Mr. President, colleagues, I am very pleased to be joined on the floor today by Senator Young. We are both members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and both have an interest in Middle East…
Mr. President, colleagues, I am very pleased to be joined on the floor today by Senator Young. We are both members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and both have an interest in Middle East security. We have joined together on the floor today to give remarks and perhaps have a short colloquy about a humanitarian crisis that is unfolding before our eyes in the Middle East.
Today, inside the country of Yemen--a country that, frankly, not a lot of our constituents give much thought to--every 10 minutes a child under the age of 5 is dying due to preventable causes. Today, 18 million Yemeni civilians--two thirds of the entire population of this country--cannot survive without humanitarian or protection support, and 7 million of those are on what we would call a starvation diet, which means that on a daily basis they don't know where their next meal is coming from. They don't have enough food to eat in order to remain healthy. Three million have already fled their homes because of the violence that has been caused by a civil war--that both Senator Young and I will talk about--inside their country and the humanitarian catastrophe that has resulted from that civil war.
This is one of four current famines that exists in the world today. But I would argue that this particular humanitarian crisis is in some ways the most relevant to the discussions we will have here in the Senate because the United States is participating in the military campaign that is, in fact, causing in part this humanitarian crisis.
The United States is an active participant with a Saudi-led military campaign seeking to regain control of Yemen from a group called the Houthis, who overran the capital and now control large portions of the country.
We, of course, are allies of Saudi Arabia. The President will be visiting Saudi Arabia very soon to solidify that alliance. But it is time we started asking some really hard questions about the conduct of the Saudi campaign inside Yemen and whether we are, in fact, helping to create a humanitarian catastrophe on the grounds that is impossible to defend on moral grounds but also is hard to defend based on national security grounds as well.
Let's be honest about what is happening here. The Saudis are deliberately trying to create a famine inside Yemen in order to essentially starve the Yemenis to the negotiating table. Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman said:
Time is on our side. Being patient is in our interest. We
have the supplies and we have the logistics and high morale.
The enemy does not have supplies and funds and is impatient.
Time is on our side and we will exploit the time to serve our
interests.
What are the Saudis doing to try to exploit this question of time and supplies? First, they are coming directly after the main port city, which brings 70 percent of food into Yemen and about 80 percent of all of the oil. That port city is called Hodeidah.
Senator Young has been very good in meetings to draw issue with what is believed to be deliberate targeting by the Saudis of the cranes and infrastructure in this port which allow for the supplies to come off of boats and move into these desperately, desperately needy areas of the country.
Second, they are requiring an additional screening process for this humanitarian aid above and beyond the one the United Nations has put into place. The United Nations is vetting supply ships coming in to Hodeidah to make sure there is really food and aid on these ships, not weapons, and it is working. But the Saudis are putting an additional process on top that is adding up to a month from the time the aid gets off the ship and into the country. Between that and the military campaign targeting the port and its infrastructure, this has essentially resulted in an effective blockade being put in and around Hodeidah, such that humanitarian support cannot effectively get into the country. But that is just the beginning.
The Saudi bombing campaign has deliberately targeted roads and bridges throughout the country, many of them in and around north Yemen. There are reports that the bombers have engaged in something called double tapping, which is where you hit a humanitarian--a civilian-- asset. You wait until the workers come to try to address that first strike, and then you hit it a second time to take out the civilians who have responded to the emergency. This isn't just my opinion of the situation. Representations have been made by multiple aid organizations on the ground, and, more importantly, by U.S. officials who have been embedded with the coalition.
This is a quote from Dafna Rand, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who was in charge of the Saudi coalition portfolio at State:
In 2015, the U.S. Government offered technical training on
cyber, ballistic missiles, border security, counterterrorism,
and maritime security, [and] the precision guided
munitions were transferred in 2015 on the hopes that they
would enable better and more precise targeting by the
coalition of the targets
itself. [But instead,] what we have seen since is not an
improvement in the targeting, and the issue itself is the
target selection. It is not the precision of the target
itself, but it is the choice of targets and adherence to
the no-strike list.
That is a really important statement, a really important sentence, because what is happening is that the United States is telling the coalition: What are the civilian targets you should stay away from, so the humanitarian aid can move into the country? The coalition is deliberately ignoring that advice. It is not a matter of mistakes being made on the ground, though there have been mistakes. It is also a matter of a no-strike list being ignored.
I mention that this is not just about the millions and millions of Yemenis who are starving today because of this civil war. It is also a question of whether this is accruing to the U.S. national security interests. Again, I am speaking just for myself on this matter.
We are allies of the Saudis, and there is no doubt that an Iranian proxy state inside Yemen presents a threat to the Saudi State. There is no doubt that Houthis have been launching attacks into Saudi Arabia. This is a real security threat for our allies. But we do have to acknowledge that there are other players that exist inside Yemen today. It is not just the Houthis and those Yemeni forces supported by the Saudis. There is also al-Qaida--a branch of al-Qaida we know well because it has traditionally been the piece of al-Qaida that has the most advanced threats to the U.S. homeland--and ISIS, which is growing inside Yemen. They have taken advantage of this civil war to fill in the ungovernable spaces.
Recently, with the help of the UAE, we have begun to hit back against al-Qaida and ISIS inside Yemen. But for a portion of time, they controlled a sizeable amount of territory and revenue inside that country. ISIS is growing as well.
As a group of Yemeni Americans told me in my office about a year ago, to Yemenis the bombing campaign is not perceived as a Saudi bombing campaign; it is seen as a U.S. bombing campaign or, at the very least, a U.S.-Saudi bombing campaign.
So when responsibility inside Yemen is allotted and attributed for this starvation campaign, it is placed upon the United States, as well as on Saudi Arabia. We have to think about what that means, given the fact that there is the potential for millions of Yemenis to be radicalized in a place with very sophisticated radical infrastructure. This is a real national security concern for the United States.
I think it is time for us to draw a hard line with this coalition and say that we will not continue to support it if there is not a real commitment made to change the way the targeting happens and to make sure that relief supplies can flow into that country to try to address this unfolding famine and humanitarian catastrophe. We can be allies with the Saudis. We can be military allies with the Saudis. But they have to understand and their partners need to understand that this humanitarian nightmare inside Yemen is both immoral--to participate in a campaign that perpetuates that kind of humanitarian crisis--but it also, in the end, doesn't benefit the long-term security of the United States or our partners in the coalition.
So we come down to the floor today to try to explain to our colleagues what is happening on the ground and to see if there is a bipartisan way for us to have a policy that brings significant relief to the suffering of the Yemeni people and strengthens our national security in the region.
With that, I notice Senator Young is going to say a few words, and then I think we will engage in a colloquy.
Mr. President, I thank my friend from Indiana. I think he walked through his thoughtful approach to this issue, which has led him to cosponsor this resolution placing these very commonsense conditions upon the transfer of further munitions.
I might ask him a question. In his list of steps he has asked the Saudis to take--I have joined him in that letter, as have many of our colleagues--amongst them is a commitment to not take military action against the port of Hodeidah.
We both met with the Foreign Minister, who talked about the need to use increased military pressure inside Yemen backed by U.S. participation in the coalition to try to draw the Houthis to the table. We have both expressed reservations about the effectiveness of that tactic, and we have something to say about it because none of this can occur without U.S. military support.
Can the Senator talk a little bit about our joint fears or his personal fears about a major new campaign on this port that brings in so much of this aid and how, in the end, that really doesn't further the goals of the coalition, the United States being amongst the partners?
I thank Senator Young for making it clear in his prepared remarks that while we are focusing on the Saudis because we are part of this coalition, the Houthis do not have clean hands here either. Part of the reason humanitarian supplies have a hard time getting to places that need them is because there are roadblocks put up by the Houthis as well. And there is this known connection between the Houthis and the Iranians--sometimes, in my opinion, a bit overplayed by some foreign policy thinkers, but it is real.
To your second point in answer to my question, Senator Young, that is, to my mind, also a likely result of a deepening of the military conflict. If the Houthis had nowhere to turn, then the calculation might be different, but because the Iranians are there as a support system to lean on, a continued military campaign against Hodeidah would push them deeper into a corner and just broaden the scope of the military conflict.
There ultimately has to be a political resolution here, and by simply upping the military ante and continuing the humanitarian crisis, you get further away from that political negotiating table rather than closer to it.
It goes without saying that it is in no one's interests in the region for this civil war to continue at its current pace. So this is an important moment at the beginning of a new administration, with a pending arms sale on the table with the Saudis, to
use that transition moment and the leverage that exists with this new proposal for major arms sales to the Saudis to make sure we get this right.
I think there is nothing political about this. We all join together in trying to abate humanitarian crises and famines around the world, and we all want a policy that is going to bring an end to this civil war because, as I said, it is just as important to remember that the most immediate enemies of the United States--those terrorist groups who want to do harm to us--find their most fertile ground today inside Yemen. The sooner we can put an end to this civil war and be able to have a central government structure that spreads across the scope of the country, the quicker we can all be focused on trying to eliminate the ISIS and al-Qaida presence--AQAP, as we refer to them--in Yemen from that battlespace.
I say to Senator Young, I don't know if you have closing remarks, but I appreciate your willingness to speak up and your leadership here, and I hope we can get others on both sides of the aisle to propose and support these commonsense conditions upon this new military transfer so that we can get the situation right inside Yemen.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.