Mr. President, when you went to a local bank in Mansfield, OH, to buy a house 30, 40, or 50 years ago, you knew the lender, and the lender knew you. You saw him or her at the grocery store. Maybe…
Mr. President, when you went to a local bank in Mansfield, OH, to buy a house 30, 40, or 50 years ago, you knew the lender, and the lender knew you. You saw him or her at the grocery store. Maybe they went to your church or synagogue. Your kids probably went to the same school. You knew that your deposits at the bank helped fund your neighbor's house or the hardware store down the street. A lot of banks and credit unions don't work this way.
The 2008 crisis taught us that finance has changed. Now a mortgage in Zanesville, OH, is diced and sliced and sold to an investor in Zurich, Switzerland. Banks in Frankfurt place bets on loans in Fostoria.
When the system went bust a decade ago and predatory loans began to fail, Ohio taxpayers picked up the tab, including for foreign banks headquartered an ocean away. The Federal Reserve opened up a spigot of cheap money to keep the global economy from tanking. Banks in Spain, France, Japan, Canada, and Korea all came to the United States for help to weather the financial storm.
Think about this. An analysis of the Fed's lending from February 2008 to 2009 showed that the vast majority of loans went to foreign banks. After the crisis, records released to the public showed that foreign banks took more than 70 percent of the Fed's loans during the crisis and 65 percent of loans from other emergency programs.
Under one bailout scheme, British Barclays alone borrowed $232 billion from the Fed at a sweetheart interest rate--the kind of rate a hardware store in Hillsboro, OH, could never get on a loan to keep them afloat back in 2008. Think about that. British Barclays got a sweetheart deal, a better deal than a hardware store in Ohio could get from a bank.
After the crisis, Congress responded with a law, the Wall Street reform act, to ensure that taxpayers would never again have to send bailout money to British and Swiss megabanks. We ordered the Fed to keep a closer eye on the big banks--to use their power to make sure the largest global banks did not again crash the economy.
Congress instructed that the Fed apply the strictest protections to the biggest banks--those with more than $50 billion in assets. We know that.
When the Fed implemented these rules, they applied some standards to banks that have more than $50 billion across the globe, but for global banks that have more than $50 billion in the United States, the Fed applied the strongest standards. For foreign banks with not only trillions worldwide but systemic operations in the United States, the Fed wrote rules that are as strict as those for our domestic megabanks, standards that former Fed Governor Dan Tarullo called ``special prudential measures.'' They are standards that ensure that we only import Swiss chocolate, not Swiss bank failures. These special measures are important.
Last year, the Office of Financial Research released a report showing that foreign banks in the United States are riskier than similarly sized U.S. regional banks. Hear that again. Foreign banks in the United States are riskier than similarly sized U.S. regional banks. Think of that in terms of what this bill that we just voted cloture on actually does.
This legislation threatens to undo important rules protecting us from risk. The legislation puts taxpayers on the hook for bailouts. That is what the Congressional Budget Office said.
Under this bill, foreign banks that took billions in bailouts would be able to take more risk under a less watchful eye. Who are some of them? Deutsche Bank, Santander, and UBS would all be treated more like they were an Ohio regional bank. Deutsche Bank, the Trump family's personal business bank; Santander, the bank in Spain that repossessed the cars of hundreds of service men and women cars while those service men and women were serving our country overseas; UBS, the Swiss bank that illegally financed Iranian activities--they would all be treated more like they were Huntington in Columbus, or Fifth Third in Cincinnati, or KeyBank in Cleveland. What is right about that? What is fair about that? What is smart about that?
Don't take my word for it. Secretary Mnuchin sat right in front of the Banking Committee; Senator Crapo, the chairman, and I, as the ranking member, looked straight at him just a few weeks ago. He confirmed that this bill would treat foreign banks with up to $250 billion in assets the same as U.S. regional banks. So they are up to $250 billion, just like Huntington, just like KeyCorp, just like Fifth Third in Ohio. Secretary Mnuchin said: We are going to treat those foreign banks the same if they are up to $250 billion in assets. That may be the first direct answer I have ever heard from Secretary Mnuchin. I sit on the Finance Committee and the Banking Committee, and he has trouble giving direct answers. He did at least that time.
It makes sense because he was just confirming his intention. From what he and the Treasury Department wrote in a report last year, that is precisely what this administration wants to do. That is what they said in this report that we should do--deregulate these foreign banks that have assets under $250 billion in the United States. They wrote it into their banking deregulation blueprint back in June.
I give credit to Secretary Mnuchin, and I give credit to the Trump administration. While I don't give them credit for the White House looking like a retreat for Wall Street executives, I do give them credit for at least finally owning up in that report, in the legislation, and in his answer to my question in the Banking Committee hearing that, yes, they are going to deregulate these foreign, huge megabanks--Deutsche, Santander, UBS, and Barclays--as long as they have under $250 billion of assets in the United States, and they do.
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Fed, is worried, as I am, that this bill deregulates the U.S. operations of foreign banks. Sarah Bloom Raskin, former Fed Governor and Deputy Treasury Secretary, said this bill ``removes necessary guardrails that were installed to reduce the chances of foreign megabanks drawing on U.S. bailout funds.''
I have watched the Presiding Officer--the junior Senator from Oklahoma--serve with integrity and honesty. I don't think you, any of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, or anybody else wants to face the voters 5 years from now, 10 years from now if what we voted on today and will vote on this week results in our bailing out foreign banks. Americans were angry that we bailed out the big U.S. megabanks. Imagine the anger if the story is focused more precisely on the fact that we bailed out foreign banks--which we actually did--but the story was more about Wall Street. Imagine if that were the story.
Former Treasury officials Michael Barr and Antonio Weiss are worried that this bill is rolling back rules that protect the U.S. economy from foreign bank risk. The former CFTC Chairman, Gary Gensler, thinks we need to amend this bill to make sure that foreign banks don't get a windfall. These are across-the-board regulators, present, past, Republicans, Democrats. That is quite a list of watchdogs, but what is most interesting: Do you know who else is under the impression this bill helps foreign banks? Foreign bank lobbyists.
I offered an amendment during the committee markup to close the loophole. I am offering it again on the Senate floor if Republican leadership allows amendments on the Senate floor. My amendment would have ensured that foreign megabanks in the United States are watched over just as closely as Wall Street banks. They are roughly the same size; some are bigger, but because their assets are smaller in the United States, we are going to treat them like Huntington and Key and Fifth Third rather than treating them like JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
Foreign bank lobbyists--they are American citizens. They are lobbyists for foreign banks; they are not foreign lobbyists, a difference. These lobbyists for foreign banks, representing Deutsche and UBS--most of them--wrote a letter opposing my amendment, saying it was unfair for me to try to keep these rules in place. They said their banks should be treated like U.S. regional banks, not like the global giants they are. That amendment was defeated in the committee; we will leave it at that.
Now, why is that such a problem? Let's look at the rap sheet on some of these foreign banks. Santander, a Spanish bank, failed a stress test 3 years in a row. It would have its rules rolled back under this bill. Stress tests are exercises, as my colleagues know, to ensure that a bank can survive an economic downturn without a bailout. So this Spanish bank, Santander, failed not once, not twice but three times. What that failure means--most people, if they fail three times, they flunk out. If they fail three times, they get in this bill, and they get a potential bailout. What is smart about that? What is honorable about that? What is good economic policy about that? What is fair about that? What is just about that?
In addition to failing its stress test, it is a bank that illegally repossessed cars from 1,100 American service men and women while they were serving our country. I spend a lot of time at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base, the largest employer in Ohio. I see all kinds of financial institutions that prey on those young airmen and their families. Airmen and women, young Americans serving in the Air Force-- particularly when they are 18, 19, 20, 21 years old--are more financially vulnerable. They are a little less sophisticated than somebody 10 years older. They don't make much money. Their families are always anxious when their husband or wife or mother or father serve overseas. This Spanish bank repossessed the cars of 1,100 American service men and women while they were serving our country. We are going to give them a break?
This is a bank that overcharged racial and ethnic minorities for car loans. It is a bank that violated a Federal order to keep more capital and instead improperly paid out money to its shareholders, and we are going to give them a break? I don't pretend to understand the thinking of that.
This bill helps Deutsche Bank, which the IMF called ``the most important net contributor to systemic risks'' of all worldwide banks. Deutsche Bank, a German bank, one of the biggest banks in the world, the International Monetary Fund called it ``the most important net contributor to systemic risks'' of all worldwide banks.
Deutsche Bank is the only bank that would lend to the Trump family economic empire. Even after all of its failed business deals, they kept lending, for whatever reason, to businessman Trump and the family. This is a bank that every week is met with a new request for information on shady financial arrangements with people in the White House.
I don't think my colleagues and I were sent here to serve Deutsche Bank. I am thinking none of us goes back in our campaigns--I am on the ballot this year. I am not going to go back and say: Please reelect me so I can help Deutsche Bank, so I can bail them out, so I can pass a bill that will actually give them something they don't deserve.
This bill would also help banks like Barclays and UBS and BNP Paribas--banks that have rigged interest rates, helped people avoid paying taxes, violated U.S. sanctions against Iran and Sudan, and manipulated energy markets. These aren't banks down the street lending to homeowners in Sandusky or businesses in Findlay or small companies in my hometown of Mansfield; these are some of the most complex global banks. They hold $1.4 trillion in assets. That is $1,400 billion--$1.4 trillion--in assets in the United States and more than $14 trillion in assets abroad.
Listen to Paul Volker, listen to Sarah Bloom Raskin, listen to Gary Gensler, listen to Michael Barr and Antonio Weiss. Believe Secretary Mnuchin when he tells you what he wants to do. Believe the lobbyists for these foreign banks when they say that is what they want. That is why they oppose this amendment. This bill gives them exactly what they want.
Let me talk about one change made to the substitute amendment. Because I have come to this floor and some others have joined me in objecting to this foreign bank provision, the leadership--Senator McConnell and his office, I assume, down the way--I assume they huddled and thought: We have to answer this somehow; we have to at least look like we care about prohibiting a bailout of foreign banks. So they made a change in the substitute. The new version of the bill came out last week. There is a new provision that provides some window dressing. It is a figleaf protection to try to convince the public that this bill doesn't do what it actually does. It doesn't actually help Santander; it doesn't actually help UBS; it doesn't actually help Barclays; it doesn't actually help the President's bank, Deutsche Bank--but it actually does. The provision provides some vague, ambiguous language and puts the question to the Fed: You can regulate the foreign banks or not; it is your choice. It doesn't require the Fed to deregulate. It doesn't stop the foreign banks from suing if the Fed doesn't obey their requests.
Why not just prohibit? Why not just say: No, we are not going to do it. But they don't want to do that. They want to keep that door open because they know the regulators on FSOC, whether it is the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Jay Clayton, whether it is Mr. Otting of the SEC, whether it is Secretary Mnuchin, or whomever they put at any of these, we know what they are going to do. They have already said what they are growing to do.
Even a writer at the Wall Street Journal agrees, saying it will be up to the Fed to decide whether Deutsche Bank ``deserves a tighter leash.''
So we are expected--we, in a pretty much party-line vote, because most Democrats think you don't want Wall Street people in these positions regulating the banks, in a party-line vote, Randal Quarles was confirmed. His job is to be the Director of Supervision at the Federal Reserve. So we are expected to trust Randal Quarles not to weaken the rules in the foreign banks--to trust Quarles, even though he himself missed the last crisis. He predicted as late as, I believe, 2007, as a member of the Bush administration, that the economy was great, the banks weren't under duress, any of that. It might have been 2006, but I think 2007. He missed the last crisis and, I might add, he personally profited from Wall Street malfeasance. I am not saying he did it on purpose, but he personally profited because of Wall Street malfeasance.
We are supposed to trust Quarles, even though just last week he spoke at an international bankers conference, where a lot of those foreign bank representatives and lobbyists were in attendance, including CEOs and other executives, and he promised those bankers regulatory relief.
So we have the head of supervision at the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States--one of the most powerful people in this country-- speaking to an international bankers group saying: Yes, we are going to give you regulatory relief. Aren't you lucky you came to this conference because I am in charge of these issues at the Federal Reserve, and I am going to help you get regulatory relief as a foreign bank. Congratulations.
Finally, this last point is technical, but it is important. The bills make sure that a globally systemic U.S. bank will not benefit from any deregulation, even if it has fewer than $250 billion in assets, but the bill doesn't even do the same for foreign banks.
Let me repeat. State Street has fewer than $250 billion in assets. State Street is called a custodial bank, located in Boston, as the Presiding Officer knows. It has fewer than $250 billion in assets. The bill says, because that bank is systemically significant, it doesn't get a free pass. This legislation says that about State Street, but it doesn't say the same for similarly--or, I would argue, way more--risky foreign banks in the United States.
My amendment would close that loophole. It treats systemically risky foreign banks like systemically risky U.S. banks. Why? Because why treat Barclays and Santander and UBS and Deutsche Bank better than we treat Huntington or Fifth Third or Key or Regents in Alabama or any of these regional banks--many of which we want to help. If we want to help community banks and credit unions and our regional banks to do the right thing, let's help them. Foreign megabanks shouldn't get another chance of a handout from American taxpayers--never.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.