Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 7892, the so-called No Aid for Ghost Students Act.

Let me say at the outset that protecting taxpayer dollars and preventing fraud in our student Federal aid program is always a good idea. As stewards of public funds, we should all agree that fraud should be identified, investigated, and stopped, but this bill is not about a thoughtful, evidence-based solution as its supporters claim.

The bill would direct the Department of Education to create an identity fraud detection system within the Free Application for Federal Student Aid process and authorize the Department to open accelerated program reviews against colleges.

Mr. Speaker, I have got to point out that the Department of Education just recently, this past April, launched a new identity fraud detection system as part of the FAFSA process. That system is still being tested, and Congress has not seen any meaningful evidence about its effectiveness or its impact upon students. Yet, this legislation would rush to codify requirements and penalties before we know whether the Department's current efforts are even working.

Federal student aid helps nearly 13 million students every year who are pursuing higher education and economic opportunity. However, the bill's creation of vague enforcement standards and punitive mandates, without clear guidance for students and institutions, risk making it harder for legitimate students to access the aid they need to attend colleges.

For example, we don't have evaluations on the effect this bill may have on legitimate students who are incorrectly flagged as suspicious. The bill prohibits colleges from distributing funds to those students until the suspicion is cleared up. These students could face hardships obtaining housing, transportation, or even buying books for who knows how long.

Mr. Speaker, we should allow the Department's new antifraud system to operate and wait for the Department to evaluate the results. The Department should work with colleges, financial aid administrators, and fraud experts to determine what additional tools and guardrails may be necessary. Codifying this new system without assessing its effectiveness just doesn't make any sense.

Moreover, H.R. 7892 could reasonably be viewed as part of a broader strategy to weaponize student aid. The Trump administration has issued numerous threats and made efforts to withhold title IV funding as a weapon to enforce ideological control over educational institutions.

Already, this administration has rewritten the accreditation handbook, threatened funding to select institutions that violate its legally dubious executive orders, and embedded ideological conditions into annual participation agreements.

The bill would give the administration another tool to further target colleges by allowing the Department to initiate and conduct program reviews based on little evidence. In fact, during the committee's debate on the bill, the committee Democrats sought to have a clear definition of what ``reasonable suspicion of identity fraud'' actually means in the legislation.

Regrettably, the bill has made its way to the floor without addressing this concern. As a result, the vague language in the bill would enable the Trump administration and future administrations to weaponize fraud investigations to target certain colleges or States.

Fraud prevention and student access to affordable college education are not competing goals. We can achieve both. Unfortunately, this bill does not strike that balance.

For that reason, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no,'' and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Menefee).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a letter in opposition to the bill from the American Federation of Teachers.

It says, in part: ``H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act, is seemingly about cracking down on the real concern about fraud in the Federal financial aid system. However, according to the Secretary of Education's own recent congressional testimony, that fraud is already being successfully addressed with existing tools at the Department of Education's disposal. The main impact of this bill would be to provide the Secretary with a wide- ranging authority to subject colleges to additional review for failing to meet vague and ill-defined metrics around `suspected fraud.' ''

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a link to another article titled: ``The Hidden Power Grab in `Fraud Prevention'--and the Students Who Will Pay,'' from the Alliance for Higher Education and The Hope Center: https://hope.temple.edu/newsroom/hope-blog/hidden-power-grab- fraud- prevention-students-who-will-pay.

It says, in part, ``The bill's operative trigger . . . `reasonable suspicion of identify fraud,' is a broad legalistic term with little history in Federal financial aid policy. This term has typically been used only when referring potential matters to the Department's inspector general, where facts and evidence could be carefully gathered by career employees with experience in fraud investigations. This bill radically expands the agency's powers to make the Secretary the judge, jury, and executioner.''

It goes on further to say that the reasonable suspicion standard ``should require articulable, credible grounds to believe fraud has occurred, not an unexamined `hunch.' It is also critical that such powers cannot be weaponized against perceived political enemies-- perhaps a State or college that isn't politically aligned with the administration.''

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record another article that is titled: ``Stop Fraud, Not Students: A Balancing Act for Financial Aid Offices and Administrators,'' from the Institute for College Access and Success.

[April 27, 2026]

Stop Fraud, Not Students: A Balancing Act for Financial Aid Offices and

Administrators

(Author: Emmanuel Rodriguez)

AI-driven application fraud is rising fast, but without

adequate staffing and resources,

prevention efforts risk blocking the very students aid is

meant to serve.

Applying for financial aid is one of the most critical

actions a low-income student can take to make their

postsecondary education a reality. Completing the Free

Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) unlocks federal,

state, and institutional resources that can bring the coAts

of college within reach. Each year, the U.S. Department of

Education (the Department) selects millions of student

applications for a taxpayer safeguard and compliance process

known as verification. Financial aid verification is split

into three main categories--V1, V4, and V5--all of which are

used to confirm that the income, household size, and identity

information reported by a student on their FAFSA is accurate.

This process can involve submitting tax records,

identification documents, or other materials to resolve

potential discrepancies. While the goal is to ensure that

limited financial aid resources are distributed

appropriately, verification creates a real tension: trying to

safeguard public taxpayer dollars without introducing delays,

confusion, or additional barriers that disproportionately

impact the students who can least afford them, and

potentially pushing them out of the educational pipeline.

Across the nation, college and financial aid administrators

have warned that the rate of financial aid fraud has

surpassed anything they've seen in the past, with ``ghost

students'' emerging as a major concern. These bad actors are

using stolen or synthetic identities to apply for aid and

enroll in colleges with no intent to attend, instead seeking

to collect financial aid and then disappear. Community

colleges, which often have more open-access admissions and

higher volumes of aid applicants, have been

disproportionately affected by this trend. While this problem

has long existed, the use of advancing technology to scale

fraudulent aid applications has surged as it facilitates mass

enrollment and can even generate coursework that can appear

legitimate.

This is not isolated to one or even a few states. In

Minnesota, colleges flagged more than 7,000 fraudulent or

suspicious applications in a single year. In Nevada, one

college reported over $7 million lost in a single semester

due to fraudulent enrollments. And nationally, federal

investigators have examined more than $350 million in ghost

student fraud cases over the past five years. Unfortunately,

the most staggering numbers are coming out of California,

where colleges have reported roughly 900,000 fraudulent

college applications in 2024 and more than $11 million lost

in aid. While the total money lost remains very small

compared to total aid, the rise in this activity is swamping

limited aid administration capacity and can undermine trust

in the program for key stakeholders, including policymakers

who allocate the funds for aid.

In response, both states and institutions are acting.

Colleges are deploying AI-powered detection tools,

implementing stricter identity verification, or front-loading

identity verification through their application process,

amongst other measures. At the federal level, the Department

is reinstating fraud detection protocols, including identity

screenings and cross-agency data checks. Even Congress has

begun to respond through the recent introduction of the

Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026

(H.R. 7891), the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026 (H.R.

7892), and the FAFSA Verification Efficiency Act (H.R. 7893).

Taken together, these efforts signal a growing recognition

that fraud prevention must be strengthened. But how it's done

matters for students. A lot.

The California Case Study

For the past few years, the California Community Colleges

(CCC) have been fighting an uphill battle against ghost

students who are getting their hands on federal, state, and

even institutional aid by taking advantage of the community

college mission to provide open access to all students no

matter when they start their educational journey.

TICAS has learned from financial aid administrators that

the AI tools they are using to combat this problem are

getting better and increasing detection. Online verification

platforms and methods have replaced paper-based systems,

allowing students to more easily submit required documents

rather than coming in person. And staff at many colleges are

proactive in their student outreach to offer support in

navigating this process, even with limited resources.

Compliance and protective measures taken by California's

colleges, no matter how thoughtfully designed and

implemented, are just one side of this equation. On the other

side, we need to track and center the experiences of students

with the processes--especially as the Department is stepping

in by expanding V4/V5 verification rates. For undocumented

students, students from mixed-status families, formerly

incarcerated students, foster youth, and others who already

navigate institutions with caution, being told ``show me your

ID'' or ``come into the office to prove you're real and that

you are as poor as you reported'' can feel threatening.

Without careful communication, these processes can feel

punitive, invasive, and in today's reality, connected to

immigration enforcement or federal data sharing that students

fear. This fear is not hypothetical, and addressing it will

take time, intentionality, and both fiscal and human

resources.

Yet, across California, financial aid offices are being

asked to do more with less. Adding identity verification on

top of their normal duties of helping students file a FAFSA

or CADAA or navigate processes like Satisfactory Academic

Progress and professional judgement requests are heavy lifts.

The CCC system and its financial aid administrators cannot

sufficiently carry out increased, more complex, and student-

centered verification practices along with their other work

without sufficient resources.

If California wants to protect taxpayer dollars as well as

students' access to an affordable education, the state must

adequately fund financial aid offices to do both well and in

an equitable way. Widely supported budget requests reflect

this reality, such as an existing ask for an additional $10

million ongoing CA Proposition 98 funds to support the

Student Financial Aid Administration (SFAA), which many

advocates support and the Chancellor's Office has uplifted.

Alternatively, California could implement a reoccurring cost-

of-living adjustment to the SFAA base or ensure they earmark

a portion of any Student Support Block Grant investments for

this purpose.

Regardless of the approach, California has the opportunity

to create a national model for balancing program integrity

with student access. To do so, it must begin with a sustained

state investment in financial aid offices to augment

resources that support vital counseling and advising, clear

communication, and secure technology.

Looking Ahead

As policymakers and institutions respond across the

country, it's critical that they all intentionally balance

program integrity with student access. TICAS offers the

following high-level principles to help guide decision-makers

grappling with how to address this issue:

Ensure all verification processes are clear, transparent,

and student-centered, with strong communication to all

affected parties about why verification is happening.

Center the experiences of students--particularly those from

vulnerable populations--who may experience verification as

confusing, intimidating, or even unsafe.

Prepare multilingual outreach materials for students and

families whom English is a second language to clearly explain

the reasons for verification, next steps, and other supports.

Avoid unnecessarily expanding verification requirements

beyond the student applying for aid--especially towards

dependents or family members.

Protect student privacy and data security, especially as

new technologies like AI are introduced and used to mine or

filter sensitive data.

Provide adequate funding and staffing so financial aid

offices can have training to understand these processes and

implement them effectively.

If colleges choose to build systems that front-load

documentation and identity verification through their

applications, invest in that infrastructure early and test it

thoroughly to ensure it is as simple and easy as possible to

complete.

It says, in part: ``While the goal is to ensure that limited financial aid resources are distributed appropriately, verification creates a real tension: trying to safeguard public taxpayer dollars without introducing delays, confusion, or additional barriers that disproportionately impact the students who can least afford them, and potentially pushing them out of the educational pipeline.''

Mr. Speaker, finally, I include in the Record an article from StateScoop with a letter from Al Sharpton of the National Action Network, outlining many issues involved in identity verification done by artificial intelligence.

[From STATESCOOP, Aug. 1, 2024]

New York lawmaker questions state's use of identity-verification vendor

(By Keely Quinlan)

In a letter to the state chief information officer, New

York state Sen. Jeremy Cooney raises concerns with the

state's use of AI-powered software from the identity-

verification firm Socure. The company says many of the claims

are false.

In a letter penned this month to Dru Rai, New York state's

chief information officer, state Sen. Jeremy Cooney raised

concerns regarding Socure, a fraud prevention and identity

verification firm used by the state, citing the vendor's data

practices and how it uses artificial intelligence.

The letter from Cooney, dated July 10, asks Rai how the

state's Office of Information Technology Services has vetted

Socure, which in addition to more than 20 state government

agencies and multiple federal agencies, provides New York

state with identity verification services. In an interview

with StateScoop, though, Socure executives said many of

Cooney's claims are simply false and that he misunderstands

how the company's technology works.

Socure's technology relies on AI and machine learning to

analyze several thousand data points to predict fraudulent

identity activity. For governments, it predicts fraud for

resident services, such as by scanning benefits applications.

Fraud is a growing concern for state agencies, which since

the COVID-19 pandemic have seen heightened levels of fraud

across many government functions.

Cooney, who also chairs the Senate Procurement and

Contracts Committee, said how Socure obtains and uses those

data points--many of which would be considered personally

identifiable data--is concerning.

Referring to the company as a data broker, Cooney said the

company ``collects, purchases and stores billions of data

points, including sensitive personal identifiable

information, on New Yorkers without their consent to confirm

their identities.'' While noting that identity verification

``is critical for ensuring equitable access to public

services,'' Cooney said that the potential risks associated

with using AI include preventing people from accessing

critical government services.

``Innovation should never come at the cost of good

governance and transparency,'' Cooney wrote in an email to

StateScoop. ``Given the widespread concerns around Socure's

business practices and the growing recognition of AI's risks,

it is important to scrutinize any work they are doing for New

York state agencies. I deeply appreciate the hard work and

ongoing efforts of the State CIO's office to make sure our

state's digital systems grant every New Yorker secure,

equitable access to state services and uphold personal

privacy.''

In the letter, Cooney also asked Rai whether the state

requires that Socure include a human review of algorithmic

output to ensure it's accurate and not discriminatory, and

whether the state has tested Socure's fraud prediction models

for bias.

``Has the state confirmed whether Socure's practices fully

comply with NY state privacy law, specifically related to its

mass collection of sensitive PII, partnership with data

brokers, and use of social media data?'' Cooney asked in the

letter.

`we are not a data broker'

Jordan Burris, vice president of public sector strategy for

Socure and the former chief of staff in the White House's

Office of the Federal CIO, told StateScoop that portions of

the letter fundamentally misunderstand what the company does,

noting that Socure is not a data broker. Additionally, New

York state has yet to pass a comprehensive data privacy law

that would legally define within the state what constitutes a

data broker. Its data privacy act is still in committee for

the second year in a row.

``We do not sell data to third parties, we do not use it

for marketing. We do not use it to run a marketplace,

offering online discounts for e-commerce, like other

companies in the space,'' Burris told StateScoop. ``We are

only focused on verifying identity and rooting out fraud, and

ultimately, under looking at what is exactly New York State

law today, we are not a data broker, and to suggest otherwise

is simply false.''

Cooney's letter follows at least two other instances this

year in which New York state leaders have levied concerns

regarding Socure and its data practices. Rep. Ritchie Torres,

D-N.Y., in February wrote a letter to Socure CEO Johnny Ayers

over concerns that his company's digital identity

verification software might lead to discrimination.

``You claim your product, `fuses personal identifiable

information (PID validated by thousands of data sources' in

order to prevent fraud,'' Torres' letter read. ``Companies'

abuse of private data can also lead to the unwanted tracking

and sale of people's sensitive health data, genetic

information, religious participation, and location. Given the

lack of transparency around your services, constituents in my

district have expressed legitimate privacy concerns and

demand to know how you source their data, how it is used, and

whether it is equitable for all American communities.''

While Cooney's recent letter claims Torres' letter went

unanswered, Socure told StateScoop it met with Torres' office

to review some of its complaints. StateScoop contacted

Torres' office for comment, but did not hear back before

publication.

data sources

In March, Rev. Al Sharpton of the National Action Network,

wrote a letter to New York State Attorney General Letitia

James citing concerns with Socure's lack of transparency

regarding the types of data it uses to perform identity

verification.

``Socure also collects data from thousands of data sources,

including personally identifiable information (PII), without

providing any meaningful transparency regarding how that data

is acquired, stored, and used,'' Sharpton's letter read.

``Socure scrapes social media, utilizes geolocation

technology, and deploys artificial intelligence technology to

conduct its business. They have no help line, and people have

no recourse should their identity be denied mistakenly. These

practices have historically and consistently hurt

marginalized communities.''

When asked how Socure obtains data to perform identity

verification, Burris said the company buys and otherwise

obtains data from a variety of public and private sources to

``bring in house.'' These sources include public records,

mobile network operators--like Verizon and AT&T--and higher

education institutions, Burris said. He added that Socure's

data scientists evaluate the ``authoritativeness of that

data.''

``I'm not looking to buy data for data's sake. I'm looking

at data for the purpose of what we can do with it,'' Burris

said. ``The only purpose for us having it is to help with

identity verification in particular. . . . And then we even

have a proprietary database that we've built of known

fraudulent identity identities that we've identified over our

12-year existence.''

`pressure testing'

As far as concerns of effects on marginalized communities,

Burris said the company is ``pressure testing'' its AI models

by testing for bias across demographics like age, race,

gender and other protected classes.

On the topic of human review in the identity verification

process, Burris said ``humans are involved all throughout the

process.''

``The question of are human reviewers evaluating every

identity decision fundamentally misunderstands the challenges

that exist with verifying identity today,'' Burris said. ``We

are going backwards if we heavily rely on human reviews to

verify identity. The cost is long wait times, backlogs and

good people who ultimately will continue to be underserved.''

In an email, a spokesperson for the New York Office of

Information Technology Services said: ``We take our

responsibility to protect the privacy of every single

resident accessing state programs or services very seriously,

and have implemented the strongest possible security measures

to ensure it.''

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, this debate is not about whether or not fraud should be stopped. Everybody agrees with that, like when Trump University paid $25 million to settle their fraud investigation. We shouldn't be debating whether or not fraud should be stopped. We should be debating the provisions of the bill, not the merits of the title.

The question before us is not whether or not we should try to reduce fraud, but whether or not Congress should codify into law a process that has barely begun to operate and whose effectiveness has not been evaluated, especially as it affects students who are incorrectly flagged under the bill. It doesn't add anything to what is already being done. It only codifies what is being done before the program can be evaluated.

We should not substitute politics for due diligence. We should wait for that evaluation. As I said in committee, I was willing to work in good faith to improve the legislation. Regrettably, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle chose not to consider the fixes needed to support students and colleges while also addressing the responsibility to defer fraud.

This bill circumvents deliberative processes, imposes new punitive requirements before we have the facts, and risks creating new barriers for students seeking an education. We should pursue smart enforcement, be flexible when honest mistakes occur, and be informed by evidence rather than assumptions.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1333, I call up the bill (H.R. 7892) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require to the Secretary of Education to use an identity fraud detection system to review each FAFSA to determine whether the FAFSA presents a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to insert extraneous material on H.R. 7892.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026, a simple and commonsense piece of legislation to fight fraud in our Federal student aid system.

This legislation, authored by Representative Burgess Owens, also includes key provisions from Representative Glenn ``GT'' Thompson's H.R. 7891, the Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026, which further strengthens this important bill.

Student aid should go to real students. This is simple but somehow contested, an idea that Republicans are committed to protecting.

Over the past few years, it has become increasingly apparent that fraudsters are exploiting Federal programs at every level. Instead of helping children get meals or supporting students' educations, Americans' tax dollars have been lining criminals' pockets, helping fraudsters get rich while Americans suffer the consequences.

At the Committee on Education and Workforce, Mr. Speaker, we have been examining this issue closely and working hard to expose the rampant fraud in our Federal assistance programs.

While childcare and hospice care have dominated the headlines in recent months, our Federal student aid programs have also fallen victim to fraud.

The most pressing threat comes from ghost students, fraudsters who use stolen or synthetic identities to submit the Free Application for Federal Student Aid, or FAFSA, and steal student aid dollars. These fraudsters commonly operate in foreign or domestic crime rings, submitting large numbers of FAFSAs to net huge amounts of cash. Until recently, these schemes were far too often successful.

This was largely possible because the Biden-Harris administration removed critical, commonsense guardrails during the COVID-19 pandemic that weakened fraud prevention measures and made it easier than ever to loot our Federal student aid programs.

Those foolish policies didn't help students. In fact, they did the opposite by creating more opportunities for fraudsters and criminals to endlessly exploit Federal student aid assistance programs and steal from taxpayers.

The good news, Mr. Speaker, is that under Education Secretary Linda McMahon's leadership, the Department of Education has made great strides in combating this fraud, restoring key safeguards, increasing identity screenings, and strengthening verification requirements. As a result, the Department blocked more than $1 billion in attempted fraud in 2025.

Those efforts, while effective, are not guaranteed to remain in place under future administrations, as we saw under the Biden administration. That is why committee Republicans are advancing legislation that not only builds on the Trump administration's efforts to stop fraud but also puts effective fraud prevention measures where they belong, in the law.

I know we all want to help students pursue an education and obtain a degree if they choose to do so. Unfortunately, that opportunity is stolen from students and borrowers when we allow fraud to continue unchecked.

H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026, creates an invaluable opportunity to stop this kind of incessant fraud and protect access to higher education.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7892, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my good friend, colleague, and ranking member's comments. I am a bit surprised because I had hoped that he could support this bill since in committee he supported this bill. In fact, one of the two bills in this bill that has been combined was unanimous in support by my Democratic colleagues.

In response to weaponization that this bill could provide, the bill does not single out any State, student, or institution. The bill's identity fraud detection system simply screens and assesses each FAFSA submission, which is working now, for indicators of fraud risk. When an application is flagged for identity verification, it is based on real fraud risk, not political agenda.

Further, the bill's program review priority categories applies only to institutions that display a pattern of disbursing aid to flagged applications, and only after giving those schools an opportunity to demonstrate compliance with the bill's reasonable, commonsense identity verification requirements. In other words, the bill simply requires institutions to do their part in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are going to real students, not fraudsters.

Additionally, the bill promotes transparency. It requires the Department to provide Congress with a written description of the system, notice of substantial changes, and annual reports on the system's use and effectiveness.

Mr. Speaker, bottom line, this bill keeps the focus where it belongs: on stopping fraud and protecting legitimate students.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Owens), the vice chairman of the Education and Workforce Committee and the sponsor of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague from Texas' concern about students and not missing one. We certainly don't want to do that. However, we have been doing that for years until the reforms that have taken place in FAFSA, and we know they are working now. It has come down to days as opposed to weeks and months before in

getting feedback. Now, in fact, most recently it has gotten down to immediate feedback in most cases.

We are seeing it work, and we have no evidence that it is unjustly pulling out certain groups or certain individuals. Again, we don't want that to take place, but we do not want fraudsters and ghost students, and that is what we are dealing with.

FAFSA finally, finally is working, and people--parents and students-- are calling my office, and I bet other offices, as well.

Mr. Speaker, with great appreciation, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Kiley), the chairman of the Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Workforce.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I was caught with the first entity that was mentioned, AFT, the American Federation of Teachers', concern about higher education.

They have messed up our K-12 education and the pipeline going into higher education. I don't see them as any voice that we ought to be listening to, especially dealing with fraud, waste, and abuse.

It is important to recognize the progress the Department has made, Mr. Speaker, in addressing ghost student fraud. In just its first 2 weeks, the Department's new real-time identity fraud detention tool blocked over $60 million in ghost student fraud. That is real money for students.

That is real success, and it is exactly why this bill is drafted this way.

The bill makes clear that the Department may satisfy the bill's identity fraud detection requirement, in whole or in part, through a system already in use, while also giving the Department room to adapt its system to evolving threats.

The trouble is that without this bill, strong safeguards against fraud are not guaranteed, as we said, to remain in place and could change from administration to administration. Especially if the AFT is pushing, we know that push is real because of the Biden administration's failures.

If we agree the current safeguards are working, we should make sure they remain in place to protect students and taxpayers alike, not just for now, but far into the future.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Kim).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Grothman), who is a working member of our Committee on Education and Workforce.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, fraud has no place in America. I think we can all agree with that, at least in word. Unfortunately, fraud has spiraled out of control and allowed criminals to steal billions from American students and taxpayers.

H.R. 7892, No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026, is a powerful opportunity to put a stop to fraud in our Federal student aid programs and expand the dream of higher education for the next generation of Americans.

While Democrats and the Biden-era administration allowed fraudsters to steal from students and taxpayers, Republicans and the Trump administration are committed to righting that wrong and ensuring Federal student aid goes to the people who are meant to receive it: students.

As lawmakers, it is imperative we do everything in our power to ensure taxpayer dollars are spent correctly. That means stopping fraud and putting an end to the parade of criminals who have exploited our Federal student assistance programs. It makes sense to me.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 7892, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, in a speech given by Frederick Douglass in 1894, he said: ``Education . . . [is] the light only by which men can be free. To deny education . . . is one of the greatest crimes against human nature [because] it is to deny them the means of freedom and the rightful pursuit of happiness.''

Mr. Speaker, this is why the issue of fraud in our financial aid system is so pernicious. Taxpayer dollars are finite, and each dollar that is defrauded represents another lost opportunity for the students who need it the most.

Ghost student fraud is a growing problem in higher education. Bad actors use fake or stolen IDs to enroll in classes, collect the refundable portion of the student aid, and then disappear, leaving taxpayers on the hook and denying real students an education.

Students and taxpayers deserve a student aid system that supports opportunity, not fraud. This bill builds on the good work already done by the Trump administration to protect taxpayer dollars and help safeguard the integrity of the student aid system by ensuring Federal aid goes to real students.

The No Aid for Ghost Students Act takes a straightforward approach: identify suspicious student aid applications and ensure these applicants are who they say they are before dollars go out the door.

The bill requires the Department of Education to use an identity fraud detection system to screen and assess each FAFSA application for fraud risk.

Just as importantly, the bill requires schools to verify the student's identity for applications flagged by the Department of Education for identity fraud risk before disbursing Federal student aid. This is a commonsense safeguard to ensure taxpayer dollars are kept out of the hands of fraudsters.

The verification methods in the bill are practical. Institutions may verify identity through in-person verification or a variety of other secure methods and must keep a record of each successful verification.

The legislation also requires the Department to establish guidelines for verification procedures, helping ensure schools have a consistent framework for carrying out these straightforward processes.

Since taking office, the Trump administration has made significant progress in combating student aid fraud. Last year, the Department blocked more than $1 billion in attempted fraud. In April, the Department implemented a new identity fraud detection tool directly into the FAFSA form, which blocked $60 million in the first 2 weeks. However, these safeguards, while effective, are not guaranteed to remain in place.

Under the Biden administration, we saw verification safeguards rolled back under false pretenses of equity and fairness, opening the door for fraudsters. This legislation addresses that vulnerability by putting fraud protections where they should be--in law.

Finally, the bill also promotes transparency and oversight. It requires the Department to provide Congress with a written description of the fraud detection system, notify Congress of substantial changes, and provide annual reports on the system's use and effectiveness.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense bill.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose H.R. 7892, the so-called No Aid for Ghost Students Act. Think about a first-generation student who is applying with a FAFSA for the first time. It is already one of the most confusing processes out there, but all this bill does is make it worse.

This bill would require the government to run every single financial aid application through a fraud detection algorithm, and if you get flagged, the college that you have been admitted to cannot release a single dollar until you jump through hoops to prove who you are.

When a student gets flagged, there is no timeline, no appeals process, no accuracy standards. For a kid who does not know the system, that could mean a missed enrollment deadline. It could mean lost housing. It could mean the end of a dream before it even starts. I know that as a first-generation college grad.

However, I want to be very clear about how this bill will impact folks. We heard earlier that this only applies when there is a real fraud risk, but that is a misnomer. Study after study on identification verification programs and fraud detection algorithms consistently show a higher false positive for Black and Hispanic users. Who are the students who are going to get flagged the most here? I bet they are going to be disproportionately Black. I bet they are going to be disproportionately Latino. I bet they are going to be lower income, those experiencing homelessness, eligible noncitizens, working adults who cannot afford to take a day off to drive to the financial aid office.

My colleague on the other side of the aisle said it best, and I completely agree: Taxpayer dollars are finite. Therefore, why is this body supporting the President and his war of choice? Why is this body supporting the President's creation of a ballroom? Why is this body supporting a President who is creating a fund for folks who stormed the Capitol?

My colleagues on the other side of the aisle could have targeted the fraud where it actually exists in higher education, but they didn't. Instead, they are locking in a brand-new unevaluated system into law with zero guardrails. That does not protect taxpayers. It just gives this administration unchecked power to delay aid to the students who need it the most.

If even one student in this country is denied financial aid wrongly because this algorithm did not work out properly because we rushed the process and didn't have accuracy standards, that would be an absolute travesty to the people that we serve.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of the No Aid for Ghost Students Act, I am very glad that it passed our committee with overwhelming bipartisan support, and I look forward to it receiving bipartisan support on the floor.

Our experience in California has demonstrated the need for this legislation. California community colleges were victimized by a staggering amount of fraud. We learned there were 1.2 million fraudulent applicants. One-third of the applicants were fake.

I talked to my local community college, and they said they noticed something odd going on where they saw this huge spike in applications, three times as many as we normally get.

They said:

We know we are doing a good job, but maybe not that good of

a job that the number of applicants suddenly triples.

They actually were on top of things and managed to root out the fraud, but not every community college has the wherewithal and the resources to do that.

The State has been, frankly, kind of missing in action. So myself and some of my colleagues, one of which was Representative Kim, from California, asked the Secretary of Education to institute new identity verification requirements, and this has largely solved the problem.

This bill is simply going to codify those best practices to prevent fraud going forward. This is important because it will save our taxpayers millions of dollars, but also because it will assure that the aid goes where it is really needed.

What these fraudsters were doing was they basically submit fake applications, then get the financial aid and then pocket that portion of the financial aid that was above and beyond room and board for discretionary use by the student. When these funds are going to fraudsters and scam artists, they are not going to the students who really need the aid in our community colleges.

Our community colleges are vital ladders of economic opportunity. They are vitally important to our workforce, and so we need to assure that they do not continue to be victimized by scam artists and fraudsters at the expense of the students who use them as ladders of opportunity.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Utah for introducing the measure. I am proud to cosponsor it, and I urge an ``aye'' vote.