Condemning The Repression Of The Iranian Baha'I Community And Calling For The Emancipation Of Iranian Baha'Is
Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the Record. [From Time Magazine, Sept. 17, 2006] What Would War Look Like? (By Michael Duffy) The first message was routine enough: a ``Prepare to Deploy'' order sent through naval communications…
Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the Record.
[From Time Magazine, Sept. 17, 2006]
What Would War Look Like?
(By Michael Duffy)
The first message was routine enough: a ``Prepare to
Deploy'' order sent through naval communications channels to
a submarine, an Aegis-class cruiser, two minesweepers and two
mine hunters. The orders didn't actually command the ships
out of port; they just said to be ready to move by Oct. 1.
But inside the Navy those messages generated more buzz than
usual last week when a second request, from the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), asked for fresh eyes on long-standing
U.S. plans to blockade two Iranian oil ports on the Persian
Gulf. The CNO had asked for a rundown on how a blockade of
those strategic targets might work. When he didn't like the
analysis he received, he ordered his troops to work the lash
up once again.
What's going on? The two orders offered tantalizing dues.
There are only a few places in the world where minesweepers
top the list of U.S. naval requirements. And every sailor,
petroleum engineer and hedge-fund manager knows the name of
the most important: the Strait of Hormuz, the 20-mile-wide
bottleneck in the Persian Gulf through which roughly 40% of
the world's oil needs to pass each day. Coupled with the
CNO's request for a blockade review, a deployment of
minesweepers to the west coast of Iran would seem to suggest
that a much discussed--but until now largely theoretical--
prospect has become real: that the U.S. may be preparing for
war with Iran.
No one knows whether--let alone when--a military
confrontation with Tehran will come to pass. The fact that
admirals are reviewing plans for blockades is hardly proof of
their intentions. The U.S. military routinely makes plans for
scores of scenarios, the vast majority of which will never be
put into practice. ``Planners always plan,'' says a Pentagon
official. Asked about the orders, a second official said only
that the Navy is
stepping up its ``listening and learning'' in the Persian
Gulf but nothing more--a prudent step, he added, after Iran
tested surface-to-ship missiles there in August during a two-
week military exercise. And yet from the State Department to
the White House to the highest reaches of the
military command, there is a growing sense that a showdown
with Iran--over its suspected quest for nuclear weapons,
its threats against Israel and its bid for dominance of
the world's richest oil region--may be impossible to
avoid. The chief of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom),
General John Abizaid, has called a commanders conference
for later this month in the Persian Gulf--sessions he
holds at least quarterly--and Iran is on the agenda.
On its face, of course, the notion of a war with Iran seems
absurd. By any rational measure, the last thing the U.S. can
afford is another war. Two unfinished wars--one on Iran's
eastern border, the other on its western flank--are daily
depleting America's treasury and overworked armed forces.
Most of Washington's allies in those adventures have made it
clear they will not join another gamble overseas. What's
more, the Bush team, led by Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, has done more diplomatic spadework on Iran than on any
other project in its 5\1/2\ years in office. For more than 18
months, Rice has kept the Administration's hard-line faction
at bay while leading a coalition that includes four other
members of the U.N. Security Council and is trying to force
Tehran to halt its suspicious nuclear ambitions. Even Iran's
former President, Mohammed Khatami, was in Washington this
month calling for a ``dialogue'' between the two nations.
But superpowers don't always get to choose their enemies or
the timing of their confrontations. The fact that all sides
would risk losing so much in armed conflict doesn't mean they
won't stumble into one anyway. And for all the good arguments
against any war now, much less this one, there are just as
many indications that a genuine, eyeball-to-eyeball crisis
between the U.S. and Iran may be looming, and sooner than
many realize. ``At the moment,'' says Ali Ansari, a top Iran
authority at London's Chatham House, a foreign-policy think
tank, ``we are headed for conflict.''
So what would it look like? Interviews with dozens of
experts and government officials in Washington, Tehran and
elsewhere in the Middle East paint a sobering picture:
military action against Iran's nuclear facilities would have
a decent chance of succeeding, but at a staggering cost. And
therein lies the excruciating calculus facing the U.S. and
its allies: Is the cost of confronting Iran greater than the
dangers of living with a nuclear Iran? And can anything short
of war persuade Tehran's fundamentalist regime to give up its
dangerous game?