Mr. President, I rise today to address the F-22 program. For the past week as the debate has swirled around on this program I have not spoken on the subject. My colleagues know that I have strongly supported the F-22 program over the past…
Mr. President, I rise today to address the F-22 program. For the past week as the debate has swirled around on this program I have not spoken on the subject. My colleagues know that I have strongly supported the F-22 program over the past two decades. Why? Because it is without question the world's most advanced fighter aircraft. It's capabilities far outstrip anything else in the world. There simply is no match.
When the Advanced Tactical Fighter Program began more than 20 years ago, no one could foresee what the world would look like in 2009. We planned to build 750 F-22s in order to match the Soviet Union's assumed far greater number of advanced fighters. The F-22 was designed with a goal of defeating 10 Soviet fighters apiece. The strategy was that using a combination of stealth and an advanced radar the F-22 would be able to attack Soviet fighters long before the adversary knew they were there.
I am pleased to note that 20 years later as we train with the F-22 our Air Force pilots report that is exactly what it can do. Time after time as we exercise with the F-22, the results are nearly the same. The F-22 defeats all
adversaries nearly with the same predictions as the designers hoped it would do.
What has changed, however, is that the Soviet Union no longer poses the threat that was assumed by the Defense Department in the 1980s. So then, critics say, why do we need to continue to buy more? We will soon have 187 aircraft that should be sufficient.
They note that the F-22 hasn't been used in Afghanistan. While that is considered a clear argument that it isn't needed, it is laughable. As far as I know al- Qaida and the Taliban don't have an air force. The F-22 is designed to defeat conventional military forces. It is designed, for example, to counter a conventional attack by an adversary against one of its neighbors. Were the Chinese to attack Taiwan, the F- 22 would provide an incredible counter to the Chinese. The same would be true if a resurgent Russia were to try to reclaim countries in the Baltics. Unless we truly believe that we will never face another nation state in a conventional conflict then the F-22 is indeed necessary.
At 187 aircraft, the F-22 provides a very credible deterrent to those nations. Is it sufficient? Perhaps. Will the Joint Strike Fighter replace it, not a chance. The Joint Strike Fighter, we expect, will be a terrific aircraft, but it is designed primarily to attack ground targets. In a battle against the F-22, it would likely lose each engagement. With better trained pilots and tactics, the Joint Strike Fighter could probably give the F-22 a run for its money, but it was never designed to replace the F-22 and should not be viewed as such.
To me what is maddening about this debate is the sense that the decision is so clear cut that the F-22 program should be killed that it is only parochial politics that could keep it alive. That is pure hogwash.
The Nation has invested more than $65 billion to develop and buy 187 aircraft. If we choose to buy more F-22s we will do so at a very reasonable price--about $150 million. While that is not cheap by any stretch of the imagination, it is far cheaper than what we paid to initiate the program. And, if we kill the program and decide that we need to restart it in a few years, it is far cheaper than we would have to pay to resuscitate production.
This is not a boondoggle. We don't have critics saying the program is flawed and should be killed. Everyone agrees it is a great aircraft. While some of my colleagues obviously support the program because it means jobs in their States, others like myself who have no F-22 jobs in their States support the program because of its capabilities and their concern for the future. Why then has it become an issue over which to veto a bill? Why are the stakes so high with this program?
I have the greatest respect for the President and the current Secretary of Defense. I have supported both in almost every initiative they have advocated. But I see in this case a pattern that I have witnessed over and over again.
Time after time our new leaders, both civilian and military, look at a program and see all the reasons why it isn't the right one. For example, in the early days of the Clinton administration the C-17 program was nearly terminated because the production of the aircraft wasn't performing up to expectations. I recall 2 years prior to that the Appropriations Committee recommended a pause in funding for the C- 17, not because we had lost confidence in the program. We still believed in the requirement for the aircraft, but the program wasn't performing. Up to that point, we had appropriated funds for 16 C-17s in total, but not a single one had been delivered, and there were very few coming together on the factory floor in Long Beach. We weren't recommending cancellation, but it served notice that attention was needed. However, the attention that the program received was mostly from critics who sought its termination.
When the Clinton administration came into office many of the new officials were convinced that the C-17 should be terminated. In that instance the Pentagon mandated a study to determine whether the C-17 was still required. Luckily the conclusion was that yes the plane was still needed and those who were calling for its cancellation, including some in Congress, would not get their way.
It was only a few years earlier that Secretary Cheney determined that the V-22 should be terminated. He was justifiably concerned that the price was increasing and that the program was taking longer than planned. It took the concerted effort of the Congress to stand up and say that we would not allow the program to be terminated. Certainly there were those in the Pentagon who agreed with the Secretary, but the Marines did not.
I am told that a few years prior to that my good friend Senator Rudman weighed in with Chairman Stevens to overrule the Air Force who wanted to kill the F-117 after the production of only one squadron of aircraft. I should point out that the F-117 was not built in New Hampshire. There might have been some modest amount of work associated with the plane in his state, but the reason that Senator Rudman insisted that we keep buying the F-117 was because of its unique capabilities not for any parochial reason.
My colleagues all know the history of the B-2 program. It was started as a classified program in 1981. The Air Force was going to build 132 bombers. We expected it to cost between $20 and $25 billion in total. The contractor built a huge state of the art factory out in the high desert of California to handle the production of the aircraft. Because it was highly classified every precaution had to be taken to protect national security all of which dramatically increased the cost to produce the aircraft.
Clearly the contractor and Air Force were overly optimistic on the cost and schedule of the program. Within 5 years it was clear that the program was not going to be completed within $25 billion. As development delays occurred, costs continued to escalate. The Air Force was unwilling to devote more resources to the program so in a series of moves it consistently delayed production of the aircraft and transferred dollars appropriated to build the aircraft to be used instead to cover higher development costs. By the time I became chairman, it was clear that the program would exceed its budget, but it was also clear that if it were successful it would provide an unmatched capability to this Nation. As costs mounted, the Defense Department determined that it would not be able to purchase all 132 aircraft. First production was cut to 75 and eventually it dropped to 20. In 1996 as the program was being killed, the contractor offered to produce three per year for several years at a price of about $600 million per copy. However, by that time support for the program had eroded so that neither the Pentagon nor the Congress would take up the offer. Instead, by only buying a total of 21 aircraft, we invested over $2 billion per plane making it the most costly aircraft in history.
This situation isn't unique to aircraft programs. In the case of shipbuilding, I remember vividly Secretary Cheney's decision to cancel the Seawolf submarine. As a result of that decision, the three Seawolf- class submarines that were eventually built were very expensive. Because we only bought three, the average cost of each submarine was more than $4 billion. Had we built the 29 originally planned, I can only speculate about the cost, but it would certainly have been less than the price we are now paying for its replacement. What is even more galling is that during that time we were still building the capable SSN-688 Los Angeles class submarines and only paying about $800 million apiece for them. Instead of reinvigorating that program, we cancelled the Seawolf program and proceeded with the New Attack submarine, now called the Virginia class, in order to move to a cheaper submarine. Regrettably, I have to report that the cost of the Virginia class submarine is so high that we have only been able to afford to purchase one per year. When I became chairman we were buying four Los Angeles class submarines a year and paying only 1/3 the cost of the Virginia class. Is the Virginia a better submarine? Surely it is. The technological advances that the Nation has developed between the time the Los Angeles subs were designed and this decade have allowed for substantial improvements. Is it better than the Seawolf? That is debatable.
The pattern I have watched during my tenure is a mix of four things.
First, programs are cancelled before or as they reach maturity. Why? Sometimes because new leadership wants to go in a new direction more often, and important costs increase and schedules are delayed which erode the support for the programs. Sometimes programs are cancelled because we believe the promised replacement will be more capable or cheaper. And sometimes we argue times have changed and we don't need them. In a few cases it is clear that the program wasn't performing as expected and should be terminated.
For the F-22 some will argue it is too expensive. That was the argument against the V-22 program. Some say we simply don't need any more. That was the argument used to kill the B-2. Would we like to have more B-2s in the inventory today? I, for one, surely would.
Others will say the threat doesn't warrant buying more F-22s. This is where I have my gravest concern. Some experts will tell you that we know that potential adversaries are working on fifth generation fighters. If in 5 years the Chinese unveil a new fifth generation fighter and begin to produce it in numbers will we regret the decision to kill the F-22, I believe we would.
I am told that no one is likely to be able to develop and build an F- 22 equivalent aircraft for a generation. The skill and funding required to do so exceeds any foreign nation's ability. But in my view, they might not be able to design an F-22 themselves, but that doesn't mean they can't steal the plans.
We were told that the North Koreans were years away from a long range missile, then were surprised when they unveiled the Taepo dong. We were surprised when Pakistan conducted a nuclear test. We were shocked when the Soviet Union collapsed and most Americans were shocked when they learned about al-Qaida after 9/11. if there is one thing that shouldn't surprise us is that we cannot foretell the future.
So as my colleagues deliberate on the F-22 program I come down on the side of caution. I believe it makes more sense at this time to continue to produce the program to hedge our bets against the future.
To my knowledge there isn't a single worker in the State of Hawaii whose job is dependent of continuing production of the F-22, but I believe the program merits continued production.
I believe it is unfortunate that the debate on this matter has taken on an overblown proportion. One can make the case that 187 could be sufficient. Our Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs agree that is the case. But just like the Marines argued for continuing to produce the V-22, the leaders of our Air National Guard and those in charge of flying the aircraft argue that we need more--even though the Defense Secretary said it should be cancelled.
When some say well, the Air Force leaders say they have enough, I will remind my colleagues that the Air Force said the same thing about the F-117 after we only produced one squadron.
When some say we should kill this and move on to the Joint Strike Fighter, I remember the Seawolf debate. We killed that submarine to build a cheaper alternative. Will we do the same thing here and be disappointed in the cost of the so-called alternative?
On February 2, 1989, I was selected as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Appropriations Committee. For the past 20 years, it has been my distinct honor to serve either as the chairman of the ranking member of this subcommittee. As my colleagues all know, the defense subcommittee has the largest budget of any of our Appropriations subcommittees, and to many of us it is probably the most important of our subcommittees. It has required a great deal of my time and attention over the past 20 years. For me it has been a labor of love. I have the greatest respect for the men and women of this Nation who are willing to serve and who guarantee constitutional freedoms for the rest of us. It has been my priority to support their cause during this period.
As I consider the F-22, I do so with the past twenty years as my guide. In my opinion what I have learned has taught me to be cautious as we kill programs. Therefore today I will cast my vote to continue the F-22 program.