Providing for consideration of the bill (S. 139) to implement the use of Rapid DNA instruments to inform decisions about pretrial release or detention and their conditions, to solve and prevent violent crimes and other crimes, to exonerate the innocent, to prevent DNA analysis backlogs, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 682 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

General Leave

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on House Resolution 682, currently under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring forward this rule on behalf of the Rules Committee. The rule provides for consideration of S. 139, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act.

The rule provides for 1 hour of debate, with 40 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 20 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking member of the Judiciary Committee.

The rule also provides for a motion to recommit.

Additionally, the rule makes in order an amendment offered by Mr. Amash, representing ideas from Members of both sides of the aisle.

Yesterday, the Rules Committee received testimony from numerous members, including Intelligence Committee Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff. We also heard from Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Nadler, Congressman Farenthold, Congressman Amash, Congresswoman Lofgren, and also Congressman Poe.

In addition to the vigorous debate on this legislation before the Rules Committee, both the Judiciary Committee and Intelligence Committee held markups on legislation to reauthorize section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Today we have the opportunity to pass an important piece of legislation that will enhance our national security and strengthen protections of Americans' privacy.

Mr. Speaker, I publicly thank Chairman Goodlatte and Chairman Nunes for their important work on this legislation. As a result of their efforts, the legislation we will consider today will protect the privacy rights of individual Americans without hindering the intelligence community's ability to gain valuable intelligence about the schemes and identities of our enemies.

Our government's most fundamental responsibilities are to defend the American people from harm and to protect their liberties. The value that we place on these duties is reflected by the fact that they are enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution.

To provide for our common defense, the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community work tirelessly to defeat the efforts of our foreign adversaries, whether they are terrorists, hostile foreign states, or nuclear proliferators.

Our Constitution tasks each branch of government--legislative, executive, and judicial--with constantly working to protect the liberty of every American.

With the bill provided for by this rule, the Chamber will be considering legislation that will help us better achieve both. The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act will extend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, Title VII for 6 years while increasing oversight of its implementation at every level and providing more robust privacy protections for Americans.

Section 702 of FISA has proven to be an invaluable tool for collecting foreign intelligence and providing insight into the plans and intentions of our enemies. It is one of the National Security Administration's most important operational authorities.

It permits the government to conduct targeted surveillance of foreign persons located outside the United States, with the compelled assistance of electronic communication service providers, to acquire foreign intelligence information.

Mr. Speaker, this program's importance to national security cannot be overstated. While many of the examples of its successes are classified in nature, I can tell you here today that it has helped protect the homeland and the American people.

One declassified example that I can share with Members concerns the story of Hajji Iman, who rose through the ranks of ISIS, eventually becoming the terrorist organization's second in command.

For more than 2 years, the intelligence community searched for Iman. During that period, the NSA used their section 702 programs to target his communications and his close associates. Their resourcefulness, together with these 702 resources, eventually led them to him.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman was a terrorist. He was a murderer. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Iman was killed by U.S. special forces on March 24, 2016, during an attempt to apprehend him.

We may not see every victory that the 702 program delivers on behalf of innocent Americans, but these initiatives help protect Americans every day.

Let us pause to note, however, that with the broad authority granted by a program like 702 to collect foreign intelligence information to fight our foreign enemies, it must come with expansive safeguards against abuse of that authority and expansive oversight of its use.

To ensure that the authorities under section 702 do not come into conflict with the liberty and privacy interests of the American people, the FISA Amendments Act expands substantially on the already extensive safeguard.

Mr. Speaker, as I have said, each branch of government is responsible for protecting the liberties of the American people. In the executive branch, there are extensive internal controls that require agency heads and the Attorney General to review and approve of actions under 702. Additionally, the inspector general for the intelligence community and the Department of Justice are tasked with comprehensive review of this program's implementation.

Mandatory internal procedures known as targeting and minimization procedures also govern the collection, use, and dissemination of information, and they are in place at each agency that uses FISA section 702.

The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act expands upon the internal protections by requiring each agency to also adopt querying procedures to control how each agency searches its database for 702-acquired communications.

This brings me to the judicial branch. Under current law, the targeting and minimization procedures must be approved annually by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, of FISC, which is made up of a rotating group of Article III judges.

The FISC, with the aid of amicus curiae briefs and technical experts, engages in exhaustive review and consideration of section 702's implementation for compliance with the Constitution and the law.

This legislation will enhance the FISC's considerations of privacy issues by providing the FISC with the authority to compensate amicus briefs and technical experts.

Finally, there is Congress, where we come to. The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Intelligence have conducted multiple oversight hearings and meetings in both classified and unclassified settings. Numerous insights came from those hearings, and the legislation that will be considered under today's rule reflects them well. The bill makes a number of improvements that will enhance the congressional oversight in coming years.

But, Mr. Speaker, it is time to remember one more group that remains critical to protecting Americans' liberties: American men and women themselves.

This legislation will improve transparency and public oversight of FISA section 702 by requiring the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review and publicly release the FISA section 702 minimization procedures every year.

Mr. Speaker, the most important reform contained in this legislation constitutes the most substantial reform to the program since its inception.

Under this legislation, the FBI will be required, when conducting a criminal investigation of a U.S. person, to obtain a warrant from the FISC prior to accessing the content of the communications that were acquired using 702.

Section 702 information is collected for the purpose of foreign intelligence operations, and this critical new requirement forecloses the possibility that FBI agents investigating Americans for traditional crimes would be able to use 702 information in such domestic investigations.

In addition to the numerous safeguards currently in place and added by this legislation, Americans are guaranteed their right of privacy by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

I took an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and the oath guides every action I take in this Chamber. The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act ensures that the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans are upheld and includes additional safeguards on top of constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Mr. Speaker, we have reviewed the importance of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act in stopping terrorist attacks and protecting the American people, but this point bears repeating: this program allows the government to obtain the communication of foreigners outside the United States, including foreign terrorist threats, in support of the counterterrorism efforts worldwide. It has allowed us to respond to threats to our country.

Now let me tell you a little bit about what the 702 program is not. It is not a bulk collection of data. It cannot be used to target Americans and it cannot be used to target individuals located inside the United States.

Mr. Speaker, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act is an example of what Congress can accomplish when we work together to find solutions to our Nation's weightiest challenges.

Mr. Speaker, before I close my opening, I also will acknowledge that there is a lot of difference of opinion, as there should be, on this bill. But at the end of the day, progress has been made, protections have been implemented, and the security of our country must be taken into account. That is why this bill needs to pass and any amendments that were brought forward need to fail.

We need to push this forward and begin the process in continuing to protect our private citizens' personal responsibilities and liberties, but also, at the same time, making sure that our intelligence communities and those entrusted with the sacred duty of protecting this country have the tools they need to do that. Anything else would be less than what we should be here.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), a fellow member of the Judiciary Committee and former chair of that committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, before I yield to my next speaker, there are a couple of things to clarify here.

This is an urgent matter. Although the gentlewoman spoke of this in the sense that the existing orders would stay in place, she fails to mention, and others have failed to talk about, that any new orders or even currently existing orders are being enforced by the intelligence community, which is set under that sort of pale of direction that they want.

So I guess if you are satisfied protecting the country with existing orders and existing threats that lasted yesterday, but I will guarantee you somebody else woke up this morning wanting to do us harm. I want the intelligence community to be able to address that in a way that is prudent and proper, which is what I feel like is happening here.

The other issue here is, and I want to make this very clear, there are strong opinions, and I respect the gentlewoman from California immensely, I have relayed and have had similar concerns that she has had over the process and I have voted with her several times to move forward, but we have moved forward, and there are, I believe, protections in this bill.

So when we also talk about, as we go forward, and there is going to be a lot of passionate rhetoric, who is looking out for whom and reminding us of our oaths, I took the oath here, just as the gentlewoman did, when we started this new session, but I also took another oath in the United States Air Force and also served in Iraq and also serve in that time since currently in the military, and we have that oath as well.

I will not take a backseat to anyone who can consciously disagree about where we are. This is a good bill. This is something that I would love to see in different ways changed, but this is the arc of where we are now in protecting our country.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Cheney).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman from California attempting to clarify.

Again, I stand by my statement. The simple fact is, it is the statement it will not go dark, but the issue is we go further here in the collection happening, but how we use that and how we deal with that in a national security context, there is an interesting issue here, and there is an issue that could keep us from doing what we need to do.

Again, this is the debate that we can have, this is the debate that we need to have on this floor, but there is a difference of opinion here. In this instance, I think with the pervasive efforts put in place, I believe that this program is one worth keeping.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick), a former FBI special agent.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Just real briefly, I think one of the issues here is this discussion of riddled with loopholes and riddled with anybody. It is just a reminder that agencies not already defined in this cannot just do random searches of this database. This is something that we have just-- again, let's just push back on the facts of the case.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask how much time is remaining on both sides, and then also inquire of my good friend from Florida if he has any more speakers.

Does the gentleman from Florida have any more speakers?

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my friend from Florida, my cohort on the Rules Committee, but I will just also say I appreciate his advice. But also, as a reminder back to my friend from Florida, we have spent time talking about things that matter and things that were messed up.

In fact, we spent a lot of time in this House and passed a healthcare bill because people in my district called me regularly over the holiday, as the new year approached, saying: We can't get insurance, or the insurance that I am provided, no doctor will accept.

We have spent time on that. I believe that is real.

We spent time in this body over the past few years working on a bill called Dodd-Frank that, in my district, decimated community banks and made lending harder and made businesses have more trouble trying to hire people to put them to meaningful work. Yes, we are spending time on things that were not well thought out.

Tax reform was well thought out and is helping Americans in all districts, including my friend's, and I believe we will continue to hear more about that as the day progresses.

But today, again, as many times, we are focused on a bill that has serious debate. It has the reality of some that can take and look at one thing and see a difference, and I agree with my friends on that. But that is why we are having this debate. That is why there will be an amendment on this bill that I oppose and that others will. Some will support it.

But I tell you one that does not support it: the current administration does not support the amendment. The current administration supports the bill, and the relevant committees that have worked on this bill support the underlying bill.

Number two, one of the issues that we have talked about today and one of the things we have to be very careful of is going back to something that was supported by both parties, and that is the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report that said that we have to take seriously the foreign--I respect greatly my friend, former speaker on our side, who disagrees with this bill, but this is about foreign surveillance. This is the foreign part of this, and we have got to make sure that we have that capability.

Really, this bill--if you continue, and especially looking at the amendment and where others want to go--would build walls that led to the very problems that we expressed before 9/11.

Then there is this last case that continually comes up, and it was about the ``about collection,'' which is no longer being done and practiced. It has been said: Well, we are just codifying it, and they can bring it back willy-nilly.

Let's remind ourselves of what actually has to happen. They have to actually decide that, one, they can, and they have to bring it to the FISC, the court. Oh, wait. Hold on here a second. Let's think about what just happened here. They have to bring it back to the very court that said: Oh, we have got a concern about this and why they have suspended it.

But, Mr. Speaker, let's also talk about why this even occurred, to start with, with the court. It was because the agencies, the intelligence communities, self-reported an issue that they needed to look at. It was not hidden. It was self-reported to the court. This is the protections built into this legislation.

Now, we can debate whether they go far enough or they are not enough or they are properly billed. This is sort of like a debate that needs to happen.

But be careful where we go here, to let the American people be led to believe that things that are happening are not really happening. Do not let it be led to believe that there are not things in place set up by even friends who have spoken today, maybe even against this, that were put in place to

protect the personal rights of our citizens.

Let's never forget that the end result of this is keeping our Nation safe while balancing the privacy concerns of our own citizens, which is never outside of my thoughts and discussions.

For years, the five years that I have been in this body and worked on the Judiciary Committee, we have pushed this envelope, pushing it for protection while, at the same time, balancing our national security needs. I will never say, for the most part, that there is a perfect bill ever to hit this floor. I would think that my friend would probably agree with me on that.

So you have to find the balance and ask: What is the aim of the bill? What is it doing? And how did it go about.

I believe this strikes that balance.

You can have disagreement, but at the end of the day, my question to you is: Is your push to make something better willing to turn out the lights or go dark on watching those who wish to do us harm?

Don't bank on the fact that the intelligence community will just continue on under what has been happening and not look at what could happen, even as we are in this Chamber debating this bill. I want them to be able to see clearly the threats to this country. I want them to use the processes in place to protect American citizens in this process, which they are doing, which, by the way, was highlighted by the fact of the self-report that led to the unbalanced collection being stopped.

But I never would want to put the security of this country in doubt when they cannot look or they are on shaky legal ground of what they can and cannot do to protect us. This goes back to a time in our country's history where we have technology--it was just said recently-- that is changing. I want them to have the ability to continue this process under the supervision of a plan that is put in place. Where those need to be adjusted, they can be adjusted.

Are there other needs that need to be addressed? Yes, there are. The Intelligence Committee chairman and I have spoken on those already. The Judiciary Committee, also, is looking into these. But at this point in time, this bill is one that I believe strikes the balance that is critical for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to have the tools they need to do their jobs, for our civil liberties and right to privacy, fundamental to our identity as Americans. I believe the underlying bill strikes that proper balance.

As we go forward, these are the debates, Mr. Speaker, we need to have in this Chamber. At the end of the day, it is about getting the bill and the process right so that we can achieve the aims that need to be achieved.

As we move forward, I would say this is what happened, this is how we work, and, for now, I believe this is the proper way to go about it. I look forward to supporting this rule and the underlying bill to protect our Nation, the American people, and also to preserve our civil liberties.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

Mr. Speaker, let me thank the gentleman from Florida for his astute assessment and analysis in his earlier remarks today, particularly sharing with us his experience on the Intelligence Committee, and I thank him for mentioning the fact that I serve as the ranking member on the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee.

In that capacity, that committee certainly encounters not only our Nation's law enforcement but many of the issues dealing with terrorism, including the work on homeland security.

With that in mind, I want to simply say to my colleagues and, certainly, to my good friend, who served and dedicated his life to the FBI for 14 years, none of us over the past couple of

months will take a backseat to championing the FBI, thanking the FBI, recognizing the FBI for the very valiant work that it does.

Being on the Judiciary Committee for the number of years that I have served, I have worked with almost every FBI Director, and agents, particularly the SACs in my particular jurisdiction, and have been engaged in discussions on the resources and needs of that organization. Mr. Speaker, again, we thank them for their service.

I would offer to say that the position I take today is to protect the FBI and to protect the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record, interestingly enough, an article written by Sheila Jackson Lee, ``Protecting America, protecting Americans,'' dated October 16, 2007.

[From the POLITICO, Oct. 16, 2007]

Protecting America, Protecting Americans

(By Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee)

Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed

that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial

conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that

best rewards and encourages those traits that are

indispensable to martial success: initiative, innovation,

resourcefulness and courage.

The United States would do well to heed de Tocqueville and

recognize that the best way to win the war on terror is to

remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its

democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of

international villains will defeat the United States in the

pursuit of its vital interests.

A major challenge facing the Congress today is to ensure

that in waging its war on terror, the administration does not

succeed in winning passage of legislation that will weaken

the nation's commitment to its democratic traditions.

This is why the upcoming debate over congressional approval

authorizing the administration to conduct terrorist

surveillance on U.S. soil is a matter of utmost importance. I

offer some thoughts on the principles that should inform that

debate.

In the waning hours before the August recess, the House

acceded to the Bush administration's request and approved the

woefully misnamed ``Protect America Act,'' which gives the

federal government enlarged powers to conduct electronic

surveillance of American citizens under the guise of

conducting surveillance of foreign terrorists.

Fortunately, the authority conferred by the PAA expires

next February.

It is therefore incumbent on the Congress to act

expeditiously to amend the PAA so that it achieves the only

legitimate goals of a terrorist surveillance program, which

is to ensure that Americans are secure in their persons,

papers and effects, but terrorists throughout the world are

made insecure.

The best way to achieve these twin goals is to follow the

rule of law. And the exclusive law to follow with respect to

authorizing foreign surveillance gathering on U.S. soil is

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Enacted by Congress in 1978, the exclusivity of FISA was

undisputed. Any legislation authorizing terrorist

surveillance programs which the administration seeks to

conduct must explicitly affirm that FISA is the sole basis of

lawful authority for conducting foreign surveillance

gathering on U.S. soil.

That FISA remains the exclusive source of authority does

not mean that the law cannot be adapted to modern

circumstances or revised to accommodate new technologies. One

widely acknowledged reform is to amend FISA to make clear

that foreign-to-foreign communications are not subject to

FISA, even though modern technology enables that

communication to be routed through the United States.

Additionally, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

is indispensable and must play a meaningful role in ensuring

compliance with the law.

Legislation must ensure that the FISC is empowered to act

as an Article III court should act, which means the court

should operate neither as a rubber stamp nor a bottleneck.

The function of the court is to validate the lawful exercise

of executive power on the one hand, and to act as the

guardian of individual rights and liberties on the other.

Congress should reject any proposal that grants amnesty to

any telecommunications company or other entity or individual

that helps federal intelligence agencies spy illegally on

innocent Americans.

Amnesty will have the unintended consequence of encouraging

telecommunications companies to comply with, rather than

contest, illegal requests to spy on Americans.

The only permissible path to legalization of conduct in

this area is full compliance with the requirements of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Finally, authorization to conduct foreign surveillance

gathering on U.S. soil must never be made permanent. The

threats to America's security and the liberties of its people

will change over time and require constant vigilance by the

people's representatives in Congress.

In short, it makes much more sense to enact legislation

that protects Americans, rather than one that protects

America, as the administration's proposal claims to do. At

bottom, America is its people connected to each other, and to

past and future generations, as in Abraham Lincoln's

unforgettable phrase, by ``the mystic chords of memory

stretching from every heart and hearthstone.''

America, in other words, is Americans coming together in a

community of shared values, ideals and principles. It is

those shared values that hold us together. It is our

commitment to those values that the terrorists wish to break

because that is the only way they can win.

Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is

for this country to redouble its commitment to the values

that every American will risk his or her life to defend. It

is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished

values that America will remain forever the home of the free,

the land of the brave and the country we love.

Mr. Speaker, that article suggests that we have the responsibility to protect America and Americans. I would make the point to my good friend, who mentioned that men and women or families sending their young people over to battlegrounds, they are absolutely right, and those young people who are going over to battlegrounds are going over on the basis of freedom. Their parents sacrificed, these loved ones sacrificed their young people because they believe so much in the freedom of this Nation.

Well, I will tell you that section 702 and the underlying bill, there is no freedom in this particular bill, and that is why we need to address the question in a thoughtful manner. I don't mind if we extend this to have a longer debate so that we can work through some of our concerns.

Let me be clear that S. 139 fails to address the core concern of Members of Congress and the American public. The government's use of section 702 information against United States citizens in investigations that have nothing to do with national security, that is the crux of our advocacy for both the Amash amendment, joined by myself and Zoe Lofgren and Ted Poe and many others--it is not to undermine the security of this Nation. It is to give substance to those families who sacrifice and send their young men and women to faraway places.

The warrant requirement contained in the bill is riddled with loopholes and applies only to fully predicated official FBI investigations, not to the hundreds of thousands of searches that the FBI runs every day to run down a lead or check out a tip.

S. 139 exacerbates existing problems with section 702 by codifying the so-called bulk collection, a type of surveillance that was shut down after it twice failed to meet the Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

S. 139 is universally opposed by technology companies, privacy and civil liberties groups across the political spectrum.

Let me read briefly what the Amash amendment really says. It is not something that would stop security, surveillance, and work in its tracks. What it does is, ``Except as provided in subparagraph C or D, no officer, agent, or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under subsection A in an effort to find communications of or about a particular person if there is reason to believe such person is a United States person,'' protecting the First Amendment freedom of speech and all of that, but matched with the important amendment of the Fourth Amendment, which, of course, is unreasonable search and seizures.

An application by the Attorney General to a judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that describes the determination of the Attorney General is probable cause to believe that such communications provide evidence of a crime, such person is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. This is a minimal standard.

Mr. Speaker, this is a minimal standard of which every American should expect and is owed. It is a minimal standard upon which we stand the Constitution.

We are missing what our role is here. It is not to rush through a FISA bill that has been delayed by my Republican friends. More importantly, it is to

do right by the American people. We are not doing right by the American people.

I remember fighting against reverse targeting, a major issue in our work on the Freedom Act and the PATRIOT Act. Now, today--in 2017, going into 2018--in 2018, it is important to remember that 9/11 was to not turn terror on Americans; it was to protect us from terrorism and to withstand that with the upholding of the Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose the underlying bill.

Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, I rise in opposition to the rule for S. 139, the ``FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017,'' and the underlying bill.

S. 139 reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is scheduled to expire on January 19, 2018.

Although Section 702 is a critical national security tool set to expire on January 19, 2018, events of the recent past strongly suggest that Section 702 should not be reauthorized without necessary and significant reforms that are not included in the legislation before us.

So as the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, I oppose the rule and underlying bill for several compelling reasons:

1. S. 139 fails to address the core concern of Members of Congress and the American public--the government's use of Section 702 information against United States citizens in investigations that have nothing to do with national security.

2. The warrant ``requirement'' contained in the bill is riddled with loopholes and applies only to fully predicated, official FBI investigations, not to the hundreds of thousands searches the FBI runs every day to run down a lead or check out a tip.

3. S. 139 exacerbates existing problems with Section 702 by codifying so-called ``about collection,'' a type of surveillance that was shut down after it twice failed to meet Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

4. S. 139 is universally opposed by technology companies, privacy, and civil liberties groups across the political spectrum, from the ACLU to FreedomWorks.

Mr. Speaker, the bill before us comes from the Intelligence Committee, where it was passed on a strict party-line vote.

This stands in stark contrast to H.R. 3989, the USA Liberty Act, I the bipartisan bill reported by the Judiciary Committee after multiple hearings, an open markup process, and a bipartisan vote of approval.

The USA Liberty Act enjoys much broader support, contains meaningful reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and is far superior to the bill before us.

FISA was enacted in 1978 to provide the Executive Branch with a statutory framework for gathering ``foreign intelligence information'' from U.S. persons.

FISA authorizes special court orders for four purposes:

1. electronic surveillance;

2. physical searches;

3. the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices; and

4. demands for the production of physical items.

Although FISA is designed for intelligence gathering, and not for the collection of criminal evidence, the law applies to activities to which a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would apply if they were conducted as part of a criminal investigation.

Most commonly, authorization for a wiretap or physical search under FISA is obtained by application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (``FISC'' or the ``FISA court'').

Section 702 is part of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), a successor to the Bush Administration's unlawful warrantless wiretapping program that ended in January 2007.

The FAA adds a new Title VII to FISA that grants the government the authority to monitor electronic communications of non-U.S. persons abroad.

Section 702 authorizes the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence ``to acquire foreign intelligence information'' from ``persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.''

Although the FAA prohibits the intentional targeting of persons in the United States, the FAA had been in place for only a few months when the New York Times reported that the NSA had ``overcollected'' domestic communications, a practice described as significant and systematic, even if unintentional.

Subsequently, the Director of the Office of National Intelligence stated that ``it is not reasonably possible to identify the number of people located in the United States whose communications may have been reviewed under the authority of the FAA.''

Section 702 provides that the government ``may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States.''

Mr. Speaker, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted to protect the liberty and security of Americans, not to diminish their constitutional rights.

That is why Section 702 should not be reauthorized with reforms to prevent the government from using information against its political opponents or members of religious, ethnic, or other groups.

One way to do that is without interfering with the national security objectives of 702 surveillance is simply to require the FBI to obtain a warrant before reading communications by Americans, when it finds those communications by targeting that American and searching its 702 databases.

Enforcing the warrant requirement would prevent the misuse of Section 702 to conduct ``backdoor searches'' where government agencies, including individual FBI agents, may search the communications collected under section 702 for communications by an individual American, read those communications and disseminate them within the government, all without any external oversight, much less a judicial warrant, simply by claiming a ``foreign intelligence'' purpose.

Mr. Speaker, all Americans want to find a common-ground where common- sense rules and regulations relating to fighting terrorism at home and abroad can exist while still protecting the cherished privacy and civil liberties which Americans hold close to our collective hearts.

Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, that as Alexis DeTocqueville, the most astute student of American democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a love of justice.

The best way to keep America safe and strong is to remain true to the valued embedded in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

The bill before us does not strike the proper balance between our cherished liberties and smart security.

We can do better; we should reject this rule and the underlying bill and bring to the floor for debate and vote H.R. 3989, the USA Liberty Act.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the House of Representatives for coming together on the floor of the House and in our various caucuses and conferences to discuss the important challenge that we all face: the balance that we have to protect the American people. That is the oath we take: to protect and defend. As we defend the Constitution, we defend the privacy and the civil liberties of the American people.

It is difficult.

Over 20 years ago, I was on the Intelligence Committee for the purpose of protecting civil liberties and privacy, and also to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, two really important overarching issues. So I come to the floor today as one who has worked on this issue for a very long time.

I thank our men and women in the intelligence community for the work they do. We are so proud of what they do.

In those days, almost 25 years ago, when I was first on the committee, it was about force protection and trying to have enough intelligence to avoid conflict, but if we were to engage, we would have the intelligence to protect our forces. It was about force protection. In the nineties, it became more about fighting terrorism and other overarching issues as well.

We live in a dangerous world and force protection on the ground, in theater, is still an essential part of what the intelligence community does. Again, I thank the men and women in the intelligence community for their patriotism and their courage.

The issue that relates to fighting terrorism is one that sometimes has a frightening manifestation on our own soil. But as we protect and defend the American people and the Constitution and their rights, we have to have that balance. It was Benjamin Franklin who said: If we don't fight for security and freedom, we won't have either.

I want to particularly thank our ranking member on the Intelligence Committee. He has made us all proud in going across the country to honor our Constitution, talking about undermining our election system, talking about protecting the American people in ways that is consistent with our Constitution. I thank Mr. Schiff and I support him today in his support of the bill that came from his committee.

Is it perfect?

I have never voted for a perfect bill in this House.

I also thank Mr. Nadler, a genius on all of these issues that relate to our Constitution. I also thank the members of the Judiciary Committee.

We have very few members on the Intelligence Committee who are deputized by the Speaker and by the leaders of each party to go to the Intelligence Committee to deal with issues that relate to the balance between security and privacy.

With all the respect in the world for the magnificent members of the Judiciary Committee, all of whom I respect, it is not right to say there is nothing in this bill that protects the privacy of the American people.

In fact, when I was supporting the Judiciary Committee bill, outside groups were complaining. They wanted the Zoe Lofgren amendment. They didn't want that bill. They were complaining about it. Now, today, they are saying that is what they want.

Studying the issue, I think one of the differences along the way is when it is appropriate in terms of a warrant. That is why I am so pleased that we will be offering a motion to recommit that addresses just that concern, which is what I am hearing about from folks.

The amendment, the motion to recommit, addresses concerns of people on both sides of the aisle, certainly in our Democratic Caucus, that seeks to secure the highest possible protections for American civil liberties. At the same time, it ensures that the intelligence community and law enforcement can continue to keep Americans safe.

This amendment would go a step further from the modified bill that is on the floor under consideration to ensure law enforcement secures a warrant before accessing Americans' information.

Let me repeat that. The amendment will go a step further than the modified bill under consideration to ensure law enforcement secures a warrant before accessing Americans' information.

Under this amendment, a court order would be required to access Americans' data in connection with any nonnational security criminal investigation by the FBI.

This amendment removes predicate--that is the operational word-- standards and it expands the universe of investigations that would require a warrant.

A vote for this amendment--and I hope it would be bipartisan, especially from those who are objecting to the bill on the floor--is a vote for privacy protections and for civil liberties. We would have preferred to have this in the original bill that is coming to the floor. We couldn't get that in committee. Hopefully, we can get it on the floor.

Voting against the motion to recommit means fewer protections, less oversight, and more risk that Americans' rights will be violated.

In the course of this, I mentioned this issue about the warrant and arrest. I talked about the Judiciary Committee's bill. At the offset of all of this, we all opposed the first Intelligence Committee's bill. We supported the Judiciary Committee's bipartisan bill being criticized by some outside groups for supporting it, rather than the Lofgren amendment.

But changes were made in the Intelligence Committee's bill to this effect. We asked the Speaker to take out the masking provisions, which have no place in this bill. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Nunes, foolishly put that in this bill. It made it a complete nonstarter. I thank the Speaker for removing it.

By the way, somebody should tell the President because he thinks it is still in the bill. With that being said, I personally directed the unmasking process be fixed. It isn't fixed in the bill, Mr. President. That would be a second tweet of the day, confusing matters even worse, unfortunately. The administration, although they probably would like an extension of the status quo, understands we have to do more than that.

The other provision that was in the bill was an expansion of agents of foreign governments. Agents of foreign governments opened up more people who would be subjected to surveillance. We said: That doesn't fly. That has to be closed. The Speaker did that.

Then, on the ``abouts'' language, I think most people who understand that--it is a complicated issue--understand that it is really not a factor in this discussion. People don't want it mentioned, but the fact is that it had to be addressed. It is not being used and it is unconstitutional. Until it can be proven to be constitutional, it can't be used. When it is used, they would have to go to the FISA court to get permission, and then come to Congress for ratification of that. So there are many protections there.

It is hard, I know. I had a hard time when I was Speaker and we passed a bill to address the gross violations of Vice President Cheney doing the Bush-Cheney surveillance. It was appalling, in my view. I considered it unconstitutional, others did not. But, nonetheless, we put in many, many protections where there were none, and then renewed and improved them when we renewed the bill subsequently in its reauthorization.

This isn't about the other side of the aisle that is saying you don't care about privacy if you support this bill. It isn't about that. It is about where you strike the balance when you weigh the equities.

We have to come down in favor of honoring our Constitution and our civil liberties, but we cannot do that completely at the expense. And I believe that the Members and Mr. Nadler understand that full well, and I commend him for his deep understanding of the vital national security issues and the invaluable work that his committee has done to strike a balance between security and privacy and has made a difference.

But the choice we have today is to pass something that is--defeat this bill. Okay. You have done that, if you want to do that. Pass an amendment that won't go anyplace, you can do that, and we will be left with extension of the status quo of the current law.

As one who has participated in writing it those years ago, I understand its merit. I also understand the changes in technology, of tactics of terrorists who are out there, and that we have to improve the bill.

I don't consider it a reform bill. It is not that vast. It is some improvements in how we can collect, protect, again, keep the American people safe as well as protect their civil liberties.

Just a couple other things about it. Since this legislation was designed to address concerns related to the use of information collected under FISA section 702, an important foreign intelligence collection authority--we have to keep that emphasis on ``an important foreign intelligence authority.''

So, my colleagues, to that end, this modifies that it requires a court order based on probable cause for FBI criminal investigators to view Americans' communication in the section 702 database and mandates an inspector general study of 702 data. So let's keep the vigilance on, even as we go forward. It contains refined language related to ``abouts'' collection. It requires the executive branch to secure explicit approval from the FISA court for collection. It further objects ``abouts'' collections to--subjects a 30-day congressional review process. I know Mr. Sensenbrenner said nobody can do anything in 30 days, but I think we can.

The bill strengthens the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. That was something I was instrumental in establishing when I was on the Intelligence Committee. I know it is important, but I also know that it has to be strengthened and it has to be respected as a watchdog.

So, I mean, the list goes on requiring public reporting on the use of 702 data, just saying to the intelligence community: Don't try to minimize any violations that may have occurred; we want the facts; we want the truth.

And that is why I am so glad it has expanded whistleblower protections and briefings to the Oversight Committee, which we have required. Unlike the original House Intelligence bill, which I oppose, this bill does not include language that would have likely expanded the universe of FISA targets who are now, as I mentioned before, agents of foreign policy powers. It excludes the language on unmasking; somebody tell the President.

It gives me great pride in our Caucus, if you could have heard the beautiful debate between Mr. Nadler and Mr.

Schiff on this subject. We are not that far apart. I think that the motion to recommit addresses most of the concerns we have been getting from the outside groups, and communities have dedicated their--whose organized purpose is to protect the civil liberties of the American people.

But, again, with great respect for everyone's opinions and whatever they have put forth, again, saluting our men and women in the intelligence community for the work that they do, we want to be sure we strengthen their hand in terms of protecting the national security of our country, which is our first responsibility, keep the American people safe, and, as we do so, to honor our oath of office to the Constitution, to honor the principles of the Constitution.

Our Founders knew full well the challenge between security and civil liberties. They lived in a world when they were under attack. The War of 1812 came very soon after the establishment of our country, so this was not a foreign idea to them, and they bequeathed to us the responsibility to protect, defend, protect our liberties.

And, again, respectful of this debate on this issue, I myself will be voting to support my ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Schiff, our ranking member, and Members will follow their conscience on this. I just wanted you to know, from my experience in all of this and with weighing the equities involved, that that is the path that I will take.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 682, I call up the bill (S. 139) to implement the use of Rapid DNA instruments to inform decisions about pretrial release or detention and their conditions, to solve and prevent violent crimes and other crimes, to exonerate the innocent, to prevent DNA analysis backlogs, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill, S. 139.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 139.

On January 19, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 will expire. This vital legislation includes section 702, which permits the government to target foreign citizens located overseas to obtain foreign intelligence information. Section 702 is one of the most, if not the most, critical national security tool used by our intelligence community to obtain intelligence on foreign terrorists located overseas.

Now, some claim section 702 vacuums bulk information without due regard to the intended target. This assertion is simply false. Section 702 is a targeted program, with roughly 106,000 foreign targets worldwide. Given that the worldwide population is about 7.5 billion, this program can hardly be described as bulk collection.

Section 702 targets spies, terrorists, weapons proliferators, and other foreign adversaries who threaten the United States, and locating them is crucial to protecting our troops and our homeland.

As an example, Hajji Iman, who was the second-in-command of ISIS, was located via section 702 and later removed from the battlefield. While the vast majority of examples remain classified, this is just one instance that demonstrates the necessity of this authority.

Subject to multiple layers of oversight by all three branches of government, section 702 is one of the government's most rigorously overseen foreign intelligence collection authorities. To date, while compliance incidents occur and are dealt with appropriately, there has never been a known, intentional abuse of this authority. Nevertheless, the program should be subject to regular adjustments, as necessary, to ensure the effectiveness of privacy protections.

Therefore, after careful consideration of the best way to strengthen privacy protections without hindering the program's effectiveness, the committee supports S. 139, a bipartisan bill that includes provisions and addresses concerns raised by the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate.

The bill's reforms include:

Requiring specific section 702 query procedures, separate from existing minimization procedures, which must be reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court every year;

Limiting the instances in which the government can use section 702 information to prosecute U.S. people;

Requiring the inspector general of the Department of Justice to conduct a review of the FBI's interpretation and implementation of the FBI's section 702 query procedures;

Temporarily codifying the end of the NSA's section 702 upstream ``abouts'' collection until the government develops new procedures and briefs the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees;

And, finally, improving transparency by mandating the publication of section 702 minimization procedures and requiring additional reporting to Congress on how the intelligence community is using other FISA authorities.

Mr. Speaker, during discussions over the past several months, both the House and the Senate have made several concessions to achieve this compromised language in order to reauthorize this critical national security authority. Accordingly, S. 139 now includes a probable cause- based order requirement for the FBI to access the content of a section 702 communication during FBI criminal investigations on Americans, unrelated to national security.

This order requirement does not reflect the committee's belief or intent that law enforcement access to lawfully acquired information constitutes a separate search under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by numerous Federal courts, does not require the FBI to obtain a separate order from the FISC to review lawfully acquired 702 information.

Though not required by the Constitution, this compromise is meant to provide additional protections for U.S.

person information that is incidentally collected under section 702. Along with the restrictions on the use of section 702 information in criminal prosecutions, this should provide further assurances to the American public that this vital national security tool is used strictly to discover and mitigate foreign threats to the United States, and the handling and use of any incidental U.S. person information is carefully controlled and monitored.

Mr. Speaker, America faces an array of international threats more complicated than anything we have endured in the past.

Speaking for the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I cannot emphasize enough that now is not the time to draw back on key national security authorities.

I am dismayed by the amount of disinformation being propagated by those who oppose section 702 for purely ideological reasons. When Congress must reauthorize this program again in 2023, we hope those who debate these issues, both inside and outside this Chamber, do so with intellectual honesty and integrity.

The USA RIGHTS Act, which has been offered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, is an attempt to kill this compromise. In its place, the amendment would begin resurrecting the information-sharing walls between national security and law enforcement that the 9/11 Commission identified as a major factor in the failure to identify and thwart the 9/11 plot.

If individuals in this body cannot learn from history, they are doomed to repeat it. There is no support for this bill in the majority of the committees of jurisdiction whose members understand that this amendment would render section 702 inoperable.

Therefore, in order to keep the U.S. interests and troops abroad safe from harm, we must ensure that the intelligence community has the tools it needs to provide intelligence to our soldiers abroad. Section 702 is critical in that regard, and S. 139 provides the intelligence community with the authorities needed to protect the homeland while implementing key privacy enhancements.

Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of S. 139, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues believe that Congress should go above and beyond what is required by the Fourth Amendment and institute additional safeguards on how the government handles any potential U.S. personal information that may be incidentally collected under section 702. While the varying committees may have different ideas as to how to strike the right balance between additional privacy measures and national security, the art of the compromise brings us to the current junction.

Under S. 139, if the bill conducts a U.S.-person query into its database during a criminal investigation not related to national security and conducts a section 702 communication, the FBI must obtain an order from the FISA court prior to assessing the content of the communication.

The committee does not believe that such an order is necessary under the Fourth Amendment, but it is adding more protections, as a matter of policy, in order to address unfounded concerns by opponents of section 702 that the authority is being used to investigate U.S. people.

Proponents of the USA RIGHTS Act amendment will say that S. 139 does not go far enough in its current form and that they have crafted a great compromise that allows the intelligence community to do its job.

Unfortunately, they are selling a poison pill that is extraordinarily harmful to our national security. Per the office of the Director of National Intelligence, under the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, the FBI would not be able to look at lawfully collected data related to suspicious activities similar to that of the 9/11 hijackers. This is unethical to the 9/11 Commission Report, and anyone who thinks about voting for the USA RIGHTS Act amendment should pick up a copy and skim it prior to voting.

Unlike the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, S. 139 is able to balance national security and privacy while adhering to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission reporting. I echo the White House statement last night strongly opposing the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, and I urge all of my colleagues in the House to support S. 139.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, before I begin, I want to emphasize how dismayed I am by the amount of disinformation being propagated by opponents of section 702. I have heard some things over the last couple of days, and I just wonder, how in the world can someone believe that.

Let me tell you why this amendment must be opposed. Under the USA RIGHTS Act, the intelligence community would not be able to query the name of the suspected terrorist supporter in the United States to see if he is in contact with terrorist recruiters. It would not be able to query the name of a person in the United States who has been suspiciously approaching U.S. Government employees with security clearances to determine if that person is part of a foreign espionage network.

We would not be able to query the name of a registered owner of a suspicious vehicle parked in front of the Washington Monument to see if that person is in contact with terrorist operatives overseas. We would not be able to query the name of a person in the aftermath of a mass casualty attack on the United States to see if he has terrorist connections, or as a follow on, if potential follow-on attacks are imminent.

We would not be able to query the name of a foreign national who travels to the United States to take flight training but doesn't care about learning how to land.

Individuals in this room who want to end section 702 know that they have an opportunity to do with their vote, but they would be putting troops and American lives at risk. And if that is okay with you, then go ahead and vote for the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, but I promise you, you will regret it when, some day, in this dangerous world we live in, we have to answer to our constituents for our votes here today.

Mr. Speaker, let me repeat the refrain of those of us who are members of the Judiciary Committee who have gone through this process since 9/11, and that is that we support the integrity and the importance of section 702 as a national security tool, and we want it reauthorized, but we want it right.

Our job and our task is also to be the protectors of the Fourth Amendment, and that is the protection of the American people against unreasonable search and seizure.

No matter how much my friends on the other side of the aisle argue, we know that the FBI can have the tools that it needs; but, in the instance of this underlying bill, similar to the bill that was passed in 2007 by the Bush administration, on which the Judiciary Committee came back and amended it and made it a bill that provides the tools that were needed by those who are on the front lines in the United States military and the FBI, ultimately, it was changed to deny those rights.

In this instance, the warrant that my friends are talking about is revised only to fully predicated cases. It does not apply to the searching of documents that will have information about Americans.

I ask my colleagues to postpone this. Let us work together on behalf of the American people. Who are we if we cannot uphold the Constitution? It is not protected in this bill.

Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, I rise in strong opposition to S. 139, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.''

S. 139 reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is scheduled to expire on January 19, 2018.

Section 702 authorizes the Justice Department and NSA to collect non- U.S. persons' communications that are sent while abroad.

The collection programs have to be approved each year by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court).

The FISA Court was set up by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA; Public Law 95-511) to oversee intelligence- gathering activities and ensure compliance with the U.S. Constitution.

Under FISA, the term ``U.S. person'' covers citizens, green card holders, associations with a ``substantial number of members'' who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents, and U.S.-incorporated companies.

Title VII also allows intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance on a specific U.S. person reasonably believed to be outside of the country, with the approval of the FISA Court.

The NSA's use of section 702 authority to collect Americans' information from their communications with foreign surveillance targets was revealed by former government contractor Edward Snowden in 2013.

Snowden also revealed that the NSA obtains communications from U.S.- based providers such as Google, Verizon, and Facebook.

Although Section 702 is a critical national security tool set to expire on January 19, 2018, events of the recent past strongly suggest that Section 702 should not be reauthorized without necessary and significant reforms that are not included in the legislation before us.

So as the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, I oppose the bill for several compelling reasons:

1. S. 139 fails to address the core concerns of Members of Congress and the American public--the government's use of Section 702 information against United States citizens investigations that have nothing to do with national security.

2. The warrant ``requirement'' contained in the bill is riddled with loopholes and applies only to fully predicated, official FBI investigations, not to the hundreds of thousands searches the FBI runs every day to run down a lead or check out a tip.

3. S. 139 exacerbates existing problems with Section 702 by codifying so-called ``about collection,'' a type of surveillance that was shut down after it twice failed to meet Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

4. S. 139 is universally opposed by technology companies, privacy, and civil liberties groups across the political spectrum from the ACLU to FreedomWorks.

Mr. Speaker, the bill before us comes from the Intelligence Committee, where it was passed on a strict party-line vote.

This stands in stark contrast to H.R. 3989, the USA Liberty Act the bipartisan bill reported by the Judiciary Committee after multiple hearings, an open markup process, and a bipartisan vote of approval.

The USA Liberty Act enjoys much broader support, contains meaningful reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and is far superior to the bill before us.

Inexplicably, the House Republican leadership did choose the best option, which was to bring the USA Liberty Act to the floor for debate and vote; instead, they chose the worst option, which is S. 139, the bill before us.

For this reason, I urge all members to join me in supporting the Amash-Lofgren Amendment, the best option remaining before us.

The Amash-Lofgren strike the text of S. 139 in its entirety and substitutes in its place the text of the ``Uniting and Strengthening America by Reforming and Improving the Government's High-Tech Surveillance Act'' (``USA RIGHTS Act'').

In contrast to S. 139, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' enacts necessary and meaningful reforms to Section 702, which are necessary in light of the past abuses of surveillance authorities, contemporary noncompliance with this authority, and the danger posed by potential future abuses.

First, the USA RIGHTS Act creates a search warrant requirement that closes the so-called ``backdoor search loophole'' through which the government searches, without first obtaining a court-issued warrant based on probable cause, for information about U.S. persons or persons inside the U.S.

The ``USA RIGHTS Act'' provides an exception for emergencies, but requires a court warrant afterward.

Second, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' prohibits the collection of domestic communications and permanently ends ``about'' collection, an illegal practice the National Security Agency recently stopped because of persistent and significant compliance violations.

This is important because while ``reverse targeting'' is prohibited under the Jackson Lee Amendment incorporated in the USA Freedom Act enacted on June 2, 2016 (Pub. L. 114-23), this prohibition was often skirted by collecting information from communications that merely mention an intelligence target.

Under the ``USA RIGHTS Act'', collections would be limited to communications that are ``to'' or ``from'' a target, and the intentional collection of wholly domestic communications is prohibited.

Third, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' requires the government give notice when it uses information obtained or derived from Section 702 surveillance in proceedings against U.S. persons or people on U.S. soil which will enable a defendant to assert his or her constitutional rights and help ensure that foreign intelligence surveillance is not being misused.

Fourth, under the ``USA RIGHTS Act'', Section 702 authority sunsets in 4 years, which will obligate the Congress to exercise regular oversight and provide the opportunity to make necessary reforms before reauthorization.

Mr. Speaker, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted to protect the liberty and security of Americans, not to diminish their constitutional rights.

All Americans want to find the common ground where commonsense rules and regulations relating to fighting terrorism at home and abroad can exist while still protecting the cherished privacy and civil liberties which Americans hold close to our collective hearts.

That is why Section 702 should not be reauthorized with reforms to prevent the government from using information against its political opponents or members of religious, ethnic, or other groups.

One way to do that without interfering with the national security objectives of 702 surveillance is simply to reject S. 139 and support the USA RIGHTS Act by voting for the Amash-Lofgren Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, that as Alexis de Tocqueville, the most astute student of American democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a love of justice.

And the best way to keep America safe and strong is to remain true to the valued embedded in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

S. 139 does not strike the proper balance between our cherished liberties and smart security.

We can do better; we should reject S. 139 and support the Amash- Lofgren Amendment.

Mr. Speaker, this body cannot be afraid of the Constitution. It has been our guiding moral force for this Nation for all of our beginnings and our nows.

This amendment is truly an amendment that will protect and provide for the FBI to do its work and to protect our men and women around the world who are wearing the uniform unselfishly. But let me be very clear: all this amendment does, frankly, is provide a roadmap for the FBI to utilize when it is surveying and it is using the private data of Americans. All the amendment does is ask the FBI and the Attorney General, where there is probable cause, that such communication provide evidence of a crime; and, as well, if there is a foreign power or foreign agent, to be able to utilize a warrant, and that is the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

Uphold the Constitution. Vote for the Amash-Lofgren amendment and let's move forward on this legislation.