Floor Statements

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess today from 3:30 to 5 p.m.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 2:15 p.m. today.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Baucus be recognized for up to 6 minutes as in morning business and then we return to the bill.

Mr. President, what is the pending amendment?

Mr. President, is there a pending amendment?

Other than those amendments that filled up the tree, there are no pending amendments; is that correct?

Mr. President, we are trying to work out a unanimous consent agreement so we can vote on the amendment of the Senator from Delaware, hopefully, at 5:30. We are attempting to work out a unanimous consent agreement. We do not have it yet.

I will suggest, if the Senator from Delaware is willing, because there is a reasonable chance we are going to get there, that he now describe his amendment and offer his amendment, and then--he cannot technically offer it, but he can describe his amendment--and, hopefully, we can get a unanimous consent agreement. If we do, he could then technically offer it.

So I would suggest that without offering his amendment, the Senator from Delaware describe his amendment, debate his amendment, in the hopes we can get a unanimous consent agreement to vote on that amendment at 5:30. We do not have it yet, but we are working on it.

If the Senator will yield, I don't believe there is an objection to the amendment. I think it is not in order at this moment to offer the modification.

If the Senator will yield.

Mr. President, I wish to briefly thank and commend the Senator from Delaware for his ongoing leadership in a very critical area, and that is the area of federalism in Iraq. He has made it clear in his amendment, he has made it clear in his remarks that the federalism he is referring to is the federalism which the Iraqis have placed in their Constitution.

There is no effort here to impose our view of federalism or an outside view of federalism on the Iraqis. It is their view of federalism, reflected in their own Constitution, that the Senator has viewed as a real potential solution to the violence in the provinces in Iraq.

So I wish to thank the Senator from Delaware, and perhaps at this point, if I could get the attention of the Senator from Delaware, in order to save time later, he and I have entered into a colloquy which doesn't need to be made part of the Record at this time, it could be put in the Record after the amendment is modified.

So I ask unanimous consent that after the amendment is modified to have printed in the Record a colloquy between myself and the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. President, the colloquy which we will offer then at a later time refers to two changes that have been made, or will be offered to the amendment by the Senator from Delaware, modifying his own amendment, which he has a right to do.

The first suggestion I made, which he has readily accepted, is to make it clear the federalism that is being referred to in his language is the federalism in the Iraqi Constitution as it now reads or as it may be amended. In

the event that the Iraqis' constitutional commission makes recommendations on that subject, and if those recommendations are accepted by the people, it is their view of federalism, in the current Constitution or in an amended Constitution, the word he added being ``final,'' that he is referring to. I thank him for that.

Also, I thank him for accepting language which makes it clear that the federalism he is referring to is a system of government that allows for the creation of Federal regions. The words that are now added, or would be added when it is modified are ``consistent with the wishes of the Iraqi people and their elected leaders.''

The reason I propose that is we have to be very clear that what the Senator from Delaware is focusing on is a Federal system which the Iraqi people either have adopted or will adopt. This is something consistent with their wishes, not ours. What we wish them to do is get on with their solutions, their political solutions. What the Senator from Delaware is so properly focusing on, and I think this Nation should be in his debt for it, is the potential of a Federal system as they designed it for addressing their problems.

We have seen the value of federalism here, but it is not our version of it that the Senator is talking about. It is the idea of federalism and how you are able to adjust powers between the central government and regions which has such potential for finally ending the violence in Iraq. He recommends it. We all, I hope, will support that as being a potential solution--not imposed on them but one which they have fashioned in their own Constitution, have adopted in their own Constitution, can amend in their own Constitution. That, it seems to me, is a very valuable contribution for which I commend the Senator.

He can offer, on our behalf, a colloquy at the appropriate time relative to the modification when it is offered.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I send a series of 34 amendments to the desk, which have been cleared by myself and the ranking member. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc, the amendments be agreed to, the motions to reconsider be laid on the table, and I ask that any statements relating to any of these individual amendments be printed in the Record.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I would like to honor the life of Dr. Edward M. Gramlich, who recently passed away at the age of 68. Dr. Gramlich was an outstanding and dedicated public servant whose expertise, knowledge, and counsel were highly sought after among the leaders of Michigan's economic and academic communities.

Dr. Gramlich will be best remembered as a pragmatic economist who championed the cause of consumer protection and sought to tighten mortgage lending practices. Appointed to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 1997 by President Clinton, Dr. Gramlich brought a balanced view to the Reserve Board that included a deep respect for consumer-protection issues. For years he warned of the looming crisis in the mortgage industry, citing excessive fees and high cost mortgages offered to those who could not afford them. In June of this year, while undergoing medical treatment, Dr. Gramlich published a timely critique of these practices entitled ``Sub-prime Mortgages: America's Latest Boom and Bust,'' which both assessed the issue and offered timely solutions to the problem.

In 2005, Dr. Gramlich resigned from the Fed to return as interim provost to the University of Michigan, where he enjoyed a decades-long affiliation. He held a number of distinguished positions there throughout his career, including as a professor of economics and public policy, chair of the Economics Department, and Dean of the Ford School of Public Policy. Other important positions included Dr. Gramlich's service as chair of the Air Transportation Stabilization Board after the attacks of September 11, 2001; deputy director and acting director of the Congressional Budget Office; senior fellow at the Brookings Institute; and director of the Policy Research Division at the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Prior to his work with the Reserve Board, Dr. Gramlich served as chairman of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. In that capacity Dr. Gramlich worked to urge legislators to clamp down on predatory lending practices and to toughen regulations on

banks and mortgage lenders. During his tenure at the Fed, his strong calls for regulation were often met with resistance from a system that favors industry self-regulation. Given today's mortgage and credit crises, we cannot help but wonder ``what if'' with respect to many of those decisions. In any event, as Congress and the States seek ways to grapple with the current situation, Dr. Gramlich's work on consumer protection issues and his insightful analyses will undoubtedly have significant influence.

Dr. Gramlich is mourned by many in Michigan and across the country, including his wife Ruth; his children, Sarah Howard and Robert; his parents, J. Edward and Harriet; as well as many other family members, friends, and colleagues. Dr. Gramlich made an extraordinary impact throughout his life, and I hope that those mourning this loss find comfort in the significant legacy he leaves behind.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on September 25, 2007, at 9:30 a.m., in order to conduct a hearing entitled ``Two Years After the Storm: Housing Needs in the Gulf Coast.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to hold a hearing during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 25, 2007, at 10 a.m. in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

The purposes of the hearing are to receive testimony on S. 1756, a bill to provide supplemental ex gratia compensation to the Republic of the Marshall Islands for impacts of the nuclear testing program of the United States, and for other purposes; and to receive testimony on the implementation of the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Marshall Islands.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 25, 2007 at 2 p.m. in room 406 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in order to conduct a hearing entitled, ``Green Jobs Created by Global Warming Initiatives.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 25, 2007, at 10 a.m., in room G-50 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to hear testimony on ``Home and Community Based Care: Expanding Options for Long Term Care.''

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 25, 2007, at 2:30 p.m., in order to hold a nomination hearing.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet in order to conduct a hearing entitled ``Strengthening FISA: Does the Protect America Act Protect Americans' Civil Liberties and Enhance Security?'' on Tuesday, September 25, 2007, at 9:30 a.m., in the Hart Senate Office Building Room 216.

Witness list:

Panel I: The Honorable J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC.

Panel II: James A. Baker, Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, Formerly Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Department of Justice Washington, DC; James X. Dempsey, Policy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology, San Francisco, CA; Suzanne E. Spaulding, Principal Bingham Consulting Group, Washington, DC; Bryan Cunningham, Principal, Morgan & Cunningham LLC, Greenwood Village, CO.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet in order to conduct a hearing entitled ``Judicial Nominations'' on Tuesday, September 25, 2007, at 2:30 p.m. in the Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226.

Witness list: John Daniel Tinder to be United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit; Robert M. Dow, Jr., to be United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for the Committee on Veterans' Affairs to be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, September 25, 2007, in order to conduct an Oversight Hearing on Persian Gulf Research. The Committee will meet in 562 Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on September 25, 2007 at 2 p.m. to hold a closed hearing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. President, I am proud to support this legislation today, which is so important for our Nation's water infrastructure. We need to repair and upgrade our waterways because so many of our businesses--and millions of jobs--depend on them. The bill would also help restore aquatic ecosystems and habitats, and it includes several provisions that are important for Michigan and the Great Lakes.

I wish to express my thanks to the chair and ranking member of the Environment and Public Works Committee, Senators Boxer and Inhofe, for their work on this bill. I also want to thank them for including a number of important provisions for the Great Lakes, one of the world's greatest natural resources. The Michigan and Great Lakes projects that I had requested, and which were included in the Senate bill, were retained in the conference report. Additionally, other important projects included in the House WRDA bill that I asked to be included in the conference report were retained.

I am also pleased that a provision that I added as an amendment to the Senate WRDA bill was retained in the conference report. This provision would expedite the operation and maintenance, including dredging, of the Great Lakes commercial navigation channels and infrastructure. This is a key provision because the Great Lakes are in the midst of a crisis: Freighters are getting stuck in shipping channels, other ships are carrying reduced loads, and some shipments have simply ceased altogether. This WRDA provision would work to address the very serious dredging backlog in the Great Lakes, which has been exacerbated by historically low water levels. I am also thankful that the bill includes a Sense of the Congress that states that the Corps' budget for dredging should be developed by using all available economic data rather than focusing on a single metric such as the amount of cargo being moved. I worked with the Senate bill managers to address this problem when WRDA was being debated on the Senate floor. At that time, the bill managers agreed to work with me to address this problem in the conference committee, and indeed they did. And for that, I am grateful.

Also of vital importance for the Great Lakes navigation system is a provision in the conference report that modifies the authorization to construct a second Poe-sized lock at Sault Ste. Marie, so that it will be constructed at full Federal expense for a total cost of $341,714,000. Two-thirds of the carrying capacity of the U.S. Great Lakes fleet is currently limited to the one large lock, the Poe lock. If the Poe lock should fail, shipping between Lake Superior and Lake Huron would essentially cease, and the steel industry, coal-reliant industries, and agricultural industries dependent on farm exports would be severely harmed. This authorization to waive the non-Federal cost- share requirement is an important step for ensuring the viability of the Great Lakes shipping infrastructure.

Another important provision for the health of the Great Lakes that was retained in the bill is a provision that authorizes the completion of the dispersal barrier to prevent invasive species, such as the Asian carp, from moving between the Mississippi River watershed and the Great Lakes. Further, the bill directs the Corps to operate both barriers I and II at full Federal expense and provides credit to those States that provided funds to begin construction of barrier II. The bill also directs the Corps to conduct a feasibility study on other ways to prevent the spread of invasives between the Great Lakes and Mississippi River.

The bill also retains a Senate WRDA provision that I have been working on for many years: the improvement of Michigan's water and sewage infrastructure. An authorization of $35 million is included in the WRDA conference report for a statewide environmental infrastructure project to correct combined sewer overflows, which is a major source of pollution in the Great Lakes and other waterbodies in Michigan. Combined sewer overflows carry both stormwater and sewage, and these can be discharged into streams, rivers, and lakes during periods of heavy rains. The $35 million provision in WRDA authorizes the Army Corps to partner with communities throughout Michigan to improve their sewer infrastructure. These improvements would not only benefit communities but would also help protect our precious water resources.

As the recent tragic collapse of a Minnesota bridge has made all too clear, the repair and modernization of this Nation's infrastructure needs to be a much higher priority. Just as roads and bridges need urgent repairs, we cannot wait further for authorizing important water projects that protect lives and property, support commerce and industry, and preserve and restore our environmental resources. We have waited 7 years for this bill. Now is the time to pass this bill, and it should not be held up by a Presidential veto, which I am confident the Congress would override.

While these important provisions, as well as several others that I have not mentioned, provide the authorization for addressing the dredging backlog in the Great Lakes, restoring the environmental integrity of our waters, and providing critical flood protection projects, the appropriations needed to make these provisions a reality are down the road. The next critical step is to appropriate the actual funding for these necessary projects.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

I also ask unanimous consent that the time of the quorum be equally divided and that apply retroactively.

Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

I suggest the absence of a quorum and equally divide the time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes.

There is a lot of disagreement about Iraq policy, how we got into the quagmire we are in there, the failure to plan properly, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, the lack of a plan for the aftermath and a number of other issues which have been the subject of great debate.

There is a consensus on a number of issues. It is that consensus which drives the Levin-Reed amendment. There is a consensus that we have an important stake in a stable and independent Iraq. Everyone agrees on that. The opponents of this amendment like to suggest that somehow or other the proponents are not interested in a stable and independent Iraq. It is exactly the opposite. We are as interested in that as are the opponents.

The question is, Are we moving in that direction? Is the current policy working or do we need to change course? Do we need to find a way to put pressure on the Iraqi leaders to reach political settlement as the only hope of achieving an independent and stable Iraq?

That is not the proponents of this amendment who are saying a political settlement is not the only hope of ending the violence and achieving stability, that is not just the proponents, that is a consensus point. General Petraeus acknowledges that very openly. The Iraq Study Group says that. General Jones and his group say that.

There is no solution that ends the violence that is not based on a political coming together of the Iraqi leaders. They have to accept responsibility for their own country. They have to meet the benchmarks they themselves have set for themselves. They have missed those benchmarks and the timelines that were set out by themselves for those benchmarks.

We have to change course because we have been through now longer than we fought World War II, we have been there longer than we fought the Korean

war, we have spent half a trillion dollars or more, we have lost almost 4,000 of our brightest and bravest men and women, seven times that many wounded, $10 billion a month.

We have to change the dynamic in Iraq, and that dynamic can only be changed when those Iraqi leaders realize the open-ended commitment is over. If we simply say, as the President says: Well, we will take another look in March, we will see what direction we are going to go in March, whether we are going to reduce our presence below the presurge level, but we will do that in March, that is a continuation of the message which this administration has been delivering to the Iraqi leaders year after year: We are going to be patient. We are going to be patient. The President has, a dozen times, said the American people need to be patient.

It is the opposite message that has a chance of working for the Iraqi leaders, that we are mighty inpatient here in America, with the dawdling of the political leaders in Iraq, who are the only ones who can achieve a political settlement. We cannot impose that on them, only they can reach it.

If they keep thinking we are not going to put the pressure on them, we are going to be their security blanket, we are going to protect them in the Green Zone, we are going to continue to lose our lives and squander our resources while they dawdle, they are making the major fundamental mistake which is going to keep the violence going.

We have to correct that. We have to change that. We have to force those leaders to accept the responsibility for their own country.

Now, the Iraq Study Group pointed to the relationship between putting pressure on the Iraqi leaders and having them reach an agreement. This is what the Iraq Study Group pointed out now almost a year ago: That an open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi Government the incentive it needs--the incentive it needs--to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence.

I yield myself 1 additional minute. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraq Study Group said, the Iraqi Government might continue to delay taking those actions.

That is the connection this amendment makes. What Levin-Reed says is: We are not going to withdraw precipitously, we are not going to totally withdraw, we have interests there that require us to keep some troops there. But we have the need to change that mission.

The President talks about the possibility, but he does not do it now. He does not say: we are announcing we are going to change our mission to a support mission, out of the middle of a civil war. We are going to change our mission to supporting our own people. We are going to change our mission to going after terrorists, a targeted counterterrorism mission, we are going to change our mission so that we are going to, yes, continue to support the Iraqi Army, to supply the Iraqi Army, but we are getting out of the middle of a sectarian battle for our sake and for the sake of the Iraqi people, to force those leaders to take responsibility for their own nation.

So it is not precipitous. We provide a reasonable timeline. We say the troops that need to be withdrawn as part of that transition to those new missions will be withdrawn within 9 months.

Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, Senator McCain and I have had discussions with our leader, and I assume on their side, and this course of action has been cleared. Here is what we are proposing to do: The Biden amendment is going to be laid down today. There will be perhaps an hour or so on that amendment--perhaps more; there is no time limit on debate today. There will be no more votes today, as the leaders announced. But on Monday, we will make an effort--let me go back. On Tuesday at 10 o'clock, we are going to have a unanimous consent agreement that the Biden amendment will be voted on at 10 o'clock on Tuesday. That is going to be part of a unanimous consent agreement that is being prepared.

In addition, in terms of the Lieberman-Kyl amendment, there will be some debate on that today, and on Monday, and we will make an effort to see if we can't agree on a time certain on Tuesday, after the Biden amendment is disposed of on Tuesday. But we can't commit to that now. We will make a good-faith effort on Monday to set up that time on Tuesday, after the Biden amendment is disposed of.

Mr. President, I agree with my good friend from Arizona on the need to move forward. We have literally hundreds of amendments we are working on. At some point next week we are going to have to find a way to end this. We have made efforts with unanimous consent proposals to cut off on amendments, but they have been objected to, and then more flood in. We have to get to an end point.

However, in reference to the Wounded Warriors legislation, there is a separate bill on which I think appointing conferees has been cleared on this side. I am wondering if the Senator from Arizona might check with his side to see whether the appointment of conferees could be cleared. I think it will be part of this bill at the end. It is important that we move this bill for a lot of reasons, including that one.

But we have a fallback. We have a safety valve. We also have a separate bill which we would like to get to conference, and if the ranking member could check on the Republican side and see if we can get the clearance for the appointment of conferees, it may give us some momentum.

Mr. President, in the aftermath of the Virginia Tech massacre, Virginia Governor Tim Kaine commissioned a panel of experts to conduct an independent review of the tragedy and make recommendations regarding improvements to Virginia's laws, policies and procedures. Late last month, the Virginia Tech Review Panel released its report.

The panel was given the difficult task of reviewing the events, assessing the actions taken and not taken, identifying the lessons learned, and proposing alternatives for the future. This included a detailed review of Seung Hui Cho's background and interactions with the mental health and legal systems, as well as the circumstances surrounding his gun purchases. Additionally, they assessed the emergency responses by law enforcement officials, university officials, medical examiners, hospital care providers and the medical examiner. Finally, the panel reviewed the university's approach to helping families, survivors, students and staff as they deal with the mental trauma incurred by the tragedy.

Among other things, the report points to weak enforcement of and gaps in regulations regarding the purchase of guns, as well as holes in State and Federal privacy laws. It talks about the critical need for improved background checks and the inherent danger the presence of firearms can present on college campuses. Tragically, many proponents of gun safety legislation have previously unsuccessfully attempted to enact the very improvements recommended in the panel's report. The tragedy at Virginia Tech underscores the need to strengthen gun safety laws. I urge Congress to wait no longer in taking up and passing sensible gun legislation.

I ask unanimous consent to include the Virginia Tech Review Panel's primary recommendations regarding firearm laws in the Record.

VI-1 All states should report information necessary to

conduct federal background checks on gun purchases. There

should be federal incentives to ensure compliance. This

should apply to states whose requirements are different from

federal law. States should become fully compliant with

federal law that disqualifies persons from purchasing or

possessing firearms who have been found by a court or other

lawful authority to be a danger to themselves or others as a

result of mental illness. Reporting of such information

should include not just those who are disqualified because

they have been found to be dangerous, but all other

categories of disqualification as well. In a society divided

on many gun control issues, laws that specify who is

prohibited from owning a firearm stand as examples of broad

agreement and should be enforced.

VI-2 Virginia should require background checks for all

firearms sales, including those at gun shows. In an age of

widespread information technology, it should not be too

difficult for anyone, including private sellers, to contact

the Virginia Firearms Transaction Program for a background

check that usually only takes minutes before transferring a

firearm. The program already processes transactions made by

registered dealers at gun shows. The practice should be

expanded to all sales.

Virginia should also provide an enhanced penalty for guns

sold without a background check and later used in a crime.

VI-3 Anyone found to be a danger to themselves or others by

a court-ordered review should be entered in the Central

Criminal Records Exchange database regardless of whether they

voluntarily agreed to treatment. Some people examined for a

mental illness and found to be a potential threat to

themselves or others are given the choice of agreeing to

mental treatment voluntarily to avoid being ordered by the

courts to be treated involuntarily. That does not appear on

their records, and they are free to purchase guns. Some

highly respected people knowledgeable about the interaction

of mentally ill people with the mental health system are

strongly opposed to requiring voluntary treatment to be

entered on the record and be sent to a state database.

Their concern is that it might reduce the incentive to seek

treatment voluntarily, which has many advantages to the

individuals (e.g., less time in hospital, less stigma, less

cost) and to the legal and medical personnel involved (e.g.,

less time, less paperwork, less cost). However, there still

are powerful incentives to take the voluntary path, such as a

shorter stay in a hospital and not having a record of

mandatory treatment. It does not seem logical to the panel to

allow someone found to be dangerous to be able to purchase a

firearm.

VI-4 The existing attorney general's opinion regarding the

authority of universities and colleges to ban guns on campus

should be clarified immediately. The universities in Virginia

have received or developed various interpretations of the

law. The Commonwealth's attorney general has provided some

guidance to universities, but additional clarity is needed

from the attorney general or from state legislation regarding

guns at universities and colleges.

VI-5 The Virginia General Assembly should adopt legislation

in the 2008 session clearly establishing the right of every

institution of higher education in the Commonwealth to

regulate the possession of firearms on campus if it so

desires. The panel recommends that guns be banned on campus

grounds and in buildings unless mandated by law.

VI-6 Universities and colleges should make clear in their

literature what their policy is regarding weapons on campus.

Prospective students and their parents, as well as university

staff, should know the policy related to concealed weapons so

they can decide whether they prefer an armed or arms-free

learning environment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after Senator Boxer offers an amendment related to the subject matter of the pending Cornyn amendment, the Boxer and Cornyn amendments be debated concurrently for 20 minutes, with the time equally divided and controlled between Senators Boxer and Cornyn or their designees; that no amendments be in order to either amendment; that upon the use or yielding back of time the Senate proceed to vote in relation to the Boxer amendment; that upon disposition of that amendment there be 2 minutes of debate prior to a vote in relation to the Cornyn amendment; that each amendment be subject to a 60-vote threshold, and if the amendment does not achieve 60 votes, the amendment then be withdrawn, with the above occurring without intervening action or debate.

I so modify the request.

If the Senator will yield for a moment, on that point I agree totally with what he just said about the importance of this bill. We are circulating a request to our Members on this side that no amendments be in order to this bill--that no amendments be filed after a certain point this afternoon, which I believe we have tried to identify as 3 o'clock. I don't know, I didn't have a chance to talk with my friend from Arizona about that, but hopefully on your side something similar could be hot-lined so we could bring this to an end.

We have literally 250 amendments already. We have disposed of a lot. We disposed of 50. We can dispose of more today at some point, but we can't have more amendments coming in than we are able to work out.

I hope on both sides we can get a unanimous consent agreement that no amendments will be in order to this bill in the first degree if they are filed later than a fixed time this afternoon.

I wish to join with Senator Boxer in saying that there is no way I know of that one can justify or rationalize the attacks on Senator Cleland or on Senator Kerry. You can't, I believe, do that by saying: Oh, no, they are in a political campaign; therefore, we can impugn their service because they run for office. To say it is different to impugn the honor of veterans such as Senator Cleland and Senator Kerry, it seems to me, is totally unacceptable. It is an effort to justify, differentiate, rationalize attacks which I consider to be abhorrent, just as I do the attack on General Petraeus, and I have said so very publicly. And this amendment, the Boxer amendment, makes it very clear that attacks on men and women who have worn the uniform honorably, attacking their service, their patriotism--this was not an attack on Senator Cleland's politics; this was an attack on his patriotism. Aligning him with Osama bin Laden in an ad is an attack on his patriotism. You can't just single out one attack which you dislike--and we all do, I hope; I hope we all condemn the ad in the New York Times. I have personally, and I feel very personal about it. I thought it was a disgraceful ad. But you can't just then say: But we are not going to talk about other attacks on men and women who have put their lives on the line, given up parts of their body, because they decide to run for public office.

No, I am afraid the Cornyn amendment is the effort to justify and rationalize something which cannot be justified or rationalized just because a veteran who has served honorably, put his life on the line, decides to run for public office. They are all disgraceful ads, and we ought to treat them the same way. They impugn the honor, integrity, and patriotism of real heroes.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate considers Feingold amendment No. 2924, which I understand will now be the matter before the Senate, there will be 2 hours of debate, with the time divided as follows: 90 minutes under the control of Senator Feingold or his designee, 30 minutes under the control of Senator McCain or his designee; that no amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote; that upon the--Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, it is our understanding--and Senator McCain and I have discussed this--that Senator Feingold will be recognized to offer amendment No. 2924.

I ask unanimous consent that there be 2 hours of debate, with the time divided as follows: 90 minutes under the control of Senator Feingold or his designee, 30 minutes under the control of Senator McCain or his designee; that no amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote; that upon the use or yielding back of time, without further intervening action or debate, the Senate proceed to vote in relation to the amendment, and that if the amendment doesn't receive 60 votes, it be withdrawn.

If the Senator will yield.

It is our hope to work out an arrangement so we can proceed next to the Levin-Reed amendment. If that is the situation, we would hope to work out a time agreement as well on that amendment. There are two other matters that we may want to try to dispose of--at least one other matter--prior to the Levin-Reed amendment. It is our hope as well, as the Senator from Arizona expects, that amendments that are Iraq related include the 60-vote requirement.

Mr. President, let me also add one comment to Senators. We have already, on this side, hotlined a unanimous consent agreement that no amendment would be in order to this bill, unless it is filed by 4 p.m. this afternoon--no first-degree amendment would be in order. We don't know what the response is. We hope all of the Democrats will agree to that. We believe that a similar unanimous consent request has been hotlined on the Republican side, but the ranking member would know that.

We hope that works, for the reason the Senator gave, which is that this bill is extremely important. We have been on it a long time. We are going to need a number of days, obviously, to resolve the hundreds of amendments

that are still filed and have not been resolved. We are working to clear amendments, and we need the cooperation of everybody.

Mr. President, I agree with much of the Feingold amendment, particularly as it relates to the desire to transition the mission of U.S. forces in Iraq and to commence the reduction of U.S. forces from Iraq. Indeed, I have long sought those actions in an attempt to put the Iraqi security forces in the lead and to bring pressure on the Iraqi Government to make the political compromises necessary for reconciliation among the three main Iraqi groups.

My concerns with the Feingold amendment are principally two. First of all, the mission to which U.S. forces would be limited after June 30, 2008, are too narrowly drawn and would not, in my view, allow our forces to carry out the missions that would be required. For example, I don't believe we should limit the duration and scope of targeted operations against al-Qaida as the amendment provides. I also don't believe we should preclude our forces from being embedded with Iraqi forces. I also believe the continuing mission of U.S. forces should include providing logistic support to the Iraqi security forces, which is prohibited by the Feingold amendment. In that regard, I would note that the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq that was led by retired Marine general Jim Jones specifically pointed out the logistic shortfalls of the Iraqi security forces and that they would need to rely on Coalition support for this function.

My second chief concern is that restricting appropriations for our military sends the wrong message to our troops who are performing so heroically on the battlefield in Iraq. It would also pose extraordinarily difficult decisions for our field commanders. They could be faced, for instance, with determining whether a member of the Iraqi security forces has ever been involved in sectarian violence or in attacks against U.S. forces, because if they were they could not be trained by our forces under the terms of the amendment. Indeed, an incorrect determination could subject the commander to violations of our antideficiency laws which prohibit the expenditures of appropriated funds except to specified purposes.

It is concerns such as these which lead me to vote ``no'' on the Feingold amendment.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate resumes consideration of H.R. 1585 tomorrow, Friday, September 21, that the time until 9:50 a.m. be equally divided and controlled between myself and Senator McCain or our designees; that the time from 9:50 to 10 a.m. be under the control of the two leaders or their designees, with the majority leader or his designee controlling the final 5 minutes; that at 10 a.m., without further intervening action or debate, the Senate proceed to vote in relation to the Levin amendment, with no amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote; that the amendment be subject to a 60-vote threshold, and if it does not achieve that threshold, the amendment be withdrawn; that upon disposition of the Levin-Reed amendment, Senator Biden be recognized to offer his amendment; that whenever the Senate resumes consideration of the Biden amendment, there be 30 minutes of debate prior to a vote in relation to the amendment, with the time equally divided and controlled between Senators Biden and McCain, or their designees, with no amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote.

I ask the Senator to yield.

It is my understanding we are attempting to go back and forth when there are amendments on both sides, and that the floor manager, Senator McCain, would have the opportunity in any event to designate Senator Kyl to offer an amendment.

I would agree that that then be the next amendment, if that is his intent, after the Biden amendment is either disposed of or is pending, and for reasons that are obvious needs to be set aside, because it is not ready for resolution, then we would go to the Kyl-Lieberman amendment.

Madam President, parliamentary inquiry: Under the unanimous consent that is now in operation, it is my understanding the Levin-Reed amendment would be called up. Is that correct?

I call up the Levin-Reed amendment.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Madam President, as I understand it, there is no time agreement on this, other than that we complete debate today on the Levin-Reed amendment, except for the time allocated tomorrow morning?

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Biden amendment identified in a previous consent agreement be subject to a 60-vote threshold, and that if the amendment does not receive 60 votes, it be withdrawn.

Madam President, there isn't any dispute about whether a stable and independent Iraq is in our national interest. Some of us disagreed with the way we went to war with Iraq 4\1/2\ years ago. We have disagreed, many of us, with many of the Bush administration's policies in Iraq since then, including ignoring the advice of senior military leaders such as General Shinseki in planning the invasion, failing to properly plan for the occupation and its aftermath, disbanding the Iraqi Army, banning low-level Baath Party members from post-Saddam Government employment, failing to pressure the Iraqi leaders to meet the benchmarks and the timetable they set for themselves and, most recently, increasing the U.S. military presence in Iraq with the so-called surge, when we should be reducing our military presence.

But the challenge facing us now, given where we are today, is what is the best way to promote a stable and independent Iraq. Is the course we are on succeeding? So while the opponents of changing course argue that those of us who want to change course don't see the importance of a stable and independent Iraq, they are exactly wrong. We see the importance of it, but we see the current policy is failing to move us in the direction of a stable and independent Iraq. It is the status quo--

staying the course--that jeopardizes the goal of a stable and independent Iraq. So while there is disagreement on whether the current course is leading to a stable and independent Iraq, there is agreement--broad consensus--on the desirability of that goal.

There has also been a consensus for some time that there is no military solution to the sectarian violence in Iraq, and that the key to ending the violence lies in bringing about a political settlement among the various factions in Iraq today. Even Prime Minister Maliki recognized that fact a few months ago. This is what he said:

The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the

cycle of blood letting of innocents are the Iraqi

politicians.

That is the Prime Minister of Iraq pointing out that it is the failure of the Iraqi politicians that is resulting in the ongoing violence. President Bush said this last January. He said the purpose of the surge--the explicit purpose, the stated purpose of the surge--was to give Iraqi politicians ``breathing space'' to work out a political settlement.

It is also pretty much undisputed that the stated purpose of the surge--that explicitly stated purpose about giving the Iraqi politicians breathing space to work out their political settlement--has not been achieved. There are going to be arguments back and forth about how much military progress there has been on the ground, and there are statistics both ways. I accept General Petraeus's assessment--and I have been there recently--that there has been some military progress on the ground. But the purpose of the surge, the goal of the surge was to provide breathing space to the Iraqi politicians; and the more the surge has succeeded, the less excuse there is for the Iraqi politicians not working out their political misunderstandings.

So it works exactly the opposite way from what the opponents of this amendment say. To the extent the surge has succeeded militarily, it makes it less understandable, less excusable, and less acceptable for the Iraqi politicians to continue to dawdle. By the way, the President has kind of shifted ground in terms of the purpose of the surge, anyway. Now the goal of the surge is to provide security and help Iraqi forces to maintain it. So having failed in its purpose, which was to give the Iraqi politicians room to work out their political misunderstandings, now we have a much more open-ended goal: to provide security and help the Iraqi forces to maintain it.

Madam President, General Petraeus agreed in his testimony last week that the purpose of the surge--to provide breathing space to work out a political settlement--has not been achieved. He was asked a direct question and he gave that answer. He acknowledged the political settlement has not been achieved and that that was the stated purpose of the surge.

There has been a lot of debate on whether the current situation on the ground in Iraq shows significant progress in terms of security--by the way, even though, as I said, this can be argued back and forth, there has been a public opinion poll taken in Iraq. The Iraqi people have been asked that question--not by supporters or opponents of the policy but by ABC News. Here is what the poll results were, and this is the Iraqi citizens being asked whether they feel more or less secure as a result of the surge. Here is the analysis by ABC News:

The surge broadly is seen to have done more harm than good,

with 65 to 70 percent [of Iraqis] saying it's worsened rather

than improved security in surge areas, security in other

areas, conditions for political dialog, the ability of the

Iraqi government to do its work, the pace of reconstruction,

and the pace of economic development.

The result of the surge--or more accurately, the lack of political results--underscores the reality that there is going to be no end to the violence until Iraqi national leaders work out their political differences. As the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, under the leadership of retired Marine General Jim Jones, reported last week:

Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian

violence in Iraq.

The Iraqi politicians surely haven't done that. They have not kept the commitments they made to achieve political reconciliation by adopting legislation setting the dates for provincial elections, approving a hydrocarbon law, a debaathification law, and submitting constitutional amendments to a referendum.

I want to emphasize that the Iraqis' commitments to work out their key differences and the timetable to do so were their commitments and their timetable. So when Prime Minister Maliki complains that outsiders are not going to dictate to the Iraqi Government, what he is trying to do is obscure the fact that his own government set the benchmarks and timetables for themselves.

Back in January, when President Bush proposed the surge, this is what he said about the benchmarks and the need for the Iraqis to meet them:

America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it

has announced.

Last Thursday, we heard the same old song from the President. He said:

The [Iraqi] government has not met its own legislative

benchmarks, and in my meeting with Iraq leaders, I have made

it clear that they must.

Eight months after saying we are going to hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks, the President's words ring hollow. We are not insisting the Iraqi leaders keep their commitments, and there have been absolutely no consequences for the Iraqi leaders' failure to do so. James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and the rest of the Iraq Study Group recommended the following:

If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress

toward the achievement of milestones on national

reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States

should reduce its political, military, or economic support

for the Iraqi government.

Now, those were the words of the Iraq Study Group. That is exactly what is needed: consequences--clear, direct, and understandable consequences. But the only response to the Iraqi politicians' continued dawdling has been the repeated calls by the President for patience.

I make reference to a letter from the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, dated January 30, 2007. The question had been raised whether the timelines that were set by the Iraqi Government were in fact their timelines or ours. This is what Secretary Rice said about the timelines:

. . . Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed

upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks

and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were

reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and

referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document

(enclosed) was posted at that time on the President of Iraq's

website.

Madam President, we have been told by the--at least the public has been told by, I believe, the Prime Minister of Iraq that they are not going to accept America's timeline, that we are not going to impose a timeline on Iraq. What Secretary Rice's letter to me confirmed very precisely is that the Presidency Council of Iraq on October 16, 2006, adopted, reaffirmed--in her words, ``Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of . . . timelines.''

The dates are here. Here is the timeline.

September 2006: To form a review committee and to agree on a political timetable.

October 2006: Approve a hydrocarbon law and approve a provincial election law.

November 2006: Approve a debaathification law and approve provincial council authorities law.

December 2006: Approve amnesty, militias, and other armed formations law.

January 2007: Constitutional Review Committee completes its work.

February 2007: Form independent commissions in accordance with the constitution.

March 2007: Constitutional amendments referendum.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Rice to me dated January 30, 2007, be printed in the Record at this point, which makes the very clear statement that, No. 1, the timelines I have referred to attached to her letter are the Iraqi Government's timelines, and they formally adopted those.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that another letter that I will read a part of be printed in the Record at this point.

This is a June 13, 2007, letter to me from Secretary Rice. The setting for this--before I read this paragraph--is that Iraq said they never adopted those timelines, they never adopted those benchmarks. They contested what Secretary Rice said to me in the letter I am making part of the Record, dated January 30. I asked Secretary Rice about that. I said the Iraqis are saying you are wrong, that they didn't adopt the benchmarks. They say you are wrong, Secretary Rice. What do you have to say about that? She wrote me back:

Thank you for your letter inquiring about the benchmarks

that the Government for Iraq set for itself last fall.

I emphasize the words ``set for itself last fall.''

Addressing me, she wrote:

As you mentioned, I sent to you a letter in January in

which I noted that Iraq's Political Committee on National

Security agreed upon a set of benchmarks and an associated

timeline, which were reaffirmed by the Iraqi Presidency

Council in October 2006.

She continued:

We have confirmed with Iraqi President Talibani's Chief of

Staff that the benchmarks were formally approved last fall by

the Iraqi Political Committee on National Security. This

committee includes the Presidency Council--the President and

two Vice Presidents--as well as the leaders of all major

political blocs in Iraq. The Iraqi Presidency Council then

posted the benchmarks on its website for several months.

I have already made this part of the Record.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretary, which precipitated this response on June 13 also be printed in the Record.

Success in Iraq--creating a stable, independent Iraq-- depends on Iraqi leaders finally seeing the end of the open-ended U.S. commitment. The Iraq Study Group correctly pointed out almost a year ago that ``An open-ended

commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence.'' In the absence of such an

incentive, the Iraqi Government might continue to delay

taking those actions.

The President's current strategy is nothing less than stagnant because it is open-ended. It lacks the key ingredient of an action- forcing mechanism aimed at getting the Iraqi leaders to resolve their political differences. What is that mechanism? What is the mechanism that will finally force the Iraqi leaders to get on with the job of negotiating their political differences? It is action on our part, not just rhetoric, that clearly demonstrates to the Iraqi Government that our open-ended commitment to the American troops in the middle of their civil war is over, and that while we will provide support to their army, we have decided, as did the British, to transfer principal responsibility for security to Iraqi forces.

It is not good enough to do what the President did a few days ago and say we are going to take another look next March. That maintains the open-ended commitment. That does not have a timetable for the reduction of our troops to the levels which are necessary to carry on the missions which are identified.

The Jones Commission reported that ``The Iraqi armed forces . . . are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.'' The Commission went on to say that a number of Iraqi Army battalions that are capable of taking the lead are not in the lead. That was a fact acknowledged by General Petraeus in our hearings about a week ago.

The Commission did one other thing: The Jones Commission also recommended--and these are the keywords--``the size of our national footprint in Iraq be reconsidered'' and that ``significant reductions . . . appear to be possible and prudent.'' Those are the words of General Jones and his Commission that significant reductions in our presence appear to be prudent. This is a group of retired generals and police officers.

I asked General Petraeus about whether there are these units of the Iraqi Army that are capable of assuming greater responsibility, as General Jones's Commission said, but they have not done so. General Petraeus acknowledged that there were such Iraqi units. I asked him how many, and he said he would supply that number for the record.

The Jones Commission emphasized that ``there is a fine line between assistance and dependence.'' When I was in Iraq last month, I asked a young American soldier who is on his third deployment to Iraq what his ideas were about transferring greater responsibility to the Iraqis. His answer was:

The Iraqi soldiers will let U.S. soldiers do the job that

they're supposed to be doing forever, and we need to let them

do it on their own.

I could not agree more.

In addition to getting our troops out of the middle of their civil war, success also depends on a transition of missions. According to the Iraq Study Group:

By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected

developments in the security situation on the ground, all

combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be

out of Iraq.

That Commission proposed that a far smaller U.S. military presence would remain only for limited missions to include force protection, counterterrorism, and training the Iraqi security forces. I believe it is essential that transition to the limited missions be announced now as a way of ending this open-ended commitment which the Iraqi political leaders have taken to be such a security blanket and have taken them off the hook from doing something that only they can do--work out the political differences that divide them which, in the words of their own Prime Minister, the failure to do has resulted in the continuation of violence.

Everybody seems to agree that there is no military solution, and yet when it comes to telling the Iraqi political leaders that the open- ended commitment is over, we are not only going to begin to reduce our troops, but we are going to transition their mission and complete that transition in a reasonable period of time, not precipitous but in a reasonable period of time, and our amendment provides 9 months after enactment of this law, it is the only way--the only way--that this open-ended commitment can finally be brought to an end. So we not only have to transition to the limited missions and announce it now, we have to adopt a timetable for the completion of that transition.

Those are the key provisions of the amendment before us. It is the key to ending the open-endedness, and it is long overdue. Presenting Iraq's political leaders with a timetable to begin withdrawing our forces and transitioning those that remain from mainly combat to mainly support roles is the only hope that Iraqi leaders will realize their future is in their hands, not in the hands of our brave men and women who proudly wear the uniform of our country.

Taking this step will also recognize another fact of life: that the stress on our forces--especially the wear and tear on the Army and Marines--must be reduced. We cannot continue to deploy our forces at the current level without seriously weakening our ability to respond to other challenges that might confront us.

So how can Congress bring about a change of course in Iraq when President Bush delays and delays and delays making any change? A clear majority of the Senate indicated support for Levin-Reed last July when we voted 53 to 46 to cut off the filibuster of the Republican leadership against the Levin-Reed amendment. Madam President, 53 to 46 was the vote.

The Levin-Reed amendment required the Secretary of Defense to begin a reduction in the number of U.S. forces in Iraq not later than 120 days after the date of enactment. It would have also required a transition to a limited presence only to carry out the missions of protecting U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure, training, equipping, and providing logistics support--and those are important words--to the Iraqi security forces and engaging in targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida, al-Qaida affiliated groups, and other international terrorist organizations. The transition to the limited presence in mission would have had to have been completed by April 30, 2008. This reduction would have been implemented along with a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community.

The continued inability of the Iraqi Government to make any progress toward a political settlement and the refusal of the Bush administration to change course reinforces the need for the Levin-Reed amendment. So that amendment is now before us. It is essentially the same as the amendment we voted on last July. The changes in the timetable are slight to accommodate the fact that we are voting at a later time, essentially. We would require the reduction to begin no later than 90 days after the date of enactment and to be completed within 9 months of the date of enactment in order to adjust the timetable to be both clear and to respond to the fact that we will be voting on this months later than the last vote in July.

The challenge before us is to get to the 60 votes. Sixty votes is the goal that I guess almost all our Iraq legislation has to meet because of the filibuster that took place the last time we offered Levin-Reed and because the threat of that filibuster exists again.

The reality is that we are going to continue to plug away to get to those 60 votes. We hope we can get them on this version of Levin-Reed. It is a version which finally, if we can get to the 60 votes and defeat this filibuster, will change course in Iraq. The majority of us in this Senate have voted to change course in Iraq, in effect, when there were 53 of us who voted to end the filibuster last July.

The majority of the American people clearly want a change of course in Iraq. They do not want a precipitous withdrawal. They understand we are going to need some troops there for force protection and for training of the Iraqi Army and for providing logistics to the Iraqi Army and for some targeted counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaida, their affiliates, and other terrorist groups. The American people understand. They want something that is

planned in terms of reduction of our forces, and they want a timetable. What they want more than anything else is to get the Iraqi leaders to end their dawdling so our troops can come home.

Everybody wants a stable, independent Iraq. The course we are on now, the course of status quo, an open-ended course, the course of, ``well, we will figure out next July whether we want to go further, whether we want to go below the presurge level,'' that stagnant course is exactly the wrong signal to the Iraqi leaders.

The course the President is on keeps that open-ended commitment of American forces. It does not do what we must do, and because the President will not do it, Congress must do it, which is to tell the Iraqis that the future of their country is in their hands and we will continue to be helpful.

We have given them an opportunity they have not seized, and 4\1/2\ years later, almost 4,000 American troops have been killed, 7 times that many wounded, $600 billion now spent, $10 billion more every month. It has to come to an end. We want to bring it to a successful end. We cannot do it militarily. Every military leader says there is no military solution. There is only a political solution, and only the Iraqi political leaders can achieve it.

That is what this amendment will help to bring about, that final statement to the Iraqi leaders: We cannot save you from yourselves.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse.) The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I send a series of 24 amendments to the desk which have been cleared on both sides. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc; that the amendments be agreed to; that the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to any of these individual amendments be printed in the Record.

There are several Senators on the way over. The Presiding Officer, I know, looks forward to the continuation of the session with his good nature.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Of course, I withdraw the request.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators now be recognized in the following order: Senator Lieberman, Senator Smith, Senator Kyl.

Before Senator Kyl is recognized, before Senator Smith is recognized, under the current UC, we would then go to Senator Kyl. I ask unanimous consent that after Senator Kyl, Senator Kennedy be recognized on this side of the issue and that after Senator Kennedy, Senator Bill Nelson be recognized as the next speaker in support of the Levin amendment. If there is a speaker in opposition after Senator Kennedy, that Senator would then come immediately after Senator Kennedy and before Senator Nelson.

With that amendment, I offer that UC.

Mr. President, I understand this is going to be simply sent to the desk, it is then going to be read, and then we are going to set aside that amendment. That is understood by the Senator from Arizona?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment be set aside.

Mr. President, there is no time agreement. As I understand, there is an order of speakers.

Mr. President, I believe Senator Nelson was scheduled to be the next speaker on this side of the aisle. He had to do that before 7 o'clock, so he will be unable to take that position. Senator Kerry is next in line on this side. However, I understand he is going to yield to Senator Kennedy for a couple minutes for him to offer a unanimous consent agreement.

I thank Senator Kerry for his patience, as always. There is a lot of confusion and difficulty in scheduling speakers. He has been extremely patient. I appreciate it a great deal.

I wonder if Senator Kennedy can be recognized for a couple of moments to propound a unanimous consent request, and then Senator Kerry can be recognized.