H.R. 1486House119th Congress (2025-2027)Passed House

Economic Espionage Prevention Act

AI-Generated Summary

Updated November 24, 2025 at 2:31 AM UTC

The Economic Espionage Prevention Act authorizes the U.S. government to sanction foreign individuals and companies—particularly those linked to China—that steal U.S. trade secrets, violate export controls, or supply critical semiconductor components to Russia’s military. It requires a detailed report on such activities, gives the President authority to block assets and deny visas, and sets up ongoing reporting and waiver mechanisms. The law targets non‑U.S. persons engaged in economic or industrial espionage and related support to foreign adversaries.

Key Provisions

Within 90 days the Secretary of State must submit a report describing any Chinese‑linked persons or entities that are supplying critical semiconductor components to Russia’s defense sector or violating U.S. export controls.
Starting 30 days after enactment, the President may sanction any foreign person (non‑U.S.) who knowingly engages in economic/industrial espionage against U.S. trade secrets, provides material support to a foreign adversary’s military or intelligence, or breaches U.S. export‑control laws.
Sanctions can include blocking all property and interests in the United States, and making the person inadmissible to the U.S., revoking any existing visas, and denying future visas.
The law provides limited exceptions for U.S. intelligence activities, compliance with international obligations, and law‑enforcement cooperation, and allows the President to waive sanctions for up to 180‑day periods with congressional notification.
The President must issue procedures for enforcing the sanctions and submit an annual report on espionage activities, unless sanctions were already imposed in the prior year.
The act clarifies that sanctions do not apply to the importation of goods (excluding technical data).

Legislative Activity

Stay on top of the latest movement without scrolling through every action

8 earlier actions

SenateIntro Referral Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Relations Committee

May 6, 2025

View full timeline

HouseIntro Referral

Introduced in House

February 21, 2025

HouseIntro Referral

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

Foreign Affairs Committee

February 21, 2025

HouseFloor

Mr. Mast moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.

May 5, 2025 • 3:46 PM

HouseFloor

Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H1828-1830)

May 5, 2025 • 3:46 PM

HouseFloor

DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 1486.

May 5, 2025 • 3:46 PM

HouseFloor

Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H1828-1829: 1)

May 5, 2025 • 3:55 PM

HouseFloor

On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H1828-1829)

May 5, 2025 • 3:55 PM

HouseFloor

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

May 5, 2025 • 3:56 PM

SenateIntro Referral

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Relations Committee

May 6, 2025

Floor Debate

3 members

What members said about H.R. 1486 on the floor

2 Republicans1 Democrat

Rep. Brian J. MastR-FL-21 · May 5, 2025

Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1486) to impose sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other purposes,…

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support for H.R. 1486, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, introduced by my colleague from Georgia (Mr. McCormick).

The Chinese Communist Party is working to undermine America's interests around the world and is the global supplier of America's adversaries.

As President Trump and his administration are working tirelessly to finally bring an end to the war in Ukraine, the CCP continues to stoke global chaos by providing massive amounts of industrial and economic support to Russia.

In fact, our State Department assessed that in the second half of 2023 alone, China supported the transfer of nearly $300 million worth of semiconductors to Russia, including for use in missiles and drones.

The CCP's actions are blatant violations of U.S. export controls and detrimental to our ongoing peace efforts. China's economic and industrial support for Russia is a critical lifeline for the Russian military.

This is why it is critical that Congress pass the Economic Espionage Prevention Act. This bill would provide important sanction authorities for cutting off the CCP's illegal and industrial supply chains to America's adversaries. Enhancing U.S. export control enforcement with economic sanctions will help shut down China's massive support for Russia's defense industrial base.

This bill also enhances Congress' visibility into this illicit supply chain by requiring the State Department to issue a report identifying these individuals and entities that are supporting the Russian defense industrial base.

The CCP is relentlessly undermining President Trump's efforts to bring an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese companies illegally supplying Russia in violation of U.S. export controls must be subjected to the full weight of our sanctions regime. The bill ensures that the CCP and the world understand that supplying America's adversaries comes with a very severe cost.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

House of Representatives,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC, May 1, 2025.

Hon. Brian Mast,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Mast: I write regarding H.R. 1486, the

Economic Espionage Prevention Act. Provisions of this bill

fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction,

and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those

provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be

discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it

may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that

forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in

any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any

future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their

subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment

of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a

conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar

legislation.

I ask that you please insert this letter in the

Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 1486 on the

House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our

committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to

working collaboratively in

the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for

your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Jim Jordan,

Chairman.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. McCormick), the sponsor of this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, in closing, I again thank Representative McCormick for his bill, as well as Select Committee on the CCP Chairman Moolenaar and Representatives Baumgartner and Lawler for their work to bring this bill to the floor to ensure that we finally end China's support for Russia's defense industrial base.

It is a great piece of legislation, and I urge all Members to support

Rep. Johnny Olszewski, Jr.D-MD-2 · May 5, 2025

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1486. This is legislation that authorizes sanctions against any person or entity that provides…

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1486. This is legislation that authorizes sanctions against any person or entity that provides material support for Russia's military and industrial defense base.

We know that Russia uses missiles, drones, planes, and rocket launchers to wreak havoc on Ukrainian cities and citizens. They do this to overthrow the government, to end democracy in Ukraine, and to seize Ukrainian territory to reconstitute a new Soviet Union, or at least a Soviet-like sphere of influence.

Ukrainians have bravely stood up to this unprovoked, unlawful aggression. The Ukrainian military has bravely fought back against the much larger Russian military and has repelled this invasion for years. The United States and its partners and allies have been critical to the defense of Ukraine, and Congress has been instrumental in the support we have provided.

As Russia continues to suffer heavy losses and economic hardship from waging this illegal invasion, it has turned to China and even Iran and North Korea for support. We absolutely should be bolstering sanctions not just on Russia's warmongering but also on its enablers.

China has played a crucial role in supporting Russia. Though they have not provided overt military support, they are continuing to provide dual-use goods, like industrial tools and semiconductors.

At a minimum, given its tendencies to appease Russia rather than pressure it, the Trump administration must maintain the current posture of deterrence with the existing tools it already has. The better approach is for this administration to also use the additional tools offered by this legislation to deter further PRC shipments of dual-use goods to Russia.

Madam Speaker, I appreciate Representative McCormick and Chairman Mast for negotiating further changes to this bill last week. I appreciate the bipartisan spirit that went into this legislation and for the work that both Ranking Member Meeks and his team have done on this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Madam Speaker, H.R. 1486 will authorize sanctions on any person or entity that supports Russia's military and defense industrial base. Russia expected to take Kyiv in a matter of days, but it has now been years as brave Ukrainians continue to defend their country and their sovereignty against Russia's illegal invasion.

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague, Representative McCormick, and others for their work on this, as Russia has now had to turn to other nations for material support to continue that invasion, which is why Congress must not only continue our support of Ukraine but also authorize sanctions on those enabling Russia's war.

This is an important bill, and I am proud to support it. I hope we can put forward other legislation like this, including a few bills sponsored by Ranking Member Meeks that have passed with bipartisan support in the past.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Rep. Richard McCormickR-GA-7 · May 5, 2025

Madam Speaker, I thank Chairman Mast and the minority party for supporting this bill. Since illegally invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has become reliant on the People's Republic of China for…

Bill Text

3 versions available

Reading Mode

Raw Text PDF XML

Referred in SenateIssued May 6, 2025

IIB

119th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 1486

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 6, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

AN ACT

To impose sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other purposes.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Economic Espionage Prevention Act.

Findings

Congress finds the following:

(1)

On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified Congress of the following:

(A)

People’s Republic of China exports of semiconductors to Russia have increased substantially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(B)

In the second half of 2023, China exported between $25,000,000 and $50,000,000 in additional semiconductors to Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels.

(C)

During the same period, China also exported between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia every month to known transshipment hubs.

(D)

These exports include both Chinese and United States-branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and are almost certainly supporting Russia’s military capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian weapons.

(E)

Because of the prevalence of United States manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the People’s Republic of China, are subject to United States export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

(F)

All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce Control List have been subject to a license requirement if destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of Ukraine.

(2)

On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, said I think we have assessed, over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to Ukraine . . . But not just to Ukraine, its new found capabilities pose a longer term challenge to stability in Europe and threatens NATO allies..

Report

(a)

In general

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a written report that contains the following:

(1)

An analysis and description of the extent to which any foreign person who is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China, or any foreign person or entity controlled by or operating at the direction of the Government of the People’s Republic of China—

(A)

is knowingly a material source of critical components necessary for the manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment by the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation;

(B)

has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any entity operating in the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(C)

has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any country or entity with which the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of Russian Federation are cooperating in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine; or

(D)

has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with a foreign person that knowingly and directly provides these components to the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(2)

The extent to which—

(A)

any foreign person that is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China has knowingly engaged, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, in transactions with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B)

any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has engaged in transactions which would constitute a significant transaction with persons that have been sanctioned for being part of, or operating on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(C)

any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has been subjected to sanctions imposed pursuant to sections 231 and 235 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525 and 9529).

(b)

Form and availability

(1)

Form

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2)

Availability

The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) may also be made available to the public.

Imposition of sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversary entities

(a)

In general

On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (a) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) against any of the foreign persons described in subsection (b).

(b)

Foreign persons described

A foreign person is described in this subsection if the President determines on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that the person is a foreign adversary entity that knowingly engages in—

(1)

economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by United States persons;

(2)

the provision of material support or services to a foreign adversaries’ military, intelligence, or other national security entities; or

(3)

the violation of United States export control laws.

(c)

Sanctions described

The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a foreign person under subsection (b) are the following:

(1)

Property blocking

The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2)

Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole

(A)

Visas, admission, or parole

An alien described in subsection (b) is—

(i)

inadmissible to the United States;

(ii)

ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii)

otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B)

Current visas revoked

(i)

In general

An alien described in subsection (b) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii)

Immediate effect

A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(d)

Exceptions

(1)

Exception for intelligence activities

Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2)

Exception to comply with international obligations

Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with—

(A)

the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States; or

(B)

other applicable international obligations.

(3)

Exception to carry out or assist law enforcement activities

Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(e)

Waiver

The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person for renewable periods of not more than 180 days each if the President determines and submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the President that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(f)

Implementation; penalties

(1)

Implementation

The President may exercise the authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this section.

(2)

Penalties

A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(3)

Procedures and guidelines for sanctions

The President shall establish procedures and guidelines for the implementation and enforcement of sanctions imposed under this section.

(4)

Annual report

(A)

Unless the exception in subparagraph (B) applies, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and for each of the 5 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on any notable developments regarding economic or industrial espionage activities by foreign persons.

(B)

The President shall not be required to submit the annual report described by subparagraph (A) if the President has imposed sanctions as authorized under this section within the previous calendar year.

(g)

Rule of construction

For purposes of this section, a transaction shall not be construed to include participation in an international standards-setting body or the activities of such a body.

Importation of goods exception

(a)

In general

The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions under this Act shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(b)

Good defined

In this section, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

Definitions

In this Act:

(1)

Appropriate congressional committees

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A)

the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B)

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2)

Economic or industrial espionage

The term economic or industrial espionage has the meaning given that term in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. Buck McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

(3)

Foreign person

The term foreign person means any person that is not a United States person.

(4)

Knowingly

The term knowingly, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5)

Own, proprietary information, and trade secret

The terms own, proprietary information, and trade secret have the meanings given those terms in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. Buck McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708(d)).

(6)

Person

The term person means an individual or entity.

(7)

United states person

The term United States person means—

(A)

a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B)

an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(8)

Foreign adversary

The term foreign adversary means the countries listed in section 7.4 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

Passed the House of Representatives May 5, 2025.

Kevin F. McCumber,

Clerk.