Counter Terrorist Network Act

Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the House of Representatives for coming together on the floor of the House and in our various caucuses and conferences to discuss the important challenge that we all face: the balance that we have to protect the American people. That is the oath we take: to protect and defend. As we defend the Constitution, we defend the privacy and the civil liberties of the American people.

It is difficult.

Over 20 years ago, I was on the Intelligence Committee for the purpose of protecting civil liberties and privacy, and also to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, two really important overarching issues. So I come to the floor today as one who has worked on this issue for a very long time.

I thank our men and women in the intelligence community for the work they do. We are so proud of what they do.

In those days, almost 25 years ago, when I was first on the committee, it was about force protection and trying to have enough intelligence to avoid conflict, but if we were to engage, we would have the intelligence to protect our forces. It was about force protection. In the nineties, it became more about fighting terrorism and other overarching issues as well.

We live in a dangerous world and force protection on the ground, in theater, is still an essential part of what the intelligence community does. Again, I thank the men and women in the intelligence community for their patriotism and their courage.

The issue that relates to fighting terrorism is one that sometimes has a frightening manifestation on our own soil. But as we protect and defend the American people and the Constitution and their rights, we have to have that balance. It was Benjamin Franklin who said: If we don't fight for security and freedom, we won't have either.

I want to particularly thank our ranking member on the Intelligence Committee. He has made us all proud in going across the country to honor our Constitution, talking about undermining our election system, talking about protecting the American people in ways that is consistent with our Constitution. I thank Mr. Schiff and I support him today in his support of the bill that came from his committee.

Is it perfect?

I have never voted for a perfect bill in this House.

I also thank Mr. Nadler, a genius on all of these issues that relate to our Constitution. I also thank the members of the Judiciary Committee.

We have very few members on the Intelligence Committee who are deputized by the Speaker and by the leaders of each party to go to the Intelligence Committee to deal with issues that relate to the balance between security and privacy.

With all the respect in the world for the magnificent members of the Judiciary Committee, all of whom I respect, it is not right to say there is nothing in this bill that protects the privacy of the American people.

In fact, when I was supporting the Judiciary Committee bill, outside groups were complaining. They wanted the Zoe Lofgren amendment. They didn't want that bill. They were complaining about it. Now, today, they are saying that is what they want.

Studying the issue, I think one of the differences along the way is when it is appropriate in terms of a warrant. That is why I am so pleased that we will be offering a motion to recommit that addresses just that concern, which is what I am hearing about from folks.

The amendment, the motion to recommit, addresses concerns of people on both sides of the aisle, certainly in our Democratic Caucus, that seeks to secure the highest possible protections for American civil liberties. At the same time, it ensures that the intelligence community and law enforcement can continue to keep Americans safe.

This amendment would go a step further from the modified bill that is on the floor under consideration to ensure law enforcement secures a warrant before accessing Americans' information.

Let me repeat that. The amendment will go a step further than the modified bill under consideration to ensure law enforcement secures a warrant before accessing Americans' information.

Under this amendment, a court order would be required to access Americans' data in connection with any nonnational security criminal investigation by the FBI.

This amendment removes predicate--that is the operational word-- standards and it expands the universe of investigations that would require a warrant.

A vote for this amendment--and I hope it would be bipartisan, especially from those who are objecting to the bill on the floor--is a vote for privacy protections and for civil liberties. We would have preferred to have this in the original bill that is coming to the floor. We couldn't get that in committee. Hopefully, we can get it on the floor.

Voting against the motion to recommit means fewer protections, less oversight, and more risk that Americans' rights will be violated.

In the course of this, I mentioned this issue about the warrant and arrest. I talked about the Judiciary Committee's bill. At the offset of all of this, we all opposed the first Intelligence Committee's bill. We supported the Judiciary Committee's bipartisan bill being criticized by some outside groups for supporting it, rather than the Lofgren amendment.

But changes were made in the Intelligence Committee's bill to this effect. We asked the Speaker to take out the masking provisions, which have no place in this bill. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Nunes, foolishly put that in this bill. It made it a complete nonstarter. I thank the Speaker for removing it.

By the way, somebody should tell the President because he thinks it is still in the bill. With that being said, I personally directed the unmasking process be fixed. It isn't fixed in the bill, Mr. President. That would be a second tweet of the day, confusing matters even worse, unfortunately. The administration, although they probably would like an extension of the status quo, understands we have to do more than that.

The other provision that was in the bill was an expansion of agents of foreign governments. Agents of foreign governments opened up more people who would be subjected to surveillance. We said: That doesn't fly. That has to be closed. The Speaker did that.

Then, on the ``abouts'' language, I think most people who understand that--it is a complicated issue--understand that it is really not a factor in this discussion. People don't want it mentioned, but the fact is that it had to be addressed. It is not being used and it is unconstitutional. Until it can be proven to be constitutional, it can't be used. When it is used, they would have to go to the FISA court to get permission, and then come to Congress for ratification of that. So there are many protections there.

It is hard, I know. I had a hard time when I was Speaker and we passed a bill to address the gross violations of Vice President Cheney doing the Bush-Cheney surveillance. It was appalling, in my view. I considered it unconstitutional, others did not. But, nonetheless, we put in many, many protections where there were none, and then renewed and improved them when we renewed the bill subsequently in its reauthorization.

This isn't about the other side of the aisle that is saying you don't care about privacy if you support this bill. It isn't about that. It is about where you strike the balance when you weigh the equities.

We have to come down in favor of honoring our Constitution and our civil liberties, but we cannot do that completely at the expense. And I believe that the Members and Mr. Nadler understand that full well, and I commend him for his deep understanding of the vital national security issues and the invaluable work that his committee has done to strike a balance between security and privacy and has made a difference.

But the choice we have today is to pass something that is--defeat this bill. Okay. You have done that, if you want to do that. Pass an amendment that won't go anyplace, you can do that, and we will be left with extension of the status quo of the current law.

As one who has participated in writing it those years ago, I understand its merit. I also understand the changes in technology, of tactics of terrorists who are out there, and that we have to improve the bill.

I don't consider it a reform bill. It is not that vast. It is some improvements in how we can collect, protect, again, keep the American people safe as well as protect their civil liberties.

Just a couple other things about it. Since this legislation was designed to address concerns related to the use of information collected under FISA section 702, an important foreign intelligence collection authority--we have to keep that emphasis on ``an important foreign intelligence authority.''

So, my colleagues, to that end, this modifies that it requires a court order based on probable cause for FBI criminal investigators to view Americans' communication in the section 702 database and mandates an inspector general study of 702 data. So let's keep the vigilance on, even as we go forward. It contains refined language related to ``abouts'' collection. It requires the executive branch to secure explicit approval from the FISA court for collection. It further objects ``abouts'' collections to--subjects a 30-day congressional review process. I know Mr. Sensenbrenner said nobody can do anything in 30 days, but I think we can.

The bill strengthens the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. That was something I was instrumental in establishing when I was on the Intelligence Committee. I know it is important, but I also know that it has to be strengthened and it has to be respected as a watchdog.

So, I mean, the list goes on requiring public reporting on the use of 702 data, just saying to the intelligence community: Don't try to minimize any violations that may have occurred; we want the facts; we want the truth.

And that is why I am so glad it has expanded whistleblower protections and briefings to the Oversight Committee, which we have required. Unlike the original House Intelligence bill, which I oppose, this bill does not include language that would have likely expanded the universe of FISA targets who are now, as I mentioned before, agents of foreign policy powers. It excludes the language on unmasking; somebody tell the President.

It gives me great pride in our Caucus, if you could have heard the beautiful debate between Mr. Nadler and Mr.

Schiff on this subject. We are not that far apart. I think that the motion to recommit addresses most of the concerns we have been getting from the outside groups, and communities have dedicated their--whose organized purpose is to protect the civil liberties of the American people.

But, again, with great respect for everyone's opinions and whatever they have put forth, again, saluting our men and women in the intelligence community for the work that they do, we want to be sure we strengthen their hand in terms of protecting the national security of our country, which is our first responsibility, keep the American people safe, and, as we do so, to honor our oath of office to the Constitution, to honor the principles of the Constitution.

Our Founders knew full well the challenge between security and civil liberties. They lived in a world when they were under attack. The War of 1812 came very soon after the establishment of our country, so this was not a foreign idea to them, and they bequeathed to us the responsibility to protect, defend, protect our liberties.

And, again, respectful of this debate on this issue, I myself will be voting to support my ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Schiff, our ranking member, and Members will follow their conscience on this. I just wanted you to know, from my experience in all of this and with weighing the equities involved, that that is the path that I will take.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program Authorization Act of 2018.

I have long supported Department of Homeland Security overseas programs aimed at preventing terrorist threats from ever arriving at our borders. In fact, over the years, I have sponsored a number of measures that specifically seek to drive greater international collaboration and expand DHS' overseas border security footprint.

Two well-established overseas DHS programs that come to mind are:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Preclearance program, in which officers are posted abroad to screen travelers prior to boarding U.S.- bound flights; and

Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Visa Security Program, in which ICE special agents are posted at overseas consulates to assist State Department staff in visa vetting.

Earlier this Congress, Representative Filemon Vela, the lead Democrat on our Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee, introduced two bills aimed at bolstering international border and counterterrorism cooperation:

H.R. 2218 would authorize ICE's Border Enforcement Security Task Force, a program that has been proven to be effective at enhancing cooperation and information sharing among law enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border.

The second bill, H.R. 4578, is targeted at expanding efforts carried out by CBP's National Targeting Center aimed at disrupting and dismantling terrorists and other criminal networks.

When presented to the full House, both bills received unanimous support from Democrats for good reason: They are effective counterterrorism programs.

However, I am sorry to say, as of today, there is not enough data to assess whether the same can be said for ICE's Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program, or BITMAP, pilot. As such, I cannot support permanently authorizing it, as set forth under H.R. 6439.

I would expect that some Members of this body are unfamiliar with the program, as it is largely a classified program and, as such, little information about BITMAP is in the public domain.

Since 2011, ICE's BITMAP pilot program has trained and equipped foreign law enforcement partners on collecting biographic and biometric data of foreign nationals migrating through partner countries so that such information can be checked against U.S. intelligence and law enforcement databases.

The stated goal of the program is to identify known or suspected terrorists or criminals prior to arrival at our borders. Though in operation for several years, the volume of data collected only started to be significant in the last 2 years.

Prior to considering H.R. 6439 in committee, committee members had repeatedly been presented in a classified setting with anecdotes about successes that the program has experienced. While we appreciated hearing positive news about this pilot, anecdotes are not enough to justify permanently authorizing this program. Anecdotes are no substitute for data and evidence of efficiency.

In an effort to secure data prior to committee consideration, I submitted a number of basic questions about the program's efficacy and operations to ICE.

I received a response prior to the committee's markup that raised further questions about BITMAP's efficacy as well as core operational questions, such as:

After checks against databases, what does the U.S. Government do with the records it collects on migrants who are not found to have terrorist ties?

What, if any, protections exist to guard against the collection of highly personal and sensitive information from migrants with no criminal or terrorist ties who are encountered nowhere near the U.S.- Mexico border and have no intentions of coming anywhere close to it?

What, if any, audit or oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that foreign partners adhere to requirements of the program and do not use this sophisticated law enforcement tool to suppress domestic activities?

Over the recess, ICE officials briefed the committee staff about BITMAP, but fundamental questions remain.

I hope that there will be a day when I can say without reservation that, after careful review of BITMAP's operational documents and data, I fully support making it permanent. Unfortunately, today is not the day.

In the absence of evidence, I cannot support H.R. 6439, but I am supportive of the pilot continuing so that ICE can work to aggregate and assess critical data to make an evidentiary case to Congress for why the program should be permanently authorized.

I would note that enactment of H.R. 6439 is not necessary for BITMAP to continue to operate. With or without passage of H.R. 6439, ICE expects to continue to be able to operate the pilot.

Madam Speaker, before I close, I include in the Record a letter from the American Civil Liberties Union in opposition to this legislation.

September 4, 2018.

Re Vote NO on H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification

Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP)

Authorization Act of 2018.

Dear Representative: On behalf of the American Civil

Liberties Union, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, National

Immigration Law Center and the National Immigration Project

of the National Lawyers Guild, we urge you to oppose H.R.

6439, legislation that would permanently authorize the

biometric pilot program known as ``BITMAP'' within the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The House is expected

to consider this bill under suspension of the rules on

Tuesday, September 4, 2018. We urge you to oppose H.R. 6439.

H.R. 6439 would permanently authorize BITMAP, a program

which has existed since 2010--but with no privacy or

transparency protections, and with insufficient fact-finding

during committee consideration of the bill. Although BITMAP

would continue without enactment of this legislation, the

House should not permanently authorize the BITMAP program

with limited information, no information on whether DHS takes

any steps to protect privacy, no studies regarding its

efficacy, and no statutory privacy or transparency

protections.

This bill raises significant concerns regarding the sharing

of information across foreign governments related to

suspicion of terrorism, gang violence, and other so-called

national security concerns with very little information as to

how this information is used and retained. In 2010, DHS began

piloting BITMAP to collect and share biometric and

biographical data on ``special interest aliens, violent

criminals, fugitives and confirmed or suspected terrorists.''

According to previous testimony by DHS officials, this also

includes gang members and other persons of interest who may

pose a potential national security concern.

There is no information or proof as to BITMAP's

effectiveness. Despite numerous requests from Congress,

including members of the House Homeland Security Committee,

DHS has failed to provide information since the program's

inception in 2010 that shows its effectiveness or that it is

tailored to meet its needs. Given this, it is premature to

permanently authorize the program, particularly given the

significant privacy and civil liberties concerns.

The legislation fails to require that the program adhere to

privacy protections. This program includes the sharing of

extraordinarily sensitive information regarding individuals

without warrant or analogous legal process. Yet, the

legislation fails to include any privacy standards that DHS

must follow with regards to the program. For example, what

information can be collected, how long can it be stored, when

can it be disseminated to other agencies, and can it be

shared with foreign partners? The omission of these

protections in the bill is particularly striking given that

the agency has not provided any public information regarding

what, if any, privacy protections currently apply to the

execution of BITMAP.

The legislation fails to place limits on how information

collected under BITMAP can be used. There is little to no

information regarding what actions may be triggered as a

result of these database checks nor information regarding

what is considered ``suspicion'' or a ``national security

concern.'' The terms used by officials in discussing this

program such as terrorism, gang members, and national

security concern have historically been used to target

Muslim, Arab, Iranian, Latinx, Middle Eastern, and South

Asian populations. The failure to provide information

regarding policies governing BITMAP raises significant

concerns that the program may result in unjust profiling and

discrimination. The existing legislation fails to include any

language that would prohibit such improper uses. Moreover,

insufficient information has been made public to assess

whether such profiling and discrimination are current

problems with the program.

Under this bill, DHS would have the authority to enter into

agreements with foreign countries to carry out BITMAP

operations without legislative or judicial review. Although

this bill would require DHS to notify Congress before the

execution of BITMAP agreements, the agreements would not be

subject to congressional authorization. This legislation

would significantly undermine Congress' oversight role by

allowing DHS to take measures without sufficient checks or

balances. Additionally, the bill fails to ensure that the

public is made aware of how DHS is exercising its authority.

It is irresponsible to permanently authorize BITMAP without

a full understanding of its effectiveness, policies and

procedures, privacy and civil rights protections, and

oversight mechanisms.

We urge you to oppose H.R. 6439.

Sincerely,

American Civil Liberties Union.

Immigrant Legal Resource Center.

National Immigration Law Center.

National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild.

Madam Speaker, it is our duty as Members of Congress to ensure that counterterrorism pilot programs are effective prior to permanently authorizing them. As I mentioned at the outset, DHS has a number of proven overseas, border, and counterterrorism programs that have strong congressional bipartisan support.

However, with all due respect to the chairman, the efficacy of BITMAP as a counterterrorism program has not been established. As such, a permanent authorization of H.R. 6439 is premature.

Given the classified nature of this program, some Members are unfamiliar with it and there are natural limitations as to what we are able to discuss on the House floor. But I understand that at an unclassified staff-level briefing during the recess on threats in the Caribbean, ICE officials stated that BITMAP is working and successful, but failed to provide data to back up the assertions.

I will concede that ICE has shared some promising anecdotes, and I do not object to ICE officials touting what they see as a successful overseas program to Congress. However, when ICE's broad-based assertions and anecdotes are not backed up with data and metrics, it falls to Congress to carry out oversight of the program, not blindly authorize it.

Let's not reward the administration for failing to provide Congress with necessary data and metrics. Let's come

together and vote down H.R. 6439. By taking such action, we will be communicating to ICE our expectations, while in no way preventing the BITMAP pilot from continuing as it has for the past 7 years.

As I said earlier, I sincerely hope that the positive aspects of BITMAP being touted by the other side of the aisle today can be backed up by reliable data and facts. Unfortunately, the little information we have on BITMAP to date simply does not justify a standalone authorization.

Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose H.R. 6439, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 682, I call up the bill (S. 139) to implement the use of Rapid DNA instruments to inform decisions about pretrial release or detention and their conditions, to solve and prevent violent crimes and other crimes, to exonerate the innocent, to prevent DNA analysis backlogs, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill, S. 139.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 139.

On January 19, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 will expire. This vital legislation includes section 702, which permits the government to target foreign citizens located overseas to obtain foreign intelligence information. Section 702 is one of the most, if not the most, critical national security tool used by our intelligence community to obtain intelligence on foreign terrorists located overseas.

Now, some claim section 702 vacuums bulk information without due regard to the intended target. This assertion is simply false. Section 702 is a targeted program, with roughly 106,000 foreign targets worldwide. Given that the worldwide population is about 7.5 billion, this program can hardly be described as bulk collection.

Section 702 targets spies, terrorists, weapons proliferators, and other foreign adversaries who threaten the United States, and locating them is crucial to protecting our troops and our homeland.

As an example, Hajji Iman, who was the second-in-command of ISIS, was located via section 702 and later removed from the battlefield. While the vast majority of examples remain classified, this is just one instance that demonstrates the necessity of this authority.

Subject to multiple layers of oversight by all three branches of government, section 702 is one of the government's most rigorously overseen foreign intelligence collection authorities. To date, while compliance incidents occur and are dealt with appropriately, there has never been a known, intentional abuse of this authority. Nevertheless, the program should be subject to regular adjustments, as necessary, to ensure the effectiveness of privacy protections.

Therefore, after careful consideration of the best way to strengthen privacy protections without hindering the program's effectiveness, the committee supports S. 139, a bipartisan bill that includes provisions and addresses concerns raised by the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate.

The bill's reforms include:

Requiring specific section 702 query procedures, separate from existing minimization procedures, which must be reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court every year;

Limiting the instances in which the government can use section 702 information to prosecute U.S. people;

Requiring the inspector general of the Department of Justice to conduct a review of the FBI's interpretation and implementation of the FBI's section 702 query procedures;

Temporarily codifying the end of the NSA's section 702 upstream ``abouts'' collection until the government develops new procedures and briefs the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees;

And, finally, improving transparency by mandating the publication of section 702 minimization procedures and requiring additional reporting to Congress on how the intelligence community is using other FISA authorities.

Mr. Speaker, during discussions over the past several months, both the House and the Senate have made several concessions to achieve this compromised language in order to reauthorize this critical national security authority. Accordingly, S. 139 now includes a probable cause- based order requirement for the FBI to access the content of a section 702 communication during FBI criminal investigations on Americans, unrelated to national security.

This order requirement does not reflect the committee's belief or intent that law enforcement access to lawfully acquired information constitutes a separate search under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by numerous Federal courts, does not require the FBI to obtain a separate order from the FISC to review lawfully acquired 702 information.

Though not required by the Constitution, this compromise is meant to provide additional protections for U.S.

person information that is incidentally collected under section 702. Along with the restrictions on the use of section 702 information in criminal prosecutions, this should provide further assurances to the American public that this vital national security tool is used strictly to discover and mitigate foreign threats to the United States, and the handling and use of any incidental U.S. person information is carefully controlled and monitored.

Mr. Speaker, America faces an array of international threats more complicated than anything we have endured in the past.

Speaking for the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I cannot emphasize enough that now is not the time to draw back on key national security authorities.

I am dismayed by the amount of disinformation being propagated by those who oppose section 702 for purely ideological reasons. When Congress must reauthorize this program again in 2023, we hope those who debate these issues, both inside and outside this Chamber, do so with intellectual honesty and integrity.

The USA RIGHTS Act, which has been offered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, is an attempt to kill this compromise. In its place, the amendment would begin resurrecting the information-sharing walls between national security and law enforcement that the 9/11 Commission identified as a major factor in the failure to identify and thwart the 9/11 plot.

If individuals in this body cannot learn from history, they are doomed to repeat it. There is no support for this bill in the majority of the committees of jurisdiction whose members understand that this amendment would render section 702 inoperable.

Therefore, in order to keep the U.S. interests and troops abroad safe from harm, we must ensure that the intelligence community has the tools it needs to provide intelligence to our soldiers abroad. Section 702 is critical in that regard, and S. 139 provides the intelligence community with the authorities needed to protect the homeland while implementing key privacy enhancements.

Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of S. 139, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues believe that Congress should go above and beyond what is required by the Fourth Amendment and institute additional safeguards on how the government handles any potential U.S. personal information that may be incidentally collected under section 702. While the varying committees may have different ideas as to how to strike the right balance between additional privacy measures and national security, the art of the compromise brings us to the current junction.

Under S. 139, if the bill conducts a U.S.-person query into its database during a criminal investigation not related to national security and conducts a section 702 communication, the FBI must obtain an order from the FISA court prior to assessing the content of the communication.

The committee does not believe that such an order is necessary under the Fourth Amendment, but it is adding more protections, as a matter of policy, in order to address unfounded concerns by opponents of section 702 that the authority is being used to investigate U.S. people.

Proponents of the USA RIGHTS Act amendment will say that S. 139 does not go far enough in its current form and that they have crafted a great compromise that allows the intelligence community to do its job.

Unfortunately, they are selling a poison pill that is extraordinarily harmful to our national security. Per the office of the Director of National Intelligence, under the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, the FBI would not be able to look at lawfully collected data related to suspicious activities similar to that of the 9/11 hijackers. This is unethical to the 9/11 Commission Report, and anyone who thinks about voting for the USA RIGHTS Act amendment should pick up a copy and skim it prior to voting.

Unlike the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, S. 139 is able to balance national security and privacy while adhering to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission reporting. I echo the White House statement last night strongly opposing the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, and I urge all of my colleagues in the House to support S. 139.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, before I begin, I want to emphasize how dismayed I am by the amount of disinformation being propagated by opponents of section 702. I have heard some things over the last couple of days, and I just wonder, how in the world can someone believe that.

Let me tell you why this amendment must be opposed. Under the USA RIGHTS Act, the intelligence community would not be able to query the name of the suspected terrorist supporter in the United States to see if he is in contact with terrorist recruiters. It would not be able to query the name of a person in the United States who has been suspiciously approaching U.S. Government employees with security clearances to determine if that person is part of a foreign espionage network.

We would not be able to query the name of a registered owner of a suspicious vehicle parked in front of the Washington Monument to see if that person is in contact with terrorist operatives overseas. We would not be able to query the name of a person in the aftermath of a mass casualty attack on the United States to see if he has terrorist connections, or as a follow on, if potential follow-on attacks are imminent.

We would not be able to query the name of a foreign national who travels to the United States to take flight training but doesn't care about learning how to land.

Individuals in this room who want to end section 702 know that they have an opportunity to do with their vote, but they would be putting troops and American lives at risk. And if that is okay with you, then go ahead and vote for the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, but I promise you, you will regret it when, some day, in this dangerous world we live in, we have to answer to our constituents for our votes here today.

Mr. Speaker, let me repeat the refrain of those of us who are members of the Judiciary Committee who have gone through this process since 9/11, and that is that we support the integrity and the importance of section 702 as a national security tool, and we want it reauthorized, but we want it right.

Our job and our task is also to be the protectors of the Fourth Amendment, and that is the protection of the American people against unreasonable search and seizure.

No matter how much my friends on the other side of the aisle argue, we know that the FBI can have the tools that it needs; but, in the instance of this underlying bill, similar to the bill that was passed in 2007 by the Bush administration, on which the Judiciary Committee came back and amended it and made it a bill that provides the tools that were needed by those who are on the front lines in the United States military and the FBI, ultimately, it was changed to deny those rights.

In this instance, the warrant that my friends are talking about is revised only to fully predicated cases. It does not apply to the searching of documents that will have information about Americans.

I ask my colleagues to postpone this. Let us work together on behalf of the American people. Who are we if we cannot uphold the Constitution? It is not protected in this bill.

Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, I rise in strong opposition to S. 139, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.''

S. 139 reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is scheduled to expire on January 19, 2018.

Section 702 authorizes the Justice Department and NSA to collect non- U.S. persons' communications that are sent while abroad.

The collection programs have to be approved each year by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court).

The FISA Court was set up by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA; Public Law 95-511) to oversee intelligence- gathering activities and ensure compliance with the U.S. Constitution.

Under FISA, the term ``U.S. person'' covers citizens, green card holders, associations with a ``substantial number of members'' who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents, and U.S.-incorporated companies.

Title VII also allows intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance on a specific U.S. person reasonably believed to be outside of the country, with the approval of the FISA Court.

The NSA's use of section 702 authority to collect Americans' information from their communications with foreign surveillance targets was revealed by former government contractor Edward Snowden in 2013.

Snowden also revealed that the NSA obtains communications from U.S.- based providers such as Google, Verizon, and Facebook.

Although Section 702 is a critical national security tool set to expire on January 19, 2018, events of the recent past strongly suggest that Section 702 should not be reauthorized without necessary and significant reforms that are not included in the legislation before us.

So as the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, I oppose the bill for several compelling reasons:

1. S. 139 fails to address the core concerns of Members of Congress and the American public--the government's use of Section 702 information against United States citizens investigations that have nothing to do with national security.

2. The warrant ``requirement'' contained in the bill is riddled with loopholes and applies only to fully predicated, official FBI investigations, not to the hundreds of thousands searches the FBI runs every day to run down a lead or check out a tip.

3. S. 139 exacerbates existing problems with Section 702 by codifying so-called ``about collection,'' a type of surveillance that was shut down after it twice failed to meet Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

4. S. 139 is universally opposed by technology companies, privacy, and civil liberties groups across the political spectrum from the ACLU to FreedomWorks.

Mr. Speaker, the bill before us comes from the Intelligence Committee, where it was passed on a strict party-line vote.

This stands in stark contrast to H.R. 3989, the USA Liberty Act the bipartisan bill reported by the Judiciary Committee after multiple hearings, an open markup process, and a bipartisan vote of approval.

The USA Liberty Act enjoys much broader support, contains meaningful reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and is far superior to the bill before us.

Inexplicably, the House Republican leadership did choose the best option, which was to bring the USA Liberty Act to the floor for debate and vote; instead, they chose the worst option, which is S. 139, the bill before us.

For this reason, I urge all members to join me in supporting the Amash-Lofgren Amendment, the best option remaining before us.

The Amash-Lofgren strike the text of S. 139 in its entirety and substitutes in its place the text of the ``Uniting and Strengthening America by Reforming and Improving the Government's High-Tech Surveillance Act'' (``USA RIGHTS Act'').

In contrast to S. 139, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' enacts necessary and meaningful reforms to Section 702, which are necessary in light of the past abuses of surveillance authorities, contemporary noncompliance with this authority, and the danger posed by potential future abuses.

First, the USA RIGHTS Act creates a search warrant requirement that closes the so-called ``backdoor search loophole'' through which the government searches, without first obtaining a court-issued warrant based on probable cause, for information about U.S. persons or persons inside the U.S.

The ``USA RIGHTS Act'' provides an exception for emergencies, but requires a court warrant afterward.

Second, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' prohibits the collection of domestic communications and permanently ends ``about'' collection, an illegal practice the National Security Agency recently stopped because of persistent and significant compliance violations.

This is important because while ``reverse targeting'' is prohibited under the Jackson Lee Amendment incorporated in the USA Freedom Act enacted on June 2, 2016 (Pub. L. 114-23), this prohibition was often skirted by collecting information from communications that merely mention an intelligence target.

Under the ``USA RIGHTS Act'', collections would be limited to communications that are ``to'' or ``from'' a target, and the intentional collection of wholly domestic communications is prohibited.

Third, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' requires the government give notice when it uses information obtained or derived from Section 702 surveillance in proceedings against U.S. persons or people on U.S. soil which will enable a defendant to assert his or her constitutional rights and help ensure that foreign intelligence surveillance is not being misused.

Fourth, under the ``USA RIGHTS Act'', Section 702 authority sunsets in 4 years, which will obligate the Congress to exercise regular oversight and provide the opportunity to make necessary reforms before reauthorization.

Mr. Speaker, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted to protect the liberty and security of Americans, not to diminish their constitutional rights.

All Americans want to find the common ground where commonsense rules and regulations relating to fighting terrorism at home and abroad can exist while still protecting the cherished privacy and civil liberties which Americans hold close to our collective hearts.

That is why Section 702 should not be reauthorized with reforms to prevent the government from using information against its political opponents or members of religious, ethnic, or other groups.

One way to do that without interfering with the national security objectives of 702 surveillance is simply to reject S. 139 and support the USA RIGHTS Act by voting for the Amash-Lofgren Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, that as Alexis de Tocqueville, the most astute student of American democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a love of justice.

And the best way to keep America safe and strong is to remain true to the valued embedded in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

S. 139 does not strike the proper balance between our cherished liberties and smart security.

We can do better; we should reject S. 139 and support the Amash- Lofgren Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, this body cannot be afraid of the Constitution. It has been our guiding moral force for this Nation for all of our beginnings and our nows.

This amendment is truly an amendment that will protect and provide for the FBI to do its work and to protect our men and women around the world who are wearing the uniform unselfishly. But let me be very clear: all this amendment does, frankly, is provide a roadmap for the FBI to utilize when it is surveying and it is using the private data of Americans. All the amendment does is ask the FBI and the Attorney General, where there is probable cause, that such communication provide evidence of a crime; and, as well, if there is a foreign power or foreign agent, to be able to utilize a warrant, and that is the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

Uphold the Constitution. Vote for the Amash-Lofgren amendment and let's move forward on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to control the time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as you all know, the Judiciary Committee worked diligently for a year on legislation that does two things: one, protect Americans' civil liberties by requiring a court order to access section 702 data during domestic criminal investigations; and, two, reauthorize the 702 program, which is our Nation's most indispensable national security tool.

We achieved that by passing the USA Liberty Act in the House Judiciary Committee last year by an overwhelming bipartisan vote, which is no easy task; however, we were able to responsibly balance civil liberties with national security.

The bill we will vote on today was drafted in the spirit of the USA Liberty Act. It is not perfect and the process getting here was not ideal, but the bill requires, for the first time, a warrant to access section 702-collected communications on U.S. persons in criminal investigations.

Moreover, in routine criminal cases, when the FBI accesses U.S. person communications that were incidentally collected without first obtaining a warrant, the FBI will not be permitted to use those communications in a criminal prosecution. This will prevent a national security tool from advancing run-of-the-mill criminal prosecutions.

These are meaningful reforms. The bill that was presented to us before Christmas with its optional warrant construct was not real reform. The bill we are debating today, however, contains meaningful reforms.

I would have preferred to include additional reforms, but I cannot stress to my colleagues enough that our choice cannot be between a perfect reform bill and expiration of this program. The 702 program is far too important for that. With this bill, we can have meaningful reform and reauthorization. In its current form, this bill will pass the Senate.

I also want to caution everyone that we cannot go too far in seeking to alter this program. There is an amendment that will be offered sponsored by Mr. Amash and Ms. Lofgren that would prevent the FBI from ever querying its 702 database using a U.S. person term.

Imagine the FBI getting a tip from a flight instructor whose student acts suspiciously by expressing great interest in learning how to take off and fly a plane but has no interest in learning how to land the plane. This could be innocent behavior, but we want law enforcement to at least be able to perform a search to see if they already have, in their possession, any communications between the student and a foreign actor involved in organizing terrorist plots.

The Judiciary Committee-passed bill would have allowed the search and allowed law enforcement to view the metadata without a warrant while requiring a warrant to view the content of the communications.

The Amash-Lofgren amendment, which was rejected in the Judiciary Committee, goes too far and would prevent such a search from even being done. It would, thus, kill this critical program by preventing the FBI from even looking at its own databases without a warrant, rendering it ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks and stifling its ability to gather necessary intelligence. It must not be adopted.

I will vote to support this bill. I will oppose the Amash-Lofgren amendment, and I urge my colleagues to join me. Vote for reform and reauthorization.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), who is a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), a member of the Judiciary Committee and the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining on each side?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, in response to those who advocate for the Amash-Lofgren amendment, this amendment will very, very seriously damage our national security. Section 702 is a program for which there is no evidence of abuse and is used to gather information about non-United States citizens outside the United States. In a targeted fashion, they have to go to the court and get approval for the selectors to gather information on a quarterly basis. They gather information incidental to that. Sometimes there is information about United States citizens.

But guess what. The information does not come with little labels attached saying: this is a United States citizen communicating here, or the communication involves someone in the United States.

Therefore, it is absolutely vitally important that we not impair the most important electronic intelligence-gathering mechanism that the United States has to keep us safe. Oppose the Amash amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I have only one speaker remaining to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Judiciary Committee, to close the debate on this side.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This amendment, plain and simple, would disable 702, our most important national security tool. If passed, any chance of reform through the underlying bill is dead on arrival in the United States Senate. We cannot risk 702 collection ending.

This Chamber cannot be complicit in allowing terrorists to fly under the radar if this amendment kills 702, and I sincerely urge you to oppose the Amash amendment and not lose the opportunity to successfully balance national security and civil liberties, which is what the underlying bill does.

We definitely need to have a move toward more protection of our Fourth Amendment rights, and a warrant requirement in domestic criminal cases and a requirement that if you are doing a national security investigation and you find that the information is useful in a criminal case and it is precluded from court are two major improvements to our 702 law that protect Americans' civil liberties.

This bill must be passed. It is absolutely essential for our protection. It surveys people outside of the United States who are not United States citizens. The fact that it collects incidental information about U.S. citizens should not be a prohibition on this effort. But if you apply this amendment, you are not going to be able to have our national intelligence officials looking at this information carefully, and they are going to have to, in many instances, get a warrant when they need to act because they think it is a national security concern. A warrant either will be unattainable or it will be in a circumstance where it is too late, and, in both instances, we cannot allow that.

This bill provides balance. That bill goes too far. The amendment goes too far. I urge my colleagues to oppose it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Costa).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Wenstrup).

Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, let me pose a hypothetical about the Amash amendment. In the criminal world, if an FBI agent is told through a tip that someone has just purchased unusual amounts of fertilizer that could be used to make a bomb, the Amash amendment would prevent that FBI agent from looking at the FBI's databases to determine if the suspicious individual's email address or other identifier--not the content of the email, just the email address or identifier--is located in the 702 database.

What would the American people say if we hamper our law enforcement from protecting them? What would people of this country say if we had another Murrah Building blow up and the FBI couldn't look at even an email address?

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), the Speaker of the House.