Reserving the right to object, first, let me clarify, this is not classification---- Mr. President, I want to join in support of the chairman of the committee. It is important to realize this was not classified after the fact. This was…
Reserving the right to object, first, let me clarify, this is not classification----
Mr. President, I want to join in support of the chairman of the committee. It is important to realize this was not classified after the fact. This was classified information.
Now, we cannot say on the floor why this must remain classified. There are good and sufficient reasons for this, unlike some of the other cables which have been cited by the distinguished vice chairman of the committee, why this one should not be released.
We are witnessing something here that is very, very disturbing. The minority leader said that partisanship is the order of the day because we have objected to this unwarranted effort to misuse and abuse the intelligence process to score political points. This approach, regrettably, is something that has been used going back to 2003 when the Democratic staff in the Intelligence Committee laid out a partisan political game plan to use intelligence to try to beat President Bush and Vice
President Cheney in 2004. They laid out a game plan and they stayed on it. They stayed on it through phase I. Phase I took 2 full years during which we exhaustively examined all of the documents, interviewed anybody that might have information on whether there was an intentional misleading or misrepresentation or pressure to change the estimates of the intelligence analysts and thwart the process.
We reviewed that process exhaustively. At the end of it, our bipartisan conclusion was there was no evidence of any pressure to change findings of the Intelligence Committee; there was no effort to mislead or misuse the information of the intelligence analysts or the intelligence estimates.
Regrettably, our Democratic colleagues were not satisfied with that. They wanted to continue the battle. So we initiated a second backward look into history that I think was a tremendous waste of time--phase II--to go back and say: Well, maybe we missed something. We are going to go back and look at the intelligence prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom and see if we can't find some misstatement, some misstep by the administration.
Well, President Bush is not running again. I don't know whether they want to try to impeach him or whether they just want to try to score points in the 2006 election campaign. But whichever thing they are doing, it is a blatant partisan effort to take what should be the bipartisan, even nonpartisan, Intelligence Committee and drag it through the political mire of name-calling and rock-throwing.
I think it is time for us to hit the baloney button on this and say: We have wasted now 2 more years in the Intelligence Committee going back and trying to defeat or impeach President Bush, and we have not been successful.
Let me mention something about this. All of this hype is about things that were added--much of it is about things that were added as comments to one of the two reports that we reported out of the Intelligence Committee. The Democrats chose to make extraneous allegations now that will be considered in a later report that is yet to be finalized by the committee, to look into statements made by administration officials and Members of Congress, to see whether they were inaccurate or if there was a misuse of the intelligence estimates that were available at the time. I have looked at them and I have seen some significant overstepping in statements that were made. Regrettably, those statements primarily came from Members of Congress, some on the other side of the aisle, who went too far. They went beyond what the intelligence estimates said.
Now, we have focused in this process on what the final intelligence estimates were. There are thousands--perhaps hundreds of thousands--at least tens of thousands of operational cables. They bring in different points of view. There are 16 different intelligence agencies that may have points of view. Do those all come to the policymakers? Of course not. The intelligence community is responsible for coming up with a National Intelligence Estimate, a community assessment that goes to the policymakers, whether that is the President, the Vice President, or this body. We get the final product.
Now, any time you want to, you can go back and look at all kinds of operational cables. You can find cables at any one time saying it is daytime and others say it is night, a third one saying it is dusk, and a fourth one saying it is dawn. But that is not what is given to the policymakers.
We ask the Intelligence Committee to use their best judgment. And as far as this cable, which has been properly classified--and we will not go into why it is properly classified--this cable was one communication to the headquarters, and it was not the only one. There were many, many more.
Looking back on it, we have a much better idea of what went on. But the whole purpose of this, the whole purpose of our Democratic colleagues in phase II, was to find grounds to defeat President Bush in 2004 or perhaps impeach him in 2006 or maybe in 2007. Well, we have been looking in the rearview mirror far too long. We have been looking backwards. We spent 2 full years, the staff of the Intelligence Committee spent hundreds of hours, reviewed tens of thousands of documents, over 1,000 interviews, and they found that there was no misuse, no abuse of the intelligence process, no pressure on the analysts.
So we have a lot of things that we ought to be doing. We have a lot of work in the Intelligence Committee because we have to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. One of the key recommendations concerning intelligence in the 9/11 Commission report was to set up a national security post in the Department of Justice to coordinate between the FBI and the CIA. Regrettably, our colleagues on the other side of the aisle are holding up the appointment of the man who is supposed to fill that position to ensure that there is good information and good exchanges of information between the FBI as a law enforcement body and the intelligence agencies. And we have a lot of other things to do because there are still problems that we have to work out in the new structure of the Director of National Intelligence.
I have been asking plaintively why we cannot look at the continuing threats, do oversight and deal with some of the questions and problems we have. The answer is we have to complete phase II, and phase II has had, again, hundreds and hundreds of hours of work by our staff, work that could have been used on other points. Regrettably, what we are hearing on the floor and what we are seeing in some of the reports coming out of the Intelligence Committee is an effort to politicize intelligence. I deeply regret the fact that so much of this has been misquoted in the report issued, the largely Democratic report issued from the intelligence community. There was a tremendous amount of cherry-picking of selected pieces of information that did not come from the National Intelligence Estimates, to say that statements by some administration officials were not based on sound evidence.
We have learned a lot. We have learned a lot since we went into Iraq. We learned that our intelligence wasn't good, state-craft and trade- craft were not properly executed. Where there were dissenting views, those dissenting views were not conveyed up the line to the policymakers. That was us and that was the administration. And we are trying to change that. We are trying to make sure that dissenting views are explored, that policymakers know if there is a division.
Now, looking back with hindsight, we could say that many of the statements made here on the floor and made by the administration were not accurate. The question is, Were they based on the best National Intelligence Estimates at the time? We found out in phase I that they were.
The effort to do more declassification is very important. The chairman of the committee, Senator Roberts, Senator Wyden and I and the vice chairman have asked the Public Interest Declassification Board and the National Archives to look at and investigate what has been classified to see if more of it could be declassified. Because I, as most of my colleagues, want to have as much that is not sensitive or revealing sources and methods to be disclosed, so we can evaluate where we stand. But for this one, I understand full well the reason it is classified, and I am not going to say why. But when we disclose intelligence, we risk sources. Unfortunately, when we prosecuted the 1993 World Trade Center bombers, the prosecution had to turn over a list of 260 names of potential suspects. They turned it over in that court proceeding and, subsequently, several years later in a raid in an African nation they found in the al-Qaida playbook the names of all these people. When we disclose who we are talking to, their names get disclosed. And regrettably, some of them have been murdered. But it is not just the individual source who is at risk.
We have repeatedly chipped away at the confidence of our allies to work with us in the war on terror by disclosing sources and methods over the years. Friendly services are saying--and CIA leaders have told me directly--that our allies in the field are rethinking if and to what extent they can work with us because the Americans cannot keep a secret. This effort to declassify operational traffic involving overseas entities could devastate the confidence of our allies in cooperating
with American intelligence and obliterate the confidence of American intelligence officials in the United States Congress, who will be taking their discrete communications among themselves and broadcasting it to the entire world.
I can't think right now of a single more devastating action that will reverse what we have been trying to fix in the U.S. intelligence community than this, to say that if you share anything within the intelligence community or even with the Intelligence Committee, it is going to get out. People don't want to share the most sensitive intelligence when it could get out and not only disclose the information, but put at risk the sources and methods by which it is being obtained.
For that reason, I regret that the minority leader has attempted to make a partisan battle out of something that did not have to do with the National Intelligence Estimate. It was not a final product of the Intelligence Committee. Therefore, it had no place in the effort to determine what kind of information got to the top policymakers in the administration.
There were lots of conflicting pieces of information going through the chain. What we properly looked at was how those were handled and what they gave to policymakers. There is no evidence, no evidence, none, zero, zip, none--that this evidence was ever shared with the top policymakers.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, could I ask the distinguished Senator from Illinois a question? On what page is there a bipartisan statement that there was no connection between al-Qaida and Iraq?
Because we also found in there a reference that there was a meeting and two contacts.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for calling my attention to page 63. I don't see the information there. It does, on page 65, talk about George Tenet saying the intelligence indicates that the two sides at various points discussed safe haven, training, and reciprocal nonaggression. And in the report there are three instances of contact cited between al-Qaida and the Iraqi Government.
I also would just follow up on my statement that some of us in this body were misled by the inaccurate intelligence estimates presented to us by the community. For example, I see this classic statement:
When you look at what Saddam Hussein has had at his
disposal in terms of chemical, biological and perhaps even
nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to
the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism
throughout his reign.
That was from Senator Dick Durbin on ``CNN Larry King Live,'' on December 21, 2001.
But I think we want to get back to the port security bill. I have been asked by Leader Frist to pass along from a letter just received from CIA Director GEN Michael Hayden.
General Hayden said:
The amendment offered by Senator Reid, seeks to declassify
and make public CIA internal communications that include
personal commentary and judgment. We hold these kinds of
cables to the highest standard of secrecy within our
organization, and would only share them outside of CIA under
certain specific conditions.
I provided this information over the objection of many of
my officers, after receiving assurances from the Chairman
that it would be treated as highly sensitive material. That
is why I am so disappointed that this amendment is being
considered at this time. In addition, I am deeply
disappointed that some have already characterized the cable's
contents in the media.
He also talks about the information coming in from Chiefs of Station.
He said:
No COS has ever written one of these cables expecting it to
be made public, and no COS will use his channel again without
fearing it will become public, if Congress demands
declassification.
He also said:
Further . . . it contains pre-decisional executive branch
information.
Finally, he said:
Lastly, a critical way in which our Nation gathers
intelligence is with the support of our liaison partners. If
these partners fear that their support for CIA activities
will be made public, it will make them reluctant to cooperate
with my agency. This will, I assure you, curtail the
intelligence made available to the CIA and could create gaps
in the final intelligence made available to policymakers. I
ask your help in defeating this effort in the Senate, and for
your help in protecting both CIA's sources and methods as
well as our ability to work cooperatively with the Oversight
Committees.
I yield the floor.
The ACT1NG PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington.