Mr. President, I am deeply concerned by proposals for arms control plans related to missile defense and outer space arms, including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, which the Obama…
Mr. President, I am deeply concerned by proposals for arms control plans related to missile defense and outer space arms, including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, which the Obama administration has embraced. These plans were confirmed by Rose Gottemoeller, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, during a House subcommittee hearing last week. I firmly believe any international agreement on a code of conduct for space should be submitted for Senate advice and consent as part of its treaty powers, and not be an ``executive agreement'' that sidesteps that process.
I have engaged with the State Department to ensure that this agreement will not be a unilateral act and that it will be fully presented to Congress before moving forward. I strongly believe, given the importance of this issue, that the U.S. Senate should be consulted as part of their advice and consent role in any decision to move forward.
I ask to have printed in the Record at the end of my remarks official letters and correspondence with the nominee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Frank Rose that demonstrate three important points. First, due to serious ongoing concerns related to national security, the administration has not pursued plans to propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this time; second, that any decision to subscribe to a code in the future will not in any way constrain our national security-related activities in space or ability to protect the U.S. or allies; third, and most importantly, that the Senate will be given access to the details surrounding any plan once and if any format is determined, and again before any agreement is entered.
Space is vital to our national security, and we must maintain the ability to use satellites and various missile capabilities. In particular, space is of critical importance to our national intelligence and warfighting capabilities. The development of anti- satellite capabilities by countries such as China and Russia is well documented, as in the example of China successfully testing a direct- ascent, anti-satellite SC-19 missile against one of its own satellites.
It is vital that the United States ensure we are not restricting activity in ways that put our security at risk. Members of Congress have been clear in their view that they see ample disadvantage to such a code for the United States; according to assessments by the uniformed military, implementation of this code would result in real world operational impacts. Congress has previously voted to limit international agreements concerning outer space activities. Section 913 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, states that any agreement will have no legally binding effect or basis for limiting the activities of the United States in outer space, and it requires certification that any such agreement will be equitable, enhance national security, and have no militarily significant impact on the ability of the United States to conduct military or intelligence activities in space.
There are several key areas that the administration must resolve before moving forward on pursuing any decision. Pentagon officials have long expressed concern that the arms initiative will be exploited by states such as China and Russia to constrain U.S. missile defenses, while both states continue to develop their own advanced missile defenses. In 2007, the Department of Defense concluded that the progress in addressing the vulnerability of U.S. space assets has not kept pace with growing threat capabilities; consequently, the vulnerability of our space assets continues to grow. Additionally, a previous U.S. Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization released a report that predicted that future warfare in space was a ``virtual certainty'' and urged the United States to begin to develop the means both to deter and defend against attacks on its space assets, and to mount offensive operations to deny the use of space to potential adversaries. To do otherwise, the commission warned, would invite a ``space Pearl Harbor.''
Further troubling, a 2014 Department of Defense report noted that China is ``developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict,'' including ``destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors.'' To protect against these types of attacks, the Department of Defense's ongoing policy is aimed at retaining the capabilities to respond at the time and place of our choosing. Any effort to move forward must address our national security needs and Congressional concerns.
Therefore, any State Department effort to move forward with a code or a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium should fully overcome existing concerns and ensure the plan does not undermine current Department of Defense policy, U.S. capabilities, or congressional concerns. Our growing dependence on space makes it fundamental to U.S. national security interests. I remain extremely concerned by what appears to be previous endeavors by the administration to avoid addressing space policy concerns and potential administration efforts to bypass Congress.
While I am pleased at the assurances that Mr. Rose has provided and that relevant offices will engage with Congress if a path forward is agreed upon,
I remain extremely concerned about the decision to negotiate a measure using past measures such as the European Union's Code of Conduct as a starting point. Russia has demonstrated its willingness to break its agreements, as seen with the ongoing violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We need to improve our capacity to understand what is going on in space, and we need to ensure we are adequately capable of deterring the growing number of countries that are pursuing weapons capable of targeting U.S. satellites.
While necessary, the development of transparency and confidence- building measures and behavioral norms promoting responsible space operations should not come at the expense of America's national security. The President's own Space Policy released in 2010 states: ``The United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.'' With a growing number of states acquiring the ability to degrade or destroy U.S. space capabilities, the probability that space systems will come under attack in a future crisis or conflict is ever increasing. The State Department cannot have the attitude that they are going to go it alone. The United States cannot afford it.
The material is as follows:
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, November 12, 2014.
Mr. Frank Rose,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense
Policy,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rose: We write to
ask for your clarification regarding the Administration's
space arms control posture. Like you, we are deeply concerned
by the rising threats of anti-satellite weapons in the hands
of states like the People's Republic of China. That said, we
believe the Administration would do better to focus on real
solutions to these threats, as opposed to more feel good
measures like the European Union's (EU) Code of Conduct for
Outer Space activities or other similar measures.
We are concerned by proposals for outer space arms control,
including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities,
which the Administration has embraced. We see no advantage to
such a Code for the United States; according to assessments
by the uniformed military, implementation of this code would
result in real world operational impacts. The product of this
equation demands the opposition of the entire United States
government.
With the languishing of that Code, we fear a new threat to
our ability to protect U.S. outer space capabilities, and,
perhaps even to develop our missile defenses. We seek your
understanding of the Administration's position on space arms
control, specifically, the ``debris generating kinetic energy
ASAT testing moratorium'' which, as we have been informed,
you proposed to U.S. allies. We are unfamiliar with any such
proposal having been coordinated with the Department of
Defense or the uniformed military, and therefore we ask for
your answers to the following questions:
1) Please indicate the date, and by which Department
official, the State Department Circular 175 request was
signed. What was the scope of this Circ-175 and has the
Department determined if this moratorium would be submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent?
2) If this Circ-175 will not be submitted to the Senate, on
what basis would such an international agreement be
negotiated and to what end?
3) Please detail the potential implications for United
States space and missile defense activities. How would such
an agreement protect our ability to fully develop our missile
defenses, including our test and targets program?
4) Please further detail how such agreement will ensure
full freedom of action for the United States to take needed
defensive and other action in space.
5) Please provide the Joint Staff assessment of impacts to
military operations you obtained before discussing this
moratorium with our allies.
6) Please detail the specific allies with which you have
discussed this moratorium and the respective dates of
discussion. Please further detail which State Department
official authorized these discussions.
We appreciate your prompt responses to these questions.
Sincerely,
David Vitter,
United States Senator.
Doug Lamborn,
Member of Congress.
