A joint resolution to require certifications regarding actions by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and for other purposes.

Mr. President, in light of the vote later today on the Sanders-Lee-Murphy legislation, or S.J. Res. 54, I rise today to discuss the situation in Yemen and the path forward. As many know, over the last year I have focused persistently on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

My activities have been manyfold. I have issued letters to the administration and the Saudi Government, an administration nomination, hearings, a Senate resolution, and countless meetings, briefings, and phone calls with senior administration officials, Saudi officials, and leaders of the NGO community.

My goal? My goal has been to address impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance--food, fuel, and medicine--into the country of Yemen.

Now, we have seen some progress, and I have been encouraged by this. The USAID-funded World Food Programme cranes have been delivered, and the Red Sea ports have been opened. According to the United Nations, since the ports were open, we have seen more than 884,000 metric tons of food and more than 410,000 metric tons of fuel delivered to the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef alone.

Of course, we understand the importance of the food. But why is the fuel so important? Well, without the fuel, you can't run the water treatment facilities and, therefore, the cholera epidemic that has broken out in Yemen will only get worse. So 884,000 metric tons of food and more than 410,000 metric tons of fuel have resulted in the saving of countless of lives in Yemen.

Look, there is a continued humanitarian crisis in Yemen. A lot of problems persist, and we need to address those. We have seen progress with respect to the delivery of some of the humanitarian assistance I mentioned, but commercial and humanitarian vessels have been offloading their lifesaving cargo less quickly than we would like. So there is a lot left for us to do.

The National Security Council presidential statement issued on March 15 related to Yemen indicated that there are still over 22 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. This is the world's largest humanitarian disaster. The risk of famine persists for millions of Yemenis.

The Saudi-led coalition continues, unfortunately, to impose unacceptable delays on ships carrying food and fuel into Yemeni ports. According to the U.N., the Saudi-led coalition caused 5.9 days of additional delay in the month of February on ships going to the major ports of Hodeidah and Saleef. Those delays continue this month.

Now, why does this matter? Well, this matters, of course, because we don't want people to suffer. It is inconsistent with our basic human values. It is inconsistent with what we Americans believe. When people suffer, it also exacerbates a national security crisis. It facilitates radicalization.

In fact, last week I chaired a Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee on this very topic--the connection between food insecurity, specifically, and the instability or radicalization of those who are food insecure. The hearing demonstrated that there is now a strong, evidentiary, and academic basis to conclude that it is in America's clear national security interest to address food insecurity, as well as a lack of fuel and medicine. A retired Marine Corps general testified at that hearing, Lieutenant General Castellaw. I thought he put it succinctly. He said: ``Food crises [can] grow terrorists.'' Well, we have seen a lot of terrorists grown in Yemen in recent years.

The longer the civil war persists in Yemen, the worse the humanitarian crisis will grow. This will radicalize yet more people and provide even further opportunities to Iran to undermine our national security interests and those of our partners.

What are our objectives in Yemen? That is a fair question. It is one that all of us as policymakers and, really, all Americans ought to be asking. Well, consistent with our humanitarian principles and our national security interests, I believe we have to continue to pursue two primary objectives. First, we want to address the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, and, second, we want to press all parties to end the civil war.

The real question here--because I don't think there is agreement on those two primary objectives--is how can we best achieve these two goals? That takes me to the Sanders-Lee-Murphy resolution before us today. We, of course, need to fulfill our article I constitutional responsibilities. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution indicates that it is Congress's responsibility to declare a war, and it is Congress's responsibility to authorize the use of military force. I share Senator Lee's conviction, Senator Sanders' conviction, and Senator Murphy's conviction that we need to take that responsibility very, very seriously. This is why I introduced an authorization for the use of military force last year. It is also why I have been working with Chairman Corker of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Kaine, and other members of the committee to break a logjam in negotiations--some principled disagreements that exist with respect to what the authorization for the use of military force should look like moving forward.

We have finalized an updated AUMF against Islamic terrorist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS that will merit consideration in coming weeks. In fact, we heard from Chairman Corker. He has now offered a public assurance that there will be hearings on the issue of authorizing military force and there will be marking-up and reporting of legislation so that this 17-year-old authorization for the use of military force can be re-upped. My own view is that whatever one thinks of the legal merits of this long war under the authorizations given in 2001 and 2002, the further away we get from that point in time, where a past Congress authorized force, the more attenuated that argument is and the less power it has. Moreover, we owe it to the men and women in uniform to consistently debate our involvement in overseas conflicts. So I commend the chairman for agreeing with other members of the committee that we need to have hearings and to pass legislation specifically on this matter through the committee of jurisdiction through what we call regular order.

Let me share with those who are watching my remarks here today what I believe the wrong approach is. I believe S.J. Res. 54 is the wrong approach. That resolution sidesteps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It doesn't lead to the sort of fulsome debate. It doesn't allow us to hear from professional witnesses and members of the administration the way a formal committee hearing and markup would allow.

Moreover, the legislation is never going to become law. It will never become law. It is an exercise in messaging. Now, messaging is important. We need to make the argument, and I respect my colleagues for making their principled arguments. They are strong in conviction, and they make each of them quite articulately. But the administration has already indicated that the President wouldn't sign this into law. The administration has already indicated that they do not regard, under the law, that we are engaging in hostilities, which is required to trigger the law they have invoked. So this will never become law.

Moreover, we most certainly will not be overriding a Presidential veto should this pass out of the Senate and the House and go to the President, whereupon he would veto it. So this will never become law.

The last reason I think S.J. Res. 54 is the wrong approach is because it will not achieve our shared objectives. It would fail to achieve its stated objective because the administration rejects the premise of the Sanders-Lee legislation related to hostilities, as I have already stated.

So there is a better approach. Rather than just criticizing S.J. Res. 54--and let me be careful to distinguish between criticizing the legislation that we will be voting on later and my colleagues, because I have great respect for my colleagues and their motives. I wanted to play a more constructive role in this debate. So I wanted to introduce legislation that would provide leverage to pressure the Saudis to actually end the civil war in Yemen and to actually improve the humanitarian situation. At the same time, we have to acknowledge and respond to Iran's malign behavior in Yemen, as well as the presence in Yemen of ISIS and AQAP--al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. This is arguably the most aggressive and most dangerous al-Qaida franchise in the world. We also have to recognize Saudi Arabia's legitimate right to not have ballistic missiles launched into their cities. This is our partner.

So I wanted to develop a bipartisan compromise that could actually pass out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, be passed by both Chambers, and signed by the President of the United States. I think we are well on our way to doing that. I wanted to develop legislation that would actually further its stated purpose and our objectives in Yemen-- ending the civil war and addressing the humanitarian crisis.

So that is why I and Senator Shaheen introduced S.J. Res. 55 on March 8. Now, since then, we worked with the committee, we have worked with members of both parties, and we have worked with the administration and outside experts to further refine our legislation, making numerous substantive changes and principled compromises.

The current version of our legislation would require the Department of State to certify in an unclassified and written report that Saudi Arabia is undertaking the following: No. 1, an urgent and good-faith effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil war in Yemen; No. 2, appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food, fuel, and medicine, including through Yemen's Red Sea ports, the airport in Sana'a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and, No. 3, demonstrable action to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from its

military operations in Yemen, including by complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating the use of cluster munitions and other defense articles and services purchased or transferred from the United States.

Now, if the Department of State can't make that certification, then U.S. air refueling missions, which are essential to the Saudi coalition's operations, would end. They would be prohibited under our law. Given the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and our national security interests there, I appreciate Chairman Corker's commitment today to mark up Yemen legislation in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when we return from recess in April.

So based on this reasoning, which I have laid out quite clearly here today, I plan to oppose the Sanders-Lee-Murphy legislation today. Instead, I will support legislation like ours that could actually become law and would provide the administration the leverage they need to result in real change in Yemen.

Thank you.

I yield the floor.

I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. President, 1 year ago today, the Senate Judiciary Committee opened its hearing on the nomination of Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch. The Stanford Law & Policy Review has now published my article on one of the opposition's arguments made in that hearing and sure to be repeated should President Trump have the opportunity to make another Supreme Court nomination.

Today, I want to look at the lower courts because no fewer than 138 positions on the Federal district and appeals courts are vacant. That does not include 33 vacancies that we already know will occur in the next year or so. Everyone must understand both the seriousness and the cause of this crisis.

By itself, 138 is just a number. It is a big number, but it needs a frame of reference or a standard for us to know whether this number of judicial vacancies is normal or a serious problem that has to be addressed. I certainly don't want to be accused of partisanship, so I will rely solely on the standards and criteria used in the past by my Democratic colleagues. Let's first use some Democratic standards to evaluate the number of judicial vacancies that we face today.

One standard is that the Democrats have specifically identified how many vacancies are unacceptable. In February 2000, with a Democrat in the White House, the Democrats said that 79 vacancies were ``too high.'' In September 2012, with the Democrats both in the White House and controlling the Senate, they declared a ``judicial vacancy crisis'' when there were 78 vacancies.

If 78 vacancies is a crisis, what is the label for 138 vacancies? This is the highest judicial vacancy total since September 1991, but more than half of those vacancies were fresh from Congress's having created new judgeships several months earlier. So I think it is fair to say that in either total or percentage terms, we face today the most serious judicial vacancy crisis that anyone in this body has ever seen.

A second Democratic vacancy standard is that, as they did in April 2014, we can compare judicial vacancies today with vacancies at the same point under previous Presidents. If that Democratic standard is valid, vacancies today are 35 percent higher than at this point under President Obama and 46 percent higher than at this point under President George W. Bush.

There is a third Democratic vacancy standard. In June 2013 and at least as far back as April 1999, the Democrats have complained that the Senate was not confirming enough judicial nominees to keep up with normal attrition. Well, judicial vacancies today are 30 percent higher than when President Trump took office, and, as I said, at least 33 more have already been announced.

Finally, the Democrats have frequently said that the 107th Congress-- the first 2 years of the George W. Bush administration--should be our judicial confirmation benchmark. During that time, the Senate confirmed an average of just over four judicial nominees per month. The Senate has so far confirmed 28 of President Trump's district and appeals court nominees or fewer than two per month.

Take your pick. By any or all of these Democratic standards, we face a much more serious judicial vacancy crisis than in years past. In addition to the gravity of this crisis, however, the American people need to know its cause. I can tell you what is not causing this vacancy crisis. President Trump started making nominations to the Federal district and appeals courts on March 21, 2017, just 61 days after taking office, as you can see on this chart. By August of last year, he had made more than three times as many judicial nominations as the average for his five predecessors of both parties. President Trump has nominated 86 men and women to the Federal bench since he took office 14 months ago.

If the President is making so many nominations, perhaps the problem lies somewhere in the Senate confirmation process. Once again, my Democratic colleagues can help figure this out. In November 2013, then- Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy spoke about obstructing judicial nominees ``in other ways that the public is less aware.'' The Democrats are using such below-the-public-radar obstruction tactics at each stage of the confirmation process.

The first stop in the confirmation process is the Senate Judiciary Committee. Under Chairman Chuck Grassley's leadership, the committee has held a hearing for 62 of President Trump's judicial nominees--more than under any of the previous five Presidents at this point. So that is clearly not the problem. The first sign of Democratic obstruction is the unwarranted and partisan opposition to reporting judicial nominations from the Judiciary Committee.

In February 2012, 3 years into the Obama administration, the Democrats complained that five nominees to the U.S. district court had been reported by the Judiciary Committee on a party-line vote. This, they said, departed dramatically from Senate tradition. Today, just 14 months into the Trump administration, eight nominees to the U.S. district court have been reported by the Judiciary Committee on a party-line vote. The present rate of such party-line votes in the Judiciary Committee is more than four times what the Democrats criticized just a few years ago.

The below-the-radar obstruction tactics continue when the Judiciary Committee sends judicial nominees to the full Senate. The Democrats, for example, refuse to cooperate in scheduling confirmation votes. They can't prevent confirmation votes altogether because they abolished nomination filibusters in 2013, but if they can't make judicial confirmations impossible, they are determined to make them very difficult. Here is how they do it.

The Senate must end debate on a nomination before it can vote on confirmation. The majority and minority have traditionally cooperated to end debate and set up confirmation votes. In March 2014, not for the first time, the Democrats said that refusing consent to schedule votes on pending nominees was obstruction. When the minority refuses that consent, the only way to end debate and set up a confirmation vote is by the formal cloture

process, which requires a cloture vote and can add up to several days to the confirmation timeline, as seen here.

Since President Trump took office, the Democrats have forced the Senate to take 28 cloture votes on judicial nominations, compared to just two cloture votes at this point under the previous five Presidents combined. Even when cloture is invoked, Senate rules provide for up to 30 hours of debate before a confirmation vote can occur. Nearly half the time under President Obama, a judicial nomination cloture vote was followed by a confirmation vote on the same day. Under President Trump, that has plummeted to 17 percent. The average time between cloture and confirmation votes for President Trump's judicial nominations is more than 55 percent longer than it was under President Obama.

When a judicial nomination gets out of the Judiciary Committee, survives an unnecessary cloture vote, and then is subjected to postcloture delay, Democratic obstruction is still not over. In March 2012, the Democrats complained about Senators having voted against nominees to the U.S. district court who were supported by their own two Senators. In fact, the Democrats called this a new standard of obstruction because it departed so far from Senate tradition.

OK. Let's assume for the moment that this Democratic standard is also valid. At this point in the previous five Presidencies--from President Reagan to President Obama--U.S. district court nominees had received a combined total of 10 negative votes. So far, under President Trump, his confirmed district court nominees have received 72 negative votes.

Two weeks ago, the Pew Research Center released a new analysis showing that President Trump's confirmed judges have ``faced a record amount of opposition.'' In fact, this analysis concluded that President Trump's judges have each received an average of more than 22 negative votes, ``by far the highest average for any president's judges since the Senate expanded to its current 100 members in 1959.'' This level of opposition is more than four times what it was under President Obama-- or should I say oppositional delay.

These tactics don't involve high-profile filibusters or headline- grabbing confirmation defeats but, rather, internal Senate rules and unwritten traditions. That is why they operate below the radar. Yet the Democrats have criticized these tactics precisely because they take their toll. Individually and especially in combination, they can add days and weeks to the time it takes to confirm a single judicial nomination even when the final confirmation vote is unanimous.

In November 2013, for example, the Democrats said that taking cloture votes on unopposed nominees amounted to ``obstruction and abuse of Senate rules.'' At that point, almost 4 years into the Obama administration, the Senate had taken one cloture vote on a judicial nominee who was later confirmed without opposition--just one. We are only 14 months into the Trump administration, and the Democrats have already forced the Senate to take five cloture votes on nominees who were later unanimously confirmed. It has already happened twice this month. If doing this once amounted to obstruction and abuse, what would my Democratic colleagues call doing it five times as often in one- fourth the time?

These are just a few of what then-Chairman Leahy called obstruction tactics that the public may not be aware of. Believe me. There is more where these came from. As I said, I want to avoid partisanship. Each of these is a Democratic standard. These are Democratic criteria. If my colleagues who once thought these were valid standards want to abandon them now, then perhaps they were also wrong the first time around. Otherwise, we have to face the conclusions that follow from applying these Democratic standards and criteria.

We face an unprecedented judicial vacancy crisis. Since President Trump is making nominations and the Judiciary Committee, under Chairman Grassley's leadership, is steadily processing them, there remains only one explanation for the vacancy crisis we face today--plain, old- fashioned, partisan obstruction. The Democrats are manipulating this process at every stage, using the very tactics that they have loudly condemned in the past to make confirmations as difficult and time- consuming as possible.

Even in politics, actions speak louder than words. In July 2012, when there were 76 judicial vacancies, Chairman Leahy said that ``we should be doing better.'' Today, with nearly twice as many vacancies, I challenge my Democratic colleagues to put actions to those words.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern about the continued deterioration of the situation in Yemen and to share my views about the resolution that is currently before us.

The military conflict going on in Yemen has gone on for far too long and has affected tens of millions of civilians who face displacement, famine, and a widespread cholera outbreak. According to the United Nations, more than 15,000 Yemenis have been killed or injured since the war began in March of 2015. The humanitarian situation there has been described as the worst in the world, with more than two-thirds of Yemen's approximately 29 million people facing severe food shortages. An outbreak of cholera has already infected at least 1 million people, marking the worst such outbreak in decades.

Continued instability in Yemen also benefits our adversaries. While we have sought to maintain pressure on al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, and ISIS, the lack of a functioning government or state security apparatus inhibits our ability to go after these groups. Additionally, it is clear that Iran has taken advantage of the current situation to spread its malign influence and provide lethal support to the Houthis, thereby further undermining regional stability and security.

Unfortunately, we have yet to hear any strategy from the administration as to how they would propose to use U.S. diplomatic leadership to help bring about an end to the conflict in Yemen. We still do not have an Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and occasional visits by White House officials are not a replacement for sustained diplomatic efforts by our experts in the Foreign Service. I am encouraged, though, by the appointment of a new United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, and hope that the U.S. Government will seek to support his efforts wherever possible.

While the primary conflict in Yemen is between an Iranian-backed Houthi insurgency and a Saudi-led coalition, the United States is involved.

As stated in a letter sent by Secretary Mattis to congressional leadership last week, ``Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support to Saudi-led coalition military operations to restore the U.N.-recognized government of Yemen and preserve Saudi territorial integrity from Houthi aligned forces in Yemen.'' Moreover, according to Secretary Mattis, U.S. forces are not authorized to use force against the Houthis but do support the Saudi-led coalition with ``intelligence sharing, military advice, and logistical support, including air-to-air refueling.''

Last week, the commander of U.S. Central Command, General Votel, testified before the Armed Services Committee that our support to the Saudi-led coalition is ``primarily defensive'' in nature and focused on the Iranian-supported ballistic missile threat to Saudi Arabia that originates in Yemen, maritime threats to international shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, the defense of Saudi Arabia's southern border, and counterterrorism.

However, General Votel also acknowledged that when the United States provides aerial refueling to coalition aircraft, we do not know where those aircraft then go; therefore, they could be going to conduct offensive strikes against Houthi targets, which may result in civilian casualties, which is a major concern for me. Even more troubling, if these aircraft went to conduct strikes against targets outside of

Yemen, the United States would be complicit in a much more dangerous and provocative activity.

I have significant concerns about persistent reports of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure caused by the Saudi- led coalition in Yemen. Far too many of the strikes by the coalition have killed or injured civilians and resulted in the destruction of infrastructure needed to provide basic services to the population, thereby exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

It is also clear that more must be done by both the coalition and the Houthis to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into and throughout Yemen. The United Nations and humanitarian organizations continue to express concern about their ability to access seaports and airports and difficulties in distributing aid to vulnerable populations once it is inside the country.

It is important that shipments into Yemen be subject to inspection by the U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism to help prevent the transit of illicit materials in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, but all parties to the conflict in Yemen have a responsibility, including under international humanitarian law, to allow access to aid by those in need.

We are faced with a very difficult set of issues, and I certainly understand and commend my colleagues, Senators Sanders, Murphy, and Lee, for bringing this issue to the floor. The Saudi-led coalition clearly must do more to end this war and must prosecute this war in a way that limits civilian casualties and the humanitarian crises. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates, or UAE, remain important partners for the United States, and we share many common interests in the region, including in the fight against al-Qaida, ISIS, and other violent extremist groups.

The resolution before us would establish a blanket prohibition on all assistance to the Saudi-led coalition except for the purposes of countering al-Qaida and associated forces. While I understand the argument for this approach, I believe it would prevent us from exerting influence to limit and hopefully end the conflict. Indeed, it may even cause harm as both sides potentially act more violently.

We can and should engage if there is a possibility that we can help minimize collateral damage by providing the coalition with training and advice on best practices. General Votel testified last week that U.S. assistance has contributed to improvement by the coalition on these issues. Specifically, the Department of Defense told us that engagement by U.S. military personnel has resulted in the introduction of a ``no- strike'' list. That is a process which actually puts targets off-limits and ensures that pilots and others understand those targets. They also caused a cessation--an ending--of the use of cluster munitions by Saudi-led forces and the formation of a body to investigate noncombatant casualties. These are positive steps, but it is clear that much more must be done to minimize the impact of the war on Yemeni civilians. I support our continued engagement for that purpose.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE face a significant threat from Houthi rebels armed with ballistic missiles, apparently with the technical assistance of the Iranians. There have reportedly been dozens of attacks against Saudi Arabia since the spring of 2015, including against civilian targets like the international airport in Riyadh, which was attacked in December. I strongly support the right of our partners to defend themselves against these threats and believe that continued sharing of U.S. intelligence for defensive purposes is appropriate, especially in light of the fact that tens of thousands of U.S. civilians, military, and diplomatic personnel also face these threats while living and working in the region around Riyadh and throughout Saudi Arabia.

I also have concerns that ending all support to the Saudi-led coalition may cause the conflict to escalate. As Secretary Mattis wrote to congressional leadership this past week, restrictions on our ``limited U.S. military support could increase civilian casualties, jeopardize cooperation with our partners on counterterrorism, and reduce our influence with the Saudis--all of which would further exacerbate the situation and humanitarian crisis.'' Secretary Mattis also expressed concern that withdrawal of our support would ``embolden Iran to increase its support to the Houthis, enabling further ballistic missile strikes on Saudi Arabia and threatening vital shipping lanes in the Red Sea, thereby raising the risk of a regional conflict.''

Therefore, I believe that support by the U.S. military of the Saudi- led coalition in Yemen should not be absolutely prohibited but should be explicitly limited to the following objectives: No. 1, enabling counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and ISIS; No. 2, defending the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including against ballistic missile threats; No. 3, preserving freedom of navigation in the maritime environment around Yemen; and No. 4, enhancing the training and professionalism of their armed forces, with a primary focus on adherence to the law of armed conflict and prevention of civilian casualties.

Our support for the Saudi-led coalition needs to be considered in a thoughtful and deliberate manner. From a policy perspective, we should distinguish between assistance that is provided for defensive or noncombat purposes and that which could be used to enable offensive military operations in the Yemeni civil war.

Let me be clear. I am not in favor of giving the Saudi-led coalition a blank check. In fact, I believe we should no longer provide aerial refueling assistance unless it is used to enable aircraft conducting counterterrorism missions pursuant to the 2001 authorization for use of military force or countering specific identified threats to Saudi territorial integrity. Indeed, use of our military assets to support Saudi-led coalition efforts or the efforts of other nations to conduct other operations outside this narrow scope would raise very serious legal questions.

Given its comprehensive approach, I do not believe the Sanders resolution is the appropriate vehicle for these issues to receive the careful and deliberate consideration they are due. I understand the Foreign Relations Committee may soon take up this issue, and I urge them to do that. I look forward to engaging further in those discussions when presented with the opportunity.

The administration must make clear to both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis that there is no military solution to this conflict and that the time has come to reach a negotiated settlement. Congress also has an important role in setting the policy framework for the use of U.S. Armed Forces overseas and ensuring that U.S. military capabilities are only used for authorized purposes. At the same time, we should not take action that would unduly restrict our engagement with partners for legitimate purposes and, in doing so, undermine our ability to help bring an end to the conflict in Yemen, ease civilian suffering, and defend the territorial integrity of our partners.

With that Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I come to the floor with a series of my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Democratic side to enter into a colloquy about this administration's chaotic and incoherent approach to foreign policy--an approach that has left our allies confused and our adversaries emboldened and undermines the standing of the United States on the global stage.

To be fair, the President's own national security strategy echoes decades of bipartisan recognition that the founding values of the United States--democracy, the rule of law--should continue to drive our foreign policy. Yet the President himself has shown a fundamental disrespect for these very principles: declining to publicly champion the importance of human rights and good governance, refusing to condemn dictators around the world who brutally repress their own citizens, sow instability across the world, or even attack those who attack the United States--something I fear will ultimately weaken our ability to promote the security and prosperity of all Americans.

Last week's unceremonious firing of our Nation's top diplomat was the President's latest and brazen example of disrespect for the role of diplomacy, diplomats, and of the State Department itself. While I had my differences with Secretary Tillerson, the reality is, it does not serve the interests of the United States when the President undermines his top diplomat on major foreign policy initiatives, from the crisis in the gulf to, ironically, his outreach to North Koreans.

Secretary Tillerson's legacy will be shaped not just by the President's misguided efforts but also his own ill-advised attempt to dismantle the State Department, leaving the United States without key voices to advance our interests around the world.

The administration has failed to even nominate critical, high-level positions--Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries--leaving a void of empowered voices. Meanwhile, there are gaping vacancies in some of the world's most troubled regions. For example, as we confront a nuclear- armed North Korea, the President has yet to nominate an ambassador to South Korea, our critical ally on the peninsula--one that has historically relied upon American assurances and allegiance.

Similarly, the President took more than a year to nominate an Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The impact of these vacancies was on full display last week when the President-- without the knowledge of his top diplomat--announced a meeting with North Korean Dictator Kim Jong Un, an assertion that was then ultimately walked back and modified by his Secretary of Defense and his White House Press Secretary.

In the Middle East, as the President continues to send more and more American troops and we face an emboldened Iranian regime creeping further into Syria, facilitated by the Kremlin's military support, he has yet to appoint Ambassadors to consequential posts, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan, which has proved a critical partner in our fight against terrorism in the region and in supporting refugees--two essential components of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

How can we possibly expect to assert American leadership and secure our interests with these posts unfilled and with no empowered individuals at the Department itself? Under the President's watch, the number of career Ambassadors, which is basically the State

Department's equivalent to four-star generals at the Department of Defense, has plummeted by 60 percent. If we were shedding four-star generals this quickly, we would be sounding the alarm of a national security crisis.

We have just one career-level Ambassador left at the State Department. Let me say that again: One career-level Ambassador left, and this administration has seen fit to ship him off to an academic institution rather than to engage him in frontline diplomacy.

We are witnessing a mass exodus of experienced diplomatic and security professionals who have dedicated their lives to this country. This is a forced exodus, and I am deeply alarmed to see reports revealing what we have feared for some time.

We just started to learn about disturbing efforts to purge the Broadcasting Board of Governors and impose a partisan editorial voice on U.S. international media. Alarmingly, last week, press reports highlighted emails that provided concrete evidence of the administration's efforts to effectively purge the Department of anyone they do not believe would be a purist for the President's vision. Emails showed political leadership describing some civil servants as ``turncoats, leakers, and troublemakers.''

The conversations showed senior political appointees working with outside organizations engaged in vicious smear campaigns against career civil servants and dismissing death threats against some of these same career officials. Diplomats who have served Republican and Democratic Presidents alike, who have spent their careers working to build a more prosperous and secure world so a Commander in Chief would not have to send our sons and daughters into war.

This is America. Our government functions because of apolitical civil servants across agencies who dedicate their lives to advance the interests of their fellow citizens, from distributing Social Security checks to negotiating nuclear arms treaties. It is outrageous. It is disgraceful. It is dangerous.

We face challenges from every corner of the globe. We simply cannot confront them if we are not present, and we cannot overcome these challenges when the President himself does not acknowledge them.

As China's political leadership consolidates power and as the country expands into the South China Sea and pursues an aggressive economic agenda around the world, the President, for his part, praises these dictatorial moves. Meanwhile, he has failed on his promise to deliver better trade deals.

In Latin America, while the President calls our neighbors to the south drug dealers, criminals, and rapists, China is expanding its economic and cultural presence in our own backyard.

In Mexico, one of our most integral bilateral partners--Mexico is the second largest market for U.S. goods and services in the world--we will soon lose our Ambassador, as we hear about how the Russian Government is seeking to interfere in their upcoming elections.

When it comes to Russia, again and again, the President's own intelligence officials have made clear that the Russian Government not only meddled in our election in 2016 but continues its interference in the American political system to this day. Yet the President refuses-- refuses--to condemn Vladimir Putin or impose congressionally mandated sanctions to hold them accountable for their attack on the United States. I understand today he congratulated him on his ``election.'' That is not an election. Putin is seeking to be a czar, not to be a President.

The Russian Government continues its military aggression in the Ukraine and its disinformation campaigns across Europe.

In the Middle East, it continues to enable Bashar al-Assad's slaughter of innocent civilians and Iran's efforts to expand its presence and threaten Israel. In a brazen move this month, the Kremlin used an unlawful chemical agent to commit murder on British soil, showing how far they will go if they are unchecked.

Beyond these great power threats, we must also confront nonstate actors and new tools designed specifically to destabilize free and democratic societies.

We must demand more information to learn about Cambridge Analytica and the efforts of this organization to exploit private information from social media users across the world to promote particular political agendas.

The only way to confront old and emerging threats is to stand united with our allies. We have spent decades building these alliances based on mutual respect, accountability, and vigorous engagement in the international institutions and security agreements that are essential to promoting peace and security around the world. We ourselves must be a reliable ally and partner. We must speak with an authoritative voice. We must have our national security agencies executing clear, integrated, coherent strategies.

The President himself must champion the fundamental ideas that have made America secure and prosperous: democracy, human rights, free expression--values we champion not because simply they are right but because they are also strategic. We stand for these values because, globally, governments that uphold the rule of law, that respect human rights and freedom of expression, that welcome economic competition-- these are the nations that form America's most reliable allies, most prosperous economic partners, and most strategic security relations.

Let me close with this: The American people and the institutions we have built remain resilient. Now more than ever, Congress must exercise its role as a coequal branch of government when it comes to our foreign policy. We need Republicans and Democrats in Congress to uphold our duty to conduct oversight, to ensure that bipartisan values that have guided American foreign policy for decades can be executed by an experienced, empowered, fully funded and fully staffed State Department.

Together, we must ensure that our reputation as a leader of nations is not eroded by a President and an administration that thus far, in my view, far from putting America first, threaten to leave America isolated and behind. That is our challenge. That is our choice. I appreciate my colleagues who join us in this regard.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I thank my colleague from New Mexico, a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for his insight, input, and continuing efforts to make sure we have a diplomacy in the world that ultimately pursues our national interests and security.

I understand there are some colleagues who are on their way to the floor--Senator Shaheen and Senator Cardin. When they get here, we will hopefully have the Chair recognize them at that point.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I join my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and under the leadership of Senator Menendez to point out that now--I guess it has been 14 months under President Trump's leadership--we have seen a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy that jeopardizes our standing globally and our national security. It starts with this administration's hollowing out the State Department and our capacity to participate in diplomacy.

As my colleagues have pointed out, so many vacancies exist today, unfilled by this administration. It is not the slowness of the Senate in confirming the positions. Many of these positions are not even positions that require Senate confirmation. We have seen an exodus of the most experienced people in the State Department, and the capacity of the State Department has been dramatically reduced. President Trump's budget speaks volumes about his support for diplomacy, as we see 30-percent reductions in the State Department budget being proposed by this administration.

The role of diplomacy in solving international issues is at an all- time low. There are many times I disagreed with Secretary Tillerson, but he at least was an independent voice in the White House as it related to certain issues on Iran or climate change. Now his voice has been silenced in this administration.

America first is America alone. It is the isolation of our country. We have seen that with the United States under

President Trump and pulling out of the climate talks--the only country in the world. We see it now, potentially, in Iran, with reports that the President may unilaterally withdraw the United States from the nuclear agreement, putting the United States as the outlier where we should be putting our attention on Iran. This is reflected in the Gallup polls, showing that the global opinion toward the United States has dropped dramatically. We see the President embracing oppressive leaders around the world, such as the leaders of Russia, China, Turkey, and Egypt, and embracing the autocratic practices of the President of the Philippines. Then, he attacks our closest allies, calling into question the transatlantic partnership.

Perhaps more than anything else, this administration has trampled on America's values. As Secretary Tillerson said early in this administration, America's interests will no longer be dictated by our values. That is not what the trademark of America is about. The President over and over has questioned universally what America stands for when he gave space to hate in his response to Charlottesville and when he implies that people who come to our country of certain religions or certain races are less favored than others. When he suggests he cannot have a conflict because he is President of the United States and does not have to divest of his business interests or when he says things that we know are not true and the President of the United States is standing up for matters that are outright lies, it diminishes the value and strength of America and our global leadership.

One issue I want to talk about in the time I have is that of ignoring one of our greatest national security threats--what Russia is doing to the United States under Mr. Putin. We just saw in Russia's most recent election that it was neither free nor fair. The opposition candidates were not allowed to participate, as they were handpicked by Mr. Putin, and he controlled the media. As the OSCE observed, the election took place in an overly controlled legal environment, and it had pressure on the critical voices of the Russian people.

We find a Russia today under Mr. Putin that is contrary to the values we stand for. In January, I authored a report on Russia, with the other Democrats on the committee, that talked about the asymmetric arsenal Mr. Putin uses that includes propaganda. We saw this on display when he was asked about what happened in the United States. According to the transcript, as reported by the Washington Post, these are Mr. Putin's own words: ``Maybe they're not even Russians,'' in his talking about who attacked our country and referring to those behind the election interference. ``Maybe they're Ukrainian, Tatars, Jews--just with Russian citizenship.'' He also speculated that France, Germany, or Asia might have interfered in the election or even Russians who were paid by the U.S. Government.

That type of rhetoric is straight out of the Soviet and Russian playbook to cast Jews and other minorities as undesirables--enemies of the state. As an American Jew who has family roots in Eastern Europe and Russia, I find that kind of rhetoric to be dangerous and frightening, but at its most basic, such rhetoric is part of Mr. Putin's grand design. That is what he does.

We saw it play out in the UK just 2 weeks ago when a person was poisoned in England who was an enemy of Mr. Putin's. We see it play out over and over again. Prime Minister May spoke out. She called it for what it was. She sent a clear signal to Moscow that that type of behavior by the Russian state against the British people would not be tolerated and that there would be consequences. This is how a leader of a great nation should speak out in defense of its people to counter a major threat from a global adversary.

Yet what happened here in Washington with the threat we saw to our own country by Mr. Putin? The President has said virtually nothing. His spokesperson condemned the crime but ignored that likely Russian link. The Secretary of State later did what the President could not or would not do by calling out the Russians. Maybe that was his swan song because it was the last thing we heard before he was silenced by Mr. Trump.

Never before in America's history has such a clear threat to our national security been so clearly ignored by the President of the United States. The President's difficulty in publicly acknowledging the Russia threat and leading our country forward to combat that threat is one of the most perplexing and reckless pieces of Mr. Trump's disastrous foreign policy. We in Congress took action. We passed legislation. We passed mandatory sanctions against Russia. Yet this administration has not taken full advantage of the law we passed. The President needs to protect America's interests, not appease Mr. Putin.

Congress's role in shaping and advancing U.S. foreign policy has never been more important. I will continue to advance legislation, conduct oversight, and speak out about these important issues in the name of the American people and the values and norms that define us and our place in this complicated world. I am proud to be a part of the group of Senators who will stand on this floor and work to make sure we protect our national security interests.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I take this time because I think this issue is an extremely important issue. I am talking about the authority of the Congress of the United States versus the President on the introduction of our troops into war or hostilities. This has been a struggle we have been debating for a long time. Congress passed the War Powers Act over the objections of the President because we recognize that the Constitution gives us the power to introduce troops into harm's way.

The resolution says very clearly that the introduction of the U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities will allow Congress to have an expedited process if the administration has not gotten the authorization for the use of that military force. The Supreme Court decision made it very difficult for us to enforce that, causing us to pass, in the State Department authorization, a process in which a joint resolution could be filed in order for Congress to express itself if the President has not sought the authorization for the use of military force.

We now have a circumstance where the United States, in my view--the President has introduced American troops into hostilities by assisting the Saudis in refueling missions in regard to the campaign in Yemen. To me, that is introducing troops. Whether it is right or wrong, Congress has a responsibility to respond to this. I say that knowing that our Presiding Officer has been very articulate about the need for us to pass an authorization for the use of military force in regard to our campaign against ISIS.

Here is the challenge we have. The administration and previous administrations have interpreted hostilities in such a narrow way, it would take away

from Congress our ability to have the authorization for the introduction of American troops into hostile circumstances. Yet compare that with this administration's and previous administrations' interpretations of the 2001 authorization for use of military force, which we passed after the attack on our country on 9/11. They would have you believe that authorization, which was limited to those who planned the attack against us in 9/11, applies to our military campaign against ISIS in Syria or ISIS in Yemen or wherever we may find ISIS anywhere in the world. I think that is an absurd interpretation.

Yes, I know the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is on the floor. I think our committee needs to take up this issue. We need to take up what is happening in Yemen with our support of the Saudis and what is happening in regard to the authorization for the use of military force. But this campaign has been going on for a long time. Congress needs to weigh in whether we are for or against it. We need to exert our jurisdiction, and we haven't done that. It is very frustrating that those of us who believe very deeply in our constitutional responsibilities, assume that responsibility--and I have a lot of confidence in the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but I question whether we are going to get more time in the future to debate this issue. I know the chairman will give us time in committee, but will we have time on the floor of the Senate to debate this issue? I think we need to debate it and vote up or down whether American troops should be assisting in this mission.

With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.