Pathway to Parenting Act of 2018

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I will take the opportunity to say good morning to the manager of the bill, my co-member on the House Judiciary Committee. I start this way, Mr. Speaker, and to my colleagues, because I always want to emphasize when I am on the floor that the Judiciary Committee has had many instances of bipartisanship.

I am very glad to have been on the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee for more than a number of years. I have seen our work, and it has certainly been in a bipartisan mode.

I want to acknowledge the chairman of the committee, Mr. Goodlatte, and the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Nadler. In many instances on the crime reform issues, we have tried to work hand-in-hand together.

It seems that criminal justice reform has partners on both sides of the aisle. It is certainly an issue that draws a vast number of stakeholders, particularly my friends in the faith community; social justice community; my friends in the libertarian community, if you will; and, certainly, giants like the ACLU, the Lawyers' Committee, and many others that have been engaged in these issues, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. So you can see that we bring people together.

So I rise to discuss H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and Security Act of 2018, which amends section 16 of title 18.

Section 16 sets forth the universal definition of what constitutes a crime of violence for the entirety of the criminal code. Therefore, this definition is critically important, and I am deeply concerned that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are introducing such an important amendment in such a hasty, precipitous manner.

Although my colleagues claim that the introduction of this bill has not been hasty and that it has been vetted for months on their side of the aisle, on our side of the aisle, we have had no engagement.

This bill has been laid before us for 7 days. Last Friday, it was singly introduced when Members were not here and, as well, before a 3- day weekend.

Let me be very clear. Criminal justice reform is not a sausage. We would work over the months and years with academic experts; victims; law enforcement--that is our family; and beyond, our prosecutors; our law enforcement; and, certainly, the Sentencing Commission, for example; our judges. We are concerned about thei viewpoints.

So I know there may be one or two who have written and may be supporting this, but this is not the way we get to the floor.

H.R. 6691 would expand the definition of crimes of violence in section 16 in two ways: enumerating certain offenses that do not currently exist under Federal law, and it would have been good to have a hearing or a series of hearings on this to be recognized for crimes of violence for Federal purposes; and by adding alternative definitions to already-existing Federal offenses, in order to have these new definitions also qualify as Federal crimes of violence.

Again, here is the trigger: More and more people incarcerated maybe could find another way of addressing these questions, even by law enforcement.

The Supreme Court recently decided Sessions v. Dimaya, holding that subsection (b) of section 16, known as the residual clause, is unconstitutionally vague. Subsection (a) in the Dimaya case left untouched defines a crime of violence as one that requires as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.

In response to Dimaya, my colleagues are now putting forth a bill to substitute subsection (b) for a list of crimes of violence, many of which have no element involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.

In addition, even the residual clause stricken down by Dimaya requires that a crime of violence at least be a felony. H.R. 6691 strips away the felony requirement.

For these reasons, this bill radically amends section 16. We go back to the old days of throwing everybody in jail.

This bill does not just list a few statutes that are obvious crimes of violence. It enumerates at least 32 separate crimes, some of which are not Federal crimes. It even offers alternative definitions for several Federal crimes. This requires careful consideration.

How dare anyone suggest that anyone on this side of the aisle is soft on crime. Some of my best friends, as we have heard others say in other settings, are law enforcement. I speak to my police officers every time I see them in the district. I am talking to the command frequently. Sometimes I congratulate them for a successful capture of a dastardly criminal.

Obviously, many of those crimes are State laws. But I know the State of Texas has been working to reduce the numbers of persons incarcerated. There is no doubt with law enforcement who the bad actors are. On the Federal level, it is the same.

But here we are, with a 1-week-old baby that has not been vetted and helped and nurtured to be able to make it work. This is serious work that we do here. So rather than proceeding through regular order by having a hearing to ascertain the relevant information from experts that will help us establish the best approach for dealing with the constitutionality of section 16, and the Federal definition of crimes of violence, we have been given 1 week to vote, with no markups to allow amendments germane to the bill's purpose.

Mr. Speaker, regular order is not a crime. Instead of taking the time to fashion a definition that takes into consideration the many legal ramifications of changing this term as proposed, the bill's sponsors are haphazardly pushing forward an overly expansive definition of crime of violence for political purposes.

Where are my civil libertarians? Where are my persons who believe in the Constitution, due process?

The bill is overbroad; two, unnecessary; and three, it could have substantial harmful effects.

First, the bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of violence a number of offenses that have no element of violence or force at all. No one likes burglary, but burglary, for example, is included in the enumerated list of crimes of violence, though it would simply mean remaining in a building without authorization and, while there, forming the attempt to commit even a minor, nonviolent offense.

Likewise, the bill lists coercion through fraud as a violent felony, though violence plays no part in that criminal offense.

The bill would also make simple assault a crime of violence, even in the circumstances where the underlying act is merely a push or a shove.

None of us applaud any of that, but we recognize in this vast country that our citizens have basic rights. One of the more egregious examples of an offense listed as a crime of violence is fleeing by automobile, which is knowingly operating a motor vehicle and failing or refusing to comply with a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a stop, or fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer. This definition does not even require intent to elude law enforcement.

Under this bill, what could have amounted to a traffic violation is, instead, a crime of violence.

It doesn't mean that we do not utilize these elements, but we are able to have vetted it in a way that truly is the crime that law enforcement seeks to protect themselves against and the public against.

Another specific area of concern is in the context of juvenile justice. If the Federal Government is prosecuting a juvenile, this bill would authorize the government to seek the transfer to adult court of someone as young as 15 years old if they were accused of committing a felony crime of violence. That may be a burglary, unintentionally in a building. We note where teenagers are and how they behave.

Under this new definition is even interference with a flight crew or an argument with a flight attendant over a Diet Coke.

And we want safety everywhere, on the highways and byways, throughout our neighborhoods and schools. We want to make sure that we attend to this, but this is serious work and it should have been done in regular order.

The consequences of H.R. 6691 are dangerous, especially as we look to the new attitude of the Justice Department, which is charging on every offense. Unlike the comprehensive and collaborative manner previously utilized in the past administration, working with faith leaders, working with law enforcement, working with advocates for social and criminal justice, U.S. attorneys were directed to not charge up, to focus on the highest crime.

Now we have the tendency to use a sprawling, overbroad definition of violent crime to justify more arrests and prosecutions and long prison sentences.

Has anybody met an ex-felon, many of them wanting to do right? I see a lot of them where good businesses have hired them. They want their head down, they want to work, they want to get an apartment, they want to support their family. They are not interested in going back again, nor are they interested in being accused of a minor offense and being ``felonized,'' if you will.

Second, a new definition of ``crime of violence'' is unnecessary, even in light of Dimaya. The court in Dimaya held that the residual clause is unconstitutional, but left in place subsection a. While perhaps not an ideal formulation, subsection a can, for now, suffice as a placeholder until Congress can undertake a more deliberate approach. Even so the Senate would have a companion bill, which to our knowledge, it does not. It is important to take note of the fact.

Third, changing the definition of a crime of violence can have other harmful effects; for example, it could have

significant exclusionary effects for criminal justice reform legislation. There is proposed legislation that excludes people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release considerations, expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors. So it would exclude people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release consideration, expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors while in custody. Unnecessarily expanding who is ineligible for these provisions is both unwise and counterproductive.

So as I have indicated, it is important that when we work together, we must work together through the goals of reforming our criminal justice system, which Congress has acknowledged needs dire fixing. Let's work together.

I am pushing for the revisions of criminal justice reform for juveniles. Reforming the juvenile justice system that locks up juveniles forever and ever because they are not sentenced in many instances. Certainly there are few juveniles in the Federal system, but in our State systems. And when we use the bully pulpit, States begin to reform their systems.

In addition, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, ACLU, Center for American Progress, and several others have opposed this bill.

We are on the Judiciary Committee. We believe in justice. Along with the advocates, we need true experts, and we are experts on these subject matters. And we are troubled by the reckless speed in which this bill was brought to the floor.

We understand the intent. We welcome it. But I have listed the fractures, the problems, the undermining of due process, the throwing the key away on good people who want to do better or who did not intend to exercise some of the elements that are in this bill.

So I ask my colleagues in this instance to recognize that this is too fast and to vote ``no'' on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss H.R. 6691, the ``Community Safety and Security Act of 2018,'' which amends section 16 of Title 18.

Section 16 sets forth the universal definition of what constitutes a ``crime of violence'' for the entirety of the criminal code.

Therefore, this definition is critically important and I am deeply concerned that my colleagues on the other side are introducing such an important amendment in such a reckless manner.

Although my colleagues claim that the introduction of this bill has not been hasty and that it has been vetted for months, on this side we have had this bill for seven days. It was introduced exactly one week ago today, on the day before a three-day weekend. That is reckless.

H.R. 6691 would expand the definition of crimes of violence in section 16 in two ways: (1) by enumerating certain offenses that do not currently exist under Federal law to be recognized as crimes of violence for Federal purposes; and (2) by adding alternative definitions to already-existing Federal offenses in order to have these new definitions also qualify as Federal crimes of violence.

The Supreme Court recently decided Sessions v Dimaya, holding that subsection (b) of section 16, known as the ``residual clause,'' is unconstitutionally vague.

Subsection (a), which Dimaya left untouched, defines a crime of violence as one that requires, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.

In response to Dimaya, my colleagues are now putting forth this bill to substitute subsection (b) for a list of ``crimes of violence,'' many of which have no element involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.

In addition, even the residual clause stricken down by Dimaya required that a crime of violence at least be a felony. H.R. 6691 strips away the felony requirement.

For these reasons, this bill radically amends section 16. This bill does not just list a few statutes that are obvious crimes of violence. It enumerates at least 32 separate crimes, some of which are not Federal crimes, and it even offers alternative definitions for several Federal crimes. This requires careful consideration.

But rather than proceeding through regular order by having a hearing, to ascertain relevant information from experts that will help us establish the best approach for dealing with the constitutionality of section 16 and the Federal definition of crimes of violence, we have been given one week to vote, with no markups to allow amendments, germane to the bill's purpose.

Instead of taking the time to fashion a definition that takes into consideration the many legal ramifications of changing this term as proposed, the bill's sponsors are haphazardly pushing forward an overly-expansive definition of ``crime of violence'' for political purposes. The bill is (1) overbroad, (2) unnecessary, and (3) could have substantial harmful effects.

First, the bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of violence a number of offenses that have no element of violence, or force, at all. Burglary, for example, is included in the enumerated list of crimes of violence though it could simply mean remaining in a building without authorization and, while there, forming the intent to commit even a minor, non-violent offense. Likewise, the bill lists coercion through fraud as a violent felony, though violence plays no part in that criminal offense. The bill would also make simple assault a crime of violence even in circumstances where the underlying act is merely a push or a shove.

One of the more egregious examples of an offense listed as a crime of violence is ``fleeing by automobile'' which is ``knowingly operating a motor vehicle and--(A) failing or refusing to comply with a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a stop; or (B) fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.'' This definition does not even require an intent to elude law enforcement. Under this bill, what could have amounted to a traffic violation becomes, instead, a ``crime of violence''.

Another specific area of concern is in the context of juvenile justice. If the Federal government is prosecuting a juvenile, this bill would authorize the government to seek transfer to adult court of someone as young as 15 years old if they are accused of committing a felony ``crime of violence'' under this new definition--even for something as minor as getting in an argument with a flight attendant over a Diet Coke.

The consequences of H.R. 6691 are dangerous, especially in the hands of a Sessions Justice Department, which has displayed a general tendency to use a sprawling, overbroad definition of violent crime to justify more arrests and prosecutions and longer prison sentences.

Second, a new definition of crime of violence is unnecessary, even in light of Dimaya. The Court in Dimaya held that the residual clause is unconstitutional, but left in place subsection (a). While perhaps not an ideal formulation, subsection (a) can for now suffice as a placeholder until Congress can undertake a more deliberate approach, instead of the reflexive one proposed by H.R. 6691.

Third, changing the definition of a crime of violence can have other harmful effects. For example, it could have significant exclusionary effects for criminal justice reform legislation. There is proposed legislation that excludes people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release considerations, expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors while in custody. Unnecessarily expanding who is ineligible for these provisions is both unwise and counterproductive to the goals of reforming our criminal justice system, which Congress has acknowledged needs dire fixing.

Families Against Mandatory Minimum (FAMM), ACLU, Center for American Progress (CAP), and several other organizations have opposed this bill.

We on the Judiciary Committee, along with advocates that are true experts on these subject matters are troubled by the reckless speed with which this bill was brought to the floor today.

We should take the time to explore why.

According to a recent report by the Pew Research Center on January 12, 2018, the number of African Americans in prisons are 33 percent. The number of Hispanics are 23 percent. Therefore, together they make up 56 percent of today's prison population.

Mr. Speaker, if I might respond to the gentleman's presentation.

Due process is denied and could be denied, based upon the fact that there is no element of the offenses that are just listed in a laundry- list type. That would come about if we had done this in an extensive manner of review.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Cicilline), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law and a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, reserving the status quo is the very point we are making, that the status quo is the unclarity, if you will, and, therefore, it is important that we pursue this in a manner of constructively understanding what is the best approach to protect the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Takano), the vice ranking member on the Veterans' Affairs Committee.

Mr. Speaker, if I might inquire how many speakers the gentlewoman from Georgia has remaining.

Mr. Speaker, earlier I indicated the work of the Judiciary Committee, and it has been enhanced by the ranking member, Mr. Nadler. We have worked on criminal justice issues bipartisanly, and I want to thank Mr. Nadler for doing so. That is the tragedy of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, sometimes vagueness is the extinguishing of constitutional rights. I know, and I will have the numbers, that the predominant numbers of incarcerated persons throughout the Nation are African Americans and Hispanics. That is men and women. A rising number of women are being incarcerated, some of them tied to crimes of their boyfriend, husband, or other significant other.

Juveniles are also being incarcerated throughout the State system.

Mass incarceration is a big deal, so it behooves us to be diligent. In this particular bill, yes, Mr. Speaker, it should have been collaborative and bipartisan, because none of us will yield to a dastardly criminal act that impacts our constituents or the American people. But a fact is a fact. This generates racial disparities.

As my friend from California indicated, individuals who put on the uniform, who may be legal permanent residents, veterans, have the potential, in spite of the uniform that they put on and their willingness to sacrifice their life for America, caught in the wrong situation, could be deported.

This is not to be taken lightly. Frankly, if my friends had studied the Constitution and read the Supreme Court decision, they would have seen the statement that Justice Kagan made, and that is that this is dividing the Federal appellate courts. She raised the question: Does car burglary qualify as a violent felony under 16(b)? She indicated that some courts say yes, some courts say no.

She went on to say, residential trespass, what is that? The same is true. She went on to say, it does not exhaust the conflict in the courts.

Well, you don't answer the conflict by doing as was stated in the Families Against Mandatory Minimums letter dated September 6. On substantive grounds, H.R. 6691 has the potential to have severe unintended consequences on sentencing in our justice system writ large.

Under this bill, seemingly nonviolent offenses will be considered violent offenses, for example, under H.R. 6691, burglary of an unoccupied home. How many teenagers--I am not condoning that--may we find in an unoccupied home? I am not condoning burglary, but it would be considered a violent offense.

Burglary is a serious offense, but should it be considered violent if the perpetrator does not even interact with another person? Yes, they should be prosecuted. But you have in this bill violent offense.

Then, of course, in this legislation, legal service providers who filed an amicus brief, these are the guys and ladies who are our public defenders who see these people every day--the indigent, and many of them minority--they wind up, as everyone says, up the road in these large, massive prisons, and their lives are ruined because we have not fixed the criminal justice system.

Legal service providers who filed the amicus brief in the Dimaya case described the different applications of subsection (b) of section 16 across Federal circuits, using the example of residential trespass, which was considered a crime of violence by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but not by the Seventh Circuit. This bill does little to resolve the inconsistent way courts apply the crime of violence based on subsection (b) because it includes vague definitions of offenses and creates definitions for the same crimes that differ from those currently in the criminal code.

That is a denial of due process, and that is not taking on this important issue. As was mentioned, there is a list of important elements. I support the fact that these are difficult and a terrible dilemma. But it can be done in a manner that is preferable, and that is through unceasing commitment and effort.

Mr. Speaker, this is why we are here today having different positions. I cannot yield to what will be claimed as individuals who do not understand how important this bill is when I know the young African American men and young men of color who are entrapped in this system, and that the better approach and the better angels are for us to do comprehensive criminal justice reform and, I might add, immigration reform as well.

But let me indicate that we support victims of crime, especially those who are victims of violent crimes. We want relief for them.

This bill dangerously leads to overcriminalization, and we should not take the task of amending the definition of ``crime of violence'' lightly.

In the Rules Committee, we addressed overcriminalization and mass incarceration. Representative Torres aptly stated that we should not proceed with haste, which will further exacerbate the overcrowdedness in our prisons.

One Member suggested, in the Rules Committee, just build prisons, that is how we stop this criminal siege, as indicated, even though the FBI and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have indicated that crime is going down.

Yes, we have our concerns. Even conservative groups that work with these very complicated and important criminal justice reform issues, like the Cook Foundation and Right on Crime, do not agree that building more prisons is the answer. Right on Crime states that, by reducing excessive sentence lengths and holding nonviolent offenders accountable through prison alternatives, public safety can often be achieved.

We recognize that the violent perpetrators should be incarcerated. If that is the case, I would stand with my colleague.

I would also stand with the Mothers of the Movement who saw their sons gunned down, in that we need to have relief in that direction.

There are many issues of criminal justice reform that should be on this floor--as I mentioned, sentencing reduction and juvenile justice reform--but we have not come to that point.

So I would ask, Mr. Speaker, that my colleagues vote ``no,'' because as Justice Kagan said in her opinion, the interpretation of crime and violence has divided the Federal appellate courts because the answer is not obvious. Therefore, we must carefully consider the alternatives to the approach prepared in this bill. We must do more than eliminate vagueness. We must achieve a just and fair result.

Nothing in this Supreme Court opinion, nothing, says, go alone, put a bill on the floor for 1 week, give Members no chance to amend, try to deny due process, build more prisons, make sure that the disparities of those who go into our jails rises and goes up, rather than giving our young people opportunities, a fair chance, and justice. So I ask my colleagues to oppose this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record letters from the ACLU, the Center for American Progress, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the National Center

for Lesbian Rights, and immigrant rights organizations ranging from the National Immigrant Justice Center to others.

Mr. Speaker, I leave my colleagues with a simple challenge. The simple challenge is: Read the Constitution.

Vagueness can be the death of us. This bill is that kind of death, and I would hope that we would have the opportunity to do this as it should be: constitutionally sound and in a bipartisan way to save lives.

Mr. Speaker, let me be clear. We support victims of crime, especially those who are victims of violent crime. But classifying particular offenses as crimes of violence has tremendous consequences for the individuals accused of committing them. This bill dangerously leads to over-criminalization and we should not take lightly the task of amending the definition of ``crime of violence.''

At Rules on Wednesday, we addressed over-criminalization and mass incarceration. Rep. Torres aptly stated that we should not proceed with haste, which will further exacerbate the over crowdedness in our prisons. Rep. Bucks responded that we should build more prisons to address that problem.

Even conservative groups that work with these very complicated and important criminal justice reform issues, like the Koch Foundation and Right on Crime, do not agree that building more prisons is the answer.

Right on Crime states, ``by reducing excessive sentence lengths and holding non-violent offenders accountable through prison alternatives, public safety can often be achieved.''

In a recent forum, the Koch Foundation stated, ``After four decades of increasing punitiveness and sky-rocketing levels of imprisonment, American incarceration rates have declined in many states over the past five years. In fact, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in favor of major criminal justice reforms that would reduce mass incarceration much further.''

The original spark for this coalition of ``unlikely bedfellows'' has come from a group of conservative leaders who emphasize a variety of different factors, ranging from economic, to

freedom, to religious groups embracing redemption and second chances.

The Koch Foundation went on to say, ``Although the 2016 presidential election temporarily halted this movement's momentum, the coalition has reemerged recently and seems prepared to make progress in 2018.''

So I disagree with the notion that we should build more prisons and not exercise due diligence to ensure that in responding to the Supreme Court's finding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, that we are doing so in a well-informed, heavily-engaged and thoughtful manner.

Due to the seriousness of our criminal justice system, we should always use due care and give thorough considerations when amending the criminal code.

For all these reasons, I oppose this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1051, I call up the bill (H.R. 6691) to amend title 18, United States Code, to clarify the definition of ``crime of violence'', and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 6691.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today in strong support of H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and Security Act of 2018. This legislation provides critical clarity to the definition of ``crime of violence'' in the United States Code in order to keep violent criminals off the streets and ensure the safety of our communities.

In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Dimaya, the term ``crime of violence'' was determined to be unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Congress to act to provide the necessary clarity in the law that allows our law enforcement and our judicial systems to work and, importantly, to protect the victims of these violent crimes.

The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 provides that clarity by precisely and legally defining the phrase ``crime of violence'' and the related criminal acts that, when combined with the element of force are, indeed, considered violent.

They include crimes such as voluntary manslaughter, attempted kidnapping, lewd acts upon a child, sexual assault, assault on a police officer, domestic violence, murder, and all other crimes that a normal, regular individual would think of as a violent crime, as well as human trafficking.

In my State of Georgia, metro Atlanta is well known as a haven for human and sex trafficking, and as a recruiting center for vulnerable young people. In 2017 alone, it was reported that nearly 3,600 females and more than 600 males were trafficked. These are just the reported cases. Thousands more go unreported every year.

This legislation that I bring forward today provides essential legal clarity to ensure that crimes like human trafficking and others in the bill are deemed legally as crimes of violence.

Failure to address this issue would foster vagueness and uncertainty in our courts, and potentially disrupt the prosecution of certain crimes of violence, like human trafficking, child abuse, domestic violence, and other acts that any reasonable individual would consider a crime of violence.

This legislation has the support of a number of organizations, including the Fraternal Order of Police and the National Association of Police Organizations.

In a recent letter to Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi, the Fraternal Order of Police noted that ``there are numerous convictions and pending cases that would be jeopardized'' in the wake of the Dimaya decision.

The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 is another step that we, as Congress, can take, that we must take, in order to make our communities the safest that they can possibly be. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, to my colleague from Texas, I want to say good morning to her as well and also recognize her significant efforts in criminal justice reform, and indeed I was proud to be able to support that recent piece of legislation that came through our committee as well.

A couple of points. I very much appreciate the concerns that have been raised, Mr. Speaker, but I assure you that this law, as crafted, does not go beyond the scope contemplated when Section 16 was originally crafted.

This is a responsible, carefully crafted piece of legislation that does what the United States Supreme Court recommended. It enumerates what crimes are crimes of violence so that there can be no vagueness and people know what the law is. In fact, it goes to protect due process, Mr. Speaker.

This is our responsibility as legislators. And indeed, Mr. Speaker, time is of the essence, given the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, and indeed

there would be substantial harmful effects if we fail as Congress to act today on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, first, I certainly appreciate my colleagues and the fact that they have read the bill so very thoroughly.

I must reiterate, however, that this legislation is not overly broad. In fact, it specifically maintains the status quo. And we drew those lines because

we crafted the bill to maintain that status quo.

The legislation will not be able to fix some of the outrageous injustices that have occurred when courts have found certain offenses do not qualify as crimes of violence. For example, where a defendant who has a conviction for sexual abuse escapes more serious consequences because the State's sexual abuse statute also encompasses certain consensual conduct and, therefore, it was not categorically a crime of violence even when and where this particular defendant committed horrific acts that were most certainly not consensual.

Some of these injustices must be fixed through State legislation. We refrained specifically from expanding the law, despite the very human desire to want to fix these kinds of injustices and recognizing that the States have the duty to fix this.

This legislation, Mr. Speaker, does affect people's lives. Specifically, it is going to affect the lives of individuals who are victims of violent crimes.

A couple more points have been raised. First of all, on the issue of fleeing, we have heard the concerns that the written text is a little bit too broad on fleeing. Well, let me just correct that. Courts have found fleeing to be a crime of violence. This is not an expansion. This applies only in vehicles. It is not on foot.

The Seventh Circuit called this specific conduct ``inherently aggressive.'' The 11th Circuit reasoned that ``fleeing from law enforcement, an individual has already resorted to an extreme measure to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the use of physical force.''

So, Mr. Speaker, we approach this bill with great diligence. Time, as I said, is of the essence, given the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision. We heard from the police officers association that they are very concerned about the fact that pending cases and convictions could be effective if Congress does not act. Indeed, substantial harm will occur if we fail to act.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, just one clarification to the most recent comments. The part that was left out in those comments was the fact that it would apply only if a violent crime is committed.

May I inquire as to how much time remains.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Carter).

Mr. Speaker, I have two additional speakers.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding).

Mr. Speaker, again, I want to make the point that time really is of the essence in being able to protect due process and, equally and perhaps more importantly, being able to protect victims of certain violent crimes.

For example, right now, today, under Fourth Circuit precedent, sex trafficking is not considered a crime of violence; and I think that most of us would all agree that sex trafficking is, indeed, a crime of violence.

Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, first let me address the criticism regarding burglary being too broad in the way it is addressed in the legislation. This is the Federal generic definition of burglary and one that courts have found satisfies the definition of ``crime of violence.''

Mr. Speaker, the detractors of this fail to recognize that these definitions are not an expansion of actual State laws but only seek to cover the generic definition and reasonable iterations found in State law.

In fact, prior to the Dimaya Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court had previously unanimously agreed in Leocal v. Ashcroft that ``burglary is the classic example of a crime of violence under subsection 16(b).''

The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 is a necessary, crucial piece of legislation that will fix a major loophole in our system. We squarely address the issues raised by the United States Supreme Court, eliminating the vagueness, giving notice, and explaining which offenses Congress intended to cover when they had first crafted the language in clause 16(b) from the very beginning.

By moving the legislation, we are avoiding potentially dangerous consequences of giving very serious, dangerous criminals a pass. We have examined the case law surrounding these offenses; we have considered the equities; we have been deliberative; and we have shown great restraint in many ways.

Congress cannot sit idly by and allow criminals to disrupt our communities because of this loophole. This bill is a product of necessity, and we do not have the privilege to squabble over hypotheticals that ultimately have no bearing on real-life applications of this law. We must move to protect our communities to prevent more victims of crime.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I can assure my colleagues that this bill is not overly broad. It is not, as some have irresponsibly stated, a ``dangerous expansion of criminal law.'' Instead, it is a carefully crafted response to the U.S. Supreme Court's recommendations in the Dimaya case. Frankly, it is just the sort of bill that our system was designed to produce.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for this bill. Vote ``yes,'' and in doing so, demonstrate to your constituents your commitment to protecting law-abiding Americans from violent criminals. It is a simple choice. Make the correct one and vote ``yes.''

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Congresswoman Handel for bringing this forth, this very important piece of legislation that has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya ruled that 18 U.S.C. Section 16 was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

That is the way the process works. We, the legislators, write the law, not an unelected bureaucrat. We, as legislators, are supposed to write the law, then the court interprets that law if an issue is brought before the court, as in this particular case.

So there is a several-page slip opinion, we call it, that explains why the court ruled the way it did, saying we need more of an explanation as to what a violent crime is. The court ruled that the statute in question failed to properly provide a definition for a crime of violence.

H.R. 6691 eliminates that vagueness and addresses the Supreme Court's concerns and preserves the pre-Dimaya status quo.

It has the support of the Justice Department.

The legislation before us today is supported by the Department of Justice, I want to reemphasize that, and will properly define what a crime of violence is. It is clearly delineated here in eight pages, the crimes, what constitutes them, the meaning, the intent, crime by crime on these pages. It does not prevent anyone from due process.

As a former Federal prosecutor and State prosecutor, I have seen serious violent crimes that were committed. And we must make sure that those that are here illegally and commit these violent crimes be sent back to their countries from where they came.

Over 18 years as a prosecutor, I have seen my share of bodies on slabs in morgues because of violent crime, and many of those were young kids.

This legislation defines crime by crime by crime and sets forth the criteria that the legislature was responsible for doing in the first place.

I want to explain the process on how this works. The crime is committed, it is reported, law enforcement goes in and does an investigation. If they feel that a crime has been committed, they file a complaint or go to the DA or go to the United States Attorney and present probable cause, evidence that the crime probably was committed. And then, in whatever situation, whether it is the State or the Federal level, there can be an indictment, the evidence can go before a grand jury, and then the decision is made if it proceeds. Then that individual goes before a judge on a preliminary hearing to the point where the person's actual constitutional rights kick in. None of that, none of that is eliminated.

I support this legislation because of what I have seen over my career. And taking care of issues of violence that we see so much of and the violence that we see, particularly by individuals that are here illegally, this remedies that matter.

We have a lot of violence in this country committed by people that are citizens, and we take care of that through the judicial system as well.

But this is commonsense legislation. It addresses the issue immediately and it does what the American people want it to do.

There is due process, but if you are here illegally, you commit a violent crime, and once that is established, then you are sent back to your country of origin.

Mr. Speaker, I support this legislation and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to make some clarifications. First of all, I am tired of hearing from the other side that bills are rushed through, bills are pushed through, there is no thought put into this, which is nothing more than a red herring.

The Supreme Court said that the term ``crime of violence'' is not specific enough. So what we did was we put into this new statute this new law explaining what murder is, and voluntary manslaughter, sexual abuse, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual abuse, child abuse, kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, firearms use, burglary, arson, extortion, communication of threats, and fleeing.

These are already laws that have been on the books for two decades. The Court just simply said it wants the specifics in the legislation for removing someone who is here illegally and who has committed one of these crimes.

Now, let's go into this. They are making, again, a red herring, a big deal, out of this term ``fleeing.'' Now, all the crimes, plus there were many more in here that I didn't have time to go over, explain and define those.

One thing I want to talk about in ``fleeing'' is, it is not if a person is speeding and an officer wants to stop that person and the person drives a little longer to find a safe place to pull over. That is absurd.

Here is the term. ``Fleeing'' means knowingly operating a motor vehicle and, following a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a stop: A, failing or refusing to comply; or, B, fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.

The term ``force'' means the level of force capable of physical pain or injury, or needed or intended to overcome resistance.

That means that that individual is fleeing in that automobile at a high rate of speed to get away from the officer because they don't want to be caught, and that person could cause much more havoc, much more danger and death, to somebody else if, when they are fleeing, they cause an accident.

My colleagues on the other side leave out these important details. It is all listed here. It is very specific. It is exactly what the Court asked for, and this is good law.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I must oppose the so-called Community Safety and Security Act. This highly flawed bill is an example of why regular order and a meaningful, deliberative process is essential to the proper crafting of legislation.

Last April, the Supreme Court, in Sessions v. Dimaya, ruled that a portion of the criminal code's definition of criminal violence is unconstitutionally vague. That was nearly 6 months ago.

The Judiciary Committee has had ample time to examine the decision, to hold hearings, to gather input from a range of stakeholders, and to carefully develop legislation through markup and regular order--but none of those things have happened.

Instead, a bill with significant ramifications for criminal law in immigration cases was introduced just last week while Members were out of town and is being rushed to the floor today without any hearings, without any markup, without any adequate opportunity for review by the public, by legal experts, or by stakeholders. So it is not a surprise that we are left with many unanswered questions and concerns about the impact of the bill.

The term ``crime of violence'' is referred to throughout the criminal code and is, for example, used to determine whether a juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult in Federal court. It also has serious implications in immigration law because a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony, described under the Immigration and Nationality Act to include a crime of violence under this section, is deportable and would be denied the opportunity for certain discretionary relief from removal.

If we do not define this term properly, it could have significant adverse consequences. H.R. 6691 specifies a long list of offenses that would be considered crimes of violence, some of which are not currently included in the Federal criminal code. The bill further defines some of the offenses that are in the code, adding layers of confusion to the bill.

We need proper definitions. For example, the crime of fleeing is identified as a crime of violence. Now, if by fleeing you mean that, when the cop pulls you over, you hit the gas and flee at 100 miles per hour, endangering anybody on the road, that is a crime of violence. But if by fleeing it is meant that you don't pull over immediately because you are looking for a safe place to stop, well, that probably shouldn't be a crime of violence, and yet, in this bill, it seems to be.

We should carefully examine all of these offenses to determine which are appropriate to be included in this definition, and we should consider what the consequences will be for each one.

In writing for the majority in Dimaya, Justice Kagan noted that:

A host of issues respecting the definition of ``crime of

violence'' application to specific crimes divide the Federal

appellate courts.

Although Congress has the power to clarify the definition or to establish a new one, as this bill would do, it is absolutely essential that we consider carefully what offenses should be included.

Indeed, in considering a change to the definition of ``crime of violence'' for the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, the United States Sentencing Commission held a hearing and received testimony. It also sought public comments in response to proposed revisions. At a minimum, we should do the same.

Finally, I note that, even in the brief time since the bill has been introduced, a week, a broad array of advocates have expressed opposition to this bill, including the American Civil Liberties Union and Families Against Mandatory Minimums.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for the additional time.

Others opposing the bill are Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Immigrant Justice Network, the Immigrant Defense Project, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others. Such opposition should, at the very least, tell us that we should not be considering this legislation without thoughtful deliberation.

This bill is a perfect example of a bill whose topics should be covered, but we could do it properly instead of having a sloppily drafted bill that does things we don't know it does and doesn't do things we think it does. We must have a hearing. We should have testimony. We should carefully consider this bill, and then we should pass some version of it.

For those reasons, I oppose passage of this version of this bill, and I ask that we take the time to examine this issue through regular order.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6691, the so-called Community Safety and Security Act.

This legislation would dramatically expand the definition of a crime of violence in the Federal criminal code, with many, many unintended consequences. The gentlewoman from Texas spoke about fleeing. That is just one example of one of the unintended consequences of this.

This is partly happening because this legislation is being rushed through the House without any meaningful debate or committee consideration. It was introduced just last week before the Labor Day weekend when most Members were home for the district work period. We have had zero markups, zero hearings on this bill, and this bill has never been considered in the previous Congress. So not in this Congress, not in the previous Congress.

It has not been considered through regular order, and that means key stakeholders, like outside experts and criminal justice reform advocates, have been given little chance to provide input on the bill.

It is a demonstration, frankly, of the arrogance of this body. We don't even think we need to listen to anybody about the implications of this bill. We know best. We are not going to have a hearing. We are just going to bring it to the floor.

In the very short time that the public has had to analyze it, groups like Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the ACLU, and the National Immigration Justice Center have expressed opposition to the bill.

It is basically fast tracked, even though changing the definition of a crime of violence will have a domino effect on our laws, given its prevalence in Federal criminal law and its application in immigration law.

This so-called Community Safety and Security Act could lead to more criminalization, harsh sentencing, and unfair results. It is overly broad and will open the doors to massive incarceration and people being unjustifiably detained, both pretrial and post-conviction. It could exacerbate racial disparities that already exist in policing and in the courts, and it could accelerate the number of immigrant detentions and deportations.

I really don't understand why my Republican colleagues are scrambling to push this through, this just-introduced bill, without careful consideration.

We do have to respond to the Supreme Court decision. We need to do it properly, and after careful deliberations, with a full understanding of all of the consequences. This bill will have far-reaching effects, not only on citizens of this country, but on people who are here in the United States.

Mr. Speaker, passing this bill today without a full understanding of these effects would be irresponsible.

We have been able to engage in really deliberative, thoughtful consideration of criminal justice reform. This May we passed the FIRST STEP Act. There was a lot of good bipartisan collaboration. There were hearings and discussions and listening to experts. That is how we should be doing business. This will affect people's lives.

We have a lot more work to do. I encourage my colleagues to reject this legislation so that we can get back to working in a bipartisan way to get rid of mandatory minimums, to making investments in reentry programs, to ending racial profiling, and so many of the other reforms that I know we can work on together. That is how we should be doing the business of the American people, not jamming things through in the dark of night with no hearings, no witnesses, no understanding of the bill that just passed.