Madam Speaker, pursuant to clause 2, rule IX, I hereby give notice of my intention to raise a question of the privileges of the House. The form of the resolution is as follows: An Article of Impeachment of President George W. Bush…
Madam Speaker, pursuant to clause 2, rule IX, I hereby give notice of my intention to raise a question of the privileges of the House. The form of the resolution is as follows:
An Article of Impeachment of President George W. Bush
Resolved, that President George W. Bush be impeached for
high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following Article
of Impeachment be exhibited to the United States Senate:
An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House of
Representatives of the United States of America in the name
of itself and the people of the United States of America, in
maintenance and support of its impeachment against President
George W. Bush for high crimes and misdemeanors.
Article One--Deceiving Congress with Fabricated Threats of Iraq WMDs to Fraudulently Obtain Support for an Authorization of the Use of Military
Force Against Iraq
In his conduct while President of the United States, George
W. Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in
violation of his constitutional duty under article II,
section 3 of the Constitution ``to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,'' deceived Congress with fabricated
threats of Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently
obtain support for an authorization for the use of force
against Iraq and used that fraudulently obtained
authorization, then acting in his capacity under article II,
section 2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to
commit U.S. troops to combat in Iraq.
To gain congressional support for the passage of the Joint
Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces
Against Iraq, the President made the following material
representations to the Congress in S.J. Res. 45:
1. That Iraq was ``continuing to possess and develop a
significant chemical and biological weapons capability. . .
.''
2. That Iraq was ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons
capability. . . .''
3. That Iraq was ``continuing to threaten the national
security interests of the United States and international
peace and security.''
4. That Iraq has demonstrated a ``willingness to attack,
the United States. . . .''
5. That ``members of al Qaeda, an organization bearing
responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens
and interests, including the attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq. . . .''
6. The ``attacks on the United States of September 11,
2001, underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will
transfer weapons of mass destruction to international
terrorist organizations. . . .''
7. That Iraq ``will either employ those weapons to launch a
surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces
or provide them to international terrorists who would do so.
. . .''
8. That an ``extreme magnitude of harm that would result to
the United States and its citizens from such an attack. . .
.''
9. That the aforementioned threats ``justify action by the
United States to defend itself. . . .''
10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. Res. 45, the
Authorization of the Use of the United States Armed Forces
authorizes the President to ``defend the national security
interests of the United States against the threat posed by
Iraq. . . .''
Each consequential representation made by the President to
the Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent iterations and the
final version was unsupported by evidence which was in the
control of the White House.
To wit:
1. Iraq was not ``continuing to possess and develop a
significant chemical and biological weapons capability . . .
''
``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents,
precursors, munitions and production equipment were destroyed
between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm
and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There
is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or will
establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.''
The source of this information is the Defense Intelligence
Agency, a report called, ``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities--An
Operational Support Study,'' September 2002.
``Statements by the President and Vice President prior to
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding
Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities
did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as
to whether such production was ongoing.''
The source of this information is the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, a report entitled ``Report on
Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq By U.S. Government
Officials Were Substantiated By Intelligence Information.''
June 5, 2008.
``In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile
trailers in Iraq. Although intelligence experts disputed the
purpose of the trailers, administration officials repeatedly
asserted that they were mobile biological weapons
laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National
Security Advisor Rice made 34 misleading statements about the
trailers in 27 separate public appearances. Shortly after the
mobile trailers were found, the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Intelligence Agency issued an unclassified
white paper evaluating the trailers. The white paper was
released without coordination with other members of the
intelligence community, however. It was later disclosed that
engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined
the trailers concluded that they were most likely used to
produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. A former
senior intelligence official reported that `only one of 15
intelligence analysts assembled from three agencies to
discuss the issue in June endorsed the white paper
conclusion.'''
The source of this information is the House Committee on
Government Reform, minority staff, ``Iraq on the Record: Bush
Administration's Public Statements about Chemical and
Biological Weapons.'' March 16, 2004.
Former chief of CIA covert operations in Europe, Tyler
Drumheller, has said that the CIA had credible sources
discounting weapons of mass destruction claims, including the
primary source of biological weapons claims, an informant who
the Germans code-named ``Curveball'' whom the Germans had
informed the Bush administration was a likely fabricator of
information including that concerning the Niger yellowcake
forgery. Two other former CIA officers confirmed Drumheller's
account to Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at
Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact is the media
source of this information.
``In practical terms, with the destruction of the al Hakam
facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced
biological weapons quickly. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found
no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new
biological weapons program or was conducting biological
weapons-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the
mid-1990s, despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear
and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence
of discussion or even interest in biological weapons at the
Presidential level. In spite of exhaustive investigation, the
Iraq Survey Group found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or
was developing, biological weapon agent production systems
mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey
Group harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility in
regards to the breakout program.'' That's a direct quote from
the ``Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the
Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' commonly
known as the Duelfer report by Charles Duelfer.
``While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions
have been discovered, the Iraq Survey Group judges that Iraq
unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons
stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that
Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter,
a policy the Iraq Survey Group attributes to Baghdad's desire
to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear
of force against it should WMD be discovered.''
The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive Report
of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
2. Iraq was not ``actively seeking a nuclear weapons
capability.''
The key finding of the Iraq Survey Group's report to the
Director of Central Intelligence found that ``Iraq's ability
to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively
decayed after that date. Saddam Husayn (sic) ended the
nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf War. Iraq Survey
Group found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to
restart the program.''
The source of this information, the ``Comprehensive Report
of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,'' Charles Duelfer.
Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium from Niger were not
supported by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research in the National Intelligence Estimate of October
2002.
The CIA had warned the British Government not to claim Iraq
was purchasing uranium from Niger prior to the British
statement that was later cited by President Bush, this
according to George Tenet of the Central Intelligence Agency
on July 11, 2003.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency,
in a ``Statement to the United Nations Security Council on
The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update'' on
March 7, 2003, said as follows:
``One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities
in those buildings that were identified through the use of
satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected
since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited
activities at any inspected sites. Second, there is no
indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since
1990. Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted
to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment.
Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have
been--it would have encountered practical difficulties in
manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in
question. Fourthly, although we are still reviewing issues
related to magnets and magnet production, there is no
indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a
centrifuge enrichment program. As I stated above, the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) will naturally continue
to further scrutinize and investigate all of the above
issues.''
3. Iraq was not ``continuing to threaten the national
security interests of the United States.''
``Let me be clear: analysts differed on several important
aspects of [Iraq's biological, chemical, and nuclear]
programs and those debates were spelled out in the Estimate.
They never said there was an `imminent' threat.''
George Tenet, who was Director of the CIA, said this in
Prepared Remarks for Delivery at Georgetown University on
February 5, 2004.
``We have been able to keep weapons from going into Iraq.
We have been able to keep the sanctions in place to the
extent that items that might support weapons of mass
destruction have had some controls on them. It's been quite a
success for 10 years.'' The source of this statement, Colin
Powell, Secretary of State, in an interview with Face the
Nation, February 11, 2001.
On July 23, 2002, a communication from the Private
Secretary to Prime Minister Tony Blair, ``Memo to British
Ambassador David Manning'' reads as follows:
``British Secret Intelligence Service Chief Sir Richard
Billing Dearlove reported on his recent talks in Washington.
There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action
was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam
through military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the
U.N. route and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the
Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in
Washington of the aftermath after military action. The
Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin
Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his
mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet
decided. But the case was thin. Saddam Hussein was not
threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less
than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a
plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the U.N.
weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force.''
4. Iraq did not have the ``willingness to attack, the
United States.''
``The fact of the matter is that both baskets, the U.N.
basket and what we and other allies have been doing in the
region, have succeeded in containing Saddam Hussein and his
ambitions. His forces are about one-third their original
size. They really don't possess the capability to attack
their neighbors the way they did 10 years ago.'' The source
of this quote, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in a
transcript of remarks made to German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer in February 2001.
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate concluded
that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical or
biological weapons against the United States, fearing that
exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a
stronger case for making war.''
5. Iraq had no connection with the attacks of 9/11 or with
al Qaeda's role in 9/11.
``The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
documents significant instances in which the administration
went beyond what the intelligence community knew or believed
in making public claims, most notably on the false assertion
that Iraq and al Qaeda had an operational partnership and
joint involvement in carrying out the attacks of September
11.'' This is a quote from Senator John D. Rockefeller, IV,
the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
entitled ``Additional Views of Chairman John D. Rockefeller,
IV'' on page 90.
Continuing from Senator Rockefeller:
``The President and his advisors undertook a relentless
public campaign in the aftermath of the attacks to use the
war against al Qaeda as a justification for overthrowing
Saddam Hussein. Representing to the American people that the
two had an operational partnership and posed a single,
indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading and led
the Nation to war on false premises.'' Senator Rockefeller.
Richard Clarke, a National Security Advisor, in a memo of
September 18, 2001 titled ``Survey of Intelligence
Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11
Attacks'' found no ``compelling case'' that Iraq had either
planned or perpetrated the attacks, and that there was no
confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with bin Laden on
unconventional weapons.
On September 17, 2003, President Bush said: ``No, we've got
no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September
11. What the Vice President said was is that he (Saddam) has
been involved with al Qaeda.''
On June 16, 2004, a staff report from the 9/11 Commission
stated: ``There have been reports that contacts between Iraq
and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to
Afghanistan in 1996, but they do not appear to have resulted
in a collaborative relationship. Two senior bin Laden
associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed
between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that
Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United
States.''
``Intelligence provided by former Undersecretary of Defense
Douglas J. Feith to buttress the White House case for
invading Iraq included `reporting of dubious quality or
reliability' that supported the political views of senior
administration officials rather than the conclusions of the
intelligence community, this according to a report by the
Pentagon Inspector General.
``Feith's office `was predisposed to finding a significant
relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda,' according to
portions of the report released by Senator Carl Levin. The
Inspector General described Feith's activities as `an
alternative intelligence assessment process.' '' The source
of this information is a report in the Washington Post dated
February 9, 2007, page A-1, an article by Walter Pincus and
Jeffrey Smith entitled ``Official's Key Report on Iraq is
Faulted, `Dubious' Intelligence Fueled Push for War.''
6. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to
transfer to anyone.
Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to transfer.
Furthermore, available intelligence information found that
the Iraq regime would probably only transfer weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist organizations if under threat of
attack by the United States.
According to information in the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq that was available to the
administration at the time that they were seeking
congressional support for the authorization of use of force
against Iraq, the Iraq regime would probably only transfer
weapons to a terrorist organization if ``sufficiently
desperate'' because it feared that ``an attack that
threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or
unavoidable.''
``The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has been
directed to conduct clandestine attacks against the United
States and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event
the United States takes action against Iraq. The IIS probably
would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to
conduct any chemical and biological weapon attacks on the
U.S. homeland, although we have no specific intelligence
information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against
U.S. territory.''
7. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and therefore
had no capability of launching a surprise attack against the
United States or its Armed Forces and no capability to
provide them to international terrorists who would do so.
Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction to transfer.
Furthermore, available intelligence information found that
the Iraq regime would probably only transfer weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist organizations if under severe threat
of attack by the United States.
According to information in the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that was available to the
administration at the time they were seeking congressional
support for the authorization of the use of force against
Iraq, the Iraqi regime would probably only transfer weapons
to a terrorist organization if ``sufficiently desperate''
because it feared that ``an attack that threatened the
survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable.'' That,
again, from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq.
``The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably has been directed
to conduct clandestine attacks against U.S. and Allied
interests in the Middle East in the event the United States
takes action against Iraq. The Iraq Intelligence Service
probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would
attempt to conduct any chemical or biological weapons attacks
on the U.S. homeland, although we have no specific
intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed
attacks against U.S. territory.''
As reported in the Washington Post on March 1, 2003, in
1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, had
informed U.S. and British intelligence officers that ``all
weapons--biological, chemical, missile, nuclear--were
destroyed.'' That from the Washington Post, March 1, 2003,
page A15, an article entitled ``Iraqi Defector Claimed Arms
Were Destroyed By 1995,'' by Colum Lynch.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a report called
``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities--An Operational Report Study'' in
September 2002, said this:
``A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents,
precursors, munitions and production equipment were destroyed
between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm
and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) actions. There
is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons or
whether Iraq has or will establish its chemical warfare agent
production facilities.''
8. There was not a real risk of an ``extreme magnitude of
harm that would result to the United States and its citizens
from such an attack'' because Iraq had no capability of
attacking the United States.
Here's what Colin Powell said at the time: ``Containment
has been a successful policy, and I think we should make sure
that we continue it until such time as Saddam Hussein comes
into compliance with the agreements he made at the end of the
Gulf War.'' Speaking of Iraq, Secretary of State Powell said,
``Iraq is not threatening America.''
9. The aforementioned evidence did not ``justify the use of
force by the United States to defend itself'' because Iraq
did not have weapons of mass destruction, or have the
intention or capability of using nonexistent WMDs against the
United States.
10. Since there was no threat posed by Iraq to the United
States, the enactment clause of the Senate Joint Resolution
45 was predicated on misstatements to Congress.
Congress relied on the information provided to it by the
President of the United States. Congress provided the
President with the authorization to use military force that
he requested. As a consequence of the fraudulent
representations made to Congress, the United States Armed
Forces, under the direction of George Bush as Commander in
Chief, pursuant to section 3 of the Authorization for the Use
of Force which President Bush requested, invaded Iraq and
occupies it to this day, at the cost of 4,116 lives of
servicemen and -women, injuries to over 30,000 of our troops,
the deaths of over 1 million innocent Iraqi civilians, the
destruction of Iraq, and a long-term cost of over $3
trillion.
President Bush's misrepresentations to Congress to induce
passage of a use of force resolution is subversive of the
constitutional system of checks and balances, destructive of
Congress' sole prerogative to declare war under article I,
section 8 of the Constitution, and is therefore a High Crime.
An even greater offense by the President of the United States
occurs in his capacity as Commander in Chief, because he
knowingly placed the men and women of the United States Armed
Forces in harm's way, jeopardizing their lives and their
families' future, for reasons that to this date have not been
established in fact.
In all of these actions and decisions, President George W.
Bush has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President
and Commander in Chief, and subversive of constitutional
government, to the prejudice of the cause of law and justice
and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States
and of those members of the Armed Forces who put their lives
on the line pursuant to the falsehoods of the President.
Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such conduct, is
guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from
office.
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore