911 SAVES Act

Mr. Chair, I respect the gentleman's point about how we need to work towards an agreement to how Congress can have the most constructive role possible on arms sales.

The concern here is the tendency of the White House to declare an emergency when they simply want to do something that we haven't allowed them to do. It is troubling because it takes us out of the process, so we need to find a way to make sure that they can't do that.

It is not a huge mystery why these arms sales have been held up. We are concerned about Iran's malign influence. We are also concerned about the actions that Saudi Arabia has been taking in that region that could be stirring up conflict and making it easier for Iran to have that malign influence; quite specifically, killing civilians in Yemen in a way that generates sympathy, certainly, for the Houthis in Yemen but then sympathy for that side.

So, we are worried about the way Saudi Arabia is conducting this war, certainly, and we are also worried about other actions by Saudi Arabia. Certainly, the murder of the journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, has not been answered for to this point.

So, simply selling weapons to Saudi Arabia at this point is something that is going to take time and is going to raise questions.

For the President to simply bypass us, taking us out of the process in that situation, I think, undermines our role.

That is the purpose of this amendment, and I urge adoption.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer amendment No. 26 as the designee of Mr. Khanna.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a variation on a bill that this House passed and the Senate passed as well that the President vetoed that would cut off any U.S. support for the Saudi coalition that is fighting in Yemen.

And I will agree with some discussion that came earlier that this is a complicated situation because we are concerned about the malign influence of Iran in the region. But the problem is the way the war has been conducted in Yemen.

As I mentioned earlier on the previous amendment, the civilian casualties and the way the war has been conducted has undermined, I believe, our efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution and to begin to limit the Iranian influence in the region.

I met with Saudi Arabian officials as they explained to me what their targeting strategy was, and how they were trying to mitigate civilian casualties, but I was not impressed because whatever they showed me on these pieces of paper, it has been well-documented that they bombed a school bus, killing a large number of children. They actually bombed a funeral, a funeral that had a lot of the key leaders in Yemen at it that were going to be responsible for negotiating a peace agreement. And on countless other instances they have bombed civilian targets.

There is also a very aggressive blockade going on in Yemen that is having a devastating humanitarian impact.

Now, I understand that Iran is also doing things that we should oppose. They are killing civilians; they are stirring up difficulties. But we are not supporting Iran. We are not responsible for that piece of it.

But to the extent that we participate in helping Saudi Arabia, through intelligence sharing, through refueling, through a variety of different means, we are participating in the atrocities that are being committed on that side, and we should not be. It is not what is going to lead us to a peaceful solution.

I also want to emphasize that this amendment, as did the bill that we passed, very carefully carves out the activity that we are engaged in in Yemen to counter violent extremist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS that have arisen in the region.

We have a counterterrorism presence in Yemen. This amendment in no way restricts us from continuing that counterterrorism activity. This is focused on the civil war in Yemen.

And it is worth noting that, as we get to the point now where Iran is involved, that is not the way it started. Basically, the Houthis in Yemen were an oppressed minority and suffered decades of mistreatment at the hands of whoever happened to be in charge in Yemen, which led to the revolt.

Now, since that time, the Houthis have committed all manner of atrocities, as well as the war moved forward. But initially, this was a civil war that doesn't really have anything to do with the terrorism fight that we are doing. And I think it is incredibly important for the credibility of our foreign policy to clearly differentiate between our activities, our legitimate activities, in Yemen to stop those terrorists in Yemen who threaten us and threaten our allies in the region, and the activities of this broader civil war that, as I said, I believe, is merely creating more violence in the Middle East and empowering Iran by creating widespread sympathy across the board and in the United States for the Houthis and for the people in Yemen who are being the victims of these bombing attacks.

The U.S. should step back from this. And if Saudi Arabia is the great ally that everyone has said they are, we should be able to have a conversation with them about how they change their actions, so we can be in a better position to support them and lead toward greater peace in the region and contain Iran. That is what we need to do.

But the current policy isn't working, so this amendment makes it clear the United States is not supporting the Saudi-led coalition that is engaged in the civil war in Yemen, and I urge support.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I have no further speakers and I am prepared to close.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I am prepared to close. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I think the intelligence sharing point the gentleman from Arkansas made is very important. Let me say, there are multiple countries involved in this coalition in Yemen.

In working with the UAE, for instance, they actually do take steps to minimize civilian casualties and are reasonably successful about it in the operations that they have conducted, both from the air and the ground.

Saudi Arabia has not. And believe me, I certainly understood the malign influence of Iran and their relationship with the Houthis. But Saudi Arabia, time and time again, regrettably, has not used this intelligence sharing in a way that minimizes civilian casualties.

I had cited the instances earlier of the school bus that was bombed; the funeral party that was bombed; the civilians who are continually hit. They are not using this intelligence sharing in a way to minimize civilian casualties. And I think we need to make a statement that they are going to have to change their ways before we continue to do this.

On the broader issue, and that is really what Yemen is about for U.S. policy purposes, is Iran's influence in the region and, also, the role that Saudi Arabia plays in the violence. And the problem I have with the administration's policy right now is it would do nothing to contain what Saudi Arabia is doing, which only exacerbates the violence and creates openings for Iran. So we need to balance that.

As far Iran is concerned, right now it is hard to say where the administration's policy is going. It is a maximum pressure campaign. We have seen Iran lash out since we abandoned the nuclear deal. They are now moving more in the direction of developing a nuclear weapon than they were before we abandoned the nuclear deal.

The administration is now saying that they want to force Iran to the table to stop them from getting a nuclear weapon.

We need a better policy in Iran. I urge support for the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, three quick points.

First of all, Richard Nixon era or not, I think we all agree that the missile right now is working. I certainly hope it is since we are relying on it as a key part of our nuclear deterrent.

We have a lot of weapons systems. I mean, I am surprised that the B- 52 bomber is still functional, but it is.

To imply that somehow because it is old, by definition, it doesn't work, I hope that is not true. In fact, I know it is not true because the current missile works perfectly fine and is a more than adequate deterrent.

Second, the studies that have been done were trying to figure out if we could get away with keeping this missile for the entire projected 80-year lifespan of its replacement. The studies have come back and said, no, it probably will not last 80 years. We have not studied whether or not it could last another 25 or another 50.

That is the purpose of this amendment. That would save us money.

Look, we need a nuclear deterrent. I don't believe the gentleman from Oregon--certainly, I don't--supports getting rid of our nuclear weapons. The question is, how many do we need? What does the deterrent look like? What makes sense?

It is clear that this missile works now. If we did this study, it is quite reasonable to presume that it would work another 10, 20, 30 years from now. Then that money could be used for other defense priorities.

This is to answer that question, which is very important.

I will skip the third point.

Mr. Chair, all I was going to say is that the voice vote in our committee was not overwhelming. I am the one who called the voice vote, and it was my sense that the amendment was agreed to in the committee, but it was not overwhelming. There was a large number of members of the Armed Services Committee who supported the proposal that Mr. Blumenauer is now making.

Mr. Chairman, this is a little bit smaller than what the gentleman from Ohio implied. We are stopping the funding of this program. Actually, what we are stopping is the additional $185 million request that NNSA and the President requested in this budget on top of this. The missile would continue to be funded.

This is a concern we had in committee. We talked about it and we let it go.

But they have not really told us what they are going to do with this additional $185 million. And we have concerns, in addition to the concerns that Mr. Blumenauer raised about the efficacy of the program, about whether or not they are going to be able to execute this $185 million and what their exact timeline is for the program. In fact, the Air Force recently said that they were delaying by a year or two certain steps in the development of this missile while saying they were also going to be able to still meet the ultimate deadline for deployment.

But the specific $185 million that is expensed is an amount that was asked for in addition to what had originally been planned for FY20. We do not have an adequate explanation, in my view, and in Mr. Blumenauer's view, from DOD as to why they want that additional $185 million, and that is the purpose of this. It is not studying the entire missile. It is saying, why are you accelerating the program and asking for this additional money? So I support this amendment.

Mr. Chair, pursuant to House Resolution 476, I offer amendments en bloc.

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal), my fellow Washingtonian.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Torres).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Shalala).

Mr. Chair, I don't have any more speakers, so I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I have no further speakers, so I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I urge support of the en bloc package, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chair, I oppose this amendment prohibiting the use of funds from the Special Defense Acquisition Fund to provide assistance to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates if such assistance could be used in hostilities in Yemen.

Nearly every Member in this Chamber has made it very clear that we are concerned about civilian casualties resulting from the conflict in Yemen. However, this amendment does not address that concern.

The war in Yemen must end, but, as Iran continues to finance terror and help the Houthis, who have overthrown the government, the consequence will be utter devastation for the Yemeni civilians.

Our assistance for the coalition opposing Houthi and Iranian terror in Yemen started in 2015 during the Obama administration when the Houthis overthrew a legitimate government, with Iran's assistance.

The Houthis fired missiles against the coalition, with support from Iran, and the U.S. provided intelligence and logistical support in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.

Iran poses a massive geostrategic threat in the area around Yemen, throughout the Middle East, and to the United States and many of our allies.

Right now, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and the U.S. share a common adversary in Iran.

We cannot signal to Iran that their continued aggression will be tolerated. Iran's nefarious activities must be countered effectively.

The coalition continues to face an onslaught of Houthi attacks on civilian targets, and the U.S. needs a nuanced approach that helps our Nation, our partners, and avoids civilian casualties.

Instead, this amendment slams the door shut, crushing any opportunity to see the region and civilians protected.

Have no doubt: The coalition will continue to purchase arms, including defensive weapons, from other sources that have no regard for how these weapons are deployed.

As a result of this amendment, the war in Yemen will not end, nor will it assist the United States or our strategic allies in containing Iran's malign influence in the region.

Mr. Chair, I urge Members to oppose this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, again, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to this amendment, which would prohibit any funds from being used to process any arms sales or transfers to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates pursuant to emergency certification made under the Arms Export Control Act.

The President's emergency certification of May 24 to move 22 arms sales as an emergency was to address increased threats from Iran to U.S. security interests and Iran's continued efforts to destabilize the region, which directly impacts our strategic allies.

The Democrat majority had been holding onto arms sales through congressional notification requirements and abusing oversight power with the Arms Export Control Act. Some of these requests by the administration had been on hold for over a year, and there was no progress in determining why.

We witnessed just last month, on June 19, Iran shot down a U.S. military asset, a drone over international waters, one of many examples of Iranian aggression toward the United States and other nations, many in that region surrounding Iran.

There is no doubt that Iran is an increased threat.

Mr. Chair, I urge Members to oppose this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I just want to point out Chairman Engel has been approaching this issue in a little more of a surgical approach in looking at Federal law. I think that that would be the more appropriate tactic in being able to work together in a bipartisan fashion on this issue.

This amendment, with all due respect to my good friend from California, is a little more of a sledgehammer. I think he would probably say that that would be true, unapologetically.

I, though, would certainly encourage my colleagues, really, on both sides of the aisle, to be able to work together through concerns that others may have rather than passing this particular amendment.

There has been a hold that has been placed for a very long time. And I would encourage any Members of Congress who are responsible for that hold or support the hold to articulate to us and to the administration exactly what the hold is, what the concerns are, and how we can work through it together.

I hope that we all are in unanimity with concern over Iranian aggression in the Middle East. We are all in unanimity with concern when we see Iran--beyond the rhetorical calling us the great Satan-- pledging death to America, building a land bridge across the Middle East, supporting Assad in Syria and financing Hezbollah in Lebanon.

And, certainly, there are the concerns with the movement in shipping lanes around Yemen, a conflict that the Houthis, in overthrowing a legitimate government, did with the backing of the Iranians.

So, there are a lot of concerns that we have on our side of the aisle as it relates to Iranian aggression, and I hope that we can work together in dealing with those concerns that we all have as it relates to Iranian aggression.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I also think it is important to note that the United States has not engaged in direct hostilities in Yemen. We stopped the refueling of Saudi aircraft, so the activities have actually, in many respects, been walked back from what was historically known as being directly engaged in hostilities on the ground, which is just not the case here as it relates to the United States.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, again, I would urge all of my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chair, I completely support Congress' solemn duty under Article I of the Constitution to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops to foreign hostilities; but that is not the only issue here.

This amendment attempts to block intelligence sharing to our strategic partners such as Saudi Arabia at a time when those partners have civilian targets that are actively being attacked by Iran-backed Houthi rebels.

Intelligence sharing can help our partners protect their forces and their civilians. It can also help them ensure that they are hitting their correct targets, thereby minimizing civilian casualties.

Additionally, the Iran-backed Houthis are stepping up its attacks on U.S. assets in Yemen. CENTCOM confirmed that the Houthis shot down a U.S. drone earlier this summer. If we cut off intelligence sharing with our strategic partners, it will certainly have repercussions that diminish our abilities to protect our own assets.

There is reason that a bipartisan majority supported exempting intelligence sharing from the War Powers Resolution on Yemen that we considered earlier this year. It is because this type of cooperation is essential to U.S. interests in the region, including ensuring responsible conduct of the war in Yemen.

It is important to point out that here, in this case with Yemen, the Houthis overthrew a government with the backing of Iran. Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terror. They do many malign, nonnuclear, nefarious activities.

While, for good reason, we give the most amount of attention to Iran's nuclear activities--they call Israel the Little Satan, the United States the Great Satan, and they pledge death to America in their parliament and on their streets and in their holidays--they have been attempting to build a land bridge to the west of the country.

They have a much more growing influence within the government of Iraq. They have been propping up Assad in Syria. They have been financing rockets and other activities to support Hezbollah in Lebanon.

When you look towards the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and the area around Yemen, and the strategic advantage for Iran to be able to successfully help the Houthis in overthrowing this government and having long-term security, Iranian aggression has caused a realignment of different alliances within the Middle East.

Many of these nations are looking at Israel differently than they used to because they are so concerned with Iranian aggression.

I think what is most important for U.S. interests in the Middle East and, specifically, in Yemen, one, it is critically important, and as the gentleman said in his point, minimizing civilian casualties must be of a bipartisan concern. It should be one of international concern, most importantly, for innocent civilians who end up losing their life.

Additionally, those who are cutting off access to humanitarian aid is also of great concern and great debate.

So for myself, speaking for myself specifically, as it relates to Yemen, I am greatly concerned by the Houthis activities backed by Iran, and it is one that we should successfully be hoping that that aggression is pushed back to the point that Houthis are unsuccessful; that Iran is unsuccessful, and they are pushed back to their own country, back in a defensive posture, and we don't see further aggression in more countries.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Crawford).

Mr. Chair, who has the right to close?

Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I would just encourage all my colleagues to oppose this amendment for reasons that were stated, hopefully, with great concern across this entire body on both sides of the aisle as it relates to Iranian aggression.

We need to work together, really all around the world or wherever the United States can be of assistance to minimize civilian casualties, to get access to humanitarian aid.

There is debate at times of who is responsible, but I think it is important for us to do a better job working together to achieve the results that are in the best interests of the United States, even though we have debates at times of the best way to get there.

I encourage all Members to vote ``no.''

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I rise today in opposition to Amendment No. 47, which directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to reclassify public safety telecommunications officers, also called 911 dispatchers, as a protective service occupation in the U.S. Government's Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system. This Amendment would have no direct effect on these workers' wages, benefits, or other resources; proponents of this reclassification have stated that ``the benefit of reclassification is recognition and respect.''

The SOC classification system is a federal statistical standard used across agencies in data collection. According to OMB, ``[t]he SOC is designed exclusively for statistical purposes.'' Changes to the codes affect multiple data sources frequently used by policymakers, researchers, and employers, including the American Community Survey, the nation's largest household survey; the Current Population Survey (CPS), the key source of our monthly employment numbers; and the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), the authoritative source of employment and wage information by occupation.

A standing committee at OMB, the SOC Policy Committee (SOCPC), is responsible maintaining the accuracy of these codes using well-defined principles. The SOCPC undertakes a routine revision of the codes roughly once per decade; the process spans multiple years and ``involves extensive background research, periods of public comment, review of comments, and implementation of revisions.'' During its latest revision, which began in early 2012 and was finalized in 2018, OMB specifically rejected comments requesting it reclassify 911 dispatchers as directed in Amendment No. 47. In its response to public comments presented in the May 2014 Federal Register, the Obama Administration's OMB explained it ``did not accept these recommendations based on Classification Principle 2, which states that workers are coded according to the work performed. The work performed is that of a dispatcher, not a first responder.'' In 2016, the previous administration's OMB declined a similar request for reclassification. Based on the principles OMB's policy committee applies to determine SOC codes, 911 telephone dispatchers are already properly and accurately classified.

Furthermore, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), in a written communication with the Education and Labor Committee on April 26, 2019, reported that the change made by H.R. 1629, a bill identical to Amendment No. 47, would ``impact computer systems, training, documentation, and other processes'' and that ``[s]uch unplanned changes require time and resources to implement and could adversely affect other survey activities.'' Moreover, changes outside of the routine revision process would undermine the goal of data continuity, limiting data sources' usefulness for their key purpose of statistical analysis; create precedent for disrupting the standard SOC revision process; and undermine the SOCPC's authority as experts to apply the classification principles to determine what accuracy requires.

Public safety telecommunications officers perform critical, challenging work. They deserve our honor and gratitude for their efforts. However, considering the many alternative ways policymakers could confer ``recognition and respect,'' as the proponents are seeking, there is little policy justification for this Amendment's approach to achieving that goal. In conclusion, mandating a change to a statistical code would not affect these workers' wages, benefits, or other resources--but it would disrupt data series continuity; require significant additional work for government agencies, researchers, employers, and others; and intervene in an official, routine government data-collection and statistical process.

Communications of April 26, 2019 From the Bureau of Labor Statistics to

the Committee on Education and Labor Regarding H.R. 1629 (Same as

Amendment No. 47)

Questions related to H.R. 1629

1. How will H.R. 1629 impact the current population survey

and occupational employment statistics?

2. H.R. 1629 would require the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) to implement a change in the Standard

Occupational Classification (SOC) system regarding public

safety telecommunicators. This requirement would alter the

existing process for periodically reviewing and updating the

SOC, which involves extensive background research, periods of

public comment, review of comments, and implementation of

revisions.

Federal statistical agencies, including the Bureau of Labor

Statistics (BLS) are currently in various stages of

implementing the 2018 revisions to the SOC (https:// www.bls.gov/soc/socimp.htm), which the Office of Management

and Budget released in a November 28, 2017 Federal Register

notice (https://www.bls.gov/soc/2018/soc2018final.pdf). In

particular, the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the

Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program are actively

using the 2018 SOC and any changes to the SOC structure would

impact computer systems, training, and documentation as well

as the systems of federal and other data users downstream,

such as the BLS Employment Projections (EP) program and the

Employment and Training Administration's Occupational

Information Network (O*NET).

The CPS is a monthly survey with a sample of 60,000

households. CPS occupational and industry data are coded

according to the most detailed level of the relevant

classification system possible, accounting for factors such

as disclosure concerns for small occupations and the ability

to code occupations based on the detail provided by household

respondents. This CPS occupational coding system closely

aligns with the SOC, but provides data on about 530

occupations, compared with 820 in the full SOC. The Census

Bureau is responsible for applying occupational codes. An

overview of how they are implementing the 2018 SOC is

outlined here https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ library/working-papers/2019/demo/sehsdwp2019-19.pdf.

Therefore, there is no guarantee that even if this change

were to occur, the Census Bureau would code at that level of

detail.

The OES program could make the needed changes. The data

would show changes in the employment and wages for major

groups affected by the change in classification.

2. Will this bill have an impact on wage class service

contracts?

BLS is not involved in wage setting for service contracts.

To the extent that any published BLS data are used in such

wage setting, any changes to those data could impact wages.

3. Will implementing H.R. 1629 be difficult for the BLS to

do?

BLS uses the SOC in several surveys. Any changes to the SOC

structure would impact computer systems, training,

documentation, and other processes. Such unplanned changes

require time and resources to implement and could adversely

affect other survey activities.

4. Are there plans for a revision of occupational

classifications?

The SOC is revised periodically, with the interagency SOC

Policy Committee making recommendations to OMB for changes.

OMB has not officially stated when the next SOC revision will

occur, although some indications are that the next SOC will

be for the year 2028. If they follow past practices, OMB is

likely to publish an initial Federal Register notice

soliciting public comment around 2024. Detailed information

on the revision process for 2018 is made available here,

including a document called ``Revising the Standard

Occupational Classification'' which provided detailed history

on the revision process and guidance on submission of

suggestions for changes for the 2018 SOC revision.

5. What other consequences are there if H.R. 1629 is

implemented?

Implementation of H.R. 1629 would alter the existing

process for periodically reviewing and updating the SOC,

which involves extensive background research, periods of

public comment, review of comments, and implementation of

revisions.

The revision process includes solicitations of public

comment in the form of Federal Register notices. During the

lengthy and comprehensive SOC revision process, the SOC

Policy Committee establishes interagency workgroups charged

with reviewing comments received in response to Federal

Register notices and providing recommendations to the SOC

Policy Committee. Guided by the SOC classification principles

and coding guidelines, the SOC Policy Committee reviews the

recommendations from the workgroups and reaches decisions by

consensus. This work process is established to ensure that

the review is conducted in alignment with the 2018 SOC

classification principles and coding guidelines, which are

available starting on page 10 of the 2018 SOC User Guide

(https://www.bls.gov/soc/2018/soc_2018_user_guide.pdf).

In response to the May 22, 2014, Federal Register notice,

the SOC Policy Committee received and reviewed six comments

regarding 9-1-1 dispatchers. These dockets were reviewed

simultaneously by the SOC Policy Committee and grouped under

docket 1-0199 Dispatchers, Public Safety Telecommunicators.

The full SOC Policy Committee response to docket 1-0199 is

available at: https://www.bls.gov/soc/2018/ soc_responses_May_2014.htm.

In response to the July 22, 2016, Federal Register notice,

the SOC Policy Committee received and reviewed over 4,000

comments regarding 9-1-1 dispatchers. The full list of

comments is available here. For comments related only to 9-1-

1 dispatchers, filter the subject column for ``Police, Fire,

and Ambulance Dispatchers.'' The Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) makes public comments available from https:// www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2016-0006-0001.

During the revision process for 2018, a guiding

classification principle was added to emphasize the

importance of maintaining time series continuity, to the

maximum extent possible. Modifications to the structure in

intervening years may be inconsistent with this principle.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chairman, I always view military policy as a measure of last resort in our foreign policy. When the American military is engaged anywhere in the world, it often comes at the cost of American lives and the lives of innocent civilians. These are the most tragic costs of war, one reason why we can never, ever be reckless in the use of military force.

Civilian casualties are a tragedy. They also give extremist groups fodder to radicalize and recruit new fighters. We need to do everything in our power to reduce the number of civilian casualties. The Pentagon has made progress in this area thanks in part to new requirements Congress put in place. My amendment would build on this progress in a number of ways.

First of all, it would help fill in the blanks when it comes to our own planning and reporting about civilian casualties. Right now, there tends to be a big difference between what the Defense Department estimates in terms of civilian casualties before a military strike and what the Department reports after and, again, a big difference between our official reporting and what NGOs report. My amendment would require a new analysis of these disparities to help figure out why we are getting it wrong ahead of time and why there is such a wide range of reporting after the fact.

Secondly, while the Pentagon has done good work developing sound policies in this area, more must be done on implementation. My measure would improve consistent standards across all the combatant commands.

Thirdly, this amendment will help improve the way we gather information about civilian casualties. It will establish new criteria and methods to assess allegations of casualties, and it will make sure we work more effectively with local populations.

Lastly, we need to understand that the Defense Department needs to keep learning and adapting. My amendment would require standards for incorporating lessons learned so our policies and practices will continue to improve as time goes on.

Because this is a learning process, I will say that this amendment won't give us a perfect policy. We need to keep working toward more comprehensive, responsible ways of preventing and addressing civilian casualties. We need to keep giving the Defense Department the tools it needs to do so. This measure will provide a few more of those tools, and I am glad the House is able to consider it today.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that I would respectfully remind my colleagues that the Foreign Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over authorizations for the use of military force, and military strikes are conducted under authority from the Foreign Affairs Committee. It shares jurisdiction.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this isn't an easy subject to deal with, but it cannot be swept under the rug. It is good that the Pentagon has taken steps in recent years to adopt stronger and more responsible policies when it comes to civilian casualties.

We need to keep pressing forward on this work to make sure we have the best information, to make sure this is a problem taken seriously and being dealt with, and to make sure the United States is behaving responsibly when these tragedies do occur.

Mr. Chair, I ask for Members to support this measure, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chair, my amendment is something that really should be a no-brainer. It says we need to maintain strong and verifiable limits on Russia's nuclear forces.

We all know that a robust nuclear deterrent has been a pillar of American security since the beginning of the Cold War, but so has arms control.

Democratic and Republican administrations alike have used arms control agreements to constrain Russia's nuclear forces. These agreements have allowed us to keep eyes on the ground so we can confirm what the Russians are doing.

They have stopped arms races. They have strengthened peace. I fear this administration wants to throw all of that out the window.

The President's withdrawal from the INF Treaty is sending us down a dangerous path toward a renewed nuclear arms race. Don't get me wrong: Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is unacceptable, but the question is how we respond to it. Instead of using diplomacy and pressure to push the Russians back into compliance, the administration is following Russia's lead and walking away. This sends a terrible message and signals a broader ideological contempt for the value of arms control.

Now the debate is shifting to New START. This treaty has won the praise of diplomats and defense and intelligence officials as a tool for advancing our national security interests. It allows us to keep a lid on competition with a hostile Russia. The New START Treaty places strong limits on Russia's strategic nuclear forces, meaning the nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.

This treaty also gives us strong mechanisms to make sure Russia is holding up its end of the bargain. It provides unique insights into Russia's nuclear forces, information that would be impossible to replace. Indeed, up to this point, the State Department has certified that Russia is in full compliance with the New START Treaty.

The clock is ticking. The New START Treaty is set to expire in a year and a half. It can be extended another 5 years until 2026, but only if the

United States and Russia agree to do so.

My amendment sets out what should be a commonsense approach. It says that as long as Russia remains in compliance with the treaty, the administration should work to extend the New START Treaty unless the administration can complete a replacement agreement with equal or greater constraints on the Russians.

We cannot accept anything less.

The amendment also requires a series of reports from the administration on potential consequences if the treaty lapses and requires the President to present a plan to Congress on how to deal with these consequences.

Like so many other aspects of its foreign policy, the Trump administration has sent confusing messages about extending the treaty. They recently called it ``unlikely,'' noting a desire to move beyond the existing arms control regime with Russia to tackle other issues like tactical nuclear weapons and China.

Those are important issues, too. I agree with that. The United States should push ahead with a new arms control agreement, but in the meantime, we shouldn't throw out the baby with the bathwater. We should extend New START. After all, we cannot allow Russia free rein to expand its nuclear forces.

What I hope this administration understands is that arms control is a critical tool in a much broader effort as we compete with Russia. Arms control reduces uncertainty. It creates patterns and predictability. It helps us make sure our forces and programs are tailored to deal with the challenges we are facing.

Mr. Chair, I ask Members to support this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to how much time I have remaining.

Mr. Chair, then let me split it. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating), a well-respected member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and one of our subcommittee chairs.

Mr. Chair, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton).

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to support this amendment.

There has been some misinformation out there about what this amendment would actually do, so let me just clear up a few things.

This measure is a prohibition on the United States deploying a short- or intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile system--just the United States. It has nothing to do with any other country.

We want to prevent an arms race. We want to push back on the President's careless and reckless approach to Russia.

The INF Treaty has been a cornerstone of arms control for 30 years. Yes, we are clear about the threat Russia poses. Yes, Russia has violated this treaty again and again, which threatens transatlantic security and stability. This is no surprise, coming from Vladimir Putin.

But we have to use every diplomatic tool at our disposal to try to salvage the treaty. Instead, the administration followed Putin's lead and walked away, and now Russia will feel totally unconstrained to start another arms race.

So I know that the relationship with Putin and all kinds of things that Putin does, we have to be very, very wary about it, and I just think what the gentlewoman is doing is a commonsense approach to this.

The United States can go back at any time and change our policy. And when it comes to Russia and Putin, we don't trust them. Trust and verify.

I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chair, this amendment's language is so wrong that it was resoundingly rejected in the Armed Services Committee by a voice vote. It is very basic and easy to understand as to why it was rejected.

This missile, and it relates to a missile upon which there is a nuclear warhead, was put on the ground in 1973. Richard Nixon was President of the United States. The year before these were put in the ground, in December of that year, was the last time we were on the Moon, in 1972. This was just at the end of the Apollo program. This is technology that is incredibly outdated.

If you think about the Apollo program and the Moon launch, you think, well, the next technology is the space shuttle. That launched in 1981, almost a decade after these were put in the ground. Even the space shuttle is retired, yet he wants to resurrect these.

This is as ridiculous as saying, ``We are going to go to the Moon again. Let's go to the museum and pull out the Apollo mooncrafts. Let's just jigger them up again and put them up into space.''

It is not going to work. This is absolutely irresponsible, but it is not really about just trying to extend this life, because this has been studied before. This would be a study of a restudy of a restudy of a restudy.

In addition, this is not only a study. This delays the program.

Everyone wonders why nuclear weapons cost so much. They cost so much because we delay and delay and delay. This will be another one of those that would just continue the prospects of our having a decaying of our nuclear deterrent and, in addition to that, increased costs as a result of increased delay.

I know Mr. Blumenauer has been a very strong advocate against nuclear weapons. I understand his interest in trying to prohibit and thwart our efforts to modernize nuclear weapons, but if you look at what our adversaries are doing, what China is doing, what Russia is doing, it is absolutely irresponsible to say that a Richard Nixon-era missile that is in the ground, that has been there since we were last on the Moon, should just be refurbished and put back in the ground and expect that we are going to be safe.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, we should turn to the experts when we talk about how long this can be extended. This amendment would try to take this Richard Nixon-era missile to 2050. General Hyten, who is the person who is charged with having expertise with this, came before us March 28, 2019. This year, he said all studies have been done. This cannot be extended.

The only reason this amendment is here is to try to delay doing what we need to do and what the experts say, which is not refurbish this missile but move forward with replacement.

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Bishop).

Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we are blazing along on the timeline of nuclear weapons and missile development where we had a missile that was last placed in the ground in 1973 during Richard Nixon's second term, after he was elected to a second term. We now have a 1980 Jimmy Carter- era warhead.

The analogy of the B-52 doesn't apply to this technology. The B-52 is a plane that has been in continuous flight. We are not talking about a plane that has been put in a hangar since Jimmy Carter. These are items that we don't use.

Nuclear weapons are there as a deterrent to deter our adversaries. The only way we can deter our adversaries is to have them believe that any aggression against us would be matched with such overwhelming force that it would be at their great risk.

To the extent that we allow our nuclear deterrent to degrade, which we have with Nixon-era missiles and Carter-era weapons, we lessen our overall security. Now, this is--again, it sounds like just a study. It is not really a study. It is a study of a study of a restudy of a restudy. This has been studied so much, in fact, it is on a bipartisan basis that this W-84 warhead needs to be refurbished, needs to be redone.

Even the Obama administration had an analysis of all alternatives and concluded that the air-launched cruise missile and its warhead could not be sustained and had already experienced reduced survivability. Even the Obama administration said, Don't do this. They said, Move forward.

Now, once again, this is not about a study. This is about stopping the ongoing efforts of a program. This is about holding moneys back so that we don't modernize our nuclear weapons. Again, China is moving forward; Russia is moving forward. But here we are, on the floor of Congress, trying to stop our ability to match and meet those who might wish to do us harm.

This amendment needs to be defeated. This is an ancient 1980s Carter- era warhead. Even the Obama administration agrees it needs to be replaced. We should not jeopardize its funding. Every time we do this, every time we stop and say, Let's study this, our costs go up and our risks go higher and our security gets lower.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).

Mr. Chairman, I understand that there are people who don't like nuclear weapons. I don't like nuclear weapons either, but I don't like nuclear weapons in the hands of other people. And, yes, there are those who say that we are in the middle of an arms race. But the reality is that we are sitting this one out. We are not in the arms race.

When we are debating on the House floor about a warhead from the Carter-era and a missile from the Nixon-era and we can't even talk about moving forward on funding, there is no race here. We are sitting this out. But our adversaries are racing, and I am concerned about what they are doing. That is why this is important that this be defeated.

But another aspect of this that is incredibly important is that this calls for an independent study. Independent: That is saying they don't trust the study that happened before. The study that happened before was the Obama administration. I think their answer was correct: We need to not study this and we need to move forward.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is very basic. You cannot have a treaty with yourself. You must have a treaty with someone else. If that other person steps out of the treaty, you no longer have a treaty.

Russia stepped out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The North Atlantic Council all came together and confirmed it. At the last NATO summit, every one of our allies confirmed it. The treaty is dead.

To have a treaty, now, where the other side has stepped out and it is only us that is left and say, by statute, we are going to shackle ourselves so that we are going to stay there has no reflection on reality.

Their violating the treaties aren't minor violations of the treaty. They have developed, tested, and deployed a weapon that violates the treaty. That means that they are once again deploying nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons for which we don't have a response.

Our response doesn't necessarily have to be go field one. We can continue diplomacy. But legislation is not diplomacy. By legislation, we are going to say that the United States shall forever, as long as the legislation stays in, be tied to a treaty that the person on the other side already left and deployed missiles that are pointed at our assets, our military people, our men and women in uniform, and our allies. This is folly.

Now, the Missile Defense Agency, by the way, issued a statement that says this affects our cooperation with Israel and our interceptor research with them.