Settlement Agreement Information Database Act of 2019

Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let me just begin by extending my appreciation for the chairman. I know his arguments are well-intentioned, as are mine. I believe that we both completely agree and completely support Congress' solemn duty under Article I of the Constitution, to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops to foreign hostilities; and perhaps there will be another example where we can join forces in that. But that is not the issue here.

Allow me to quote the actual War Powers Act, from Title 50 of the United States Code. This procedure applies to ``the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States.''

This has always meant, historically, and today, U.S. troops being directly involved in live-fire combat. As the Department of Defense has repeatedly confirmed, U.S. Armed Forces are not engaged in hostilities against the Houthi forces in Yemen.

This resolution is directing us to remove troops that simply, Madam Chair, are not there. Even the aerial refueling of coalition jets, which does not constitute traditional hostilities, ended last November.

This resolution, in my judgment, misuses the tool to try to get at the different issue of security assistance to third countries. It provides no clear decisions on which forms of assistance are cut off. It does not address the humanitarian catastrophe inside Yemen and, alarmingly, it completely ignores the destabilization role that Iran is playing in Yemen and the region.

This irresponsible measure is trying to hammer a square peg in a round hole.

This resolution really stretches the definition of ``hostilities'' to cover non-U.S. military operations by other countries. It reinterprets U.S. support to those countries as ``engagement in hostilities.''

This overreach has dangerous implications far beyond Saudi Arabia. This approach will now allow any single Member to use this privileged mechanism to second-guess U.S. security cooperation relationships with more than 100 countries throughout the world.

Under this model, if one Member doesn't like something that any of our security partners does overseas, that Member can force quick consideration of a resolution directing the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities ``in or affecting'' that situation. It no longer matters that U.S. forces are not actually conducting those hostilities.

This could impact our assistance to Israel. It could affect our cooperation with our NATO allies. It could impact counterterrorism cooperation with African nations in the Sahel. We could recklessly undo critical security relationships that we have spent decades building.

That is not what the War Powers Resolution has ever meant, and I don't think that is what Congress designed it to do, and it should not be used in this way now.

No one is saying that U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia, or anyone else, is beyond congressional scrutiny. Congress has many tools at its disposal. Our committee receives regular arms sales notifications. Congress can condition or cut off security assistance through targeted legislation or the annual appropriations process.

But this resolution is the wrong tool. It is vague and irresponsible. It will create new doubts for our partners and allies around the world.

For those reasons, Madam Chair, I strongly oppose this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), the ranking member on the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho), the ranking member on the Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee.

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Zeldin), the ranking member of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Watkins), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn).

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I have no further speakers, so I am prepared to close, and I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, let me state a few points.

We all condemn the murder of Khashoggi. I have condemned it publicly, very strongly, what happened with the Saudis killing Khashoggi, executing him.

We are talking about the situation in Yemen.

Who started this humanitarian crisis in the first place? The Houthis tried to take over the Yemeni Government--the Houthis, backed by Iran.

This is about the geopolitics of Iran, Houthis in Yemen, Iran and the Shia crescent in Iraq and Syria, and a direct threat to Israel by the largest state-sponsored terror, Iran, that is a mortal sworn enemy to Israel, as they chant ``death to Israel,'' ``death to America.''

So let's put this all in proper context of what we are really talking about here. Are we defending Iran and the Houthis here today?

So I would like to close by putting two documents in the Record. The first is a letter sent by the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel stating that ``DOD opposes the resolution because the resolution's fundamental premise is flawed'' because the United States support to the Saudi-led coalition ``does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities.''

Are we going to go around and second-guess every security cooperation agreement we have with 117 countries, including Israel and NATO and other partners?

Mr. Chair, I include in the Record this letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense.

General Counsel of the

Department of Defense,

Washington, DC, Feb. 27, 2018.

Hon. Mitchell ``Mitch'' McConnell,

Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Majority Leader: On February 22, 2018, the

Department of Defense (DoD) briefed your staff concerning DoD

support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) operations in

Yemen. Subsequently, you requested an unclassified letter

reflecting DoD's views on a draft joint resolution that would

``direct[] the President to remove United States Armed Forces

from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen,

except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations

directed at al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or associated

forces. . . .'' DoD opposes this Joint Resolution. Even if

enacted into law, the Joint Resolution would not achieve its

apparent purpose of restricting U.S. support to the KSA-led

coalition, because, as described below, that support does not

constitute ``hostilities.'' In addition to the potential

constitutional concerns raised by such a proposal, the draft

resolution's restrictions on U.S. military support to our

partners could undermine our ability to foster long-term

relationships, increase interoperability, promote burden

sharing, and build strong security architectures throughout

the world. The KSA is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East

and we rely on our strong military partnership to promote

regional security.

DoD opposes the resolution because the resolution's

fundamental premise is flawed. Specifically, the draft

resolution incorrectly asserts that U.S. forces have been

``introduced into hostilities between the [KSA-led] coalition

and the Houthis. . . .'' The limited military and

intelligence support that the United States is providing to

the KSA-led coalition does not involve any introduction of

U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers

Resolution or of section 1013 of the Department of State

Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 USC 1546a).

Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support

to KSA-led coalition military operations against Houthi and

Saleh-aligned forces in Yemen. With the exception of a

defensive strike in October 2016, U.S. forces are not taking

direct military action in this Saudi-led effort in Yemen.

Instead, the United States provides the KSA-led coalition

defense articles and services, including air-to-air

refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice,

including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed

conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian

casualties.

The draft resolution incorrectly describes United States

support to the KSA-led coalition as an operation that

introduces U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent

involvement in hostilities for purposes of the War Powers

Resolution. It has been the longstanding view of the

Executive Branch that ``hostilities'' refers to ``a situation

in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in

exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.''

U.S. personnel providing support to the KSA-led coalition are

not engaged in any such exchanges of fire. Further, the

limited U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition does not

implicate the activities identified in section 8(c) of the

War Powers Resolution. Section 8(c) defines the term

``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' but does not

address the term ``hostilities.'' ``[W]hen applying section

8(c), the

relevant question remains whether U.S. forces--not the

foreign forces they are accompanying--are introduced into

hostilities or situations involving the imminent threat

thereof.'' With respect to U.S. support to the KSA-led

coalition, U.S. forces do not currently command, coordinate,

accompany, or participate in the movement of coalition forces

in counter-Houthi operations. Thus, no U.S. forces are

accompanying the KSA-led coalition when its military forces

are engaged, or an imminent threat exists that they will

become engaged, in hostilities. Accordingly, U.S. forces

supporting the KSA-led coalition have not been introduced

into hostilities or situations where hostilities are

imminent.

Although the resolution's requirement to remove U.S. forces

from hostilities would not implicate U.S. support to the KSA-

led coalition, this requirement could call into question the

statutory authority for ongoing U.S. counterterrorism

operations in Yemen. Pursuant to the 2001 Authorization to

Use Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107-40), U.S. armed

forces are currently engaged in hostilities against both al

Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Yemen. Hostilities against AQAP

and associated forces are explicitly exempted from the

resolution's termination requirement, but hostilities against

ISIS are not similarly exempted.

The resolution also asserts incorrectly that there is no

authorization for U.S. participation in a Joint Combined

Planning Cell with the KSA and mid-air refueling of KSA-led

coalition aircraft. President Obama directed such military

and intelligence support pursuant to his authority under

Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief and

Chief Executive and his authority to conduct U.S. foreign

relations. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615

(1850) (explaining that the President ``is authorized to

direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed

by law at his command''); Training of British Flying Students

in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 62 (1941)

(``[T]he President's authority has long been recognized as

extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside the United

States, either on missions of goodwill or rescue, or for the

purpose of protecting American lives or property or American

interests.''). Because, as discussed above, this limited

support to the KSA does not involve the introduction of U.S.

forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, it does

not implicate section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers

Resolution. See 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1543(a)(l). The Obama

Administration published its summary of that limited

support to the KSA-led coalition as part of the December

2016 ``Report of the Legal and Policy Framework Guiding

the United States Use of Military Force and Related

National Security Operations.'' As discussed further

below, DoD and the Department of State have implemented

the President's direction through statutory authorities

available to the respective Secretaries.

Article II of the Constitution likewise supplied the legal

authority for the October 2016 strikes against radar

facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in defense of U.S.

Navy ships in international waters. The President has

authority pursuant to Article II to take military action that

furthers sufficiently important national interests. The

limited October 2016 strikes were taken to protect U.S.

vessels and personnel. Consistent with the War Powers

Resolution, President Obama notified Congress of these

strikes on October 14, 2016. The Obama Administration also

published a summary of its legal analysis for the strike in

its December 2016 report.

In late July 2017, President Trump completed a review of

the Obama Administration's policy of limited support to the

Saudi-led coalition. President Trump decided to continue that

support, adjusting the priorities in light of the

recommendations of Secretary of Defense James Mattis and

intervening developments in Yemen. President Trump's policy

guidance for support to the KSA-led coalition's operations in

Yemen is to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional

conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending

Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red

Sea. Authorized types of support continue to include

intelligence, logistics, and advisory support to the KSA-led

coalition.

DoD and the Department of State have implemented the

President's policy guidance to provide limited support to the

Saudi-led coalition pursuant to legal authorities available

to the respective Secretaries. The most prominent forms of

support to the KSA and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as

well as the corresponding legal authorities, are detailed

below.

Arms and Other Defense Articles: The Arms Export Control

Act (AECA) is the underlying authority through which the

United States provides or licenses defense articles and

defense services to the KSA, UAE, and other members of the

KSA-led coalition; many of these defense articles and defense

services have been used in the conflict in Yemen. The AECA

and associated delegations of authority provide the Secretary

of State with the authority to approve the transfer of arms

and other defense articles and defense services, primarily

through the Foreign Military Sales program (which is overseen

by the State Department and implemented through DoD) and

through the State Department's licensing of Direct Commercial

Sales to foreign partners. The authority to approve such

transfers or licenses is not contingent upon whether the

foreign recipient is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict,

although the existence of such a conflict clearly increases

demand and can be a policy factor in approval decisions.

Transfers and licenses made pursuant to the AECA are subject

to various requirements (such as notifications to Congress

when transfers are above certain monetary thresholds) as well

as restrictions on end-use (including no further transfer by

the end-user without U.S. consent and that proposed uses must

be consistent with the law of armed conflict).

Logistics: Pursuant to licenses issued by the State

Department under the AECA, U.S. contractors provide defense

services in the form of essential maintenance and sustainment

for KSA and UAE combat aircraft engaged in hostilities in

Yemen. The in-flight refueling of KSA and UAE aircraft,

including combat aircraft, and certain other support, may

also be provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2341 et

seq., which authorizes DoD to provide logistic support,

supplies, and services to the military forces of a country

with which DoD has an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing

Agreement (ACSA) in force. DoD must first obtain State

Department approval to conclude an ACSA; DoD has ACSAs with

the Ministry of Defense of the KSA (applied provisionally

pending its formal entry into force) and with the Armed

Forces General Headquarters of the UAE.

I trust that this response will be helpful to your

understanding of U.S. support to the KSA's operations in

Yemen, and the reason for the DoD's opposition to this

proposed Joint Resolution. Thank you for your continued

support of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely,

William S. Castle,

Acting.

Mr. Chair, I include in the Record this second document, which is a Statement of Administration Policy on this point.

Statement of Administration Policy

S.J. Res. 54--To Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that Have Not Been Authorized by

the Congress--Sen. Sanders, I-VT and 16 cosponsors

The Administration strongly opposes passage of S.J. Res.

54, a joint resolution that purports to direct the removal of

United States Armed Forces that have not been authorized by

the Congress from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen. The

fundamental premise of S.J. Res. 54 is flawed--United States

forces are not engaged in hostilities between the Saudi-led

coalition and Houthi forces in Yemen. Since 2015, the United

States has provided limited support to member countries of

the Emirati and Saudi-led coalition, including intelligence

sharing, logistics, and, until recently, aerial refueling.

This support is provided in accordance with licenses and

approvals under the Arms Export Control Act, statutory

authorities to provide logistics support, and the President's

constitutional powers. United States counterterrorism

operations and an October 2016 strike on radar facilities in

Houthi-controlled territory, which was the subject of a prior

report consistent with the War Powers Resolution of 1973, are

separate matters. Other than those engagements, no United

States forces have been introduced into hostilities, or into

situations where hostilities are clearly imminent, in

connection with ongoing support to the Saudi-led coalition.

As a result, this United States support does not implicate

the War Powers Resolution.

In addition to its erroneous premise, the joint resolution

would harm bilateral relationships in the region and

negatively impact the ability of the United States to prevent

the spread of violent extremist organizations such as al-

Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS in Yemen. The

continued cooperation of the United States allows the

Administration to support diplomatic negotiations to end the

war, ensure humanitarian access, enhance efforts to recover

United States hostages in Yemen, and defeat terrorists that

seek to harm the United States.

Accordingly, if S.J. Res. 54 were presented to the

President in its current form, his advisors would recommend

that he veto the joint resolution.

Mr. Chair, I am deeply troubled by the one-sided nature of this resolution and what is missing from this resolution, which I just stated earlier, and that is Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terror and the Houthis' benefactor. By staying silent on Iran and by not condemning the Houthis in this resolution, it sends a green light to the Houthis and to the Iranian backers to press on.

This resolution is counterproductive, also, to the efforts that are ongoing right now to negotiate peace in Yemen between the Houthi rebels and the Government of the Yemen Republic.

As we speak, the U.N. envoy is working with the full support of the United States to negotiate a political resolution to this conflict. Getting to these talks has required placing substantial pressure on all parties involved.

The U.N. is encouraging the Houthis to uphold these agreements and to make further agreements with the Yemini Government and the Saudi-led

coalition. But this resolution might cut the U.N. efforts off at its knees.

The Democrats can't tell specifically what assistance this resolution cuts off, but what I can say for sure is that what this resolution says to the Houthis and to Iran is: You have got a green light. Keep going on. You can gain more ground and cause more destruction and humanitarian crisis and cause more problems for Israel and our Saudi ally.

Advancing this pro-Houthi, pro-Iran, anti-Israel resolution does not help to end this war. In Yemen, it only emboldens the rebels in Iran who violently overthrew Yemen's Government and the radical regime that backs them, Iran.

So I would say, Mr. Chairman, in closing, this resolution is not only a dangerous precedent legally--it violates the construction of the War Powers Act--but it is damaging and very bad policy, and I urge my colleagues to vote against it.

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to insert extraneous material on H.J. Res. 37.

Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

This is an important moment for the House, Madam Chair. For years, under administrations of both parties, the Congress has handed away our authority and abrogated our responsibility when it comes to foreign policy, particularly the questions of how and where our military is engaged around the world.

Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the responsibility to declare war, yet we have given Presidents of both parties a virtual blank check to send our brave servicemembers into harm's way while we have stood on the sidelines.

With the measure we are considering today, we take some of that power back, and we do so to restore a sense of American values and American leadership to the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world.

For the last few years, we have all seen horrific images of the civilian casualties in the Yemen war: starving children, millions displaced, outbreaks of deadly disease.

Madam Chair, 85,000 children have starved to death. Fourteen million are on the brink of famine. More than a million suffer from cholera. And the ongoing military operations are bringing us no closer to a resolution. The only way out of this mess is for parties to sit down and work toward a political solution.

The United States can and should play a role pushing for that solution, pushing parties to make a commitment to negotiations. This measure, introduced by Mr. Khanna, will help us do exactly that.

Let me explain why this is so important and why I support passing this resolution right now.

In the last few years, the Saudi-led coalition has carried out 18,000 airstrikes. A full one-third of those strikes hit nonmilitary targets. This is absolutely reckless.

I am not naive, Madam Chair. I know we have critical strategic interests in that region. The Houthis are a problem. They get support from Iran. They launch missiles into Saudi territory and international waterways, threatening Saudi civilians. They are starving the Yemeni people, diverting assistance, and holding civilians hostage to their political demands. But we cannot just give the coalition a blank check when so many innocent lives are being lost. And if the administration won't demand any sort of accountability from the Saudis and Emiratis, it is time for Congress to act.

I want to acknowledge my friend from Texas, the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. McCaul. I believe that he also wants to see Congress reclaim our prerogatives on foreign policy, though I understand we have an honest difference of opinion on the approach we are dealing with today.

I am glad that we moved this measure through regular order, that we had a hearing with experts and a markup, and that the gentleman from Texas and I could make our cases before the Rules Committee. It allowed me to hear the arguments from all perspectives on this issue.

I think, during this debate, we will hear my friends on the other side call this resolution misguided. I think because this resolution has to do with our security agreements with the Saudis and Emiratis, we will hear them question what impact this may have on other security agreements.

It is a fair question, to be honest. That is why this measure is tailored so specifically to deal with just this situation. This is not a broad, blanket policy that is going to tie the hands of the executive branch. There is no dangerous precedent being set here, just an attempt to stop a war that is costing far too many innocent lives.

I think we will hear my friends question whether this measure would even do anything because this measure withdraws American forces engaged in hostilities, and the Pentagon says ``hostilities'' only applies to situations where American troops are firing weapons at an enemy. I have two reactions to that.

First of all, this measure would specifically define ``hostilities'' to include aerial refueling of warplanes carrying out airstrikes against Houthi militants. Now, I understand the Defense

Department has stopped refueling as a matter of policy, but policies can be reversed, so this resolution would cut off refueling as a matter of law.

My second point is broader and gets at the heart of today's debate. This body is not subject to the definitions conjured up by the Defense Department. We don't ask permission to exercise our Article I authority. Of course, the Pentagon will try to define things in a way that consolidates the power of the executive branch, but Congress, with authority over war powers, need not accept that definition.

The Congress has lost its grip on foreign policy, in my opinion, by granting too much deference to the executive branch, by failing to examine the decisions, determinations, and definitions that are used to justify sending Americans into harm's way. Our job is to keep that branch in check, not to shrug our shoulders when they tell us to mind our own business.

Lastly, I think we will hear my colleagues on the other side ask: Isn't this just all politics? No, Madam Chair. Politics is what the former majority did to this resolution twice during the last Congress. Politics is stifling debate on national security issues because we are uncomfortable with the message it might send or we don't want to take a tough vote.

Politics is walking away from our constitutional responsibilities, as Congress has done for far too long; and frankly, we have done it for far too long, Congresses in both parties with a majority and Presidents in both parties.

Our Article I responsibilities are things that we cannot just simply turn the other way. We are a coequal branch of government, and we have not had a declaration of war, for instance, since 1941. We are content to just tell whatever administration is in, go ahead, you handle it. We don't have any responsibility. I hope that that stops this afternoon.

The other body has already weighed in on this measure. It passed with bipartisan support. Today, the Members of the House get our chance to go on record finally and say where we stand.

I joined this resolution as an original cosponsor because I think it will lead to a sort of reckoning for our government.

What is our role in the conflict in Yemen?

What is Congress' voice in our foreign policy?

How will we exercise American leadership and American power?

What will we provide and what will we withhold to push warring parties toward peace?

I want to thank Mr. Khanna for his hard work and for his leadership in shining the light on this issue.

I want to thank our members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who have contributed so far to a valuable debate.

I want to thank Mr. McCaul, who has made his opposition to this about the policy, not about the politics or the personalities. We are going to have a lot more debates; sometimes we will be on the same side and sometimes not, but I hope we can always grapple with these challenges in a substantive way.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Khanna), the author of this joint resolution.

Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Bera), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, a very valued member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), a new member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee who is already making his mark.

Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman.

Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), our majority leader.

(Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Ted Lieu), a very well-respected member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Espaillat), another very valuable member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Trone), another new member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Pocan), a champion of progressive causes.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Connolly), another very valued member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).

Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Welch).

Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Today is the day that Congress begins to take back its jurisdiction over war and peace. For time after time and year after year, administration after administration, Congress after Congress, the Congress has relinquished its responsibility given to us by the Constitution.

The Constitution clearly says that Congress has the power to wage war, and yet, since President Roosevelt declared war against Japan on December 7, 1941, we have had war after war and conflict after conflict, and Congress has not had anything to do with it. Congress has been silent.

This is not a matter of whether a war is a good war or a bad war. This is a matter of the fact that this Congress needs to make that determination.

Article I makes us a coequal branch of government. And, again, for too long, we have had administration after administration, Republican and Democratic, usurp the power that should be the Congress'. So this is the day my colleagues would begin to take it back.

Mr. Chair, I know that my friends on the other side of the aisle have been saying that this is not the best way to do it, but, you know, I have learned through the years that, if you don't take the bull by the horns, it is never the best way to do it.

There is always a reason not to do it. There is always a reason to point out certain things and say, well, this is not a perfect situation. This isn't the perfect situation. I will be the first to say that. But it is perfect in terms of saying we will take back our jurisdiction and do what the American people elected us to do.

Again, I want to thank Mr. Khanna for his tireless work on this issue.

As I mentioned, this measure is an important step in Congress reclaiming its role in foreign policy by debating where and when the United States military is engaged abroad. I don't think that is too much to ask. I think that is what we should be doing.

With the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, it is critical that we act now. We can go after Iran another time--and heaven knows I have been the sponsor of many resolutions and bills sanctioning Iran--but this is not to mix apples with oranges.

There is a civil war going on now in Yemen, and innocent children are dying. We have an ability to put an end to that, and that is what we should do. With this humanitarian crisis, it is critical that we don't delay.

So I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting it, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute. I actually support intelligence sharing. We need to work to reduce civilian casualties and ensure that the United States has a clear picture into the security threats in the region.

However, this amendment is unnecessary. The underlying resolution does not implicate intelligence sharing. I have been very clear about what this resolution would do. We have made necessary changes to this resolution, but I do not support adding unnecessary rules of construction to a resolution which has already passed the Senate.

For that reason, I am opposed to this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not oppose the motion.

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I accept this resolution, and I agree with everything that Mr. Kustoff just said. Anti-Semitism is a scourge. It is a scourge on humanity; it is a scourge on this country; and it has to be fought just the way prejudice of any kind has to be fought.

I think that this entire House should support this and say, once and for all, with a united voice, we will not tolerate anti-Semitism in any shape or form.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House in the motion to recommit, I report the joint resolution, H.J. Res 37, back to the House with an amendment.

Mr. Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.J. Res. 37, which directs the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.

The passage of H.J. Res. 37 would mark the first time in the 45 years since the enactment of the War Powers Act that the House of Representatives successfully invoked the statute's removal mechanism to compel the Executive Branch to remove American troops from harm's way.

I support this resolution because, Congress has the sole power to declare war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the United States Constitution.

Mr. Chair, Congress has not declared war with respect to, or provided a specific statutory authorization for, the conflict between military forces led by Saudi Arabia, including forces from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, and Sudan (the Saudi-led coalition), against the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, in the Republic of Yemen.

Since March 2015, members of the United States Armed Forces have been introduced into hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, including providing to the Saudi-led coalition aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-flight aerial refueling.

The United States has established a Joint Combined Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia, in which members of the United States Armed Forces assist in aerial targeting and help to coordinate military and intelligence activities.

Mr. Chair, the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis constitutes, within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543(a)), either hostilities or a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances into which United States Armed Forces have been introduced.

Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)) states that, ``at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs''.

Most importantly, no specific statutory authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces with respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen has been enacted.

Also, no provision of law explicitly authorizes the provision of targeting assistance or of midair refueling services to warplanes of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates that are engaged in such conflict.

For this reason, the resolution directs that the President remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al-Qaeda or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment.

The resolution makes clear that the term ``hostilities'' includes in- flight refueling, non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen.

Mr. Chair, Yemen is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world right now.

The Yemen crisis began in the Arab Spring of 2011, when an uprising forced the country's long-time authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah

Saleh, to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

Since 2015, Saudis Arabia has launched an estimated 18,000 air strikes on Yemen, attacking hospitals, schools, water treatment plants, funerals, markets and even farms.

The Saudis also imposed a blockade on food, fuel and medicine from freely entering the country in what can only be described as a deliberate effort to starve the civilian population into submission.

More than 14 million Yemenis are steps away from starvation and at least 85,000 children under the age of five have perished from war- related hunger and disease.

The United States has supported the Saudi-led air campaign with mid- air refueling support, intelligence and targeting assistance, and other support.

Yemen is experiencing the world's worst famine in 100 years, with 12 million to 13 million innocent civilians at risk of dying from the lack of food within months.

Mr. Chair, too many lives hang in the balance to allow American involvement in Yemen war to continue.

I ask all members to join me in supporting H.J. Res. 37.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my colleague from North Carolina in congratulating the gentlewoman from California on passing her first bill. I now know what that broad smile was about when the ``yeas'' were announced.

Mr. Speaker, the Federal Government's duty to serve the public interest relies on transparency and accountability to its citizens; however, since the 1970s, Federal agencies have increasingly chosen to avoid a public trial and settle litigation behind closed doors. The resulting consent decrees and settlement agreements can mandate terms beyond the scope of the original violation of Federal law and can lead to higher costs than a trial.

These agreements are nearly impossible to modify or vacate, and in many cases can remain in place for decades. In one instance in New York City, their special education program has been under a consent decree since 1972.

This process has influenced a range of public policies across governmental programs in States, counties, and cities, with elected officials inheriting the burden with little knowledge of the mandates or cost.

In Alabama, for instance, when former Member of Congress Governor Bob Riley was elected Governor of Alabama, he was going over the budget and saw the amount for legal fees and asked what it was for. He was informed of the number of consent decrees that the State was under and they were paying out these legal fees, and it was an enormous amount.

States, municipalities, industry, stakeholders, and taxpayers are often directly affected by the terms of the agreements but are prevented from participating in the negotiations. In some cases, the settlements are declared to be confidential and the contents sealed, without providing any explanation.

Unfortunately, there is no uniform standard for recordkeeping across Federal agencies. While some agencies have issued directives to streamline and publish this information, most of the public's access to Federal settlement agreement information is primarily issued, as my colleague from North Carolina pointed out, in the form of a press release. It is, therefore, impossible for the public to determine the comprehensive costs and outcomes of these settlement agreements.

This lack of transparency leaves elected officials, agency officials, and the public in the dark about the consent decrees that can impact them. Oftentimes, newly elected officials, as I said, from Governors to attorneys general to mayors are sworn in and inherit substantial legal obligations they were completely unaware of before they took office.

The Settlement Agreement Information Database Act will address this problem. The bill establishes a centralized and electronic database of settlement agreements entered into by Federal agencies. Basic information about the settlement agreements already collected by Federal agencies, such as payments and dates, will be available to the public online through this database.

H.R. 995 provides long overdue transparency and accountability and standards to the Federal settlement agreements.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Meadows) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Hill), for their support on this bill, and I urge my other colleagues to support this bill as well.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of H.R. 995. But before I do, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman on the passage, I believe, of her first bill here on the House floor; and go even further to say that, in keeping with this bipartisan support of H.R. 995, the Settlement Agreement Information Database Act of 2019 that was introduced, and is introduced, by the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Palmer).

Mr. Speaker, transparency and public participation are critical to maintaining the public trust in its government. However, Federal agencies have increasingly resolved litigation by entering into settlement agreements rather than going through a lengthy public trial.

Now settlement agreements are often negotiated behind closed doors. Those secret negotiations effectively prevent the public from participating in important policy sessions.

Mr. Speaker, let me reiterate this. When these settlements are done, when they are actually consummated, they set up future public policy, and to do that behind closed doors is certainly not something that a transparent government should be about.

State and local governments, industry stakeholders, and taxpayers are often directly affected by these settlements, but unable to provide input.

For example, through the settlement agreement, the Environmental Protection Agency required the city of Fort Smith, Arkansas, to overhaul its sewer system in 12 years. Sewer utility bills increased by 167 percent in 3 years to fund the obligation of this agreement. At the same time, Fort Smith residents' income actually decreased by 11 percent.

The burden of a Federal settlement can be difficult to see and understand. Poor recordkeeping makes it impossible for Congress and the public to determine the full impact of the Federal settlement agreements.

Agencies release information about settlements at their discretion. Some agencies rely even on press releases to release the amount of information. So, as a result, the public only sees the facts through what the agency puts out and only in the most favorable light.

So, in many cases these closed-door negotiations, the terms of the settlement are deemed confidential. Without an explanation to the public, the process becomes even more opaque and seemingly arbitrary.

H.R. 995 will shine a light on Federal settlement agreements. This bill will require the establishment of electronic and publicly available databases for agencies' settlement agreements.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this particular bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Palmer), the sponsor of this particular piece of legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Alabama for his leadership on this particular bill. I urge the adoption of it, and I yield back the balance of my time.