Combating Human Trafficking in Commercial Vehicles Act

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. David Scott).

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I do anticipate additional speakers, and I will be making comments myself.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, because I believe in truth in labeling, truth in titling, truth in the style of legislation, Mr. Speaker, I believe that this bill should be appropriately styled the Big Bank Bonus Bill.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be styled the Big Bank Bonus Bill.

Mr. Speaker, I am sorry?

A UC request.

Mr. Speaker, my friends on the other side have said much about Barney Frank.

Chairman Frank was a dear friend of mine. I knew him well. I still do know him well. Mr. Speaker, Chairman Frank has not endorsed this bill. The language that they have used would lead an unsuspecting person to conclude that Chairman Frank supports this piece of legislation. He does not.

I have in my hand a letter from Chairman Frank. I will read a portion of it. He indicates:

H.R. 3312 significantly increases the need for subjective

judgment by the regulators and very much weakens the ability

of financial institutions to rely on clear rules to guide

their decisionmaking.

Mr. Speaker, without question, Chairman Frank does not support this legislation.

My friends have made much to-do about the term ``arbitrary and capricious,'' a threshold that is arbitrary. What is more arbitrary than reducing the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent, which you just did? What is more arbitrary than reducing the individual tax rate from 39.6 percent to 37 percent, which you just did?

You are the masters of arbitrary and capricious numbers. That bill that you just passed is flush with arbitrary and capricious numbers.

Mr. Speaker, I would suggest that they examine their thoughts about arbitrary and capricious before we continue, because I have more to say about arbitrary and capricious numbers.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Sarbanes), my colleague.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would like to engage my friend from Minnesota, if I may, before he leaves. Would the gentleman please not leave?

Would Mr. Hensarling ask the gentleman not to leave? I want to engage him.

I would like to engage Mr. Emmer, if he will come back, please. I would like to engage with the gentleman for just a moment if I may.

The gentleman declines.

Is there anyone on the other side that I can talk to?

I ask Mr. Hensarling, is 39.6 arbitrary, reducing the taxes on individuals from 39.6 to 37? What is 37? Why is it not arbitrary?

Pardon?

I yield time. Yes, of course.

I yield.

I yield you such time as I may deem necessary, if you will take time.

Well, you may use your own time.

Mr. Speaker, the arbitrary numbers that they have they don't care to defend.

Let's talk about the one-size-fits-all accusation, if you will.

Mr. Speaker, I have a source, and it is the Department of the Treasury, which indicates that we have a tiered system, and we actually have five different tiers. These tiers will allow banks to be classified as small, midsize, regional, international active, and G- SIBs.

There is a tiering system, but within the tiering system, we have given the regulators the authority to tailor rules to fit banks within the system.

Mr. Speaker, my colleague mentioned institution failure. I was here. I know what happened in 2008. I understand why we have Dodd-Frank. We don't have Dodd-Frank because Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank woke up one morning and decided that they would like to regulate banks to the extent that they were regulated.

We have Dodd-Frank because we had a crisis. We had Dodd-Frank developed because of exotic products, the 327s and the 228s, which had teaser rates that would allow persons to get into loans that had fixed rates for 3 years or 2 years, and then they would have 27 years of variable rates or 28 years of variable rates.

This was the exotic product that a good many people had and could not get out of because, quite frankly, they also had a prepayment penalty that would coincide with these teaser rates.

It was a time of great crisis for banking.

We also had the so-called credit default swaps, which were just another way of laying off bets. Banks found clever ways to lay off their bets that they thought were risky.

We had no-doc loans, negative amortization. You could pay as much as you wanted and would add to the principal what you didn't pay, which means that you would end up paying a lot more for your loan than you initially started out owing.

We had interest-only loans: just pay the interest, let the loan continue to increase in value.

There was no firewall between commercial banking and investment banking. They finally got Glass-Steagall. Took them decades to do it, but they did.

Then we had the dastardly yield spread premium, which would allow the person who was servicing you, the loan originator, to qualify you for a loan at 5 percent, come out and shake your hand and say: Good news, you now have a loan for 10 percent.

That was all lawful, but Dodd-Frank ended all of this.

We have Dodd-Frank because we had a deregulation era, very much comparable to what we are about to go through now. Banks were regulated to the extent that they couldn't do all of these things, but we deregulated, just as we are about to do it now, and we will get back to the future, where banks will not have the liquidity necessary, where the credit risk that they take will be unreasonable.

This is a bill that belongs on the trash heap of history. I adamantly oppose the bill. I believe that it is time for us to take the stand that the American people want us to take, not the stand that the big banks would have us take.

This is a big bank bonus. The big banks love this bill. Thirty banks are going to be relieved of their obligation to let us know how to put them out of their misery in the event that they are about to bring the banking system down. Thirty banks. These are big banks, $500 billion max. Big banks.

These banks will continue to give us their stress test so that we can know what their liquidity is and understand their credit worthiness by virtue of the loans that they make.

This bill is what the big banks want, but not the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters), the ranking member.

Mr. Speaker, what is the amount of time remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, this bill does not impact 99 percent, approximately, of the banks. Most banks in this country have assets--about 89 to 90 percent of them--of $1 billion or under.

This bill is for the big banks. The big banks are doing quite well. Last year, the banks made record profits of $171 billion. Community banks grew at 8.3 percent, and big banks grew at a 4.8 percent rate. They are lending to businesses at a record level.

So the contention cannot be that they are doing this because banks are losing money. It has very little to do with how much money they are losing. It has a lot to do with the fact that big banks would like to be deregulated so that they can get back to the business as usual that caused the crisis of 2008.

Mr. Speaker, there are 30 big banks this bill will impact worth more than $5 trillion in assets. This bill is not needed because, if this bill is implemented, it will cause the banks to no longer be placed under the $50 billion threshold, except by way of regulation from the prudential regulator, which won't happen easily.

MetLife is a pretty good example of what can happen. Currently, MetLife is in court. They are tied up in court, probably indefinitely, because the big banks have big bucks, and they are

going to fight being designated as SIFIs.

MetLife is fighting it. It is an insurance company, of course, but it is fighting it. If they are going to fight the designation, you have to have some way to put them under the stress test, under the living wills test. This has to be done.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.

If you don't have a trigger, it is not likely to be done, because the banks are going to fight you all the way through the courts and tie you up for years.

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the amount of time I have remaining.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters).

Mr. Speaker, how much time does the other gentleman from Texas have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Moore).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I think that we have to reemphasize that Chairman Frank is not supporting this bill. I thought that the initial comment would be sufficient, but, again, I will read what Chairman Frank has delivered to us. He indicates that H.R. 3312 significantly increases the need for subjective judgments by the regulators and very much weakens the ability of financial institutions to rely on clear rules to guide their decisionmaking. Chairman Frank does not support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is not before the House because banks are losing money. Banks are making record profits: $171 billion last year. The big banks, a 4.8 percent growth rate; and community banks, an 8.3 percent growth rate.

This bill is before the House because the big banks want to again get back to business as usual, which will allow them to do many of the things that brought this economy to its knees.

Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, we have 30 banks with assets in excess of $5 trillion. These banks have been designated as SIFIs for a reason. They ought to have to let the regulators know how they can be wound down in the event there is a crisis in the economy. They ought to undergo stress tests.

If a consumer wants a loan, the consumer has to demonstrate creditworthiness. If banks of this size are going to remain in business, they ought to let us know what their liquidity is and be required to have a certain amount of liquidity that will cause them to stay in business, even when we are faced with a crisis. They ought to be tested for their creditworthiness. That is what we currently have.

If the $50 billion threshold is released, then they will be placed under the designation of SIFI only by regulators; and MetLife is proof positive that it is difficult, if not impossible, to do.

AIG went under simply because it was already known to be a systemically important institution.

Mr. Speaker, we must defeat this bill. I call on my colleagues to vote against it. It is a big-bank-bonus bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to remind my colleague that he will have another chance to vote on impeachment and to ask for a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 667, I call up the bill (H.R. 3312) to amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to specify when bank holding companies may be subject to certain enhanced supervision, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and submit extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support of H.R. 3312, the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 2017.

This very important piece of legislation was introduced by my friend, Mr. Luetkemeyer, who serves as chairman of the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee of the Financial Services Committee, and is cosponsored by a bipartisan group of Members of the House. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the bill was approved in October by the Financial Services Committee with a very strong bipartisan vote of 47-12, so strong, Mr. Speaker, that even a majority of Democrats on the committee voted to support the bill.

This bill reforms what Republicans and now many Democrats acknowledge is a flawed and arbitrary framework under the Dodd-Frank Act to designate so-called systemically important financial institutions, also known as SIFIs. In fact, one of those Democrats who acknowledges that it is a flawed and arbitrary framework is none other than former chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Frank, the very Frank of Dodd-Frank, the coauthor of the Dodd-Frank Act. He, himself, has said that this provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that many of us are trying to reform today is ``arbitrary'' and ``a mistake.'' Those are his words, Mr. Speaker, not mine.

That arbitrary and mistaken provision is Dodd-Frank's one-size-fits- all standard that subjects banks with $50 billion or more in assets to the same costly and cumbersome SIFI regulatory standards as trillion- dollar global systemically important institutions.

We should take note that this flawed standard has now been criticized by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen, former Federal Reserve Board Governor Dan Tarullo, former Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry, and many other Obama appointees. In other words, Mr. Speaker, it is that bad.

Mr. Luetkemeyer's bipartisan bill--again, very strong bipartisan bill--replaces this inflexible, flawed, $50 billion threshold that has been criticized by so many with a series of well-established, critical standards that more accurately measure systemic importance.

Specifically, his legislation requires the Federal Reserve to review a financial institution's size, interconnectedness, global cross- jurisdictional activity, and complexity, before determining whether the institution should be subject to heightened SIFI regulatory standards.

In other words, this bipartisan bill tailors regulations based on a bank's

actual level of risk, instead of Dodd-Frank's one-size-fits-all system that ensnares smaller regional and midsize banks that, essentially, have simple community bank lending models. These banks are not globally complex Wall Street banks and shouldn't be treated the same.

It simply doesn't make sense to subject small regional and midsize banks with only $50 billion in assets to the same expensive and cumbersome SIFI regulatory regime as a bank like JPMorgan Chase, which has $2.5 trillion in assets. Based on size alone, the $50 billion bank is just 2 percent, 2 percent of JPMorgan Chase's size.

What does make sense, Mr. Speaker, is to base the regulation of these financial institutions on their actual risk profile rather than their asset size alone, which is exactly what Mr. Luetkemeyer's strongly bipartisan bill will do.

Now, while I personally do not support the SIFI architecture at all and do not believe any financial institution in America should be designated too big to fail, it is important that we always continue to work to find bipartisan reforms where we can find them and improve current law, and the legislation before us today represents a good faith effort to do exactly that.

Let's keep in mind, Mr. Speaker, this is simply not a debate over an arcane definition in law. It is about the real world effect these regulations have on the U.S. economy and the working men and women whom we represent.

Let me share with my colleagues what the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council has to say about the importance of the bill that we are debating today: ``Access to working and growth capital remains a challenge for many entrepreneurs and small businesses. H.R. 3312 would improve the lending environment and unleash capital by alleviating inappropriate requirements imposed on regional and midsize banks under Dodd-Frank. Midsize and regional banks, which many startups and small businesses have counted on for lending, have been negatively affected by this Dodd-Frank arbitrary trigger.''

Mr. Speaker, the American people deserve better. They deserve a healthy economy with growing paychecks, better jobs, and a brighter future. It is time to restore economic growth fueled by capital flowing from America's banks to American communities across our Nation.

So I urge my colleagues to correct this widely acknowledged mistake in Dodd-Frank, even acknowledged by former Congressman Barney Frank himself, and put into place real, discernible, critical standards, and help our struggling small businesses on Main Street. Let's pass H.R. 3312.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Luetkemeyer), who is the Republican sponsor of the legislation and the chairman of our Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. Wagner), the chairwoman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Barr), the chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade.

Mr. Speaker, in order to better balance the time on each side, may I inquire if my colleague anticipates having speakers on the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hultgren), the vice chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investments.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Emmer), a hardworking member of the Financial Services Committee.

Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman prepared to yield me time?

Is the gentleman prepared to yield me time?

How much time does the gentleman yield me?

I inquire of the gentleman how much time is he yielding? I don't wish to be cut off.

I am going to respectfully decline the opportunity.

Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hill), a member of the Financial Services Committee and our Republican whip.

Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Poliquin), a very hardworking member of our committee.

Mr. Speaker, I might point out to the ranking member that she should read her mail, since I responded to her letter.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson), a hardworking member of the Financial Services Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hollingsworth), a member of the Financial Services Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I happen to have the letter in my hand. I would be happy to share it with the ranking member if she has misfiled it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. GOTTHEIMER), a Democratic colleague.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

First, I want to thank my colleague, the gentleman from Texas, for coming to the floor. I know how busy he is with his impeachment activities, so we are glad he has had an opportunity to come and share his views on this particular bill.

He spent a lot of time telling us who wasn't for the bill, but he didn't tell us who was for it. And I would, once again, inform my friend, my colleague from Texas, that not only is every single Republican member of the House Financial Services Committee for this bill, but a majority of the Democrats on the committee are for this bill. Perhaps that is why he could find so few Democrats to speak out against it.

So what we have heard, Mr. Speaker, is my colleague and the ranking member vociferously defend the whole idea that there should be institutions that are too big to fail. As they defend the Dodd-Frank Act, Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out that, yet again, the big banks have gotten bigger. Under their regulatory scheme, the big banks have gotten bigger and the communities banks have become fewer.

And now what they are telling us is: Oh, no, we have got to protect this regime.

Well, I don't believe in it. But what I do believe in, Mr. Speaker, and what Mr. Luetkemeyer believes in, is that we need to try to find some bipartisan solutions, some common ground, to try to make some common sense out of some of these regulations.

What is fascinating to me is so many of the Obama-era regulators have said this $50 billion threshold makes no sense. Usually, my Democratic colleagues will quote Mr. Tarullo, they

will quote Janet Yellen, or they will quote Mr. Curry. Well, all of them have said that the $50 billion threshold is essentially arbitrary and does not work.

So, at the end of the day, what it is doing, Mr. Speaker, is putting in an additional regulatory burden on banks that pose no systemic risk to our economy, making it more difficult to extend credit to hardworking Americans who need it. But for people who just voted against tax relief for hardworking Americans, I guess that is what I would expect.

Now they want to make sure that they don't have tax relief, they don't have mortgages, and they don't have credit cards. That is what they are defending, Mr. Speaker, and it is wrong.

On a bipartisan basis, today, I believe we are going to vote for H.R. 3312 and make some sense out of this SIFI rule, and we will have a better America tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, first I would like to thank Congressman Green for his leadership. He is a member of the Financial Services Committee, who is dedicated to the proposition that we can and should work very hard to implement Dodd-Frank.

He has done a wonderful job in representing all of the people of this country when it comes to this issue of whether or not we are going to allow the biggest banks in this country to revert back to the practices that they have been involved in historically, where it caused us to be into a situation that caused the recession in 2008 or whether or not we are going to honor the work of Dodd-Frank and the reforms that were instituted and be about the business of fairness and justice.

I want to thank Mr. Green for his work, for his leadership, and for managing this most important legislation today.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 3312, the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act.

At a time when big banks are doing very well and the industry made record profits--more than $171 billion last year--and business lending has increased 75 percent since Dodd-Frank was signed into law, now is not the time to eliminate critical safeguards and reduce oversight of many of our largest banks.

H.R. 3312 will roll back the enhanced prudential standards that currently apply to the 30 of the largest banks with more than $50 billion in assets. These are some of the most important

rules in Dodd-Frank, like enhanced capital and stress testing that are critical to maintaining a safe and sound banking system that supports the broader economy.

Proponents of this bill argue that Dodd-Frank imposed a one-size- fits-all approach to any bank over $50 billion. But the law makes clear that the Fed should tier and tailor its rules to differentiate between even these large banks ``on an individual basis or by category, taking into consideration their capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities (including the financial activities of their subsidiaries), size, and any other risk-related factors that the Board of Governors deems appropriate.''

There is no one-size-fits-all mandate and the Fed has indeed tailored these rules. For example, the prudential rules for a trillion-dollar bank are much tougher compared to those that apply to a $250 billion bank and considerably more so compared to a $50 billion bank.

Yet, after 18 months, this bill would exempt 30 of our largest banks from enhanced oversight, and it replaces the $50 billion threshold with a cumbersome, discretionary process led by the Federal Reserve along with the FSOC. We have a similar process for designating non-bank financial bank companies, like AIG, which have posed a systemic risk. So it is strange that Republicans are now pushing a similar approach after they repeatedly blasted the same FSOC designation process for being arbitrary, opaque, unfair, and unworkable.

Those designations were heavily litigated, if not blocked in court, as these new designations by the Federal Reserve and the FSOC would likely be. Currently, there is only one non-bank designated by the FSOC through this process, so we should expect there would be hardly any designations through H.R. 3312.

Who are these 30 massive banks that stand to benefit?

These banks collectively hold more than $5 trillion in assets or one- fourth of all banking assets in the United States. Of the 30 banks, 12 of them are foreign banks, including Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Credit Suisse, and UBS. These banks have violated a wide range of U.S. laws, including anti-money laundering and unlawful trading practices, so I have no clue why Congress should even consider doing those banks any favors.

For all the talk about helping out small community banks that serve our customers well in our rural and underserved neighborhoods, there is not a single provision that helps out these thousands of community banks and their customers. While some characterize this bill as helping ``medium-sized'' banks, the medium-sized bank has only about $200 million in assets or roughly 250 times less than the massive banks that benefit by this bill.

More troubling, instead of helping community banks, the bill would make it easier for the largest banks to acquire smaller ones, accelerating a 30-year consolidation trend.

Reasonable people can disagree on how best to dial up or down some of these enhanced standards and tier them more effectively--and I know my colleagues have good intentions--but this proposal goes way, way too far in reversing strong oversight of the Nation's largest banks. Even a Senate bill that resembles Chairman Hensarling's ``Wrong Choice Act'' is far less aggressive, raising the $50 billion threshold to $250 billion, although even that proposal would be damaging.

Let me close by emphasizing that H.R. 3312 represents one of the largest rollbacks of sensible rules for many of our largest banks, including a dozen foreign banks, at a time when the industry is making record profits, and such a bill would hurt and make it harder for community banks to compete.

For these reasons, I strongly urge Members to oppose this bill, H.R. 3312.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to talk about what is happening in this country with this administration at this time. It is so related to what we are trying to explain about what this bill attempts to do.

First of all, let me just share with you that committee Democrats have made repeated attempts to follow the Trump money trail and investigate the suspicious financial dealings of the President, his immediate family and his associates, including their possible involvement in illicit Russian financial schemes.

Since March, Democrats have written six letters--two to committee Chairman Hensarling, one to Deutsche Bank, one to Deutsche Bank CEO John Cryan, two to Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, and another to Deutsche Bank's external counsel, requesting their cooperation in exposing the scope of Russian influence on the Trump administration.

I have also written two letters on my own--one to Attorney General Jeff Sessions, another to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, regarding the Department of Justice's investigation into Deutsche Bank's Russian mirror trading scheme.

On March 10, 2017, committee Democrats called on Chairman Hensarling to use the full range of the committee's investigative powers to examine Deutsche Bank's Russian money laundering operation and assess the integrity of the U.S. Department of Justice's ongoing investigation into the scheme, given the Trump administration's conflicts of interest in the matter and the revelations of Attorney General Sessions' communications with the Russian Ambassador. Chairman Hensarling failed to respond. We have heard nothing from our chairman.

On May 23, 2017, committee Democrats sent a letter to Deutsche Bank's chief executive officer, John Cryan, requesting information on two internal reviews the bank reportedly conducted, the first on its mirror trading scandal and the second on whether the accounts of President Donald Trump and his family members held at the bank had any ties to Russia.

Deutsche Bank's external counsel responded, stating that Deutsche Bank was unable to cooperate with the request, citing privacy concerns.

On May 23, 2017, committee Democrats all sent a letter to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin requesting that FinCEN provide any records to the committee that detail President Trump's financial ties to Russia as well as those of his family, his family members, and associates. Secretary Mnuchin failed to respond.

It goes on and on and on. Letters were sent on June 21. We sent a follow-up letter to Deutsche Bank. On and on and on.

What is important about all of this is Deutsche Bank is known and has been fined for many things, including money laundering. So, knowing that, what we are doing here is lifting oversight on Deutsche Bank, one of the fallen banks that would be covered by this bill.

I think this is outrageous. I think people should know what this bill is all about and how it is going to put us at greater risk. We are dealing with limiting the oversight of banks like Deutsche Bank.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to correct my chairman--I do not like to do this--however, I did check my mail, and I have discovered that when he responded to the August 11 letter, he let me know that he would not use his subpoena power to help us out. He did not respond at all to the March 10 letter.

Mr. Speaker, I want to start by thanking Chairman Hensarling for his support of this legislation and his dedication to a more reasonable regulatory regime.

I would also like to thank my good friend, Representative David Scott from Georgia, for being a cosponsor on the Democrat side and for all the hard work and support he has given us throughout this labor of love here on trying to get this thing done. He has been a champion for us, and we thank him sincerely.

Today, the House will consider H.R. 3312, the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 2017, a bipartisan piece of legislation to address an inefficient regulatory structure by accounting for actual risk, rather than the size alone in the designation of systemically important financial institutions, or SIFIs.

Under the current regulatory framework for SIFI designations, any bank holding company with more than $50 billion in assets is subject to enhanced regulatory supervision and special assessments. This approach fails to take into account differences in business models or risks posed to the financial system. It has real world implications, too, stunting economic growth and limiting access to credit.

The risk of a traditional bank is not the same as an internationally active complex firm. In fact, the Fed has produced data showing the risk of every single midsize and regional bank which pales in comparison to risks posed by many and almost all global systemically important banks.

H.R. 3312 will remove the completely arbitrary approach taken today and replace it with analysis of actual risk posed to the financial system. The bill would require regulators to examine not just size, but also interconnectedness, the extent of readily available substitutes, global cross-jurisdictional activity, and the complexity of each bank holding company.

Today's method isn't a reasonable basis for supervision, a fact that has been recognized by Fed Chair Yellen, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, and former Treasury Secretary Lew, and many Members of this body. Even Barney Frank, as Chairman Hensarling just noted, the former Democratic chairman of the Financial Services Committee and author of the Dodd- Frank Act, has said the $50 billion threshold is completely arbitrary and has had negative implications on our economy.

It is important to note that this bill will not impact the authority of the Federal Reserve to oversee institutions. The focused standards set forth in the bill don't guarantee that any institution will be permanently freed from the rigors that are associated with SIFI designation. If the Fed so feels that a bank needs to have continuous oversight, they will do so.

I want to take a moment to discuss the score issued by the Congressional Budget Office. CBO opined that this bill would result in direct spending. I disagree with the CBO interpretation of what this legislation will do, and I believe that my bill will actually create a safer financial system.

At the same time, it is important to me and my colleagues that the bill comes to the taxpayers at no cost. The offset included in the Rules Committee Print will more than cover any potential hit to the Deposit Insurance Fund and makes this legislation budget-neutral.

The bottom line is this: an inefficient regulatory structure that does not reflect the reality of the U.S. banking system can have real economic consequences. We should no longer let the SIFI process lead to marketplace disruption or penalize companies for size alone.

I have worked on this legislation surrounding the SIFI designation process for the last 4 years, but I have not done it alone. H.R. 3312 was drafted in good faith with--and with considerable input from--many of my friends on the other side of the aisle as well.

Because we worked together, this legislation received broad bipartisan support when it was reported by the Financial Services Committee with a vote of 47-12. That means nearly 80 percent of the committee members voted in favor of this legislation.

I want to thank my colleagues for their help in this effort, namely, Mr. Scott, Ms. Sinema, Mr. Hill, Mr. Williams, Mr. Stivers, Mrs. Beatty, Mr.

Budd, Mr. Meeks, and Mr. Gottheimer. This is an important issue, and I hope our colleagues will join us in supporting this bipartisan, commonsense measure.

Mr. Speaker, at the end of the day, this is a bill about being able to allow these banks that are caught in a ``California Hotel'' situation here to be able to get out of this with a good analysis of their risk profile, their business model, because, at the end of the day, this is what this is all about. Their business model is not a risk to this country or the economic system that we have. It is not like the international connected banks, and, therefore, they shouldn't be treated as such.

As a result, this is important for not only the midsize banks, but for the banks below them because the regulators have been also allowing these sorts of requirements and rules to roll downhill on community banks as well. So it is time we put a stop to this.

It is important that we take a pragmatic approach to this designation process, to manage actual risk, and limit the real threats to our financial system.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R. 3312. I appreciate my colleague's redesignation, renaming of the bill. I think it is much more appropriate.

Mr. Speaker, this is a completely unwarranted piece of legislation. If you look at it, it is just another gift to the wealthy and the well connected on Wall Street.

We keep saying that over here because it is true. It is crazy. In 2008, the economy was brought to its knees. Reckless behavior out there by a lot of these huge institutions. The Nation's largest financial institutions crashed the economy. Everybody knows it.

So what did we do? We took steps, smart steps. We put in place the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect Act of 2010. I think most Americans were comforted by that. They felt, okay. There are guardrails in place now so this kind of thing can't happen again.

But the fact of the matter is that, as soon as the ink was dry on that law, lobbyists moved in, the special interests moved in, and they started to unwind the core provisions, and the guardrails are starting to come down.

This is crazy. This is a case of amnesia at best or cynical capitulation to Wall Street at worst.

Proponents of the legislation say this is about helping the mom-and- pop banks on Main Street--Main Street. Were institutions like Countrywide and Washington Mutual and Wachovia and IndyMac--these are the names that haunt a lot of Americans. A lot of American households suffered because of the behavior of those institutions. Were they Main Street banks?

The fact is, under the bill before us, some of the Nation's largest banks whose failure led to the carnage of 2008 would be exempt from heightened oversight. Exactly the kind of institutions that the public wants us to keep an eye on would no longer have that oversight in place. Of those still standing, 30 of the Nation's 38 largest financial institutions would escape sensible oversight imposed by Dodd-Frank.

Even more than that, this legislation is based on the false premise that the reforms of Dodd-Frank were one size fits all. That is the phrase we always hear to justify letting go of the reins: Oh, it is one size fits all. People can't fit into this. We have got to do something.

But, no, the agency was given the maneuvering room, the flexibility, to actually customize things and have been in a position to do that.

There was a premium put on regulatory flexibility, explicitly instructing the Federal Reserve to tailor its prudential regulatory regime based on size and risk profile of financial institutions.

Ironically, the changes to asset thresholds will increase the likelihood of consolidation as large financial institutions and banks can now grow, that is, buy out small players beyond the $50 billion threshold. The banks are going to start growing bigger again. The financial institutions are going to get heavier again. It makes it easier for them to crash through whatever guardrails we can build.

The public doesn't want this, and that means true community banks very well might be absorbed by super-regional banks, which would decrease consumer credit access and worsen pricing.

Mr. Speaker, Americans are tired of watching this Congress forget the lessons of the 2008 financial crash. They are tired of a Congress that routinely favors Wall Street over the interests of Main Street, and they are tired of the same worn-out talking points that are used to justify deregulation of Wall Street.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.