Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention Act Of 2004--Conference Report
Madam President, I am going to submit for the Record a fuller statement, but in deference to the limited time we have, I have a few brief comments on what I consider to be one of the most important enactments of my 18 years in the Senate.…
Madam President, I am going to submit for the Record a fuller statement, but in deference to the limited time we have, I have a few brief comments on what I consider to be one of the most important enactments of my 18 years in the Senate.
This is an accomplishment which did not happen beginning this summer but rather has been underway for at least the 15 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. I am extremely pleased we have now arrived at the point we may be in a position to enact serious intelligence reform for the first time in over 50 years.
There are many important aspects of this legislation. One, it will centralize the intelligence agencies, not as an end in itself, but to create the platform from which we can then decentralize. As Senator Roberts was discussing, in 1947, the various separate military branches--there was a Secretary of the Army, there was a Secretary of the Navy--were brought together under a Secretary of Defense. Then, 39 years later, that centralized organization was decentralized into the combatant joint commands that now are the principal warfighters for America.
That is exactly the process anticipated here. The only major difference is it will not take 39 years to get from centralization to decentralization.
A second aspect of this bill I point out, we have much work to do in the area of human intelligence. The case could be made that both the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq were a product of our inadequate human intelligence capabilities. We must make a major effort to rebuild our human capabilities. This bill takes a step in that direction through emphasis on more linguistic training in the Defense bill that was the establishment of what I refer to as the intelligence equivalent of the Reserve Officers Training Corps. We need many other initiatives to fill this gaping hole in our intelligence.
The third area--and I particularly commend Senator Wyden and Senator Lott and others involved in this--is to try to make our security classifications more truly an issue of security rather than agencies trying to bury their mistakes.
In this legislation we establish a new classification board that will review decisions that are made in the executive branch to determine if there has been an excessive use of secrecy. Our former colleague, Senator Pat Moynihan, used to say that secrecy is for losers. We do not want the United States to be in that category of losers.
What we are doing today is an important step. It is not by any means the
last step. Let me mention a few things that will need to flow from our decision today. Some are rather tangential to the issue of intelligence reform. As an example, we are now requiring any visa applicant to have a face-to-face encounter with a visa agent. That may sound like an appropriate protection against inappropriate people getting access to the United States.
There are also, however, very practical matters. A country that will be of increasing significance to the United States is the country of Brazil. Brazil is a country which is the size of the continental United States plus a second Texas. It is the fourth largest country in population in the world. Today we have three places in which a person could get a visa. They are relatively close together. It would be as if the only place you could get a visa in the United States was Washington, New York, or Boston. We have to develop some strategy to make it more reasonable for persons around the world, but particularly in these large-sized nations that are so important to our economy, to be able to have reasonable access to the visa process.
The second part of this legislation relates to the United States relationship with Saudi Arabia. It points out that the Government of Saudi Arabia has not always responded promptly or fully to the United States request for assistance in the global war on Islamic terrorism.
I believe we need an enormous increase in the transparency of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and that is a goal we have been retreating from. In the joint House-Senate report on the factors that led to 9/11, an 800-page report contained 27 pages on the role of Saudi Arabia in 9/11. Every one of those 27 pages was classified, so the American people in that and other instances have been denied access to the information about our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I hope the provision contained in this legislation will move us toward a greater frankness and candor in that important relationship.
Finally, this legislation places responsibility for important future actions in at least three places. One of those is the President. The President will have the responsibility for making a series of critical appointments so there will be the human beings responsible for implementing this legislation in a creative, dynamic manner.
He also must assure there is a value system in relationship to this new office and other positions which are also his responsibility to appoint. The most notable of these will be between the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense. It will require continued Presidential involvement and monitoring to assure that relationship achieves rather than frustrates the objectives of this legislation.
The new Director of National Intelligence will have enormous responsibility. He or she will have to establish clear priorities for the intelligence community, and this will be reflected in the creation of additional national intelligence centers. These are the decentralizing units that have been established in the case of terrorism and counterproliferation and will be under the directive of the DNI to establish in other emerging threat areas. The DNI must also revise current budget priorities, particularly in areas such as research and development, to reflect response to our emerging threats.
He also will have to establish communitywide personnel policies that support the recruitment, training, and retention of the most effective intelligence community personnel.
Finally, there will be a responsibility here on the Congress. In the Senate, we have taken steps to reform our oversight of intelligence. No longer will there be an 8-year term limit. No longer will intelligence budgets go through the Defense subcommittee but, rather, through their own Appropriations subcommittees.
These are good starts. But we are also going to have to look at the culture of the congressional oversight committees, focusing much more on the future and the threats that are coming at us and relatively give less of our time to constant focus on the accidents that can be seen through the rearview mirror. By its nature, the intelligence community is going to create accidents from time to time. They need to be reviewed, but we cannot afford for them to be totally consuming in terms of our oversight responsibility. It is in the future that the threats are to be found, and it is our responsibility to be able to assure the American people that our intelligence communities are capable of identifying those threats and providing information to decisionmakers to mitigate the chances that those threats will become the next Pearl Harbor or the next 9/11 tragedy.
Madam President, in conclusion, I thank all the people who have played such a significant role. Obviously, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman deserve special notice. But there are many other people in this Chamber today, such as Senator Roberts and Senator Rockefeller, who have played a continuing role in seeing that our intelligence community is able to serve its responsibility to the people of America.
Thank you very much.
Yesterday was the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, which is remembered as one of the greatest intelligence failures in our country's history. The desire to prevent future Pearl Harbors helped lead to the creation of our national intelligence community in 1947.
In the 15 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been a growing awareness that our national intelligence community is in need of serious reform. Despite frequent reviews of the intelligence community's failures and structural problems--including the Hart-Rudman Commission; the Gilmore Commission; the Bremer Commission; the Congressional Investigation of 9/11; and the 9/11--there has been continued reluctance and resistance to reform.
Recent intelligence failures--most notably the failure to detect the September 11 plot, and the massive intelligence failures that led us to war in Iraq--have given new exposure to the problem and new momentum to reform efforts. I am extremely pleased that we are now in a position to enact serious intelligence reform legislation for the first time in over 50 years. I consider this legislation to be one of the most important enactments of my 18 years in the U.S. Senate. There are several elements of this legislation which warrant more detailed comment.
One of the most important aspects of this legislation is the element that Senator Roberts was just discussing--the need to centralize the intelligence agencies is not an end in itself, but a platform from which we can move to decentralize.
As the United States military transformed itself from the military of San Juan Hill and the World Wars, it first needed to centralize, under the National Security Act of 1947, consolidating the secretaries of the Army and Navy into the Department of Defense, and then to decentralize, under the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 into the joint commands of the modern military. Our intelligence community needs to transform itself and move from being designed around functions--such as electronic eavesdropping, or satellite surveillance--to a focus on missions, such as counterterrorism or counterproliferation.
This legislation makes the appropriate and necessary first step of centralizing the intelligence community under a Director of National Intelligence. It also lays the foundation for the next step, which is decentralizing the intelligence community through the establishment of mission-based intelligence centers. Two are established by statute-- Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation--and the legislation gives the DNI the power to establish other centers, to focus on those current or emerging threats he or she deems to be of priority importance.
Among the shortcomings referred to earlier, one of the first and foremost is obviously an underdeveloped capacity for gathering human intelligence. Our intelligence community has come to rely too heavily on electronic eavesdropping and satellite surveillance, and human intelligence has been neglected. A case could be made that both the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq were the products of our inadequate human intelligence capabilities. We must make a major effort to rebuild our capabilities, and this legislation begins to address that problem.
One of the most important elements of a human intelligence program is a corps of skilled and dedicated linguists. Unfortunately, while our intelligence agencies still possess a more-than-adequate number of Russian speakers, they lack individuals proficient in the Middle Eastern and Central Asian languages that are of obvious current importance. This legislation, along with language in the Defense authorization bill that establishes a Reserve Officers Training Corps counterpart for the intelligence community, helps to address this problem as well.
The third intelligence-related item deserving particular attention is the issue of excessive classification. I want to comment senator Wyden and Senator Lott, who were very involved in this aspect of the legislation. Our intelligence community has developed an unhealthy obsession with secrecy, and this has often led to bad analysis and bad decisions. This obsession with secrecy prevented intelligence agencies that had knowledge of various elements of the 9/11 plot from ``connecting the dots'' and realizing that a major terrorist operation was being plotted on American soil. This obsession with secrecy contributed to inadequate scrutiny of intelligence relating to Iraq, and as a result we went to war because of weapons that did not exist, and terrorist connections that appear to have been imaginary.
This obsession with secrecy poses a serious and continuing threat to our national security. As the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, ``Secrecy is for losers.'' If we do not want to lose in our struggle with the various threats we face today, we must abandon this unhealthy obsession. This legislation addresses this problem by directing that more rational guidelines for intelligence classification be established, and that an independent board be empowered to review these decisions. This is an important first step toward abandoning this dangerous obsession, and making sure that secrecy decisions are made for reasons of national security, rather than agencies trying to bury their mistakes.
Madam President, what we are doing today is an important step, but it is not by any means the last step. Some of these steps are rather tangential to the issue of intelligence reform. For example, this legislation includes a provision requiring face-to-face interviews with visa applicants. If we are to implement this provision effectively we must seriously consider increasing the capacity of our consular service. Currently, in Brazil, visa applicants must travel to one of three large cities in order to get a visa for travel to the United States.
Since Brazil is the size of the continental United States, and these three
cities are located close together, this is the equivalent of telling Americans who wish to secure a visa to Mexico that they must first travel to either Dallas, Chicago, or Cleveland. While it is probably not cost-effective to open new consulates in every city that might need visa services, we should at lest open more visa offices, so that these interviews can be conducted without unduly inconveniencing our foreign guests.
This legislation also includes a section addressing the United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia. It points out, and I quote, that ``the Government of Saudi Arabia has not always responded to promptly or fully to United States requests for assistance in the global war on Islamist terrorism,'' and particularly cities the Saudi government's inattention to the problem of terrorist financing. I would add that we have compelling evidence to believe that Saudi interests actually played a role in financing insurgents in Iraq and earlier the 9/11 hijackers. The extent of Saudi involvement in 9/11 was detailed in a twenty-seven page section of our 2002 joint House-Senate Intelligence Committees report on the attacks of September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, every one of those twenty-seven pages was classified. This means that the American people have, in that and other instances, been denied important information about our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I hope that this intelligence reform legislation calling for more dialogue on the U.S.-Saudi relationship is heeded, and that increased attention to this relationship will lead to greater transparency and candor.
Madam President, as I said in my farewell speech yesterday, in a quote from Winston Churchill, ``This is not the end, nor is it the beginning of the end, but it is perhaps the end of the beginning''. This Churchillian wisdom also applies to what we are accomplishing today. There is more that still needs to be done as we move beyond the end of the beginning of intelligence reform.
Let me start with the President's responsibilities. The President will have the responsibility for making a series of critical appointments, and he must appoint creative, dynamic and extremely hard- working people who can be effective in the challenging new roles that we are creating. He must also ensure that the people he appoints promote a value system that is conducive to open, honest and effective intelligence gathering and analysis. And he must also manage the relationships between the new DNI and existing department and agency heads--most notably the Secretary of Defense--in order to ensure that the goals of intelligence reform are realized.
The new DNI will also have tremendous responsibility. He or she will have to establish clear priorities for the intelligence community, and this will be reflected in the National Intelligence Centers that are created to work, alongside the National Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Centers. The DNI must also revise current budget priorities, such as the research and development budgets, and establish community-wide personnel policies that support the recruitment, training and retention of effective intelligence community personnel.
Finally, there will be a responsibility here on the Congress. In the Senate we have taken steps to reform our oversight of intelligence. Terms limits on the Intelligence Committee have been removed. By creating a new appropriation subcommittee for intelligence we have freed the intelligence budget from its previously unbreakable link to the defense budget. These are good starts. But we will also have to look at the culture of the congressional oversight committees, and make sure that they direct their attention to the front windshield of the future, and the threats that are coming at us, and spend relatively less of their time on looking through the rear view mirror at accidents that have already occurred.
By its nature, the intelligence community is going to create accidents from time to time. They need to be reviewed. But we cannot afford for them to consume all of our oversight responsibility. It is in the future that new threats are to be found, and it is our responsibility to be able to assure the American people that our intelligence community is capable of identifying those threats, and of providing information to the appropriate decision makers, in order to prevent those threats from becoming the next Pearl Harbor, or the next 9/11.
Madam President, in conclusion, I would like to note that this bill would not have been possible without an extraordinary effort by dozens of members of Congress, the Joint House-Senate intelligence inquiry members and staff, the 9/11 Commission, and, particularly, the families of the victims of 9/11.
Today is a celebration of the success of urgently needed reform, finally overcoming the inertia of the status quo. But, this is only the end of the beginning. The President, the Congress, those Americans who do and will serve the intelligence community, bear the responsibility of ensuring that the promise of enhanced security through reformed intelligence is achieved. The fulfillment of this promise will be neither quick nor easy. The most important undertakings seldom are. But the goal is worthy of our most steadfast commitment to its attainment.
