Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by telling you how impressed I am with the firm statement of principle apparently by the Republican Study Committee. Confronted with an appropriations bill that they believe wrecks the budget, violates the…
Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by telling you how impressed I am with the firm statement of principle apparently by the Republican Study Committee. Confronted with an appropriations bill that they believe wrecks the budget, violates the House rules, they are calling for a firm and principled ``present'' on the rule. That is an inspirational example of how to combat wrongdoing. It does give new meaning to the faith-based initiative. Apparently the gentleman from Indiana thinks this is a terrible rule and a bad bill, but because he has faith that by some process, apparently others will be excluded, that the chairman of the committee will fix it, he will refrain from voting against it.
I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Connecticut, who fights very hard for the most important parts of this bill, in my judgment, those which my colleague from Massachusetts alluded to, those which try to alleviate hunger, food stamps and international feeding programs, and I am pleased that they have survived the onslaught as well as they have. I hope that when we get to the reconciliation process, her efforts and the efforts of others who care about these things will succeed.
There is one aspect of the feeding program, however, where I find myself in sharp disagreement with the conference report, and at this point I would include for the record a speech given to the Kansas City Export Food Aid Conference in May by USAID Administrator Natsios.
[From the Kansas City Export Food Aid Conference, May 3, 2005]
The Local Purchase Initiative
(Remarks by Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development)
I am very pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. food
aid--what we have done right in the past and what we can do
to improve how we conduct our food aid programs in light of
new challenges since September 11, 2001.
Last year when I was here, I talked about the success of
U.S. food aid over the past 50 years and how we have assisted
more than 3 billion people through P.L. 480 programs. Over
the past twelve months, many of you have continued to work
with people in Sri Lanka and Indonesia whose lives were
devastated as a result of the Tsunami as well as people in
Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea who have been hit hard by the
equally overwhelming consequences of conflict and drought. In
addition, many of your organizations contribute to long term
development programs in places like Honduras and Bangladesh
that strengthen communities so that when they face sudden or
slow onset disasters, they are prepared and better able to
cope with the setbacks. You have continued to work tirelessly
to save and improve people's lives. I appreciate the
partnerships we have created together to address food
insecurity.
I want to take a few minutes now to talk about changes in
the world over the past few years and how the change has
affected our ability to meet food aid needs. Our Agency, and
particularly our food programs now operate in an environment
characterized by increased frequency and severity of natural
and manmade disasters, terrorism, instability, the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, corruption, poor governance and conflict which has
led to increased population displacement.
The United States Government is facing increasing demands
on its diplomatic, military and humanitarian resources. And
the resources are limited. But not responding is not an
option, so we prioritize and stretch the dollars to meet as
many needs as possible as efficiently as possible.
At the same time, the World Trade Organization continues
its debate on food aid issues in the context of the current
agricultural trade negotiations. Some of the other members
would like to do away with in-kind food aid such as the P.L.
480 Title II program. The U.S. has made two presentations at
the WTO in Geneva on U.S. food aid policies and programs. At
these presentations and in the negotiations we keep reminding
member states, and relevant international organizations that
we must come to an agreement that will ensure (1) that we
maintain adequate food aid levels to meet global needs; (2)
that food aid continues to be an internationally accepted
form of assistance when it targets food insecure populations;
and (3) that we minimize any trade distortions. I won't
belabor this any further as I know that there will be a more
in-depth discussion on trade issues over the next few days.
Let me just say that we will continue to try to ensure that
the WTO Doha Development Round does not restrict in-kind food
aid. If food aid is unduly restricted, inhibit development,
increase food insecurity and create instability in developing
countries.
In President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy, he
acknowledged the importance of fighting poverty abroad when
he defined the three pillars of our foreign policy as
Defense, Diplomacy and Development. Recognizing that we
cannot address all of today's problems using our military
or diplomatic resources, he emphasized that what we do as
development practitioners can also serve to protect vital
American national interests.
In January of this year, USAID released a paper focusing
attention on failing, failed and recovering states known as
the Fragile States Strategy. The strategy provides a focal
point for the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian assistance in defining its priorities and in
carrying out its humanitarian assistance role. The strategy
promotes four basic objectives for carrying out work in
fragile, failed and failing states which are to: (1) improve
monitoring and analysis; (2) ensure that priorities respond
to realities on the ground; (3) focus programs on the source
of the fragility or weakness; and (4) create or use
streamlined operational procedures to support rapid and
effective response.
Failed states are both the incubator and sanctuary for
terrorists. Where there is no effective national government
to control terrorist organizations, these groups will
flourish. It was no accident that Sudan, Somalia, and
Afghanistan served as the base of Al Qaeda training and
planning. As the National Security Strategy document so
succinctly puts it: ``America is now threatened less by
conquering states than by failing ones.'' We now know by
painful experience that we are not immune from the
consequences that arise from state failure on other
continents.
Our underlying priorities, in working in fragile states,
are to increase stability, promote security, encourage reform
and build institutional capacity. This will address the
causes of fragility as opposed to simply targeting symptoms.
The President's 2006 budget proposes reforms which will give
USAID the programmatic tools to deal with fragile states.
In crisis situations, strategic programming of food aid can
stabilize a fragile economy by supporting local farmers and
maintaining demand for the locally produced goods, despite
the low purchasing power of those requiring assistance.
Famines can be demand driven or supply driven. A supply
driven famine is caused by reduced food production and rising
prices. In this case, importing U.S. food to increase the
food supply would be an appropriate response. A demand driven
famine is caused by the collapse of family livelihoods and
the inability of families to access food, even where there is
adequate supply and low prices. In cases where the food
supply is adequate and prices stable, but where families
cannot afford to purchase the food, an appropriate response
would be to purchase what is available locally to assist the
food insecure rather than adding U.S. food to the local
supply which could depress local prices and further aggravate
the economy.
As with all of our work in fragile countries, we need to
take a close look at all of our options when responding to
needs. The work is getting more rather than less arduous and
it is evident that we must expand the ways in which we
conduct our business. The old way of doing business is
insufficient to meet the mounting food needs in this new
environment given our limited dollars.
Despite all that we are doing, and all that the rest of the
world is doing to win the war on hunger, the number of
chronically malnourished people in the world continues to
rise, now totaling more than 850 million people. And though
the prevalence of undernourishment has fallen in 30
developing countries since the early 1990s, poverty and
conflict have contributed to its growth elsewhere.
In the past decade, and especially in the past several
years, conflict-related emergencies and natural disasters
have created global food needs beyond the capacity of the
U.S. and other donors to respond using the options currently
available to us. In specific situations, when food pipelines
break or when conflicts pause and we need to move food in
quickly to save lives, we need to be able to access food more
quickly.
In his book on famine, Fred Cuny stated that ``the chances
of saving lives at the outset of a [relief] operation are
greatly reduced when food is imported. By the time it arrives
in the country and gets to people, many will have died.'' He
goes on to say that ``evidence suggests the massive food
shipments sent to Ethiopia in 1985 had little impact on the
outcome of the famine . . . and that by the time it arrived
in sufficient, steady quantities in the rural areas, the
death rate had peaked and was already declining.''
Some of the starkest evidence we have of deaths directly
related to a slow food aid response took place in Gode,
Ethiopia, the epicenter of the 2000 famine there, which
threatened over 10 million people with starvation. While the
famine was eventually averted--the Centers for Disease
Control has estimated that in Gode, 20,000 deaths resulted
from the crisis in that region alone with an estimated 78,000
deaths in four other regions. Seventy-seven percent of the
deaths in Gode occurred before the major relief interventions
began in the summer of 2000 and more than half of the deaths
were of children under the age of five.
One way to respond to the needs more quickly is to purchase
food locally, but this requires us to have access to cash.
When food emergencies are a function of localized drought,
conflict or crop failure from disease or locusts with food
available close-by, local purchase can be critical.
USAID is searching for innovative ways to stretch its
dollars and meet the needs of the most vulnerable populations
with emergency and developmental food assistance. One way of
doing this is to provide cash which could be used to purchase
food in the country or region where an emergency is taking
place.
For FY 2006, President Bush has taken the initiative to
provide this tool to USAID humanitarian officers and has put
a request into the FY 2006 budget asking that $300 million be
shifted out of P.L. 480 Title II and into the International
Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) account to be used as
cash for meeting emergency food needs. Specifically, the
President stated in his budget that ``This funding will
permit USAID to provide food assistance in the most timely
and efficient manner to the most critical emergency food
crises. This assistance will be used in those instances where
the rapid use of cash assistance is critical to saving
lives.''
One of the factors behind this request is the length of
time that it takes to ship food commodities from the United
States to an emergency. Shipping in-kind assistance from the
U.S. normally requires three or four months to arrive at an
emergency distribution point once it is ordered. Having the
option to purchase the food in the same country or region
where an emergency is happening would enable us to get food
to hungry people faster. It would save lives and would fill a
critical gap until U.S. commodities arrive at the site. In
addition to providing a faster option, local purchases of
food will, in many cases, save the dollars that would
otherwise have been spent on transportation costs, allowing
us to purchase additional food aid to feed more people.
The primary purpose of the Title II program is to save
lives and having more flexibility in our programs to use cash
to buy food locally will save lives. The fact that U.S.
farmers and shippers are able to benefit from the Food for
Peace program is an important, but secondary benefit. It is
not the primary objective of the program. The primary
objective is to save lives.
In responding to pending crises, USAID has limited options:
We can order a shipment of U.S. commodities which can be
expected to arrive at the distribution site within 3 to 4
months of purchase.
We can access food from pre-positioned U.S. commodity
stocks or swap commodities from other food pipelines.
However, the limited pre-positioned stocks are not always
adequate or suitable for every situation and increasingly
thin pipelines have lately rendered swaps infeasible.
Within the past year, we have established a pre-position
warehouse in Dubai, UAE to store commodities until they are
needed in an emergency. While this is extremely useful, we
cannot always preposition the amount or appropriate mix of
commodities that would be needed in every emergency. Also,
pre-positioning will not solve every problem. For example,
currently Ethiopia is facing an unexpectedly severe food
crisis and while the current supplemental budget has a
sizable increase in food aid, it cannot be used to order food
until the President signs it. When this happens, we will need
to order the commodities in the U.S., ship them, and then
wait for them to arrive in Ethiopia several months from now.
Needless deaths will occur while we wait. If we had the
flexibility to purchase food locally, we could purchase the
commodities in or near Ethiopia once the legislation is
signed, getting the food to the people who need it months
sooner. This is not a hypothetical situation--it is taking
place as we speak.
Another option that we have to meet emergencies is to
divert U.S. commodities headed to other programs on the high
seas. And while this has been done, it is an extremely costly
intervention. It means that another program will suffer, and
ultimately means less money for commodities.
The ability to purchase food supplies in local or regional
markets would give us one more option for meeting critical
needs. While this will not always be viable, this flexibility
will make a difference in the reduction of human suffering.
I want to be very clear that this requested change is not
an attack on the U.S. farmers or the U.S. maritime industry.
The contributions that many of you have made in feeding
hungry people overseas is notable and will continue to be a
critical, basic component of how the U.S. conducts its
management of food aid. The Administration has no intention
of changing how the United States runs its food aid programs
in general. This is not the beginning of a push to make our
food aid program an all-cash program. I personally would
oppose any kind of proposal to make more than one quarter of
our food aid budget available for local purchase. The greater
portion of U.S. food aid must continue to be purchased in
American markets where the supply is assured for emergencies
where large volume is needed.
One thing that I have been asked repeatedly is: How will we
sustain support on Capitol Hill for these humanitarian food
aid programs, if the benefits to the U.S. agricultural and
shipping industries are perceived to be decreased? The budget
for OFDA, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the
Refugee Program budget have been as stable in funding as the
Food for Peace budget, and these two budgets contain no
guaranteed purchase of U.S. commodities. Americans, including
those who have been intimately involved in our food aid
programs in the past, will strongly support USAID's effort to
improve the U.S. food response to humanitarian emergencies by
making that response as flexible and effective as possible to
save more lives and reduce suffering. I believe that
compassion for those who are suffering is part of the moral
fabric of this society. This was evident to me in the massive
outpouring of private cash contributions to help the victims
of the Tsunami and I believe that it holds true here.
Stretching our emergency resources further will also help
to protect our development programs from being tapped to meet
emergency needs.
I know that many of you have questions about how we will
run this program and I will try to answer as many of them as
possible.
The Administration has requested that the money be placed
in the International Disaster and Famine Account. This is the
emergency account managed by our Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance. However, the $300 million designated to this
account for the purchase of food aid will be managed by the
Office of Food for Peace, which currently manages the Title
II food aid program. As Food for Peace currently has the
responsibility for and the expertise in managing food aid,
they are the appropriate group to administer this money. The
money, like current Title II money, will be programmed
primarily through NGOs and the World Food Program.
One of the questions that I have been asked is: Is there
enough food available in local markets to meet our emergency
needs? Though local purchase will not support all of our food
aid initiatives, there is food available for purchase in
developing countries. In 2004 more than $680 million worth of
food aid was purchased from developing countries by WFP in
order to meet local food aid needs. Developing countries able
to supply food aid commodities have included (but are not
limited to) Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa and Sudan. This
method not only provides food more quickly and more cheaply,
it also supports the local economy and helps improve the
livelihoods of poor farmers.
We follow the principle of ``Do no Harm'' in local markets.
The $300 million will not all be used to purchase and program
food in a single country, but in a variety of countries,
reducing the impact on local markets. We also intend to apply
Title II legislated requirements such as Bellmon and Usual
Marketing Requirement, where local purchases are conducted to
ensure that there will be no displacement of commercial
sales, or negative impact on local markets.
I have also been asked several times why we can't just use
our notwithstanding authority under Title II to make local
purchases. I have been told in no uncertain terms by our
USAID lawyers that we cannot use our notwithstanding
authority for local purchases. Title II authorizes the
donation of American agricultural commodities.
Notwithstanding authority was not intended for, nor can it be
used to create additional authority that would allow the
purchase of foreign commodities. The notwithstanding clause
can waive existing federal laws which slow down emergency
response, but it cannot be used to invent new authority not
now available under Title II. As it is currently written,
Title II can not be used to purchase commodities locally.
We do not intend for this money to be used in purchasing
commodities from other developed nations. If food aid is not
available for local purchase under appropriate market
conditions in developing countries with some proximity to the
emergency need, the food aid will be purchased in the United
States.
I want to close with another example of where this type of
program could be used effectively.
In the past in southern Sudan, small farmers in the fertile
western farming areas have often produced small grain
surpluses, while hundreds of thousands of Sudanese in other
parts of the country have urgently needed food aid. If we
were able to strategically and carefully buy the surpluses to
meet food aid needs elsewhere in the same country, we would
end up sustaining and improving the lives of both groups.
Should signatories comply with the July Peace Accords, there
is a real possibility that agricultural output could return
to its former level and the region would once again act as an
important regional cereal supplier. However, if using donated
food commodities from the U.S. remains our only option, we
risk lowering demand for the local production and destroying
price incentives for the local farmers to improve their
production to meet future food aid needs.
I would be happy to take your questions.
Mr. Speaker, the issue was this. We give food aid, and that is generous. Under the rules that will be maintained by this bill, the aid can only be given in kind; that is, we ship the actual physical food. That has obvious advantages in that it helps the American farmer while it helps those in need. Particularly for nonemergency food aid, that is an entirely legitimate way to go. In some emergency situations, maybe in many, it is the right way to go.
The problem is under current law, the American foreign aid administrators are not allowed to use any of this food aid by buying the food near where the emergency happens. That is one reason why a large part of the food aid is taken up in transportation costs. I understand there are maritime interests like that, but that is not an appropriate way, it seems to me, to go about trying to help them.
Inevitably, not inevitably, correctly, much of the food aid will be that bulk aid. But to maintain a position that we will never use any of the food aid to buy the food on site, nearby, in ways that it can be done in ways that do not disturb local markets is a grave error.
What bothers me about this appropriation is not simply that it bans that from happening, and I give credit to the administration and to the President, Administrator Natsios, my former legislative colleague from Massachusetts, who asked for the authority to do this. When that was rejected outright, there were various compromises proposed. The senior Senator from Ohio Mr. DeWine, I think senior, whatever, proposed a compromise in which a percentage of the emergency aid would be available.
We are not talking, those of us who support this, about making all of even the emergency aid cash-based, but there ought to be a capacity in the Administrator to put some of the money that is appropriated into buying food locally. Now, I know, by the way, there are people on the Committee on Agriculture that say, no, that would be bad for the local markets. Mr. Speaker, I have a rule in politics: Try not to say anything that no one will believe is really your motive.
When you look at this agricultural bill and American agricultural policy and the devastation our subsidy policy wreaks on local food markets, the notion that the people who make American agriculture policy in this Congress are really concerned about the poor local farmers is risible. We obviously have ways of dealing with the local impact, and I believe that Administrator Natsios is absolutely right.
There is another argument here to which I give more credibility, and that is some of the organizations that are engaged in international development of food aid are the intermediaries here, and they get the food and they sell it, and they then use the money in various good ways. And these are good organizations.
I will note that two of the major organizations here, OXFAM and CARE, have decided, no, they do not need to have 100 percent of the aid being given in bulk, and that a percentage of the emergency aid, that is all we are talking about, a percentage of the emergency aid being available, not mandated, but being available when appropriate, to be bought on site or nearby, not right on site, but nearby, that is better. There are other organizations that have concerns.
I notice one of them is the Catholic Relief Services, which does great work. I do want to express great concern, Mr. Speaker. I hope in consequence to the what the President sent this House on Wednesday, I hope that Catholic Relief Services, because they want to help people overseas, will not be told the that Catholic Church cannot do voter registration to get out the vote, which is what some people would say if they helped people locally. So I hope that the restrictions on the Catholic Church and other good organizations that the majority wants to apply if they are doing things domestically to help the poor will not also apply to their international efforts. I hope we will work out a compromise.
Let me close by saying I was particularly disturbed by this language, and it
is the Republican majority, the great believers in openness, the great principled reformers, here is what their report says, the majority report, on this bill. ``The conferees further admonish the executive branch to refrain from proposals which place at risk a carefully balanced coalition of interests which have served the interests of international food assistance programs well for more than 50 years.''
In other words, we got a deal going here. Take your principles and get out of here before you upset the apple cart. Do not come to us talking about a more efficient way to provide emergency food aid to people, because you might break up our political deal.
Some reform.
Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding and for what she says. I know she is very much on the side of doing this in the right way, and confronted with particular facts, you have to deal with things. So I do believe that a rational food aid policy will include some flexibility on buying the food in an emergency, time and everything else, but I certainly agree it should not come at the expense of the overall program.