Madam President, last week, I announced my intention to vote in favor of H.J. Res. 46. This is a resolution expressing disapproval of the President's February 15 proclamation of a national emergency.…
Madam President, last week, I announced my intention to vote in favor of H.J. Res. 46. This is a resolution expressing disapproval of the President's February 15 proclamation of a national emergency. At that same time, I joined with my colleague, the Senator from New Mexico, along with the Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, and the Senator from New Hampshire, Mrs. Shaheen, in the introduction of the Senate companion, S.J. Res. 10.
I want to take just a few moments this afternoon and speak to my rationale not only for my statements but for my support for terminating the national emergency. It is, certainly, not based on disagreement over the issue of border security on our southern border. I recognize full well, along with, I believe, all of our colleagues here, the situation on the border and the humanitarian issues that face us. The issue that faces us with the level of those coming across our borders is not a sustainable situation, and, certainly, the influx of drugs that we are seeing in this community must be addressed.
Rather, my concern is, really, about the institution of the Congress and the constitutional balance of powers that, I think, are just fundamental to our democracy. In my view, it really comes down to article I of the Constitution. Article I, section 7, clause 8 reads: ``No
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriation.''
This provision and the necessary and proper clause of article I, section 8, clause 18 and the taxing and spending clauses--article VIII, clause 1--are just generally regarded as the basis for the notion that the power to spend resides in the Congress. We say it around here--that the power of the purse rests with the Congress.
Of all of these three clauses that I have just articulated, the admonition that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriation is probably the clearest expression of the Framers' view that the executive has no power to spend money in a manner that is inconsistent with the intentions of the Congress.
Justice Story, in his 1883 Commentaries on the Constitution, characterized that clause as an important means of self-protection for the legislative department.
He went on to write:
The [legislature] has, and must have, a controlling
influence over the executive power, since it holds at its
command all of the resources by which the executive could
make himself formidable. It possesses the power of the purse
of the nation and the property of the people.
Again, he just very clearly articulates where these lanes of authority--these lanes of jurisdiction--reside.
This past weekend, on Sunday, a local newspaper, the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, published an editorial. In that editorial, it was argued that our colleagues here in the Senate should vote for the resolution of disapproval. The editorial is entitled: ``A dangerous course: Congress shouldn't cede power to president in border funding dispute.''
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the Record.
Madam President, in support of the argument outlined in that headline, the News-Miner's editorial board wrote the following:
Encroachment by one branch on another and the consolidating
of power in one branch worried some of the Founders as they
crafted our system of independent yet interlocking government
branches. The Federalist Papers . . . contain references to
that concern.
The editorial board goes on to refer to Federalist No. 51, which reads:
The great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of others. . . . Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.
When you translate that into just plain old English, it basically means Congress is a coequal branch of government, and, as such, Congress should stand up for itself. That really is the reason--the root--of why I have announced my support for this resolution of disapproval. I think it is fair to say that we all have disagreements around here about all sorts of things that are part of the appropriations process, and, certainly, the issue of border funding or just border security is no exception.
Even if the fiscal year 2019 appropriations process had run smoothly, which it certainly did not, think about how we got to where we are right now. The President submitted his budget last year. He requested money for barriers on the border and other aspects of border security. The request went through the appropriations process. I serve on that subcommittee. In the Senate subcommittee, we advanced out of the committee the President's request. After 3 months of continuing resolutions, we ended up in a stalemate with the other body last year, calendar year 2018. In January, control of the other body changed. The stalemate continued until the lengthy negotiations concluded, which allowed both bodies to pass and for the President to agree to sign an appropriations package just several weeks ago in February.
Again, that appropriations package was, I think it is probably fair to say, the result of a great deal of back-and-forth between the House, the Senate, and the White House, but it was clearly something that did help to advance the priorities that the President had outlined with regard to the southern border.
I am quoting from a White House fact sheet here, which reads: ``Secured a number of significant legislative victories that further the President's effort to secure the Southern Border and protect our country.'' Chief among those victories was ``the bill provides $1.375 billion for approximately 55 miles of border barrier in highly dangerous and drug smuggling areas in the Rio Grande Valley, where it is desperately needed.''
So we are where we were on February 15 when the administration recognized that significant gains had been made, but I think we all know that the President believes very, very strongly that there is more that should be done, that must be done, and that will be done to address that.
Clearly, there was a disagreement between the Congress and the President about how much could be spent on border security in 2019. I think, in fairness, sticking up for Congress's power of the purse doesn't necessarily mean that it comes at the expense of border security. I believe very strongly we can
address the President's concerns--the very, very real and legitimate concerns that need to be addressed--but that we don't have to do it at the expense of ceding that authority, of ceding that power of the purse, of ceding that article I power that we have here.
There are ways that the President can advance his issues, and he has done so. He, certainly, has the prerogative to ask for supplemental appropriations. He has identified additional funding that is outside of the national emergency designation, or declaration, if you will.
He has identified additional funding--close to $3 billion--from other statutory authorities. These are the authorities under 10 U.S.C. 284(b), which is the counterdrug account, counterdrug funds. That will require a level of reprogramming through the appropriating committees, but that can be done outside of the national emergency. The other source of funding is the Treasury Forfeiture Fund through the Secretary of the Treasury under 31 U.S.C. 9705. So I think it is clear that there are avenues to enhance the funding opportunities to address the situation at the border.
The concern that many of us have raised is the designation in this third account--the designation of a national emergency--that would tap into funds that have already been designated for military construction projects, important construction projects that have been designated around the country. We certainly have many in my State of Alaska. We haven't seen the list that would perhaps outline with greater articulation where the Secretary of Defense might think it would be appropriate to delay some of these projects. But, again, I would just remind--these are projects that have perhaps already been delayed because of the Budget Control Act that has been in place for several years, so I think further delay for many of these projects would cause most concern.
So I come to the National Emergencies Act. I think there is a recognition that when this was adopted, was put into law, it was initially intended to rein in the President's ability to declare emergencies. But at the same time it authorized the President to declare national emergencies, it didn't ever clearly define the extent of that power. So that is an issue that I think we are dealing with right now. Implicit in this grant is the trust that the power will be used sparingly. I think that if you look back over the history, the 59 previous times these powers have been utilized, you can say they have been used sparingly. But also explicit is the authority for the Congress to terminate an emergency if the Congress believes it was imprudently declared, and that is basically where we are today.
Because Congress did not explicitly constrain the President's power to declare an emergency, many of the constitutional scholars--those who are trying to game this out--believe the President will ultimately prevail in the litigation that we are entirely certain will be seen in the courts.
The question for us to consider in this body is not whether the President could have declared an emergency but whether he should have and, again, the question relating to the redirection of military construction funds from our bases around the country to the southern border. These are the questions we are currently debating. But in the final analysis, I look at the issue we have in front of us, and this is really a very challenging place for us as a Congress, to be debating the constitutional powers of the Congress against a legislative agenda--a strong legislative agenda and an important one that the President has. But I have come to be quite concerned about where we are when it comes to precedent and the precedent that we may see unleashed. In many ways, I view this as an expansion of Executive powers by legislative acquiescence.
If we fail to weigh in, if we fail to acknowledge that this designation has gone beyond that which has previously been considered, if we go around, effectively, the will of Congress, where will it take us next? I think we need to think about that because it is so easy to get focused on where we are in the here and now and the situation we are dealing with today, but when we are pushing out those lanes of congressional authority, I think we need to be thinking clearly about what that may mean for future administrations and for future Congresses.
As the chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, my focus is very often on the energy sector, on the energy space, and so I have asked, if we were in a situation with a new President, what could be invoked if a new President should decide to exercise his or her emergency authorities as they relate to energy? It is entirely possible that a future President could declare a national emergency related to global climate change, speaking to a humanitarian crisis and what it might mean for national security. In fact, one of our colleagues from Massachusetts has already said as much--that a national emergency could be declared as relates to global climate change.
You have to ask the question. What would stop a future President from declaring an emergency and then directing the military to spend billions of dollars on renewable projects or refugee assistance? What is to stop a future President from targeting the Nation's oil and gas supply by cutting off exports and shutting down production on the Outer Continental Shelf?
I think we would all say: Well, we don't need to worry about that happening with our current President; he is not going to do any of those things. But the authorities technically would exist for all of them, and so it is concerning. It is concerning to me that a future President could use that to drive their agenda--again, without the consent of the Congress.
So I repeat--I am concerned that, as a Congress, as a legislative body, we would stand back and we would acquiesce in the use of a national emergency to resolve a disagreement between the executive and the legislative branches over the appropriate level of funding for a situation that likely exceeds what can be spent in our current fiscal year.
I know there will be continued discussion not only here in the Senate, in the Congress, but certainly around the country about these matters. I know some of my colleagues are interested in revisiting the scope of the National Emergencies Act, and that is clearly worth considering. But I firmly believe that one can be strongly for border security and at the same time question whether the administration has overreached in using the National Emergencies Act in the way that it has, and I find myself in that camp. That is why it is with great resolve that I support the adoption of the resolutions of disapproval.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.