Mr. President, I rise to make a number of points on the two Feingold bills which are before us. I will be happy, after I conclude my remarks, if my neighbor from Illinois, the majority whip, wants to come back and discuss some of the…
Mr. President, I rise to make a number of points on the two Feingold bills which are before us. I will be happy, after I conclude my remarks, if my neighbor from Illinois, the majority whip, wants to come back and discuss some of the points he made. I believe I disagree strongly with them. But I wish to take the time to lay out my views of what is happening in Iraq and in our battle against al-Qaida and why the two measures before us make absolutely no sense.
On the second Feingold bill, he asks for a strategy dealing with al- Qaida. Let me assure you, as the ranking Republican, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I know one of the most important elements we have in dealing with al-Qaida is to be able to listen in on their electronic communications. That is covered by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
On February 16, 2008, after being extended for an additional 15 days--and we agreed, the Republicans agreed, the President agreed to give an additional 15-day extension on the Protect America Act, but it expired. The Protect America Act which I was pleased to sponsor passed in Congress in August 2007 to provide a short-term legislative solution to intelligence gaps that were occurring because of the outdated Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, which put a 6-month sunset on the PAA to give Congress ample time to work on permanent changes to FISA.
Our Intelligence Committee, in September, immediately answered the call. We went to work, and after many discussions among staff on both sides, members on both sides, visits to NSA, and in close collaboration with the intelligence community, we passed out a
bill that was a strong bipartisan bill that would, with a few modifications, ultimately become the bill the Senate passed. The majority leader, however, did not act on this bill until the final days of the session in December. Even though it was passed out in October, on December 17 several Democrats led a filibuster preventing the Senate from considering this vital intelligence legislation.
I find it ironic that the assistant majority leader is now accusing Republicans of taking up postcloture time on S. 2633, the troop withdrawal bill, when it was one of his own members who filibustered even bringing FISA to the floor last December by demanding postcloture time that killed moving to the FISA legislation in 2007. And it aided in jamming us with a deadline of the expiration of the PAA. That was the Senate Democrats, not Republicans, who jammed this body on the FISA deadline.
Again, when Congress returned from its recess in January, the PAA was set to expire in a few short weeks. The majority leader did not take up this important legislation, however, but he went to a debate on the Indian health bill. With the original PAA deadline looming, a short 15- day extension of the PAA was agreed to with the understanding that both House and Senate would be able to act within that time.
Why the majority leader wanted to put the Senate up against this deadline, I have no idea. He claimed the Senate Republicans did that. Well, I can assure you that it is not the Senate Republicans who filibustered moving the bill in December and insisted on bringing up Indian health before FISA in January. Why was that done? We just passed Indian health recently. It was an important bill, but there was no deadline requiring us to bring up that bill before we went to FISA. Unfortunately, once we did get on the FISA bill, more time was wasted trying to come up with a bipartisan agreement on how to handle amendments.
Ultimately, the Senate passed its bill on Tuesday, February 12--5 days before the expiration of the Protect America Act. The Intelligence Committee bill has been available for review by both Houses since its passage in October. As I said, there are a few modifications in the bill passed by the Senate, but the authorities and concepts remained unchanged.
Additionally, Senate and House majority staff were in close coordination during the deliberation of our bill in the Senate. And it happened more than once, when we were trying to move forward on the Senate floor, that Democrats had to pull their staff out of meetings with our House counterparts to talk to us so we could move forward in passing the bill out of the Senate.
After we passed our bill, the House Speaker refused to allow the Senate's bill to come up for a vote, even after she failed to get agreement from her own body to extend the PAA a second time. The House refused to grant an extension. The Speaker spent the remaining period of time before the recess considering censure resolutions against current and former administration officials and debating and listening to the potential steroid abuse by Major League Baseball players. She had been assured by the majority of her colleagues in the House, Republican and Democrat, that they would pass the Senate bill were she to allow it to come up for a vote. Nonetheless, she allowed the Protect America Act to expire on February 16, and the House went home on recess, as we did in the Senate.
We all know the Senate's bill was passed by a strong, bipartisan 68- to-29 vote. As we all know, this bill goes further than ever before in providing a role for the FISA Court in foreign intelligence collection. It requires, for the first time in history, that the Government obtain a court order to target a U.S. person overseas. And let me be clear, this is not even a requirement in criminal matters, but it is for intercepting terrorist communications. We have gone further in protecting civil liberties than ever intended by Congress previously in FISA or other measures, permitting law enforcement authorities to listen in on conversations or intercepted communications of people engaged in criminal activities.
Finally, of the utmost importance, the Senate bill afforded civil liberties to those companies that aided us with the President's terrorist surveillance program following the September 11 terrorist attack. Why is this last point so important? Well, the events of this past week should make it clear that we need the voluntary cooperation of our private partners in order to collect timely intelligence. The PAA did not provide any civil liberty protections for those providers that assisted with the terrorist surveillance program. It did, however, give prospective liability protection to companies that complied with the directives while the PAA was in existence.
Let me address one point that has been brought up on the floor. The President authorized the use of the terrorist surveillance program under his constitutional article II authorities, which have been used consistently by many Presidents throughout history.
I understand--and I was not involved at the time--that the administration talked with the top leaders on the intelligence committees in both bodies, the Senate and the House, on a bipartisan basis, about trying to get the FISA law changed before they instituted collection. It was the advice of those leaders that the President not try to wait until we could amend and change FISA.
It is a good thing they gave that advice because, as we have seen, trying to get a long-term FISA amendment passed has taken an inordinate amount of time since we first were advised of the need to amend FISA last April when one of the courts involved in this issued an order saying that because technology had changed, we could no longer intercept communications of foreign terrorists whose communications, because of modern technology, came through the United States. That is what shut us down, and that is what still continues to bother us today. That still continues to limit us today, with the expiration of the Protect America Act.
Once the PAA expired, the liability protections as well as the Government's ability to compel assistance were thrown into doubt. Providers that were being threatened with hundreds of millions of dollars in damages from frivolous lawsuits because they helped their country after 9/11 began to delay or refuse assistance with directives under the now expired PAA. And who can blame them? These providers have a fiduciary obligation to their shareholders, and if the law becomes uncertain, as it now does with the expiration of the PAA, it becomes harder to satisfy those obligations, especially when they are faced with the ongoing frivolous litigation that was described here a few moments ago.
There is a very real difference between having the authorization to make the collections and being able to collect. Being able to exercise those authorities requires that the intelligence community have the full cooperation of the intelligence community and that the intelligence community have the full cooperation of the private telecom carriers.
Based on the opinions and legal documents I have read, they were required by law, by the Constitution, to participate. Yet having participated, now they are being faced with frivolous lawsuits which will, I am confident, never show any wrongdoing by the telecommunications companies. The purpose of these lawsuits is not to collect intelligence but, rather, to destroy the ability of the intelligence community to collect information by imposing unbearable public costs on the companies, threatening not only their reputations and potentially a very large amount of their shareholder value but also exposing their personnel and facilities here and abroad to retaliation by terrorist groups.
Finally, the lawsuits, which were applauded recently, have the very real potential of providing more information to terrorists on how we collect their electronic communications. The more we tell them about what we do to collect against them, the better off they are in being able to avoid those collections.
The Director of National Intelligence has told us that now, after a lag, the surveillance under existing directives has resumed. That is good news. But what this means for collection tomorrow, next week, or next month is simply unknown, especially if, for example, the need arises to issue a new directive to a new provider, if some new terrorist group, some new target comes
up not covered by previous orders. It is this uncertainty due to Congress's inaction that the DNI and the Attorney General have said is their greatest concern. Let me assure you, the providers share this concern. It is only because of the heroic around-the-clock efforts of the men and women of the intelligence community and the Department of Justice that the providers have agreed to cooperate for the time being, but it is only for the time being. We should not be lulled into thinking we have time, certainly not time for another extension of the 15 days after the 6-month sunsetting bill, to get this legislation to the President for signature. Just as easily, any one provider could decide at any one time that it is no longer in its business's best interest to comply with the Government's lawful request for assistance when the legal authority has expired. Losing the cooperation of just one provider could mean losing thousands of pieces of intelligence on a daily basis. Moreover, because we have already lost cooperation for several days, we lost the foreign intelligence information that will likely never be within our ability to recall.
What terrorist communications we have missed or will miss in the future because of this 1-week gap we cannot calculate. We do not know. I for one believe we were elected in Congress to establish the framework for protecting our national security and for encouraging assistance from our citizens to serve their country rather than encouraging or allowing a state of fear to fall upon our citizens and companies that would dare to assist their Government in a time of need.
Is this really the message we want to send? Do we really want to send the message: Don't help your country or you will get sued and your elected officials will condemn you? Isn't that really the main issue and the heart of the message here? I am afraid it is. I deeply regret that is what we are seeing on this floor.
Some in Congress, particularly in the House Democratic leadership, have asserted that even though the PAA has expired, the country is just as safe as we were after the PAA was enacted. They claim the procedures under FISA are more than adequate to allow the intelligence community to do its job. They point out that the certifications already issued under PAA do not expire until at least August. These arguments simply do not carry water. Those who claim we can revert simply to emergency FISA orders demonstrate they really don't understand how the FISA process works. The intelligence gaps that led to the need for PAA were caused not by backlogs in processing FISA warrants but because of the way FISA was being applied to foreign intelligence collection, and seeking emergency authorization is not simply a solution, as though the intelligence community could just tell the Attorney General they are intercepting terrorist communications and then build a case for probable cause. Rather, the intelligence community must first establish probable cause on each target before they go to the Attorney General for emergency authorization.
The problem prior to PAA--and it is the same problem that exists now that the PAA has expired--is that the probable cause standard cannot always be satisfied easily when we are talking about foreign terrorists, foreign terrorists who are not entitled to constitutional protections. Analysts who should be spending their time tracking the terrorists will be forced to expend countless hours, hundreds of hours, to develop enough information to support the FISA probable cause standard. We all understand the merits of a probable cause determination when we are talking about U.S. citizens. That is what the fourth amendment is all about. But when we are talking about foreign terrorists, applying such a standard absolutely makes no sense.
Is the House Democratic leadership really advocating a system that imposes unreasonable burdens on our intelligence analysts at the expense of our ability to track terrorists and affords foreign terrorists the same fourth amendment protections our own citizens have? I would hope not. The people I talk to back home don't think that makes sense. There is a lot of common sense around the country. When you go out and talk to people and you listen to them, you hear that common sense. They say: What are we doing, giving our constitutional rights to foreign terrorists who seek to harm us?
These points were reiterated this past week by the DNI and the Attorney General in their letter to House Intelligence Committee chairman Silvestre Reyes. The DNI and AG disagreed that FISA could be employed in place of the PAA, pointing out that it was ``the very framework that created intelligence gaps in the past.''
Further, just because existing authorities will continue in effect at least until August doesn't mean the intelligence community has the flexibility and authorities it needs to address future unknown threats or technologies. Having the authorization doesn't necessarily mean you have the ability, particularly in the situation in which we have placed our vital private sector partners who must cooperate with us.
As the DNI noted this weekend in an interview:
A new personality, a new phone number, a new location--we
now have to put it into the system to be able to collect that
information. That's the question, because the private sector
partners said nothing new. So we had to negotiate that
because what it created was uncertainty, and the position
from the private sector point of view, ``Am I protected?
Does the law allow you to compel me to comply?'' And when
the act expired last week, that's in question. And that's
why we feel that we are less capable of doing our job.
The immediate problem for the intelligence community is how to address this uncertainty so that new threats not covered under current certifications or directives may be pursued. And the DNI has told us this is no longer a hypothetical concern. While I cannot discuss details publicly, any Member may come to the Intelligence Committee's spaces for a classified briefing on this issue.
Simply to sum up on the second Feingold amendment--for the safety of our country, the safety of our troops abroad, the safety of our allies, the House must bring up and pass our bipartisan FISA bill now.
Turning to the first Feingold amendment, that is another one seeking to renew and rejuvenate a measure that we have voted down more than 40 times in this body: that we cut and run, that we declare defeat and retreat from Iraq. I thought it was interesting; this morning I saw a Presidential candidate on the trail stating that al-Qaida was not even in Iraq before we went in to take out Saddam Hussein. If you take time to get informed about what was going on in Iraq, as we have in the Intelligence Committee, you will know there was a very vibrant group, a very vibrant Islamic terrorist group called Ansar al-Islam. Its leader was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. We got to know him well because he was that vicious villain who beheaded his enemies on television. Innocent citizens, American troops, journalists, he took great delight in lopping off their heads in front of television.
And, yes, his group, Ansar al-Islam, picked up the major franchise. He joined officially what he had been unofficially, and that was an ally of al-Qaida. His group is now called al-Qaida in Iraq. They may have changed the name, but the people were there. The terrorists were there. David Kay went into Iraq after we deposed Saddam Hussein. He was sent there with a group called the Iraqi Survey Group to find out why we got the information wrong. There were wrong things in our intelligence. We made assumptions that weren't correct. But we missed other dangers, such as his ballistic missile program, the fact that he found Iraq to have been a very dangerous place in which terrorist groups were running loose and where Saddam's government had the ability to start a just-in-time inventory production of weapons of mass destruction.
The conclusion of the Iraqi Survey Group, which was discussed with us many times in the Intelligence Committee and was then stated publicly: Iraq was a far more dangerous place ever than we knew. That is what the best intelligence post-fall of Saddam Hussein had to say for those who question why we went in. We didn't get it all right. But we had enough right to make the right decisions. From the intelligence we know now, al-Qaida was not only in Iraq before we went in, it is the primary danger we fight there now, and its leaders have said repeatedly
that they want to make their headquarters for their worldwide caliphate in Iraq.
Fortunately, our military leaders have developed a strategy that is working against them: General Petraeus, the surge and, most importantly, the counterinsurgency strategy, COIN, to go in, clear, hold, and build.
We can't just knock out a terrorist activity. We have to go in and make sure al-Qaida doesn't come back. We have to go in with Iraqi security forces to make sure the area can be safe so they don't come in and retaliate against citizens who cooperate with us.
We have been hearing on the floor some very compelling testimony by my colleagues who have recently returned from Iraq about the tremendous progress that has been made there. My last trip to Iraq was in May of 2007. We saw, when our Intelligence Committee was there, the beginning of a turnaround that showed that the COIN strategy of General Petraeus was working. But last night, I had an opportunity for an extensive conversation with a Marine combat platoon commander who went back to Al Anbar province in March of 2007, having left there 1 year previously after spending 13 months there on his first tour in Fallujah.
In March of last year, it was a very difficult situation, and al- Qaida was still hanging on to control in Al Anbar. The Marine platoon commander had left there in February 2006. We were working toward progress, but then al-Qaida bombed the Golden Mosque at Samarra and the ensuing chaos allowed al-Qaida to establish a firm foothold in Al Anbar and served up grave sectarian stress.
Things began to change in the spring with the COIN strategy. American and Iraqi forces were clearing, holding, and building, embedded in the communities they had cleared. As of May of last year, Marine outposts and Iraqi Army outposts were still being bombarded with mortars, threatened by IEDs, and continually harassed by small arms fire, a deadly combination of attacks on them. But when the American troops demonstrated they came in to clear and help Iraqis hold a secure area, things started changing dramatically. Iraqi security forces began working better among themselves and with their forces. There was much greater civilian cooperation, and Iraqi civilians became our most vital source of intelligence. That intelligence, combined with the good work of the Iraqi security forces and Marine action, essentially eliminated most of the kinetic threats, the killing threats.
By the end of July 2007, the Iraqi Army was no longer needed in Al Anbar and moved on to other areas to chase al-Qaida. They turned the security in Al Anbar back to the Iraqi police, backed up by the Marines.
This began a very positive trajectory that continued throughout the time the platoon commander was there. In the last 4 months he was there, he said the 2nd Battalion 6th Marines did not suffer any injuries from hostile kinetic attack--mortars, IEDs, small arms fire. But probably the most important thing was that al-Qaida lost its traction. It was denied the assistance and support of local populations. And for the Iraqis, the most significant thing was the Iraqis were much safer themselves, having less to fear from the terrorists who killed Muslims as freely as they killed Americans.
In my view, that is a military strategy for success. Al-Qaida forces must be driven out wherever they amass to mount attacks against us or our allies or peaceful Iraqis. Iraqis are taking over security with their Army and police. We must continue to train and support them and back them up when al-Qaida amasses forces against them. That is essential.
Al-Qaida will not go away anytime in the near future. But right now the military battle is in Iraq, and we must continue to strengthen the ISF to fight al-Qaida jointly with them and enable the ISF to do the basic job of assuring security and stability in Iraq. Al-Qaida will no doubt try to establish other beachheads, and we will attack them where we find them.
That is our military strategy. That depends upon good intelligence. That depends upon the passage of FISA. Our intelligence strategy is clear. We must have the FISA bill, and it is time for the House to act. It is the only way we can monitor top-level communications of al-Qaida leaders.
Working with our Pakistani allies, we have seen the death recently of Abu Laith al-Libi, the fifth-in-line operational chief of al-Qaida, who became eliminated. Fortunately for us, the operational leaders, the ones who give the orders, are taken out on a regular basis because we can get the information on them and we can work with our allies to take them out.
I would say, parenthetically, we need a clear, hold, and build strategy wherever terrorism threatens. That means before a radical group steps up and takes over a country. That means we must reject protectionist calls from those who would stop American economic ties and development activities, educational exchanges, with Islamic and Third World countries where terrorism seeks to gain a foothold.
What we call smart power is the essential element in maintaining long-term safety and security. The battle against terrorism is 20 percent kinetic. That is what our military does so well, and we are doing it well in Iraq. We need to be aggressive in going after their kinetic threats, against terrorists. We need strong intelligence activities. But 80 percent of the battle is economic development, personal contact, educational exchange, helping those countries know we are with them in partnership to assure their democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity through free markets in their countries. That strategy is working in Iraq, and we need to apply that strategy wherever the danger exists or where it may exist.
What is working in Iraq right now? We have seen the COIN strategy. Attacks by insurgents and rival militias have fallen by 80 percent in Baghdad. Our marines have returned from Al Anbar on success, having routed al-Qaida. Al-Qaida once controlled big chunks of Iraq and is now fighting to maintain its last stronghold in the country in Mosul. According to senior Iraqi military officials, concrete blast walls that divide the capital can soon be removed.
These dramatic security improvements and our COIN strategy have, as intended, created an environment in which Iraqi political leaders can reconcile. Everybody wanted to see them act quicker than this body, Congress, can act. They passed a debaathification law, a provincial election law, an amnesty law, a $50 billion budget. These things are going to go through the political process. One of them was vetoed. But they are making the process work, and that is what we can expect, not that they will move more efficiently and effectively than we do.
Despite all the progress, some on the other side remain unwavering in their commitment to withdrawal. The artificial deadlines, timelines would jeopardize Iraq's very real chances that it will emerge as a secure and stable state.
Are the Democrats so intent on denying President Bush a victory for a war they insist is his that they would deny their own country a now achievable victory--a secure and stable Iraq? Trying to blame the Iraq war on Karl Rove is a political shot that has to be dismissed as nothing more.
The Iraqi Government has its problems, and there is too much sectarianism in the Government and the Iraqi Security Forces. But saying the benchmarks have not been met--and damning the war to failure on that basis--is shortsighted, defeatist, and yesterday's sound bite. We do not need any more sound bites. We do not need any more political campaigning on keeping our country safe. It is time we got serious about assuring our troops they have the support they need and that our intelligence agencies have the ability to use their full capabilities, technical capabilities in partnership with the private companies, to make sure we get the best intelligence available.
No responsible Iraqi official thinks we can leave now, nor do our U.S. commanders, and nor do any responsible world leaders, regardless of whether they felt we were right to go into Iraq in the first place.
If you think our world standing has gone down as a result of Iraq, watch it take a nosedive if we pull out precipitously and irresponsibly, leaving a mess in our wake: Chaos, widespread killing, potential regionwide sectarian
wars, and the reestablishment of an al-Qaida safe haven, a caliphate.
The same people who were wrong about the surge a year ago are determined to remain wrong about it now. We must defeat the retreat- and-defeat resolution. We must defeat an effort to establish our al- Qaida fighting strategy in public. We have a strategy. Anybody who wants to learn about it can learn about it. Some of it is classified. We are not going to talk about it publicly. But I join with my colleagues in urging defeat of both the Feingold amendments.
Now, Mr. President, I yield the floor for my colleague from Florida.