with legalized commercial gambling. Using the most recent data available from 2006:

California employed 180 gambling oversight officials to regulate $5.2 billion dollars in economic activity.

This means the State only employed 1 official for every $28.9 million dollars of economic activity in the gambling industry.

By comparison, the 11 States that had legalized commercial gambling averaged 1 oversight official per $12.1 million dollars of activity.

Furthermore, closed-door gaming compacts limit what little power these investigators actually have. They cannot conduct unannounced visits, they have little discretion on what penalties to enact, and they cannot enforce their punishments when they are handed down. Quite simply, it is a broken system.

I know that some may try to mischaracterize my legislation and say that I am trying to limit the sovereignty of Native American tribes or destroy their ability to undertake much needed economic development.

But I am here today to say that nothing could be farther from the truth.

The fact of the matter is that most casinos are appropriately placed--on historical tribal lands--and there is no need to argue about the legitimacy of these establishments.

My legislation only deals with those proposals that are truly beyond the scope of Congressional intent when the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was passed in 1988.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Lieberman and

Senator Akaka in introducing the SECURE Facilities Act of 2011-- Supporting Employee Competency and Updating Readiness Enhancements. This bill would help to improve inadequate security at too many of our Federal buildings.

As a Nation, we have learned several hard truths. Terrorists are intent on attacking the United States, and their tactics continue to evolve. The early identification of a security gap can save countless lives if we act promptly to close it. There is no substitute for pre- emptive action to detect, disrupt, and defend against terrorist plots.

As we remember the lives lost when terrorists attacked the United States in 2001, we must avoid complacency. Our country's defenses must be nimble, multi-layered, informed by timely intelligence and coordinated across multiple agencies.

This is difficult work, requiring painstaking attention to detail and an unwavering focus. We must remain vigilant about the threats we face. Unfortunately, the evidence indicates there are significant security problems at Federal buildings where thousands of employees serve thousands more of our citizens every work day.

The Federal Protective Service, FPS, is charged with securing nearly 9,000 Federal facilities and protecting the government employees who work in them, and the Americans who use them to access vital services.

But, independent investigations by the Government Accountability Office, at the request of our Committee, and the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General have documented serious and systemic security flaws within the operations of the FPS. These lapses place Federal employees and private citizens at risk.

In April and May of 2009, for example, GAO's undercover investigators smuggled bomb-making materials into 10 Federal office buildings. Every single building GAO targeted was breached--a perfect record of security failure. At each facility, concealed bomb components passed through checkpoints monitored by FPS guards. Once inside, the covert GAO investigators were able to assemble the simulated explosive devices without interruption.

A July 2009 GAO report documented training flaws for FPS contract guards, some of whom failed to receive mandatory training on the operation of metal detectors and x-ray equipment. Other contract guards were deficient in key certifications such as CPR, First Aid, and firearms training. All told, GAO found that 62 percent of the FPS contract guards it reviewed lacked valid certifications in one or more of these areas.

This review also found that FPS did little to ensure compliance with rules and regulations and failed to conduct inspections of guard posts after regular business hours. When GAO investigators tested these posts, they found some guards sleeping on an overnight shift.

In another example, an inattentive guard allowed a baby in a carrier to pass through an x-ray machine on its conveyor belt. That guard was fired, but he ultimately won a lawsuit against the FPS because the agency could not document that he had received required training on the machine.

A few months earlier, in April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General also found critical failings in the FPS contract guard program. The Inspector General's recommendations included many concrete steps to strengthen contract guard performance, such as improving the award and management of contracts and increasing the amount of training and number of compliance inspections.

These reports demonstrate that American taxpayers are simply not receiving the security they have paid for and that they expect FPS to provide. The reports also show the vulnerabilities facing Federal employees and federal infrastructure because of lax security.

While shining a light on these failings in multiple hearings, our Committee pressed FPS to take action to close these security gaps. Although some tentative steps have been taken by FPS, we can no longer wait for OMB and DHS to implement the absolutely critical security measures necessary to help protect our Federal buildings, our Federal employees, and the American public.

The legislation that I introduce today, with Senators Lieberman and Akaka, would help close these security gaps at our Federal buildings.

First, the bill would codify the Interagency Security Committee, which was established by Executive Order 6 months after the Oklahoma City bombing, to increase security standards at Federal facilities. The ISC, comprised of representatives from agencies across the government, would establish risk-based performance standards for the security of Federal buildings. FPS would then enforce these requirements based on the risk tier assigned the facility by the ISC.

Prior reports clearly demonstrate that FPS lacks authority to require tenant agencies of a Federal facility to comply with recommended security countermeasures.

For example, although FPS may ask tenant agencies to purchase or repair security equipment like cameras and x-ray machines, these tenant agencies can refuse to purchase or repair the equipment based on cost. Since FPS has no enforcement mechanism, these machines are not upgraded, or remain inoperable, and security suffers. With so much at stake, tenant agencies should not be able to effectively overrule the security experts on the ISC and at FPS.

To address this problem, our legislation would provide FPS the authority needed to mandate the implementation of security measures at a facility. FPS also would have the authority to inspect Federal facilities to enforce compliance.

The bill would allow the FPS Director to charge additional fees if tenant agencies fail to comply with applicable security standards. In such cases, the Secretary also must notify Congress of the non- compliant facilities.

Our bill also would require an independent analysis of FPS's long- term staffing needs.

The government has an obligation to protect our Nation's security, and our Federal buildings are targets for violence. This legislation would provide FPS with stronger authority to improve security at our Federal buildings.

The American public that relies on these facilities and the Federal employees who work in them deserve better and more reliable protection.

Mr. President, along with Senator Isakson, today I am introducing a bill to allow veterans with disabilities who utilize service dogs the same access to VA health care and facilities as those using guide dogs. Right now, a vet who has a seeing-eye dog can go into any VA hospital to get services, but it is at the discretion of each facility whether or not to allow a vet to bring a service dog, which they use for mobility, assistance with living with hearing loss, comfort for those experiencing PTSD, and to alert others if they have a seizure.

This bill will provide for full access to all veterans at every VA facility, without exception. There should not be a variation in policy from one VA facility to another. It is a small but laudable goal to promote the access of persons with disabilities at VA facilities and guarantee all veterans, regardless of their disability, receive the care and services they need and are entitled to through their selfless service to our Nation.

Mr. President, along with Senator Isakson, today I am introducing a bill to allow veterans with disabilities who utilize service dogs the same access to VA health care and facilities as those using guide dogs. Right now, a vet who has a seeing-eye dog can go into any VA hospital to get services, but it is at the discretion of each facility whether or not to allow a vet to bring a service dog, which they use for mobility, assistance with living with hearing loss, comfort for those experiencing PTSD, and to alert others if they have a seizure.

This bill will provide for full access to all veterans at every VA facility, without exception. There should not be a variation in policy from one VA facility to another. It is a small but laudable goal to promote the access of persons with disabilities at VA facilities and guarantee all veterans, regardless of their disability, receive the care and services they need and are entitled to through their selfless service to our Nation.