Energy Emergency Leadership Act

Madam Speaker, while I agree with my colleagues about the importance of securing our Nation's energy infrastructure, I am concerned that--as currently written--H.R. 2931, H.R. 2928, and H.R. 3119 may weaken the core tenets of the U.S. Government's framework for protecting critical infrastructure.

That framework is currently laid out in Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) and has been reinforced in numerous Federal policies and statutes enacted since 9/11. It has been embraced by Republican and Democratic administrations alike and by Congress. Earlier this year, Congress strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the PPD-21 framework in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act.

PPD-21 designates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead Federal agency responsible for coordinating Federal efforts to secure critical infrastructure across all 16 sectors--while working hand-in-hand with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs).

I support enhancing the Department of Energy (DOE)'s capacity, as the SRMA for the energy sector, to engage with the sector as a liaison, trusted partner, and valuable source of sector-specific expertise.

That said, it is important that legislation authorizing such activity acknowledge the role that DHS, through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), plays as the Nation's risk advisor and Federal civilian interface for private sector engagement and collaboration.

Congress has often reiterated that it expects CISA to use its authorities and cross-sector convening power to maintain a bird's eye view of threats across sectors--taking threat intelligence from one sector and integrating it into a broader threat context to help other owners and operators protect themselves.

But CISA can only do this if its SRMA partners work with it in a collaborative way that complements--rather than duplicates--the tools, services, resources CISA brings in support of these broader efforts.

Herein lies the issue with H.R. 2931, H.R. 2928, and H.R. 3119: the measures, as drafted, would authorize DOE to carry out responsibilities and develop capabilities that overlap with or duplicate those already housed within CISA, and there is no directive for DOE to do so in coordination with DHS.

There are several problems that could arise from this lack of coordination.

First, it runs the risk of creating a siloed, stovepiped approach to managing information about threats to the energy sector--a critically important, lifeline sector that has been under sustained attack for decades.

Congress has worked to break down these siloes since 9/11, which is why DHS was tasked as a ``central hub'' for critical infrastructure in the first place.

Second, having multiple Federal agencies carry out overlapping roles and responsibilities creates confusion among private sector stakeholders, who are not sure who to call during a crisis, or who to partner with during steady state.

This duplication also means that the Federal Government is forced to spread an already thin supply of cybersecurity experts and resources even thinner.

Finally, cybersecurity is rarely--if ever--a sector-specific problem.

Critical infrastructure is interconnected, and technologies used in one sector are often deployed throughout others, as are the vulnerabilities embedded in those technologies. Adversaries can use the distributed nature of these vulnerabilities to exploit owners and operators across industry lines, at scale.

Take, for instance, the recent SolarWinds campaign. Russian intelligence agencies were able to corrupt a software update deployed across the public and private sectors, then use it as a foothold to infiltrate an equally ubiquitous set of Microsoft tools and products to seize an untold amount of sensitive information.

Hostile foreign nations like China and Russia do not organize cyber operations one sector at a time. They wage simultaneous, parallel campaigns designed to yield the highest possible reward at the lowest possible cost.

It is not uncommon for attacks on the energy sector to coincide with, or foreshadow, similar attacks on other sectors. In 2018, DHS and the FBI warned about a ``multi-stage intrusion campaign'' by Russia that targeted ``U.S. government entities, as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.''

While cyberattacks against the energy sector have accelerated, the sector does not exist in a vacuum.

Though I am concerned about the possibility that these challenges may arise, it is not a foregone conclusion that they will. If DOE collaborates with CISA to forge a more productive and effective partnership, I believe many of these challenges can be overcome.

Last year, I came to the floor to ask the chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee to confirm his intent that the activities authorized by this legislation be carried out in coordination with DHS. He responded it was ``absolutely'' his intent that these bills be carried out with DHS ``first and foremost.''

I also asked for clarification that these bills do not detract from, erode, or infringe upon any existing authorities or policies laid out in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Act of 2018, PPD-41, Executive Order 13636, or Executive Order 13691. He responded that ``nothing in these bills is intended to infringe, curtail, or otherwise affect authorities of [DHS] . . . in any way, shape, or form.''

I would like to reiterate these commitments from one year ago, and I look forward to working with the Committee on Energy and Commerce to conduct vigorous oversight to ensure that DOE is coordinating with DHS in a manner that reflects congressional intent.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3119) to amend the Department of Energy Organization Act with respect to functions assigned to Assistant Secretaries, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 3119.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3119, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act. This legislation and the two other energy bills that will follow it are bipartisan bills that will protect our energy grid from cyberattacks. All three of these bills passed the House last Congress but were never taken up in the Senate. That must change this year as the need for this legislation becomes more important by the day.

We have heard repeatedly from security experts and regulators over the last few years that our energy infrastructure and grid are being attacked by state actors or other entities. Indeed, just 2 months ago, large parts of this country suffered from gas shortages after a ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline.

Former Energy Secretary Perry took the first step toward addressing the increasing risk of cyberattacks on our energy infrastructure by creating the Cybersecurity and Energy Security Emergency Response office, or CESER, as it is pronounced. He then enhanced its stature by making its leader an assistant secretary.

So H.R. 3119 would amend section 203(a) of the Department of Energy Organization Act by establishing in statute the new assistant secretary position responsible for cybersecurity and emergency response issues.

This bill also makes clear that this assistant secretary would have jurisdiction over all energy emergency and security functions related to energy supply, infrastructure, and cybersecurity.

It also vests the assistant secretary with the authority to provide DOE technical assistance and support to State, local, or Tribal governments upon request.

And it requires the assistant secretary and the Department of Energy to coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and other relevant Federal agencies in carrying out the bill's provisions. CESER performed this role admirably in May when it coordinated the whole-of- government response to the Colonial Pipeline attack.

By codifying an assistant secretary for cybersecurity and emergency response issues, this bill would go a long way in helping to protect the Nation's electric infrastructure from hackers and other bad actors who would attempt to disrupt our energy grid and harm our economy, our daily lives, and our overall national security. It would also appropriately raise the stature of the CESER office and provide more accountability over the vital functions with a lead person tasked with carrying them out.

I commend Energy Subcommittee Chairman Bobby Rush and Representative Walberg for their bipartisan effort to protect our energy infrastructure. This bipartisan cooperation is essential as we continue to work to defend our country from the threat of cyberattacks. I also thank Ranking Member Rodgers and Energy Subcommittee Ranking Member Upton for working with us to move this bill and the other two cybersecurity bills that will follow.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank both sides of the aisle, Mr. Latta and others, for their help in getting this bill moved.

Mr. Speaker, again, I would ask support for the legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3119, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act.

This bill, sponsored by Representatives Rush and Walberg, has strong bipartisan support, and passed on suspension last Congress.

The bill is necessary to strengthen the Department of Energy's important energy emergency mission.

It does so by requiring that the well-established energy emergency and cybersecurity functions at DOE are organized under the leadership of an assistant secretary confirmed by the Senate.

Three-and-one-half years ago, Secretary of Energy Perry recognized the importance of elevating this position within the Department.

He established an assistant secretary-led office, the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, which proved its worth in various situations over the past 2 years, including assistance relating to hurricanes and the recent Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack.

This bill amends the Department of Energy Organization Act to establish in law this assistant secretary level of leadership of DOE's emergency response and cybersecurity functions.

This bill will ensure the Department has the focused and accountable leadership to protect the public more fully

from fuel and electricity supply disruptions against all hazards, natural or man-made, including emerging threats from our foreign adversaries to the Nation's electric grid.

The bill has been drafted to ensure the Department carries out its responsibility in coordination with other agencies by improving coordination across the Department; ensuring more effective interagency collaborations; and increasing accountability to Congress.

Establishing accountable leadership of this DOE mission is an important step in the face of increased threats, vulnerabilities, and interdependencies of energy infrastructure and end-use systems.

Protecting energy security requires defense in depth.

This means a strong energy sector, strong state capabilities, and ensuring sector agencies, like the Department of Energy, have the tools and accountable leadership they need to respond to energy emergencies.

A vote for H.R. 3119 is a vote for ensuring accountable DOE leadership over energy emergencies for the benefit of public safety and welfare and for stronger cybersecurity protections and energy systems.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg), one of the coleads on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I again thank Representative Walberg and Representative Bobby Rush for their work on this very important legislation because, again, it is going to ensure that the Department of Energy has the focus and the accountable leadership to more fully protect the public from any electricity fuel supply disruptions against all hazards-- natural or manmade--including emerging threats from our foreign adversaries to our Nation's electric grid.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend for yielding and allowing me the opportunity to speak.

I rise today in support of H.R. 3119, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act. I thank my good friend from Illinois, Mr. Bobby Rush, for continuing to work with me to get this bill across the finish line.

This is the third Congress in a row that we have introduced this bill, each time passing the Committee on Energy and Commerce with unanimous, bipartisan support.

And frankly, given what we have seen just over the last few months in disruptions to our energy supply--including the Colonial Pipeline attack--it is well past due for this important energy security measure to be enacted in law.

Mr. Speaker, our Nation's economy and the health and safety of the American public depend upon the reliable and uninterrupted supply of fuels and electricity.

Hazards of all forms--including natural disasters, digital, and cyberattacks--are no longer just threats. They are occurring at an alarming and continuing rate.

Whether it is power outages in Texas and California due to weather events, or foreign adversaries hacking into our pipelines or grid, it is critical that we better equip our Federal agencies to prevent and respond to attacks in a way that fully protects the public.

Presidential administrations of both parties have recognized this by providing the Department of Energy with the responsibilities, expertise, and tools to ensure the reliable supply of energy.

It is time Congress does its part by requiring the energy emergency and cybersecurity functions at DOE to be organized under the leadership of an assistant secretary confirmed by the Senate. This will ensure the Department has focused and accountable leadership with high-level continuity throughout future administrations.

H.R. 3119 will encourage more effective and seamless information- sharing with Federal and industry stakeholders on energy security threats, risks, and incidents, as well as recovery and response.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of H.R. 3119 in order to protect our Nation's electric infrastructure from foreign adversaries who are attempting to disrupt our energy system and cause untold harm to our economy, our daily lives, and our national security.