Reserved for the Minority Leader.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise with a sense of moral indignation that we would want to block parents from loving their children, children from loving their parents, and deporting persons who have no reason to criminally act in this Nation.

I join with the President in saying let us keep families and deport felons. That is a discretion that is given by the law to allow Presidents to take care and ensure that the laws are enforced properly.

This legislation is wrongheaded and misdirected. Allow me to say that this November 20 executive order is now being retroactively judged by this Congress. That is not the Congress' responsibility. The Congress, if they desire to do so, as they have done on many occasions, is to bring this to the judicial courts. But if they do so, they will find that the law has dictated that courts grant without much interest in deciding whether or not an administrative decision has been made with fault. The President, through his executive order, is making an administrative decision in terms of how laws are prosecuted.

Just yesterday, the State of Texas and a number of other States filed a lawsuit against the executive actions announced by the President on November 20. Much to my surprise--and, of course, with great joy--the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have already issued a decision, dismissing such a complaint. It did so in 1997 when Governor George W. Bush was arguing that the Federal Government's failure to enforce our immigration laws violated article I, and the court rejected Texas' argument that the Federal Government had breached a nondiscretionary duty to control immigration under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Specifically, the court said: ``We are not aware of and have difficulty conceiving of any judicially discoverable standards for determining whether immigration control efforts by Congress are constitutionally adequate.'' Why? Because there is an interpretation of the law and an administrative component of the law.

Likewise, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Court said: ``An agency's decision not to take enforcement actions is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act because a court has no workable standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.''

The President of the United States is not exercising discretion of executive order. He is instructing and giving guidance to administrative agencies who will make decisions accordingly to the framework of making sure that those who are felons are out but families are not.

If you want to stop human trafficking, if you want to have a conscience in this Nation, if you want to protect the vulnerable, if you want to keep young people who are bright-eyed simply to serve in the United States military----

I thank the gentleman for his kindness.

Mr. Speaker, if you want to recognize those individuals who have come here to do what is right and if you want to stop the siege of human trafficking, as I have said, where Houston is the epicenter of such, where we see it every day, where people are out of the shadows, if you want to do that, then you will vote against this misdirected law and you will read the constitutional dictates--first from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, then from the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States--and understand that the President has the executive authority to do just what he has done, to be a moral keeper and to give discretion to the law.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the rule governing debate of H.R. 5759, the so-called ``Preventing Executive Overreach On Immigration Act,'' and the underlying bill.

I oppose the rule and the underlying bill because it is nothing more than the Republican majority's latest partisan attack on the President and another diversionary tactic to avoid addressing the challenge posed by the nation's broken immigration system.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5759, which by all appearances was hastily introduced on November 20, 2014, without evident deliberation for the ostensible purpose of establishing a retroactive ``rule of construction clarifying the limitations on executive authority to provide certain forms of immigration relief.''

As originally drafted and introduced the bill provided:

No provision of the United States Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act, or other Federal law shall be interpreted or applied to authorize the executive branch of the Government to exempt, by Executive order, regulation, or any other means, categories of persons unlawfully present in the United States from removal under the immigration laws (as such term is defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).

Any action by the executive branch with the purpose of circumventing the objectives of this statute shall be null and void and without legal effect.

Although the bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, upon which I have served throughout my ten terms in Congress, no hearing or markup of the bill was ever held. And it shows.

The most obvious and fatal flaw in the bill as introduced and considered by the Rules Committee is its attempt to dictate to the federal judiciary how the Constitution is to be interpreted--``No provision of the United States Constitution . . . shall be interpreted or applied to authorize the executive branch . . .''

Mr. Speaker, it has been settled law for 211 years, since 1803, when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison that the federal courts, and ultimately, the Supreme Court are the arbiters when it comes to interpreting the Constitution and the laws. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury:

``It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.''

Had regular order been followed and this ill-conceived bill been subject to hearing and markup this fatal deficiency would have been revealed and made plain and the bill likely would have died a quiet death.

Mr. Speaker, because H.R. 5759 was so poorly conceived and drafted, it would have embarrassed the Republican leadership to bring the bill to floor in its original form so the bill was amended in the Rules Committee, which made in order an Amendment in the

Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that tries--but does not succeed--in remedying the many deficiencies of the original bill.

As amended and reported by the Rules Committee, H.R. 5759 seeks to prohibit the executive branch from exempting or deferring from deportation any immigrants considered to be unlawfully present in the United States under U.S. immigration law, and to prohibit the administration from treating those immigrants as if they were lawfully present or had lawful immigration status.

The amended bill now includes three exceptions to this prohibition:

1. ``to the extent prohibited by the Constitution:''

2. ``upon the request of Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies, for purposes of maintaining aliens in the United States to be tried for crimes or to be witnesses at trial''; and

3. ``for humanitarian purposes where the aliens are at imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death.''

The amended bill seeks to make November 20, 2014 the effective date of these prohibitions--thereby retroactively blocking the executive actions taken on that date by President Obama to address our broken immigration system by providing smarter enforcement at the border, prioritize deporting felons--not families--and allowing certain undocumented immigrants, including the parents of U.S. citizens and lawful residents, who pass a criminal background check and pay taxes to temporarily stay in the U.S. without fear of deportation.

Mr. Speaker, let me briefly discuss why the executive actions taken by President Obama are reasonable, responsible, and within his constitutional authority.

Under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, the President, the nation's Chief Executive, ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.''

In addition to establishing the President's obligation to execute the law, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Take Care Clause as ensuring presidential control over those who execute and enforce the law and the authority to decide how best to enforce the laws. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States; Bowsher v. Synar; Buckley v. Valeo; Printz v. United States; Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.

Every law enforcement agency, including the agencies that enforce immigration laws, has ``prosecutorial discretion''--the power to decide whom to investigate, arrest, detain, charge, and prosecute.

Agencies, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), may develop discretionary policies specific to the laws they are charged with enforcing, the population they serve, and the problems they face so that they can prioritize resources to meet mission critical enforcement goals.

Executive authority to take action is thus ``fairly wide'', indeed the federal government's discretion is extremely ``broad''; as the Supreme Court held in the recent case of Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012), an opinion written Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts:

``Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so. Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law. Removal is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal.'' (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

The Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, also strongly suggests that the executive branch's discretion in matters of deportation may be exercised on an individual basis, or it may be used to protect entire classes of individuals such as ``[u]nauthorized workers trying to support their families'' or immigrants who originate from countries torn apart by internal conflicts:

``Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service.

Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation's international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return.

The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation's foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.''

Mr. Speaker, in exercising his broad discretion in the area of removal proceedings, President Obama has acted responsibly and reasonably in determining the circumstances in which it makes sense to pursue removal and when it does not.

In exercising this broad discretion, President Obama has not done anything that is novel or unprecedented.

Here are just a few examples of executive action taken by several presidents, both Republican and Democratic, on issues affecting immigrants over the past 35 years:

1. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter exercised parole authority to allow Cubans to enter the U.S., and about 123,000 ``Mariel Cubans'' were paroled into the U.S. by 1981.

2. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan used executive action in 1987 to allow 200,000 Nicaraguans facing deportation to apply for relief from expulsion and work authorization.

3. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued an executive order that granted Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) to certain nationals of the People's Republic of China who were in the United States.

4. In 1992, the Bush administration granted DED to certain nationals of El Salvador.

5. In 1997, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order granting DED to certain Haitians who had arrived in the United States before Dec. 31, 1995.

6. In 2010 the Obama administration began a policy of granting parole to the spouses, parents, and children of military members.

Mr. Speaker, because of the President's leadership and far-sighted executive action, 594,000 undocumented immigrants in my home state of Texas are eligible for deferred action.

If these immigrants are able to remain united with their families and receive a temporary work permit, it would lead to a $338 million increase in tax revenues, over five years.

Mr. Speaker, the President's laudable executive actions are a welcome development but not a substitute modernizing the nation's immigration laws. Only Congress can do that.

America's borders are dynamic, with constantly evolving security challenges. Border security must be undertaken in a manner that allows actors to use pragmatism and common sense.

And as shown by the success of H.R. 17, the bipartisan ``Border Security Results Act, which I helped to write and introduced along with the senior leaders of the House Homeland Security Committee, we can do this without putting the nation at risk or rejecting our national heritage as a welcoming and generous nation.

This legislation has been incorporated in H.R. 15, the bipartisan ``Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,'' legislation which reflects nearly all of the core principles announced earlier this year by House Republicans.

As a nation of immigrants, the United States has set the example for the world as to what can be achieved when people of diverse backgrounds, cultures, and experiences come together.

It is now time to open the golden symbolized by Lady Liberty's lamp to the immigrant community of today so they can participate fully in the American Dream.

These loyal and law-abiding persons have been waiting patiently for far too long for their chance.

We can and should seize this historic opportunity to pass legislation to ensure that we have in place adequate systems and resources to secure our borders while at the same time preserving America's character as the most open and welcoming country in the history of the world and to reap the hundreds of billions of dollars in economic productivity that will result from comprehensive immigration reform.

President Obama has acted boldly, responsibly, and compassionately in exercising his constitutional authority to enforce the immigration laws in an effective and humane manner.

If congressional Republicans, who have refused to debate comprehensive immigration reform legislation for more than 500 days, disapprove of the lawful actions taken by the President, an alternative course of action is readily available to them: pass a bill and send it to the President for signature.

The President has shown responsible leadership. The next step is up to congressional Republicans.

I urge all Members to join me in opposing the rule and the underlying bill.

Just yesterday, the State of Texas and a number of other States filed a lawsuit challenging the executive actions announced by the President on November 20. The lawsuit,

which will be known as Texas v. United States of America, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Much to my surprise, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have already issued a decision dismissing the Complaint. In the case of Texas v. United States--sound similar?--the Fifth Circuit in 1997 dismissed a lawsuit by then Governor George W. Bush arguing that the Federal Government's failure to enforce our immigration laws violated Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution--the Naturalization Clause. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Texas's argument that the Federal Government had breached a nondiscretionary duty to control immigration under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In rejecting the Naturalization Clause argument, the Fifth Circuit wrote that ``A judicial action presents a nonjusticiable political question not amenable to judicial resolution where there is . . . a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.'' In this case, the Court stated plainly that ``We are not aware of and have difficulty conceiving of any judicially discoverable standards for determining whether immigration control efforts by Congress are constitutionally adequate.'' Of course the President lawsuit challenges the enforcement actions of the President, not of Congress, but the broader point is the same.

In rejecting the statutory claim brought by Texas, the Court cited the Administrative Procedure Act and Heckler v. Chaney--the Supreme Court's leading case on the non-reviewability of agency decisions not to take enforcement actions--for the proposition that ``An agency's decision not to take enforcement actions is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act because a court has no workable standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.''

At a time when illegal border crossings was at its peak--1.5 million returns each year in 1996 and 1997--the Court stated: ``We reject out- of-hand the State's contention that the federal defendants' alleged systemic failure to control immigration is so extreme as to constitute a reviewable abdication of duty. The State does not contend that federal defendants are doing nothing to enforce the immigration laws or that they have consciously decided to abdicate their enforcement responsibilities. Real or perceived inadequate enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.''

During this President's tenure, well over 2 million people have been formally removed from this country. Prosecutions for illegal entry and reentry after removal have increased exponentially. And even if 5 million people come forward and receive temporary protection from removal through DACA and the new Deferred Action for Parental Accountability program, there will still be well over 6 million undocumented immigrants who have received no such protection. With funds to deport no more than 400,000 people each year I assure my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that the President is in no danger of ``doing nothing to enforce the immigration laws'' and that he had not ``consciously decided to abdicate [his] enforcement responsibilities.''

The argument that the President has declared that he will no longer enforce our immigration laws is offensive to the 34,000 people-- including thousands of women and children--who are sitting in detention centers today waiting for their day in court. It is also frivolous.

The lawsuit filed yesterday will fail and this bill never will become law. Rather, the President's actions will soon take effect and will bring a small measure of sanity to our broken immigration system.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the rule governing debate of H.R. 5759, the so-called ``Preventing Executive Overreach On Immigration Act,'' and the underlying bill.

I oppose the rule and the underlying bill because it is nothing more than the Republican majority's latest partisan attack on the President and another diversionary tactic to avoid addressing the challenge posed by the nation's broken immigration system.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5759, which by all appearances was hastily introduced on November 20, 2014, without evident deliberation for the ostensible purpose of establishing a retroactive ``rule of construction clarifying the limitations on executive authority to provide certain forms of immigration relief.''

As originally drafted and introduced the bill provided:

No provision of the United States Constitution, the

Immigration and Nationality Act, or other Federal law shall

be interpreted or applied to authorize the executive branch

of the Government to exempt, by Executive order, regulation,

or any other means, categories of persons unlawfully present

in the United States from removal under the immigration laws

(as such term is defined in section 101 of the Immigration

and Nationality Act).

Any action by the executive branch with the purpose of

circumventing the objectives of this statute shall be null

and void and without legal effect.

Although the bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, upon which I have served throughout my ten terms in Congress, no hearing or markup of the bill was ever held. And it shows.

The most obvious and fatal flaw in the bill as introduced and considered by the Rules Committee is its attempt to dictate to the federal judiciary how the Constitution is to be interpreted--``No provision of the United States Constitution . . . shall be interpreted or applied to authorize the executive branch . . .''

Mr. Speaker, it has been settled law for 211 years, since 1803, when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison that the federal courts, and ultimately, the Supreme Court are the arbiters when it comes to interpreting the Constitution and the laws. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule

to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret

that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts

must decide on the operation of each.

Had regular order been followed and this ill-conceived bill been subject to hearing and markup this fatal deficiency would have been revealed and made plain and the bill likely would have died a quiet death.

Mr. Speaker, because H.R. 5759 was so poorly conceived and drafted, it would have embarrassed the Republican leadership to bring the bill to floor in its original form so the bill was amended in the Rules Committee, which made in order an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that tries--but does not succeed--in remedying the many deficiencies of the original bill.

As amended and reported by the Rules Committee, H.R. 5759 seeks to prohibit the executive branch from exempting or deferring from deportation any immigrants considered to be unlawfully present in the United States under U.S. immigration law, and to prohibit the administration from treating those immigrants as if they were lawfully present or had lawful immigration status.

The amended bill now includes three exceptions to this prohibition:

1. ``to the extent prohibited by the Constitution;''

2. ``upon the request of Federal, State, or local law

enforcement agencies, for purposes of maintaining aliens in

the United States to be tried for crimes or to be witnesses

at trial''; and

3. ``for humanitarian purposes where the aliens are at

imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death.''

The amended bill seeks to make November 20, 2014 the effective date of these prohibitions--thereby retroactively blocking the executive actions taken on that date by President Obama to address our broken immigration system by providing smarter enforcement at the border, prioritize deporting felons--not families--and allowing certain undocumented immigrants, including the parents of U.S. citizens and lawful residents, who pass a criminal background check and pay taxes to temporarily stay in the U.S. without fear of deportation.

Mr. Speaker, let me briefly discuss why the executive actions taken by President Obama are reasonable, responsible, and within his constitutional authority.

Under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, the President, the nation's Chief Executive, ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.''

In addition to establishing the President's obligation to execute the law, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Take Care Clause as ensuring presidential control over those who execute and enforce the law and the authority to decide how best to enforce the laws. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States; Bowsher v. Synar; Buckley v. Valeo; Printz v. United States; Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.

Every law enforcement agency, including the agencies that enforce immigration laws, has ``prosecutorial discretion''--the power to decide whom to investigate, arrest, detain, charge, and prosecute.

Agencies, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), may develop discretionary policies specific to the laws they are charged with enforcing, the population they serve, and the problems they face so that they can prioritize resources to meet mission critical enforcement goals.

Executive authority to take action is thus ``fairly wide,'' indeed the federal government's discretion is extremely ``broad'' as the Supreme Court held in the recent case of Arizona V. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012), an opinion written Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts:

Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the

United States and the procedures for doing so. Aliens may be

removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have

been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set

by federal law. Removal is a civil, not criminal, matter. A

principal feature of the removal system is the broad

discretion exercised by immigration officials. Federal

officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes

sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings

commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary

relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to

leave without formal removal. (emphasis added) (citations

omitted).

The Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, also strongly suggests that the executive branch's discretion in matters of deportation may be exercised on an individual basis, or it may be used to protect entire classes of individuals such as ``[u]nauthorized workers trying to support their families'' or immigrants who originate from countries torn apart by internal conflicts:

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces

immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to

support their families, for example, likely pose less danger

than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.

The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors,

including whether the alien has children born in the United

States, long ties to the community, or a record of

distinguished military service.

Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that

bear on this Nation's international relations. Returning an

alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even

where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet

the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in

civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring

conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his

family will be harmed upon return.

The dynamic nature of relations with other countries

requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement

policies are consistent with this Nation's foreign policy

with respect to these and other realities.

Mr. Speaker, in exercising his broad discretion in the area of removal proceedings, President Obama has acted responsibly and reasonably in determining the circumstances in which it makes sense to pursue removal and when it does not.

In exercising this broad discretion, President Obama has not done anything that is novel or unprecedented.

Here are a just a few examples of executive action taken by several presidents, both Republican and Democratic, on issues affecting immigrants over the past 35 years:

1. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter exercised parole authority to allow Cubans to enter the U.S., and about 123,000 ``Mariel Cubans'' were paroled into the U.S. by 1981.

2. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan used executive action in 1987 to allow 200,000 Nicaraguans facing deportation to apply for relief from expulsion and work authorization.

3. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued an executive order that granted Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) to certain nationals of the People's Republic of China who were in the United States.

4. In 1992, the Bush administration granted DED to certain nationals of El Salvador.

5. In 1997, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order granting DED to certain Haitians who had arrived in the United States before Dec. 31, 1995.

6. In 2010 the Obama administration began a policy of granting parole to the spouses, parents, and children of military members.

Mr. Speaker, because of the President's leadership and far-sighted executive action, 594,000 undocumented immigrants in my home state of Texas are eligible for deferred action.

If these immigrants are able to remain united with their families and receive a temporary work permit, it would lead to a $338 million increase in tax revenues, over five years.

Mr. Speaker, the President's laudable executive actions are a welcome development but

not a substitute modernizing the nation's immigration laws. Only Congress can do that.

America's borders are dynamic, with constantly evolving security challenges. Border security must be undertaken in a manner that allows actors to use pragmatism and common sense.

And as shown by the success of H.R. 17, the bipartisan ``Border Security Results Act, which I helped to write and introduced along with the senior leaders of the House Homeland Security Committee, we can do this without putting the nation at risk or rejecting our national heritage as a welcoming and generous nation.

This legislation has been incorporated in H.R. 15, the bipartisan ``Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,'' legislation which reflects nearly all of the core principles announced earlier this year by House Republicans.

As a nation of immigrants, the United States has set the example for the world as to what can be achieved when people of diverse backgrounds, cultures, and experiences come together.

It is now time to open the golden symbolized by Lady Liberty's lamp to the immigrant community of today so they can participate fully in the American Dream.

These loyal and law-abiding persons have been waiting patiently for far too long for their chance.

We can and should seize this historic opportunity pass legislation to ensure that we have in place adequate systems and resources to secure our borders while at the same time preserving America's character as the most open and welcoming country in the history of the world and to reap the hundreds of billions of dollars in economic productivity that will result from comprehensive immigration reform.

President Obama has acted boldly, responsibly, and compassionately in exercising his constitutional authority to enforce the immigration laws in an effective and humane manner.

If congressional Republicans, who have refused to debate comprehensive immigration reform legislation for more than 500 days, disapprove of the lawful actions taken by the President, an alternative course of action is readily available to them: pass a bill and send it to the President for signature.

The President has shown responsible leadership. The next step is up to congressional Republicans.

I urge all Members to join me in opposing the rule and the underlying bill.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, everyone in Congress and most people in this country understand that our immigration system is broken and needs to be fixed. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle have blocked a bipartisan Senate bill from coming to the floor, and President Obama has taken action that he is legally permitted and morally obligated to take.

Executive orders are not unusual. Every President since President Eisenhower has used this authority to take action on immigration issues, including six Republican Presidents.

So, Mr. Speaker, when the gentleman from Florida said voting against his bill is like voting against the Constitution, I suggest it is just the opposite. The contours for the executive authority of the President are defined in the Constitution and by precedent of the courts. There is no question that the President has the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in this regard. So, in fact, voting for this bill undermines the Constitution because the executive authority of the President is set forth in the Constitution of the United States.

We all recognize there are 11 million undocumented residents of this country. We don't allocate resources to deport all 11 million. We allocate resources to deport about 400,000, which means, by definition, we are asking the department to set priorities in deciding whom to deport. Setting those priorities ensures that they deport the most serious offenders, people who pose threats to our communities.

That act of prosecutorial discretion is what is reflected in the President's executive order.

It is very important to understand that there is practically very little question from legal scholars.

I insert in the Record a letter which has the signature of 136 law professors who support the constitutionality of this provision, as well as a separate letter from additional titans in the legal community, beginning with President Lee Bollinger from Columbia University, Adam Cox from New York University, Walter Dellinger, and several other legal scholars.

25 November 2014.

We write as scholars and teachers of immigration law who

have reviewed the executive actions announced by the

President on November 20, 2014. It is our considered view

that the expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood

Arrivals (DACA) and establishment of the Deferred Action for

Parental Accountability (DAPA) programs are within the legal

authority of the executive branch of the government of the

United States. To explain, we cite federal statutes,

regulations, and historical precedents. We do not express any

views on the policy aspects of these two executive actions.

This letter updates a letter transmitted by 136 law

professors to the White House on

September 3, 2014, on the role of executive action in

immigration law. We focus on the legal basis for granting

certain noncitizens in the United States ``deferred action''

status as a temporary reprieve from deportation. One of these

programs, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), was

established by executive action in June 2012. On November 20,

the President announced the expansion of eligibility criteria

for DACA and the creation of a new program, Deferred Action

for Parental Accountability (DAPA).

Prosecutorial discretion in immigration law enforcement

Both November 20 executive actions relating to deferred

action are exercises of prosecutorial discretion.

Prosecutorial discretion refers to the authority of the

Department of Homeland Security to decide how the immigration

laws should be applied. Prosecutorial discretion is a long-

accepted legal practice in practically every law enforcement

context, unavoidable whenever the appropriated resources do

not permit 100 percent enforcement. In immigration

enforcement, prosecutorial discretion covers both agency

decisions to refrain from acting on enforcement like

cancelling or not serving or filing a charging document to

Notice to Appear with the immigration court, as well as

decisions to provide a discretionary remedy like granting a

stay of removal, parole, or deferred action.

Prosecutorial discretion provides a temporary reprieve from

deportation. Some forms of prosecutorial discretion, like

deferred action, confer ``lawful presence'' and the ability

to apply for work authorization. However, the benefits of the

deferred action programs announced on November 20 are not

unlimited. The DACA and DAPA programs, like any other

exercise of prosecutorial discretion do not provide an

independent means to obtain permanent residence in the United

States, nor do they allow a noncitizen to acquire eligibility

to apply for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. As the

President has emphasized, only Congress can prescribe the

qualifications for permanent resident status or citizenship.

Statutory authority and long-standing agency practice

Focusing first on statutes enacted by Congress, Sec. 103(a)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'' or the

``Act''), clearly empowers the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) to make choices about immigration enforcement.

That section provides: ``The Secretary of Homeland Security

shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of

this Act and all other laws relating to the immigration and

naturalization of aliens . . . .'' INA Sec. 242(g) recognizes

the executive branch's legal authority to exercise

prosecutorial discretion, specifically by barring judicial

review of three particular types of prosecutorial discretion

decisions: to commence removal proceedings, to adjudicate

cases, and to execute removal orders. In other sections of

the Act, Congress has explicitly recognized deferred action

by name, as a tool that the executive branch may use, in the

exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, to protect certain

victims of abuse, crime or trafficking. Another statutory

provision, INA Sec. 274A(h)(3), recognizes executive branch

authority to authorize employment for noncitizens who do not

otherwise receive it automatically by virtue of their

particular immigration status. This provision (and the formal

regulations noted below) confer the work authorization

eligibility that is part of both the DACA and DAPA programs.

Based on this statutory foundation, the application of

prosecutorial discretion to individuals or groups has been

part of the immigration system for many years. Longstanding

provisions of the formal regulations promulgated under the

Act (which have the force of law) reflect the prominence of

prosecutorial discretion in immigration law. Deferred action

is expressly defined in one regulation as ``an act of

administrative convenience to the government which gives some

cases lower priority'' and goes on to authorize work permits

for those who receive deferred action. Agency memoranda

further reaffirm the role of prosecutorial discretion in

immigration law. In 1976, President Ford's Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel Sam Bernsen

stated in a legal opinion, ``The reasons for the exercise of

prosecutorial discretion are both practical and humanitarian.

There simply are not enough resources to enforce all of the

rules and regulations presently on the books.' In 2000, a

memorandum on prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters

issued by INS Commissioner Doris Meissner provided that

[s]ervice officers are not only authorized by law but

expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all

stages of the enforcement process,'' and spelled out the

factors that should guide those decisions. In 2011,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of

Homeland Security published guidance known as the ``Morton

Memo,'' outlining more than one dozen factors, including

humanitarian factors, for employees to consider in deciding

whether prosecutorial discretion should be exercised. These

factors--now updated by the November 20 executive actions--

include tender or elderly age, long-time lawful permanent

residence, and serious health conditions.

Judicial recognition of executive branch prosecutorial discretion in

immigration cases

Federal courts have also explicitly recognized

prosecutorial discretion in general and deferred action in

particular: Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in its

Arizona v. United States decision in 2012: ``A principal

feature of the removal system is the broad discretion

exercised by immigration officials . . . Federal officials,

as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to

pursue removal at all . . .'' In its 1999 decision in Reno v.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Supreme

Court explicitly recognized deferred action by name. This

affirmation of the role of discretion is consistent with

congressional appropriations for immigration enforcement,

which are at an annual level that would allow for the arrest,

detention, and deportation of fewer than 4 percent of the

noncitizens in the United States who lack lawful immigration

status.

Based on statutory authority, U.S. immigration agencies

have a long history of exercising prosecutorial discretion

for a range of reasons that include economic or humanitarian

considerations, especially--albeit not only--when the

noncitizens involved have strong family ties or long-term

residence in the United States. Prosecutorial discretion,

including deferred action, has been made available on both a

case-by-case basis and a group basis, as are true under DACA

and DAPA. But even when a program like deferred action has

been aimed at a particular group of people, individuals must

apply, and the agency must exercise its discretion based on

the facts of each individual case. Both DACA and DAPA

explicitly incorporate that requirement.

Historical precedents for deferred action and similar programs for

individuals and groups

As examples of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,

numerous administrations have issued directives providing

deferred action or functionally similar forms of

prosecutorial discretion to groups of noncitizens, often to

large groups. The administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan

and George H.W. Bush deferred the deportations of a then-

predicted (though ultimately much lower) 1.5 million

noncitizen spouses and children of immigrants who qualified

for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act

(IRCA) of 1986, authorizing work permits for the spouses.

Presidents Reagan and Bush took these actions, even though

Congress had decided to exclude them from IRCA. Among the

many other examples of significant deferred action or similar

programs are two during the George W. Bush administration: a

deferred action program in 2005 for foreign academic students

affected by Hurricane Katrina, and ``Deferred Enforcement

Departure'' for certain Liberians in 2007.'' Several decades

earlier, the Reagan administration issued a form of

prosecutorial discretion called ``Extended Voluntary

Departure'' in 1981 to thousands of Polish nationals. The

legal sources and historical examples of immigration

prosecutorial discretion described above are by no means

exhaustive, but they underscore the legal authority for an

administration to apply prosecutorial discretion to both

individuals and groups.

Some have suggested that the size of the group who may

``benefit'' from an act of prosecutorial discretion is

relevant to its legality. We are unaware of any legal

authority for such an assumption. Notably, the Reagan-Bush

programs of the late 1980s and early 1990s were based on an

initial estimated percentage of the unauthorized population

(about 40 percent) that is comparable to the initial

estimated percentage for the November 20 executive actions.

The President could conceivably decide to cap the number of

people who can receive prosecutorial discretion or make the

conditions restrictive enough to keep the numbers small, but

this would be a policy choice, not a legal issue. For all of

these reasons, the President is not ``re-writing'' the

immigration laws, as some of his critics have suggested. He

is doing precisely the opposite--exercising a discretion

conferred by the immigration laws and settled general

principles of enforcement discretion.

The Constitution and immigration enforcement discretion

Critics have also suggested that the deferred action

programs announced on November 20 violate the President's

constitutional duty to ``take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed.'' A serious legal question would

therefore arise if the executive branch were to halt all

immigration enforcement, or even if the Administration were

to refuse to substantially spend the resources appropriated

by Congress. In either of those scenarios, the justification

based on resource limitations would not apply. But the Obama

administration has fully utilized all the enforcement

resources Congress has appropriated. It has enforced the

immigration law at record levels through apprehensions,

investigations, and detentions that have resulted in over two

million removals. At the same time that the President

announced the November 20 executive actions that we discuss

here, he also announced revised enforcement priorities to

focus on removing the most serious criminal offenders and

further shoring up the southern border. Nothing in the

President's actions will prevent him from continuing to

remove as many violators as the resources Congress has given

him permit.

Moreover, when prosecutorial discretion is exercised,

particularly when the numbers are large, there is no legal

barrier to formalizing that policy decision through sound

procedures that include a formal application and

dissemination of the relevant criteria to the

officers charged with implementing the program and to the

public. As DACA has shown, those kinds of procedures assure

that important policy decisions are made at the leadership

level, help officers to implement policy decisions fairly and

consistently, and offer the public the transparency that

government priority decisions require in a democracy.

Conclusion

Our conclusion is that the expansion of the DACA program

and the establishment of Deferred Action for Parental

Accountability are legal exercises of prosecutorial

discretion. Both executive actions are well within the legal

authority of the executive branch of the government of the

United States.

Hiroshi Motomura & Susan Westerberg Prager, University of

California, Los Angeles, School of Law*; Shoba Sivaprasad

Wadhia, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of

Law; Stephen H. Legomsky, Washington University School of

Law; David Abraham, University of Miami School of Law; Raquel

Aldana, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law;

Farrin R. Anello, Seton Hall University School of Law;

Deborah Anker, Harvard Law School; Sabrineh Ardalan, Harvard

Law School; David C. Baluarte, Washington and Lee University

School of Law; Melynda Barnhart, New York Law School; Jon

Bauer, University of Connecticut School of Law; Lenni B.

Benson, New York Law School; Jacqueline Bhabha, Harvard Law

School;

Linda Bosniak, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden;

Richard A. Boswell, U.C. Hastings College of the Law; Jason

A. Cade, University of Georgia Law School; Janet Calvo, CUNY

School of Law, New York; Kristina M. Campbell, University of

the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law; Stacy

Caplow, Brooklyn Law School; Benjamin Casper, University of

Minnesota Law School; Linus Chan, University of Minnesota;

Howard F. Chang, University of Pennsylvania Law School;

Michael J. Churgin, University of Texas at Austin; Marisa

Cianciarulo, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law;

Evelyn Cruz, Arizona State University; Ingrid Eagly, UCLA

School of Law; Philip Eichorn, Cleveland State--Cleveland

Marshall School of Law;

Bram T. Elias, University of Iowa College of Law; Stella

Burch Elias, University of Iowa College of Law; Jill E.

Family, Widener University School of Law; Niels Frenzen,

University of Southern California; Maryellen Fullerton,

Brooklyn Law School; Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez,

University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Lauren Gilbert,

St. Thomas University School of Law; Denise L. Gilman,

University of Texas School of Law; John F. Gossart, Jr.,

University of Maryland School of Law; P. Gulasekaram, Santa

Clara University; Anju Gupta, Rutgers School of Law--Newark;

Susan R. Gzesh, University of Chicago; Jonathan Hafetz, Seton

Hall University; Dina Francesca Haynes, New England Law,

Boston; Susan Hazeldean, Cornell Law School;

Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Chapman University; Laura A.

Hernandez, Baylor Law School; Michael Heyman, John Marshall

Law School; Barbara Hines, University of Texas School of Law;

Laila L. Hlass, Boston University School of Law; Geoffrey

Hoffman, University of Houston Law Center; Mary Holper,

Boston College Law School; Alan Hyde, Rutgers University

School of Law--Newark; Kate Jastram, University of

California, Berkeley, School of Law; Kit Johnson, University

of Oklahoma College of Law; Anil Kalhan, Drexel University

Kline School of Law; Daniel Kanstroom, Boston College Law

School; Elizabeth Keyes, University of Baltimore School of

Law; Kathleen Kim, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; David C.

Koelsch, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; Jennifer

Lee Koh, Western State College of Law;

Kevin Lapp, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Christopher

Lasch, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Jennifer J.

Lee, Temple University Beasley School of Law; Stephen Lee,

University of California, Irvine; Christine Lin, University

of California, Hastings College of the Law; Beth Lyon,

Villanova University School of Law; Stephen Manning, Lewis &

Clark College; Lynn Marcus, University of Arizona James E.

Rogers College of Law; Miriam H. Marton, University of Tulsa

College of Law; Elizabeth McCormick, University of Tulsa

College of Law; M. Isabel Medina, Loyola University New

Orleans College of Law; Stephen Meili, University of

Minnesota Law School; Vanessa Merton, Pace University School

of Law; Andrew Moore, University of Detroit Mercy School of

Law; Jennifer Moore, University of New Mexico School of Law;

Daniel I. Morales, DePaul University College of Law; Nancy

Morawetz, NYU School of Law; Karen Musalo, U.C. Hastings

College of the Law; Alizabeth Newman, CUNY School of Law;

Noah Novogrodsky, University of Wyoming College of Law;

Fernando A. Nunez, Charlotte School of Law; Mariela Olivares,

Howard University School of Law; Michael A. Olivas,

University of Houston Law Center; Patrick D. O'Neill, Esq.,

University of Puerto Rico School of Law; Sarah Paoletti,

University of Pennsylvania Law School; Sunita Patel, American

University, Washington College of Law; Huyen Pham, Texas A&M

University School of Law; Michele R. Pistone, Villanova

University School of Law; Luis F.B. Plascencia, Arizona State

University; Polly J. Price, Emory University School of Law;

Doris Marie Provine, Arizona State University; Nina Rabin,

James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona;

Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Temple University, Beasley School of

Law; Renee C. Redman, University of Connecticut School of

Law; Ediberto Roman, Florida International University; Victor

C. Romero, Penn State Law; Joseph H. Rosen, Atlanta's John

Marshall Law School; Carrie Rosenbaum, Golden Gate University

School of Law; Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Northeastern University

School of Law; Ruben G. Rumbaut, University of California,

Irvine; Ted Ruthizer, Columbia Law School; Leticia M.

Saucedo, UC Davis School of Law; Heather Scavone, Elon

University School of Law; Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Georgetown

Law; Philip Schrag, Georgetown University Law Center; Bijal

Shah, NYU School of Law; Ragini Shah, Suffolk University Law

School; Careen Shannon, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N.

Cardozo School of Law; Anna Williams Shavers, University of

Nebraska College of Law; Bryn Siegel, Pacific Coast

University School of Law;

Anita Sinha, American University, Washington College of

Law; Dan R. Smulian, Brooklyn Law School; Gemma Solimene,

Fordham University School of Law; Jayashri Srikantiah,

Stanford Law School; Juliet Stumpf, Lewis & Clark Law School;

Maureen A. Sweeney, University of Maryland Carey School of

Law; Barbara Szweda, Lincoln Memorial University Duncan

School of Law; Margaret H. Taylor, Wake Forest University

School of Law; David Thronson, Michigan State University

College of Law; Allison Brownell Tirres, DePaul University

College of Law; Scott Titshaw, Mercer University School of

Law; Phil Torrey, Harvard Law School; Enid Trucios-Haynes,

Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville;

Diane Uchimiya, University of La Verne College of Law;

Gloria Valencia-Weber, University of New Mexico School of

Law; Sheila I. Velez Martinez, University of Pittsburgh

School of Law; Alex Vernon, Ave Maria School of Law; Rose

Cuison Villazor, University of California at Davis School of

Law; Leti Volpp, University of California, Berkeley; Jonathan

Weinberg, Wayne State University; Deborah M. Weissman,

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Lisa Weissman-

Ward, Stanford Law School; Anna R. Welch, University of Maine

School of Law; Virgil O. Wiebe, University of St. Thomas

School of Law, Minneapolis; Michael J. Wishnie, Yale Law

School; Stephen Yale-Loehr, Cornell University Law School;

Elizabeth Lee Young, University of Arkansas School of Law.

Mr. Speaker, the President's executive order will ensure that we have a safer country, that we will grow our economy, and that we will keep families together. I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this Republican proposal and to allow the President's executive order to remain.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 770, I call up the bill (H.R. 5759) to establish a rule of construction clarifying the limitations on executive authority to provide certain forms of immigration relief, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 5759.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support Mr. Yoho's important bill, the Preventing Executive Overreach on Immigration Act of 2014.

President Obama has just announced one of the biggest constitutional power grabs ever by a President. He has declared unilaterally that, by his own estimation, more than 4 million unlawful immigrants will be free from the legal consequences of their lawless actions.

Not only that, he will, in addition, bestow upon them gifts such as work authorization and other immigration benefits. This despite the fact that President Obama has stated, over 20 times in the past, that he does not have the constitutional power to take such steps on his own and has repeatedly stated, ``I'm not a king.''

Pursuant to article I, section 8, of the Constitution, only Congress has the power to write immigration laws. Our Founding Fathers established this separation of powers to prevent tyranny. As James Madison wrote:

No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value

or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons

of liberty than that . . . the accumulation of all powers

legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,

whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-

appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very

definition of tyranny.

President Obama is, in effect, rewriting our immigration laws by granting deferred action to more than 4 million unlawful aliens.

Pursuant to article II, section 3, of the Constitution, the President is required to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed''; yet President Obama is refusing to enforce our immigration laws for these millions of unlawful aliens.

President Obama justifies his actions by claiming that his administration is merely exercising the power of prosecutorial discretion; yet as Clinton administration INS Commissioner Doris Meissner told her agency, ``Exercising prosecutorial discretion does not lessen the INS' commitment to enforce the immigration laws to the best of our ability.''

While previous Presidents have provided immigration relief to groups of aliens, usually their actions were based on emergencies in foreign countries, thereby relying upon the broad constitutional power given to a President to conduct foreign affairs.

Without any such foreign crisis and in granting deferred action to a totally unprecedented number of aliens, President Obama has clearly exceeded his constitutional authority.

I commend Mr. Yoho for introducing his bill, which undoes the damage to our constitutional system that President Obama's actions are causing. The bill reaffirms the constitutional principles that only Congress has the power to write immigration laws and that the President must enforce those laws.

Mr. Yoho's bill prevents President Obama or any future President from exempting or deferring the removal of categories of unlawful aliens, except to the extent that the President is relying on his constitutional powers over foreign affairs or utilizing exceptions provided for in the bill for exceptional humanitarian and law enforcement circumstances.

The bill prevents President Obama or any future President from considering such aliens to be lawfully present in the United States and thus ineligible for the rights and privileges available to lawfully present aliens.

It prevents President Obama or any future President from granting work authorization to such aliens.

Finally, the bill takes effect as if enacted on November 20, 2014, thus nullifying the President's recent executive actions. I, again, urge my colleagues to vote for this necessary bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to clarify a couple of things.

First of all, it is not true that the House of Representatives has not acted to fix our broken immigration system. First of all, last summer, we passed two bills, one from the Appropriations Committee and one under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, that did just that, that provided resources to secure our borders to stop the surge of illegal immigrants coming into our country and make sure that the similarly unconstitutional DACA program that the President implemented earlier was frozen and could not proceed further. So, to me, that is simply not true.

I yield myself an additional 15 seconds to say that the fact of the matter is that when you talk about taxes, there is no requirement in the President's executive order that anyone who qualifies as an unlawful alien must get this administrative legalization to pay back taxes. There is none.

They have to pay taxes moving forward, but one of the benefits is they qualify for the earned income tax credit. So this could cost the taxpayers of the country even more.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho), the chief sponsor of the legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

I would point out that the Supreme Court decision in Heckler v. Chaney in no way justifies the claim that the President of the United States has this authority to issue this enormous order.

Nor do we have a situation where it could justifiably be

found that the agency has consciously and expressly adopted a

general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an

abdication of its statutory responsibilities.

That is what has happened here. The President has abdicated his statutory responsibilities in enforcing the law and changed the law, and that is why it cannot be upheld.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Smith), a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Scalise), the majority whip.

Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan).

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining on each side.

Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. McClintock).

Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Barletta).

Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford).

Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to me to see former President Ronald Reagan, especially here in the House Chamber. I, in fact, voted for President Reagan twice and was proud to support him.

One of the things that I remember most about President Reagan was that great debate with his opponent in one of the Presidential debates in which he said, ``There he goes again,'' pointing out when his opponent said something inaccurate about him.

Well, there they go again because what we have today is something that is very, very different than what President Reagan did. President Reagan signed a law--a bill passed by the Congress and signed it into law, and then he found some things that he didn't think were correct, so he then took action.

In today's Washington Post, which I would cite for the gentleman from Illinois, its headline, The Washington Post editorial today, ``An action without precedent,'' so when he cites President Reagan as a precedent here, The Washington Post clearly refutes that by pointing out how small that was and how it was done in response to a specific, identifiable concern about legislation that had been passed. Guess what? The Congress then subsequently fixed it as well.

That is not what is occurring here today, and as The Washington Post notes, it is plain that the White House's numbers--the 1.5 million claim--are indefensible, and it is similarly plain that the scale of Mr. Obama's move goes far beyond anything his predecessors attempted and without legislation that had been passed to found it upon.

No, this is power grab of enormous proportion. It is unconstitutional. It is clearly what he said he was going to do when he came to this body.

I yield myself an additional 1 minute.

When he came to this body almost 3 years ago with his list of things that he wanted done, he said, ``If you don't do it, I will.'' On that occasion, some Members on that side of the aisle stood up and applauded.

Guess what? Since then, in health care reform, in the environment, in enforcement of our drug laws and in a whole host of other things, that is exactly what he has done, and he said he was going to do it. He said, ``I have my pen and my phone, and I will do it myself.''

Well, in this case, he has, on more than 20 occasions, said he did not have the authority to do it. Now, the folks on the other side of the aisle are saying, ``Oh, he didn't change the law.''

I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.

He didn't have the authority to change the law, but guess what? When he signed the order, here is what he said:

What you are not paying attention to is that I just took

action to change the law.

To change the law. Article I of the Constitution says the law is only changed by the United States Congress. Article III says the President shall faithfully execute the law. His actions are unconstitutional and they are unprecedented.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).

I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I have one speaker remaining, and so I reserve the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, it has been said repeatedly that we need to do immigration reform, and I certainly don't disagree with that, but the United States Constitution says that immigration reform must be done by the United States Congress, and the President doesn't say, nor does the Constitution say, ``Hey, if the Congress doesn't do it or doesn't do it the way I like it, then I get the opportunity to do it myself.'' That is not what the Constitution says. It says the President shall faithfully execute the laws.

Now, the gentleman from New York, in talking about the impact of the President's executive action here says, ``Oh, the people who are here illegally and are taking jobs, they are taking jobs that Americans don't want.''

Well, maybe there is some truth to that, maybe some of them are not, but the fact of the matter is the President has unilaterally taken an executive order that would give every single one of the 4 million to 5 million undocumented people in the United States who take jobs, to take any job in the country they want to, as good a job, as high-paying a job as they want.

So, yes, we need to do immigration reform. The American people want us to do immigration reform, but they want us to start with enforcement first.

Instead, what the President has done, he has taken the law into his own hands. That is the real issue in this case and the real matter before the Congress and the real import of this legislation. It is not about where you are on immigration reform; it is about where you are on protecting the United States Constitution. Because this President's actions are unprecedented; this President's actions are beyond the pale; this President's actions are unconstitutional.

This legislation offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho) stops that. That is why every Member of the House should support this good legislation and make sure that we preserve what we are sworn under an oath to preserve, and that is the Constitution of the United States.

Ladies and gentlemen, I urge adoption of this legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order against the motion to recommit.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of a point of order, and I claim the time in opposition to the gentleman's motion.

Mr. Speaker, first, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho), also the gentleman from Idaho (Mr. Labrador) for the contribution he made to the language that is in this important bill to stop the President's unilateral action that is unconstitutional.

The gentleman offering the motion to recommit should note that the bill takes effect as if enacted on November 20, 2014. It nullifies the President's unlawful, unconstitutional executive order. It does not change all immigration law that provides already considerable statutory protection for our members of the Armed Forces of the United States and their families. It protects victims of domestic violence who successfully petition for relief; and Cuban nationals, as has been noted during the debate here, are already protected under the law, and this bill in no way, shape, or form harms any of those protections under the law.

I would urge my colleagues to oppose this motion to recommit and support the underlying legislation, which is needed to stop the unconstitutional actions of the President of the United States in writing an executive order that is unprecedented in its scope.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I commend him for his leadership as chairman and now ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and his important work for comprehensive immigration reform.

I also salute the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren of California, who has not only chaired the Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee, she has taught immigration law, she has been an immigration lawyer. She represents a very diverse district in California blessed with a strong immigrant population.

Mr. Speaker, more than 520 days ago, the Senate passed bold bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform by an overwhelming margin. It was bipartisan, it was overwhelming, 520 days ago--more than that.

Time and again, the Republican leadership of the House has promised productive action to fix our clearly broken immigration system; yet, time and again, Republicans have refused to give the American people a vote on this critical issue.

They have ignored law enforcement, the badges; faith leaders, the Bibles; and business groups--the three Bs. They have denied our country billions of dollars in economic benefits and $1 trillion in deficit reduction, turned their backs on millions of hardworking immigrant families forced to live in daily dread of separation and deportation.

In the face of Republicans' failure to act, President Obama has used his well-established legal and constitutional authority to bring our immigration system back into line with our needs as a Nation and our values as a people.

The President's executive actions will restore accountability to our immigration enforcement: securing our borders; deporting felons, not families; and requiring undocumented immigrants to pass a criminal background check and pay taxes.

Presidents have had broad authority to defer removal when it is in the national interest, and past Presidents have regularly used this authority. President Ronald Reagan understood that immigration was the constant reinvigoration of our Nation.

As a new President in 1981, President Reagan said:

Our Nation is a nation of immigrants. More than any other

country, our strength comes from our own immigrant heritage

and our capacity to welcome those from other lands.

In the lead-up to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, President Reagan, again, called our Nation to action when he said:

We are also going to have compassion and legalize those who

came here sometime ago and have legitimately put roots down

and are living as legal residents of our country, even though

illegal. We are going to make them legal.

In his signing statement of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, President Reagan said:

We have consistently supported a legalization program which

is both generous to the alien and fair to the countless

thousands of people throughout the world who seek legally to

come to America.

He went on to say:

The legalization provisions in this act will go far to

improve the lives of a class of individuals who now must hide

in the shadows without access to many of the benefits of a

free and open society.

Does that sound familiar?

He went on to say:

Very soon, many of these men and women will be able to step

into the sunlight, and, ultimately, if they choose, they may

become Americans.

In the years immediately following the enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, President Reagan and President George Herbert

Walker Bush took bold action to protect the spouses and children of people who received status under that law.

Although Congress explicitly chose not to grant status to these people, Presidents Reagan and Bush recognized that it was not in the national interest to separate families. Using their authority to establish a family fairness program by executive action, they offered spouses and children indefinite protection from deportation and gave them work authorization.

Every President since President Dwight David Eisenhower has used this same broad authority, Republicans and Democrats alike. Dating back more than 50 years, Presidents have granted Extended Voluntary Departure to nationals of more than a dozen countries, including Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Chile, Poland, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Uganda.

President George Herbert Walker Bush granted Deferred Enforced Departure to Chinese nationals after the Tiananmen Square massacre, even though he vetoed a similar bill passed by Congress.

I remember that well. It was my bill. He vetoed the bill because he didn't want to sign the bill, and then he issued the executive order doing exactly what the bill would do. Several years later, he granted the same status to 200,000 Salvadorans.

Thanks to President Obama's immigration accountability executive actions, in the same vein, millions of hardworking, law-abiding families will be able to celebrate the holidays with renewed hope in the future.

In response to this Presidential action of common sense and compassion, Republicans are advancing today on this floor a radical bill of appalling callousness and cruelty. With this bill, Republicans are demanding that we deport hundreds of thousands of young DREAMers who know no country but the United States. With this bill, Republicans would tear apart millions of families and throw thousands upon thousands of American children into foster care.

With this bill, Republicans would deport the family members of our heroes in uniform who are serving overseas, deny relief and respite to victims of human trafficking and domestic violence, and reject the values that are at the heart of our heritage and our history.

This legislation is unworthy of our Nation.

Don't take it from me. That is why this bill is opposed by groups, including the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, who wrote:

Instead of traumatizing these children and young adults--

the future leaders of our country--we should invest in them

by ensuring that their families remain intact.

Mr. Speaker, I hope our colleagues will take the advice of the Conference of Catholic Bishops and vote against this legislation.

Democrats in the House will continue to demand comprehensive immigration reform, which honors our heritage, giving certainty to families, fueling innovation, creating jobs, and reducing the deficit. We know that the President's steps cannot be a substitute for legislation. They must be a summons to action.

Here in Congress and across the country, we will keep up the drumbeat for the progress of advancing comprehensive immigration reform. We will do so in heeding the advice of President George W. Bush, who told us as we dealt with this issue to treat the people who are affected by it with respect.

Republicans should reject this coldhearted bill and give the American people the vote on immigration reform that they deserve.

Mr. Speaker, there is legal authority for the President's immigration actions derived, in part, from his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court explained this duty does not require the President to act against every technical violation of the law. The Court said: ``An agency's decision

not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to the agency's absolute discretion.''

Two years ago, the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. United States, struck down most of Arizona's S.B. 1070 law. The Court said then the broad discretion exercised by Federal immigration officials extends to ``whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.'' The Court said discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns and can turn on factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service.

When we created the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, we charged the Secretary with the duty to establish national immigration enforcement policies and priorities. That is at 6 U.S. Code 202.

Congress delegated that authority to the executive branch, and they are now using this authority. We enacted a law that permits the issuance of employment authorization. They are now implementing that part of the law.

This bill would block some portions of the President's recent action to keep young people from facing deportation and to prevent parents of U.S. citizen kids from being deported, but the bill harms others, too. Immigrant victims of domestic violence who seek a green card through the Violence Against Women Act are not protected from deportation while they wait for a visa. With this bill, they would face deportation.

Victims of serious crimes approved for U visas get deferred action while they wait for a visa. Under this bill, they would face deportation. The exception in the bill is insufficient because victims may assist law enforcement without appearing at trial.

Victims of severe forms of human trafficking eligible for statutorily-capped T visas could also face deportation. The bill would end the ability to parole in place the undocumented families of American military personnel and veterans. Deporting the mothers of American soldiers could be the result.

There is strong historical precedent for the President's actions. Prior Presidents were not met with such obstructionism. President Ronald Reagan created the family fairness program. Once expanded by President George H.W. Bush, that program is expected to protect 1.5 million people. The reason was to keep families together, one of the key motivations for the President's actions last month.

As some wrongly claim, the Reagan program was to carry out congressional intent in the 1986 act. That is false. When the Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill, they said: ``It is the intent of the committee that the families of legalized aliens will obtain no special petitioning right by virtue of the legalization. They will be required to wait in line in the same manner as immediate family members of other new resident aliens.'' President Reagan decided otherwise.

Some wrongly argue the scope of the Reagan family fairness program was smaller, that it was not intended to provide relief to 1.5 million people, about 40 percent of the undocumented population at the time. Again, that is false. The INS Commissioner then testified before Congress that it covered 1.5 million people. An internal decision memo at the time states:

Family fairness policy provides voluntary departure and

employment authorization to potentially millions of

individuals.

The draft processing plan at the time said:

Current estimates are that greater than 1 million IRCA-

eligible family members will file for this benefit.

Now, many Members on the other side of the aisle want to prevent the President's actions from going into effect, but the President has strong constitutional and statutory authority to take these actions.

He cannot change the law, and he has not done so. He does have the authority to grant temporary relief to some. We need broad reform, and to do that, we need to legislate.

It is shameful that the House has failed in its duty to legislate to fix our broken immigration system. The Judiciary Committee has reported out four bills. We have yet to see them on the floor.

I would like to enter into the Record the testimony by the Commissioner before the Judiciary Committee in 1990, the draft processing plan from 1990, and the decision memo from 1990 that prove the elements of the Reagan fairness plan.

Mr. Speaker, I, in my opening remarks, did note the uncanny similarity between the action that President Reagan and the first President Bush took and the action that President Obama has now taken.

I would note that I used the official record as a source of information instead of chat and articles, and I submitted for the record the internal decision memorandum in the INS, dated February 8, 1990, indicating that 1.5 million, 40 percent of the undocumented population, in contravention to the orders of Congress, were going to be given deferred action.

The Commissioner of the INS testified that 40 percent of the undocumented population were going to be given, in contradiction to the Congress' explicit decision, were going to be given deferred action. I also have the draft processing plan that says millions of people would be given, in contravention to the act of Congress, deferred action. They even have the amount of money that they were going to make off the estimated filing fees.

I would recommend that people take a look at the documents, and they will see that what President Reagan did is almost exactly the same as what President Obama did--40 percent of the population.

I don't think that President Reagan could get the Republican nomination today, but that does not diminish the validity of his action at that time.