Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, a number of us have been coming to the floor for quite some time now, talking about challenges posed by China--the big geostrategic…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, a number of us have been coming to the floor for quite some time now, talking about challenges posed by China--the big geostrategic challenges for the United States posed by China.
What has happened over the last couple of years--and I think it is very important--is that this issue went from an issue where not many Senators 2, 3, or 4 years ago were talking about it to now, when Democrats, Republicans--all of us--have recognized that literally for the next 50 to 100 years, the biggest challenges we have in terms of national security and economic security for our Nation are the challenges posed by the rise of China. I think that is an important course correction that we have seen in the Congress and, importantly, from the executive branch.
The Trump administration put out a national security strategy, and that national security strategy said: Yes, we still have very significant challenges with regard to violent, extremist organizations like al-Qaida, like ISIS, but long-term we are shifting to a period in which the most significant economic and national security challenge we face as a nation involves the rise of great powers, particularly China as the pacing threat.
I think the administration deserves a lot of credit for this course correction. It is in the national security strategy of the administration. It is in the national defense strategy of the administration. I believe it is strongly supported by Democrats and Republicans in this body.
You may have seen, for example, that Vice President Pence gave a speech at the Hudson Institute a couple of
months ago. For anyone in America interested in U.S.-China relations, I commend that speech to you. It was an outstanding speech. In my view, it was probably the most important speech on U.S.-China relations since a former Deputy Secretary of State, Bob Zoellick, gave the speech called the Responsible Stakeholder Speech. That was over a decade ago, and Deputy Secretary Zoellick essentially said to China: You have risen in large measure because of the international system that the United States established after World War II, and you benefited from that. What you need to do now is to become a responsible stakeholder in that system. Here is your opportunity. The system that benefited you more than anybody, the system that the United States led--China, you now have the opportunity to become a responsible stakeholder in that system. We are inviting you into it.
Well, I think pretty much everybody--whether Trump administration officials, Obama administration officials, former Bush administration officials--recognizes that China rejected that offer. They are saying: We don't want to be part of the responsible--we do not want to be a member of the system that the United States has led. We are going to do something different.
They rejected it. Again, I think that is not a controversial statement. China experts--Democrats, Republicans, Trump, Obama, Bush-- all pretty much agree that is what has happened. So we need a different approach.
Right now, there are very serious negotiations going on between the Trump administration officials and senior Chinese officials, mostly on economic issues. But this relates to broader challenges we have with China, and I have had a number of discussions with Ambassador Lighthizer, Larry Kudlow, who is the NEC chairman at the White House, Secretary Mnuchin, the Vice President, and the President on this topic. I would say again--because it is important not only for the American people but for the Chinese to know--that there is strong bipartisan backing for what is happening right now in terms of our reorientation of the U.S.-China relationship and what we are finally demanding of them.
Not everything is agreed to. There are some people, I think with good reason, who have some concerns about the use of tariffs, but, overall, I think there is broad bipartisan support in this body--having talked frequently with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle--for what the Trump administration is trying to do with regard to China.
As they look to address these issues--and they just had these high- level negotiations just last week--I thought it would be important to lay out a couple of things that I know many Members of the Senate are interested in. Again, this is to show our backing of these negotiations but also to make sure China knows that it isn't just the Trump administration that is focused on these issues. The Congress and Senate of the United States of America also hold similar goals.
Obviously, the most important goal is to have a relationship in terms of economics and trade and investment that focuses on fairness, reciprocity in terms of open investment and a trading relationship with China. Fairness, reciprocity, open trade, and investment with China--we do not have that right now. That is one of the big challenges.
As they are looking to continue these negotiations and possibly come up with an agreement with China, I thought it would be important for the Chinese to hear what a number of Members of the Senate believe is important in my discussions. Let me review some of these.
First, we need to ensure that China commits to structural changes in their economy, not just pledges to increase purchases of U.S. goods. Increasing purchases of U.S. goods--whether they are Nebraska farm products, which I know the Presiding Officer cares a lot about, or clean burning Alaska natural gas, which I certainly care a lot about-- would be positive. But it is certainly not enough. Structural changes to the way in which they run their economy, to the way in which they treat other countries are critical. It was good to see the President last night in the State of the Union say exactly that.
Structural changes--what do we mean by structural changes? First, China, for decades now, has required American companies that invest in China to essentially transfer their technology in exchange for access to their market. No other country in the world does that. China says they don't do it. They do it. They need to stop that. It is against WTO rules.
Secondly, I am going to talk more in detail about how China consistently steals intellectual property from American and other countries' companies around the world.
Third, they heavily subsidize their state-owned enterprises, which gives them an unfair competitive advantage against our companies and impacts negatively our workers and our families.
No. 1, structural changes have to come, and if they don't, we should not accept this kind of deal.
No. 2, China needs to end the ``promise fatigue'' that we have had with China by enabling us, through some kind of trade agreement, to hold them accountable for the commitments they make. What do I mean by that? We need assurances from the Chinese that will ultimately be fulfilled that an agreement that is reached at the end by this administration can be enforced. Why is that so important? As I mentioned, these kinds of negotiations have been going on for years. The Obama administration, Bush administration, Clinton administration, all in good faith, have tried to get China to commit to the promises and commitments they have already made and hold to them, whether through their WTO commitments or all kinds of other commitments.
Here is the problem. The talk, the agreements, the WTO, the strategic economic dialogues with China--they all sound good, but for the most part, China has not kept its commitments.
In the United States, we are suffering from promise fatigue. We get commitments from China. They make promises, and then they don't keep them. Promise fatigue--the American people, the U.S. Congress, this administration, and I believe other administrations are tired of that. Whatever agreement the Trump administration is working on should address this issue of promise fatigue.
Let me give you a couple of examples of promise fatigue. Many years ago, I had the honor of serving on the National Security Council staff at the White House under Condoleezza Rice. We were at a meeting. I was a staffer for Secretary Condoleezza Rice, who, at the time was National Security Advisor, and President George W. Bush was in the Oval Office with a senior administration official from China, Madame Wu Yi. She was the Vice Premier. She was a very important person from that country. In this meeting, the President--as President Obama has done, as President Trump has done, as President Clinton has done--President Bush really pressed Madame Wu Yi on intellectual property theft. This was in the Oval Office. This was in a meeting in 2003, over 15 years ago. Madame Wu Yi looked the President of the United States in the eye and said: Mr. President, we are going to fix this. Protecting intellectual property is very important to my country. We know it hurts your country when we steal it. We are going to fix this. I am in charge.
That was pretty powerful. She said it directly to the President of the United States in the Oval Office. I witnessed this.
Let's fast forward to 15 years later. Have they fixed it? No. Has it actually gotten worse? Yes. Promise fatigue.
Let me give a couple of other examples of promise fatigue. In 2015, in the Rose Garden, President Xi of China was standing next to President Obama, and he made essentially two commitments: We are going to stop the cyber theft of industrial products in the United States; we are going to not steal, through the internet, your intellectual property and other valuable trade secrets from American companies-- whether related to defense, whether related to other issues--and China will not militarize the South China Sea.
This is 2015--less than 4 years ago--standing next to the President of the United States, the President of China made these commitments in the Rose Garden. Has China kept these commitments? No. They have massively militarized the South China Sea, and they continue their industrial-scale cyber
theft. Great countries, particularly in these kind of settings, need to keep their word. China should know this. A key element of any deal that we as a country strike with China needs to take into account this promise fatigue and have real mechanisms to keep their commitments.
Third, we need to make sure China commits to end its global corrupt practices. What do I mean by that? Predatory Chinese infrastructure financing and bribery of foreign officials are trapping countries around the world in debt and marginalizing outside competition by foreign investors.
There was an article recently in the Wall Street Journal that went into very minute detail of how Chinese officials at the highest levels were bribing senior officials from Malaysia to get investment opportunities with regard to infrastructure in that country.
This is essentially official policy in China to bribe and pay off officials in other countries to help their companies, which are often state-owned and compete against other companies. Is this fair? No. Is this good for the international economic system? No. Does China do it on a regular basis? Yes. Do our companies or the U.S. Government engage in this kind of systematic corruption globally? No.
If the U.S. companies do this, their leaders can go to jail for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. China has no such prohibitions. To the contrary, they do it as part of official state policy.
Whatever agreement we have with regard to the Chinese on this issue also needs to include addressing this challenge globally of foreign corrupt practices. This kind of state-sponsored corruption should not be tolerated or overlooked. Again, in my discussions with the administration's senior officials, I have encouraged them to make sure this is part of the negotiations in the agreement.
Finally, an important element of our strategy with regard to China has to involve our allies. All of the issues I just talked about-- promise fatigue, industrial cyber theft, intellectual property theft-- aren't just issues the United States is dealing with. They are issues all of our key allies are dealing with--the Germans, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Canada. Everybody is dealing with these same challenges with regard to China. What does that mean?
The good news is, strategically, the United States is an ally-rich nation, and our adversaries and potential adversaries are ally-poor. We have built a system of alliances. Since World War II, that provides strategic advantage to our Nation. As a matter of fact, one of the most strategic, important advantages we have is our system of alliances, which we need to deepen and broaden. There are many countries in Asia-- many countries in Asia--that want a closer relationship with the United States because of the rise of China. This administration needs to seize that because it makes strategic sense for us, but they also need to coordinate with these countries as we are working on these broader global economic issues as it relates to China. Why? Because if we come to the table, not just the United States but with the Europeans, with the Japanese, with the Koreans, with the Canadians, this provides leverage.
The countries I just named, including ours, constitutes well over two-thirds of the global GDP. If we come together with these demands, we will have much more leverage to get a better deal.
The time is right. I have had the opportunity to talk to senior officials from all of these countries. Every single one of them has challenges like we did with regard to China, and every single one of them wants to work with us.
I commend Ambassador Lighthizer for starting an alliance on trade, as it relates to China, on a regular basis with the EU and Japan. The EU, Japan, and the United States are coordinating on these issues. I think it makes sense for the Ambassador to broaden that coalition--the coalition of the willing on these issues. It does bring significant leverage, and countries are ready for the United States to lean on us. As a matter of fact, the number of countries and Ambassadors whom I have heard who have cited Vice President Pence's speech on how we have to deal with China has been remarkable. They are looking for U.S. leadership. The administration needs to provide it. Using and making sure we are coordinating with our traditional allies on this issue is vital, and that is how we are going to come to a successful conclusion.
There is a lot we need to do with regard to the challenges posed by China. They are not all negative. A lot of them can be positive. If we had Chinese investment, greenfield investment, in our country, that could help with jobs. That could help ease tensions. It is something I have been encouraging Chinese officials to do for a long time. It is in their interests. I think it is in our interests. We need to take seriously these challenges.
It is an issue. You often hear about some of the tensions or some of the conflicts that exist in this body. In my view, a lot of that is overblown. There is a lot of bipartisan work that goes on in the Senate. The vast majority of the work that goes on in the Senate is bipartisan.
One area of bipartisan agreement, I believe, is the need to focus on this very important geostrategic challenge that our country faces with regard to the rise of China. We are off to a good start in that regard. I want to encourage the administration to continue to focus on this issue and focus on these four points I highlighted this morning on the Senate floor.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.