Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1146, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 248) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from…
Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1146, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 248) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan, and ask for its immediate consideration.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, in 2001 I joined the House in voting for the Authorization for Use of Military Force. In the past 8\1/2\ years, it has become clear that the Authorization for Use of Military Force is being interpreted as carte blanche for circumventing Congress' role as a coequal branch of government.
My legislation invokes the War Powers Resolution of 1973. If enacted, it would require the President to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from Afghanistan by December 31, 2010.
The debate today will be the first opportunity we have had to revisit the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which the House supported following the worst terrorist attack in our country's history. Regardless of your support or opposition to the war in Afghanistan, this is going to be the first opportunity to evaluate critically where the Authorization for Use of Military Force has taken us in the last 8\1/2\ years.
This 2001 resolution allowed military action ``to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.'' Those of us who support the withdrawal from Afghanistan may or may not agree on a timeline for troop withdrawal, but I think we agree that this debate is timely.
The rest of the world is beginning to see the folly of trying to occupy Afghanistan: The Dutch Government recently came to a halt over the commitment of more troops from their country. In Britain public outcry over the war is growing. A recent BBC poll indicated that 63 percent of the British public is demanding that their troops come home by Christmas. In Germany opposition to the war has risen to 69 percent. Russia has lost billions of dollars in the 9 years it spent attempting to control Afghanistan.
Our supposed nation-building in Afghanistan has come at the destruction of our own. The military escalation cements the path of the United States down the road of previous occupiers that earned Afghanistan its nickname as the ``graveyard of empires.''
One year ago last month, a report by the Carnegie Endowment concluded ``the only meaningful way to halt the insurgency's momentum is to start withdrawing troops. The presence of foreign troops is the most important element driving the resurgence of the Taliban.''
So with this debate today, Mr. Speaker, we will have a chance for the first time to reflect on our responsibility for troop casualties that are now reaching 1,000; to look at our responsibility for the costs of the war, which approaches $250 billion; our responsibility for the civilian casualties and the human costs of the war; our responsibility for challenging the corruption that takes place in Afghanistan; our responsibility for having a real understanding of the role of the pipeline in this war; our responsibility for debating the role of counterinsurgency strategies, as opposed to counterterrorism; our responsibility for being able to make a case for the logistics of withdrawal.
After 8\1/2\ years, it is time that we have this debate.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).
I yield the gentleman 30 seconds.
I just want to say that you can talk about how the Democratic leadership is bringing this up at the time that there is obviously a surge about to begin, but why question the timeliness of the debate when in fact my friend in the minority, their party didn't bring this up for 8 years of debate? Eight years. I mean I think it's timely. That is the whole point.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).
(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Could I ask, Madam Speaker, how much time is remaining on each side?
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy).
I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Madam Speaker, I would like to respond to my friend that the authorization for the use of military force, which passed September 14, 2001, had in its provision this particular line: ``Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.''
So the war powers resolution is properly the subject of a debate and properly serves as a vehicle to bring this debate to the House of Representatives, and we don't need to cede our right under article I, section 8 at any time to determine whether or not we go to war. This is clearly a constitutional issue. And when I take an oath to defend the Constitution, I don't cross my fingers behind my back and say, Well, I will let the President make the final decision regarding war.
Our Founders didn't want to do that. Our Founders said in order to restrain the dog of war, they would put the ability to declare war in the legislative branch. They were very clear about that.
Do not disrespect this institution when it comes to the Constitution. Remember, the War Powers Act specifically was mentioned in the resolution that was passed on September 14, 2001. It was not superseded. And I might add that while I voted for the authorization for the use of military force because I believe America has a right to defend herself, I didn't give any President carte blanche to go and carry or prosecute a war wherever he or she, in the future, determines necessary.
I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan).
Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
I yield the gentlewoman an additional minute.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I want to thank Mr. Berman for agreeing to make this debate possible. I do appreciate it very much. You have been open to that, and I think the country should appreciate that about you.
I also want to say that this CRS study, Congressional Research Study, on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force makes it very clear in it that the War Powers Act is not superseded, and I would like to submit this for the Record.
Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks
(P.L. 107-40): Legislative History
[From the Congressional Research Service, Jan. 16, 2007]
(By Richard F. Grimmett)
Summary
In response to the terrorist attacks against the United
States on September 11, 2001, the Congress passed
legislation, S.J. Res. 23, on September 14, 2001, authorizing
the President to ``use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons. . . .'' The President
signed this legislation into law on September 18, 2001 (P.L.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). This report provides a
legislative history of this statute, the ``Authorization for
Use of Military Force'' (AUMF), which, as Congress stated in
its text, constitutes the legislative authorization for the
use of U.S. military force contemplated by the War Powers
Resolution. It also is the statute which the President and
his attorneys have subsequently cited as an authority for him
to engage in electronic surveillance against possible
terrorists without obtaining authorization of the special
Court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) of 1978, as amended. This report will only be updated
if events warrant.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists linked to Islamic
militant Usama bin Laden hijacked four U.S. commercial
airliners, crashing two into the twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City, and another into the Pentagon
building in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth plane crashed in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh, after passengers
struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft.
The collective death toll resulting from these incidents was
nearly 3,000. President George W. Bush characterized these
attacks as more than acts of terror. ``They were acts of
war,'' he said. He added that ``freedom and democracy are
under attack,'' and he asserted that the United States would
use ``all of our resources to conquer this enemy.''
In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the
President consulted with the leaders of Congress on
appropriate steps to take to deal with the situation
confronting the United States. These discussions produced the
concept of a joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the
President to take military steps to deal with the parties
responsible for the attacks on the United States. The leaders
of the Senate and the House decided at the outset that the
discussions and negotiations with the President and White
House officials over the specific language of the joint
resolution would be conducted by them, and not through the
formal committee legislation review process. Consequently, no
formal reports on this legislation were made by any committee
of either the House or the Senate. As a result, it is
necessary to rely on the texts of the original draft proposal
by the President for a use of military force resolution, and
the final bill, S.J. Res. 23, as enacted, together with the
public statements of those involved in drafting the bill, to
construct the legislative history of this statute. Between
September 12 and 14, 2001, draft language of a joint
resolution was discussed and negotiated by the White House
Counsel's Office, and the Senate and House leaders of both
parties. Other members of both Houses of Congress suggested
language for consideration through their respective party
leaders.
On Wednesday, September 12, 2001, the White House gave a
draft joint resolution to the leaders of the Senate and the
House. This White House draft legislation, if it had been
enacted, would have authorized the President (1) to take
military action against those involved in some notable way
with the September 11 attacks on the U.S., but it also would
have granted him (2) statutory authority ``to deter and pre-
empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the
United States.'' This language would have seemingly
authorized the President, without durational limitation, and
at his sole discretion, to take military action against any
nation, terrorist group or individuals in the
world without having to seek further authority from the
Congress. It would have granted the President open-ended
authority to act against all terrorism and terrorists or
potential aggressors against the United States anywhere,
not just the authority to act against the terrorists
involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and those
nations, organizations and persons who had aided or
harbored the terrorists. As a consequence, this portion of
the language in the proposed White House draft resolution
was strongly opposed by key legislators in Congress and
was not included in the final version of the legislation
that was passed.
The floor debates in the Senate and House on S.J. Res. 23
make clear that the focus of the military force legislation
was on the extent of the authorization that Congress would
provide to the President for use of U.S. military force
against the international terrorists who attacked the U.S. on
September 11, 2001 and those who directly and materially
assisted them in carrying out their actions. The language of
the enacted legislation, on its face, makes clear--especially
in contrast to the White House's draft joint resolution of
September 12, 2001--the degree to which Congress limited the
scope of the President's authorization to use U.S. military
force through P.L. 107-40 to military actions against only
those international terrorists and other parties directly
involved in aiding or materially supporting the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States. The authorization was not
framed in terms of use of military action against terrorists
generally.
On Friday, September 14, 2001, after the conclusion of the
meetings of their respective party caucuses from 9:15 a.m. to
10:15 a.m., where the final text of the draft bill was
discussed, S.J. Res. 23, jointly sponsored by Senators Thomas
Daschle and Trent Lott, the Senate Majority and Minority
leaders respectively, was called up for quick consideration
under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement. S.J. Res.
23 was then considered and passed by the Senate by a vote of
98-0. As part of the Senate's unanimous consent agreement
that set the stage for the rapid consideration and vote on
S.J. Res. 23, the Senate agreed to adjourn and to have no
additional votes until after the following Wednesday. That
action effectively meant that if the House amended S.J. Res.
23, no further legislative action on it would occur until the
middle of the following week. After the House of
Representatives received S.J. Res. 23 from the Senate, on
Friday, September 14, 2001, the House passed it late that
evening, after several hours of debate, by a vote of 420-1,
clearing it for the President. Prior to passing S.J. Res. 23,
the House considered, and then tabled an identically worded
joint resolution, H.J. Res. 64, and rejected a motion to
recommit by Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.), that would have had
the effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report from
the President on his actions under the joint resolution every
60 days after it entered into force.
S.J. Res. 23, formally titled in Section 1 as the
``Authorization for Use of Military Force,'' was thus passed
by Congress on September 14, 2001, and was signed into law by
the President on September 18, 2001. The enacted bill
contains five ``Whereas clauses'' in its preamble, expressing
opinions regarding why the joint resolution is necessary.
Four of these are identical to the ``Whereas clauses''
contained in the White House draft joint resolution of
September 12, 2001. The fifth, which was not in the original
White House draft, reads as follows: ``Whereas, the President
has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter
and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
United States. . . .'' This statement, and all of the other
Whereas clauses in P.L. 107-40, are not part of the language
after the Resolving clause of the Act, and, as such, it is
not clear how a Court would treat such provisions in
interpreting the scope of the authority granted in the law.
Section 2(a) of the joint resolution, authorizes the
President ``to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.'' The joint
resolution further states, in Section 2(b)(1), Congressional
intent that it ``constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution.'' Finally, Section 2(b)(2) of the joint
resolution states that ``[n]othing in this resolution
supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.''
A notable feature of S.J. Res. 23 is that unlike all other
major legislation authorizing the use of military force by
the President, this joint resolution authorizes military
force against ``organizations and persons'' linked to the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In its past
authorizations for use of U.S. military force, Congress has
permitted action against unnamed nations in specific regions
of the world, or against named individual nations, but never
against ``organizations or persons.'' The authorization of
use of force against unnamed nations is consistent with some
previous instances where authority was given to act against
unnamed states when they became aggressors or took military
action against the United States or its citizens.
President George W. Bush in signing S.J. Res. 23 into law
on September 18, 2001, noted the Congress had acted ``wisely,
decisively, and in the finest traditions of our country.'' He
thanked the ``leadership of both Houses for their role in
expeditiously passing this historic joint resolution.'' He
noted that he had had the ``benefit of meaningful
consultations with members of the Congress'' since the
September 11 attacks, and that he would ``continue to consult
closely with them as our Nation responds to this threat to
our peace and security.'' President Bush also asserted that
S.J. Res. 23 ``recognized the authority of the President
under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent
acts of terrorism against the United States.'' He also stated
that ``In signing this resolution, I maintain the
longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the
President's constitutional authority to use force, including
the Armed Forces of the United States and regarding the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.''
It is important to note here that Presidents frequently
sign bills into law that contain provisions or language with
which they disagree. Presidents sometimes draw attention to
these disagreements in a formal statement at the time they
sign a bill into law. While Presidential ``signing
statements'' may indicate that the President views certain
provisions to be unconstitutional, they do not themselves
have the force of law, nor do they modify the language of the
enacted statute. Should the President strongly object to the
language of any bill presented to him, he has the option to
veto it, and compel the Congress to enact it through voting
to override his veto. Once a bill is enacted into law,
however, every President, in accordance with Article II,
section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, is obligated to ``take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. . . .'' Thus,
unless its current language is changed through enactment of a
new statute that amends it, or its effect is modified by
opinions of the Federal Courts, the ``Authorization for Use
of Military Force'' statute, P.L. 107-40, retains the legal
force it has had since its enactment on September 18, 2001.
Text of Original Draft of Proposed White House Joint Resolution
(September 12, 2001)
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against
those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the
United States.
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence
were committed against the United States and its citizens;
and
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate
that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense
and to protect United States citizens both at home and
abroad; and
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts
of violence; and
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States,
Now, therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled--
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations or
persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored,
committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the
attacks against the United States that occurred on September
11, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of
terrorism or aggression against the United States.
Text of S.J. Res. 23 as Passed September 14, 2001, and Signed Into Law
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against
those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the
United States.
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence
were committed against the United States and its citizens;
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate
that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense
and to protect United States citizens both at home and
abroad;
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts
of violence;
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States; and
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution
to take action to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin).
I yield the gentlewoman 1 additional minute.
I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Grayson).
I just want to say to the gentleman who just spoke, to Mr. Hunter, that we honor his service to our country both as a Member of Congress and in the military, as we honored your father's service. You have served this country well. You are well-spoken, and we appreciate that you are here.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Davis).
I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis).
I would gently remind my colleague from Georgia that article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States places expressly in the hands of Congress the power to declare war. This resolution does not seek to usurp our Commander in Chief. It seeks to reset the balance in our Constitution so that we reclaim what the Founders rightly intended--that the war power be in the Congress and, by reference, that we have the power to determine not just when a war starts, but when a war stops. It is also telling that in this war, in this surge, we're essentially announcing to the Taliban where we are proceeding and when.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield myself 5 minutes.
To my friend from Indiana, who cited his disagreement based on law and facts and the troops, I would like to respond categorically.
First of all, section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Act requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When the President reports, he does so consistent with but not pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. That's nuance when we're speaking about reporting requirements, because if President Obama did submit a report pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, it would trigger a vote on withdrawal from Afghanistan. Or Congress, on the other hand, has the ability, as I have, to bring a privileged resolution forward.
Now, I have heard a lot of talk about the troops here. I don't take a backseat to anyone in support of the troops. There are some that believe the way that we support the troops is to keep them in Afghanistan. There are others who believe that the way to support the troops is to bring them home.
The Washington Post this week carried one of a series of presentations of what they call ``Faces of the Fallen.'' We owe our gratitude to each and every person who has served this country. We support those who served. But it is our obligation to be able to question the mission at any time. We should honor those who serve and those who have given their lives and made the supreme sacrifice. We owe it to them to continually critically analyze the cost of the war, the purpose of the war, and the continuation of the war.
I never had the opportunity to serve. I had a heart murmur during the Vietnam era. But my father was a World War II marine veteran who had his knee shot out in a campaign in the South Pacific. My brother Frank, who is now deceased, served in combat in Vietnam and came home with post-traumatic stress. It changed his whole life. My brother Gary, a Vietnam-era Marine veteran; my sister Beth Ann, who recently passed, an Army veteran; my nephew Gary, an Iraq combat veteran. I come from a family which believes in service. The American family, the large family of our Nation, believes in service to our country. Yet, it is true that the death toll, as The Washington Post reports in Afghanistan, is at least at 1,000, and we have to have this debate to either recommit to continuing the war and giving the reasons to the troops why we're doing that or to suggest that maybe this is the opportunity for us to take a new direction.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), who, you know, we do have a difference of opinion about this resolution, but we're united in the fact that this House should debate it, and any Member of this House, whatever their opinion is on this resolution, has the right to debate it. And to try to diminish this institution by saying, Well, this is not a proper subject for debate-- we're about to begin a surge. This is a proper subject for debate, and this is why we're here.
If we wait 8\1/2\ years to debate this, and people say, Well, why are we debating it now? Should we wait another 8\1/2\ years to have a debate? Or should we have it now before we commit more and more people into combat?
I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Serrano).
(Mr. SERRANO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
One of the things that really doesn't often get discussion here on this floor with respect to a war is the specifics about how it affects people back home. And because I come from Cleveland, I just want to share with you some things just about my community.
Cleveland, as some of you may know, was the epicenter of the subprime mortgage meltdown. Predatory lenders descended on neighbors in our community and were able to take people into contracts that eventually led them into foreclosure and losing their homes.
Now, I don't think that even the most powerful camera would be able to pick up the sea of red dots across our metropolitan area that represents foreclosures, but you get an idea that we have a desperate need not only in Cleveland but across the country for helping to keep people in their homes. And yet more and more, our priorities are to spend money not just on these wars but to increase the Pentagon budget.
I would like to point out that just with respect to the amount of money that is being spent, allocated by congressional districts--this is the National Priorities Project that I am quoting which includes the fiscal 2010 budget. They point out that taxpayers in the 10th Congressional District that I represent will pay $591.9 million for total Afghanistan war spending, counting all the spending since 2001.
And they go on to say, Here's what that money could have been spent for instead. It could have been used to provide 209,812 people with health care for 1 year. Or it could have been used to provide 13,404 public safety officers for 1 year, or 9,063 music and arts teachers for 1 year, or 68,299 scholarships for university students for 1 year. Or it could have been spent for 106,658 students receiving Pell grants of $5,550. Or it could have been spent to provide for 5,521 affordable housing units. It could be have been spent for providing 355,972 children with health care for 1 year, or 92,161 Head Start places for children for 1 year, or 9,433 elementary school teachers for 1 year, or 662,950 homes with renewable electricity for 1 year.
When we spend money on wars and we spend money expanding the budget for military spending, we may say we are making things safer at home, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the shift in allocation of funds and the shift for spending towards wars, which were off-budget for quite a while, have put our country in a position where we are not really able to meet our needs.
When you look at this, this is from the Friends Committee on National Legislation, they say for each dollar of Federal income tax we paid in 2009, the government spent about 33 cents for Pentagon spending for current and past wars; 27 cents supporting the economy, which is the recovery and the bailouts; 17 cents for health care; 11 cents responding to poverty; 9 cents for general government, and of that 7 cents goes for interest on the public debt; 2 cents for energy, science and environment; and a penny of the Federal dollar for diplomacy, development, and war prevention.
We are setting our priorities here constantly. When we remain silent about war spending, we actually have put ourselves in a position where we go headlong. And the headlong momentum that occurs from being silent about a war just carries us into all these reshaped priorities, whether we realize it or not. That is why I have asked this resolution to be brought forth, so we could talk about this.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank the gentleman from Georgia for the collegial manner in which he has approached this debate, and also to suggest that I think that while this is a very emotional matter, that it is possible for us to talk about it in terms that are clear and logical. I also want to say to my friend that I think I probably joined you in voting against the Wall Street bailouts. That was the fiscal conservative in me.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland (Ms. Edwards).
I yield the gentlewoman an additional 1 minute.
Madam Speaker, I just would like to talk for a minute about the mission in the context of what is going on with the government in Kabul. The Washington Post did a story on February 25 which talks about ``Officials puzzle over millions of dollars leaving Afghanistan by plane for Dubai,'' and I will include that for the Record.
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 25, 2010]
Officials Puzzle Over Millions of Dollars Leaving Afghanistan by Plane
for Dubai
(By Andrew Higgins)
Kabul.--A blizzard of bank notes is flying out of
Afghanistan--often in full view of customs officers at the
Kabul airport--as part of a cash exodus that is confounding
U.S. officials and raising concerns about the money's origin.
The cash, estimated to total well over $1 billion a year,
flows mostly to the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, where many
wealthy Afghans now park their families and funds, according
to U.S. and Afghan officials. So long as departing cash is
declared at the airport here, its transfer is legal.
But at a time when the United States and its allies are
spending billions of dollars to prop up the fragile
government of President Hamid Karzai, the volume of the
outflow has stirred concerns that funds have been diverted
from aid. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, for its
part, is trying to figure out whether some of the money comes
from Afghanistan's thriving opium trade. And officials in
neighboring Pakistan think that at least some of the cash
leaving Kabul has been smuggled overland from Pakistan.
``All this money magically appears from nowhere,'' said a
U.S. official who monitors Afghanistan's growing role as a
hub for cash transfers to Dubai, which has six flights a day
to and from Kabul.
Meanwhile, the United States is stepping up efforts to stop
money flow in the other direction--into Afghanistan and
Pakistan in support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Senior
Treasury Department officials visited Kabul this month to
discuss the cash flows and other issues relating to this
country's infant, often chaotic financial sector.
Tracking Afghan exchanges has long been made difficult by
the widespread use of traditional money-moving outfits, known
as ``hawalas,'' which keep few records. The Afghan central
bank, supported by U.S. Treasury advisers, is trying to get a
grip on them by licensing their operations.
In the meantime, the money continues to flow. Cash
declaration forms filed at Kabul International Airport and
reviewed by The Washington Post show that Afghan passengers
took more than $180 million to Dubai during a two-month
period starting in July. If that rate held for the entire
year, the amount of cash that left Afghanistan in 2009 would
have far exceeded the country's annual tax and other domestic
revenue of about $875 million.
The declaration forms highlight the prominent and often
opaque role played by hawalas. Asked to identify the ``source
of funds'' in forms issued by the Afghan central bank, cash
couriers frequently put down the name of the same Kabul
hawala, an outfit called New Ansari Exchange.
Early last month, Afghan police and intelligence officers
raided New Ansari's office in Kabul's bazaar district,
carting away documents and computers, said Afghan bankers
familiar with the operation. U.S. officials declined to
comment on what prompted the raid. New Ansari Exchange, which
is affiliated with a licensed Afghan bank, closed for a day
or so but was soon up and running again.
The total volume of departing cash is almost certainly much
higher than the declared amount. A Chinese man, for instance,
was arrested recently at the Kabul airport carrying 800,000
undeclared euros (about $1.1 million).
Cash also can be moved easily through a VIP section at the
airport, from which Afghan officials generally leave without
being searched. American officials said that they have
repeatedly raised the issue of special treatment for VIPs at
the Kabul airport with the Afghan government but that they
have made no headway.
One U.S. official said he had been told by a senior Dubai
police officer that an Afghan diplomat flew into the
emirate's airport last
year with more than $2 million worth of euros in undeclared
cash. The Afghan consul general in Dubai, Haji Rashoudin
Mohammadi, said in a telephone interview that he was not
aware of any such incident.
The high volume of cash passing through Kabul's airport
first came to light last summer when British company Global
Strategies Group, which has an airport security contract,
started filing reports on the money transfers at the request
of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, the
domestic intelligence agency. The country's notoriously
corrupt police force, however, complained about this
arrangement, and Global stopped its reporting in September,
according to someone familiar with the matter.
Afghan bankers interviewed in Kabul said that much of the
money that does get declared belongs to traders who want to
buy goods in Dubai but want to avoid the fees, delays and
paperwork that result from conventional wire transfers.
The cash flown out of Kabul includes a wide range of
foreign currencies. Most is in U.S. dollars, euros and--to
the bafflement of officials--Saudi Arabian riyals, a currency
not widely used in Afghanistan.
Last month, a well-dressed Afghan man en route to Dubai was
found carrying three briefcases stuffed with $3 million in
U.S. currency and $2 million in Saudi currency, according to
an American official who was present when the notes were
counted. A few days later, the same man was back at the Kabul
airport, en route to Dubai again, with about $5 million in
U.S. and Saudi bank notes.
One theory is that some of the Arab nation's cash might
come from Saudi donations that were supposed to go to mosques
and other projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, the
American official said, ``we don't really know what is going
on.''
Efforts to figure out just how much money is leaving
Afghanistan and why have been hampered by a lack of
cooperation from Dubai, complained Afghan and U.S. officials,
who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Dubai's financial
problems, said a U.S. official, had left the emirate eager
for foreign cash, and ``they don't seem to care where it
comes from.'' Dubai authorities declined to comment.
Previous to that, the Post did a story about money funneled through a Kabul bank and companies owned by the bank's founder to individual friends, family, and business connections of Hamid Karzai. When you consider the amount of corruption that is going on in Afghanistan, it can only be called, charitably, ``crony capitalism.'' In fact, The Washington Post printed an article on February 22, entitled ``In Afghanistan, Signs of Crony Capitalism,'' and I include this for the Record.
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2010]
In Afghanistan, Signs of Crony Capitalism
(By Andrew Higgins)
Kabul.--Afghanistan's biggest private bank--founded by the
Islamic nation's only world-class poker player--celebrated
its fifth year in business last summer with a lottery for
depositors at Paris Palace, a Kabul wedding hall.
Prizes awarded by Kabul Bank included nine apartments in
the Afghan capital and cash gifts totaling more than $1
million. The bank trumpeted the event as the biggest prize
drawing of its kind in Central Asia.
Less publicly, Kabul Bank's boss has been handing out far
bigger prizes to his country's U.S.-backed ruling elite:
multimillion-dollar loans for the purchase of luxury villas
in Dubai by members of President Hamid Karzai's family, his
government and his supporters.
The close ties between Kabul Bank and Karzai's circle
reflect a defining feature of the shaky post-Taliban order in
which Washington has invested more than $40 billion and the
lives of more than 900 U.S. service members: a crony
capitalism that enriches politically connected insiders and
dismays the Afghan populace.
``What I'm doing is not proper, not exactly what I should
do. But this is Afghanistan,'' Kabul Bank's founder and
chairman, Sherkhan Farnood, said in an interview when asked
about the Dubai purchases and why, according to data from the
Persian Gulf emirate's Land Department, many of the villas
have been registered in his name. ``These people don't want
to reveal their names.''
Afghan laws prohibit hidden overseas lending and require
strict accounting of all transactions. But those involved in
the Dubai loans, including Kabul Bank's owners, said the cozy
flow of cash is not unusual or illegal in a deeply
traditional system underpinned more by relationships than
laws.
The curious role played by the bank and its unorthodox
owners has not previously been reported and was documented by
land registration data; public records; and interviews in
Kabul, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Moscow.
Many of those involved appear to have gone to considerable
lengths to conceal the benefits they have received from Kabul
Bank or its owners. Karzai's older brother and his former
vice president, for example, both have Dubai villas
registered under Farnood's name. Kabul Bank's executives said
their books record no loans for these or other Dubai deals
financed at least in part by Farnood, including home
purchases by Karzai's cousin and the brother of Mohammed
Qasim Fahim, his current first vice president and a much-
feared warlord who worked closely with U.S. forces to topple
the Taliban in 2001.
At a time when Washington is ramping up military pressure
on the Taliban, the off-balance-sheet activities of Afghan
bankers raise the risk of fmancial instability that could
offset progress on the battlefield. Fewer than 5 percent of
Afghans have bank accounts, but among those who do are many
soldiers and policemen whose salaries are paid through Kabul
Bank.
A U.S. official who monitors Afghan finances, who spoke on
the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to
comment publicly, said banks appear to have plenty of money
but noted that in a crisis, Afghan depositors ``won't wait in
line holding cups of latte'' but would be ``waving AK-47s.''
Kabul Bank executives, in separate interviews, gave
different accounts of what the bank is up to with Dubai home
buyers. ``They are borrowers. They have an account at Kabul
Bank,'' said the bank's chairman, Farnood, a boisterous 46-
year-old with a gift for math and money--and the winner of
$120,000 at the 2008 World Series of Poker Europe, held in a
London casino.
The bank's chief audit officer, Raja Gopalakrishnan,
however, insisted that the loan money didn't come directly
from Kabul Bank. He said it was from affiliated but separate
entities, notably a money-transfer agency called Shaheen
Exchange, which is owned by Farnood, is run by one of Kabul
Bank's 16 shareholders and operates in Kabul out of the
bank's headquarters.
The audit officer said Farnood ``thinks it is one big
pot,'' but the entities are ``legally definitely separate.''
A new economy
In some ways, Kabul Bank is a symbol of how much has
changed in Afghanistan since 2001, when the country had no
private banks and no economy to speak of. Kabul Bank has
opened more than 60 branches and recently announced that it
will open 250 more, and it claims to have more than $1
billion in deposits from more than a million Afghan
customers.
Kabul Bank prospers because Afghanistan, though extremely
poor, is in places awash with cash, a result of huge
infusions of foreign aid, opium revenue and a legal economy
that, against the odds, is growing at about 15 percent a
year. The vast majority of this money flows into the hands of
a tiny minority--some of it through legitimate profits, some
of it through kickbacks and insider deals that bind the
country's political, security and business elites.
The result is that, while anchoring a free-market order as
Washington had hoped, financial institutions here sometimes
serve as piggy banks for their owners and their political
friends. Kabul Bank, for example, helps bankroll a money-
losing airline owned by Farnood and fellow bank shareholders
that flies three times a day between Kabul and Dubai.
Kabul Bank's executives helped finance President Hamid
Karzai's fraud-blighted reelection campaign last year, and
the bank is partly owned by Mahmoud Karzai, the Afghan
president's older brother, and by Haseen Fahim, the brother
of Karzai's vice presidential running mate.
Farnood, who now spends most of his time in Dubai, said he
wants to do business in a ``normal way'' and does not receive
favors as a result of his official contacts. He said that
putting properties in his name means his bank's money is safe
despite a slump in the Dubai property market: He can easily
repossess if borrowers run short on cash.
A review of Dubai property data and interviews with current
and former executives of Kabul Bank indicate that Farnood and
his bank partners have at least $150 million invested in
Dubai real estate. Most of their property is on Palm
Jumeirah, a man-made island in the shape of a palm tree where
the cheapest house costs more than $2 million.
Mirwais Azizi, an estranged business associate of Farnood
and the founder of the rival Azizi Bank in Kabul, has also
poured money into Dubai real estate, with even more uncertain
results. A Dubai company he heads, Azizi Investments, has
invested heavily in plots of land on Palm Jebel Ali, a
stalled property development. Azizi did not respond to
interview requests. His son, Farhad, said Mirwais was busy.
Responsibility for bank supervision in Afghanistan lies
with the Afghan central bank, whose duties include preventing
foreign property speculation. The United States has spent
millions of dollars trying to shore up the central bank. But
Afghan and U.S. officials say the bank, though increasingly
professional, lacks political clout.
The central bank's governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat, said his
staff had ``vigorously investigated'' what he called
``rumors'' of Dubai property deals, but ``unfortunately, up
until now they have not found anything.'' Fitrat, who used to
live in Washington, last month sent a team of inspectors to
Kabul Bank as part of a regular review of the bank's
accounts. He acknowledged that Afghan loans are ``very
difficult to verify'' because ``we don't know who owns
what.''
Kabul Bank's dealings with Mahmoud Karzai, the president's
brother, help explain why this is so. In interviews, Karzai,
who has an Afghan restaurant in Baltimore, initially said he
rented a $5.5 million Palm Jumeirah mansion, where he now
lives with his family. But later he said he had an informal
home-loan agreement with Kabul Bank and pays $7,000 a month
in interest.
``It is a very peculiar situation. It is hard to comprehend
because this is not the usual way of doing business,'' said
Karzai, whose home is in Farnood's name.
Karzai also said he bought a 7.4 percent stake in the bank
with $5 million he borrowed from the bank. But
Gopalakrishnan, the chief audit officer, said Kabul Bank's
books include no loans to the president's brother.
Also in a Palm Jumeirah villa registered in Farnood's name
is the family of Ahmad Zia Massoud, Afghanistan's first vice
president from 2004 until last November. The house, bought in
December 2007 for $2.3 million, was first put in the name of
Massoud's wife but was later re-registered to give Farnood
formal ownership, property records indicate.
Massoud, brother of the legendary anti-Soviet guerrilla
leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, said that Farnood had always been
the owner but let his family use it rent-free for the past
two years because he is ``my close friend.'' Massoud added:
``We have played football together. We have played chess
together.'' Farnood, however, said that though the ``villa is
in my name,'' it belongs to Massoud ``in reality.''
Haseen Fahim, the brother of Afghanistan's current first
vice president, has been another beneficiary of Kabul Bank's
largesse. He got money from Farnood to help buy a $6 million
villa in Dubai, which, unusually, is under his own name. He
borrowed millions more from the bank, which he partly owns,
to fund companies he owns in Afghanistan.
In an interview at Kabul Bank's headquarters, Khalilullah
Fruzi, who as chief executive heads the bank's day-to-day
operations, said he didn't know how much bank money has ended
up in Dubai. If Karzai's relatives and others buy homes ``in
Dubai, or Germany or America . . . that is their own
affair,'' Fruzi said, adding that the bank ``doesn't give
loans directly for Dubai.''
Fruzi, a former gem trader, said Kabul Bank is in robust
health, makes a profit and has about $400 million in liquid
assets deposited with the Afghan central bank and other
institutions. Kabul Bank is so flush, he added, that it is
building a $30 million headquarters, a cluster of shimmering
towers of bulletproof glass.
The bank is also spending millions to hire gunmen from a
company called Khurasan Security Services, which, according
to registration documents, used to be controlled by Fruzi and
is now run by his brother.
The roots of Kabul Bank stretch back to the Soviet Union.
Both Fruzi and Farnood got their education and their start in
business there after Moscow invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
While in Moscow, Farnood set up a successful hawala money-
transfer outfit to move funds between Russia and Kabul.
Russian court documents show that 10 of Farnood's employees
were arrested in 1998 and later convicted of illegal banking
activity. Fearful of arrest in Russia and also in Taliban-
ruled Afghanistan, Farnood shifted his focus to Dubai.
In 2004, three years after the fall of the Taliban regime,
he got a license to open Kabul Bank. His Dubai-registered
hawala, Shaheen Exchange, moved in upstairs and started
moving cash for bank clients. It last year shifted $250
million to $300 million to Dubai, said the chief audit
officer.
The bank began to take in new, politically connected
shareholders, among them the president's brother, Mahmoud,
and Fahim, brother of the vice president, who registered his
stake in the name of his teenage son.
Fahim said two of his companies have borrowed $70 million
from Kabul Bank. Insider borrowing, he said, is unavoidable
and even desirable in Afghanistan because, in the absence of
a solid legal system, business revolves around trust, not
formal contracts. ``Afghanistan is not America or Europe.
Afghanistan is starting from zero,'' he said.
Fahim's business has boomed, thanks largely to
subcontracting work on foreign-funded projects, including a
new U.S. Embassy annex and various buildings at CIA sites
across the country, among them a remote base in Khost where
seven Americans were killed in a December suicide attack by a
Jordanian jihadiist. ``I have good opportunities to get
profit,'' Fahim said.
``Like wild horses''
Kabul Bank also plunged into the airline business,
providing loans to Pamir Airways, an Afghan carrier now owned
by Farnood, Fruzi and Fahim. Pamir spent $46 million on four
used Boeing 737-400s and hired Hashim Karzai, the president's
cousin, formerly of Silver Spring, as a ``senior adviser.''
Farnood said he also provided a ``little bit'' of money to
help Hashim Karzai buy a house on Palm Jumeirah in Dubai.
Karzai, in brief telephone interviews, said that the property
was an investment and that he had borrowed some money from
Farnood. He said he couldn't recall details and would ``have
to check with my accountant.''
Noor Delawari, governor of the central bank during Kabul
Bank's rise, said Farnood and his lieutenants ``were like
wild horses'' and ``never paid attention to the rules and
regulations.'' Delawari said he didn't know about any
property deals by Kabul Bank in Dubai. He said that he, too,
bought a home in the emirate, for about $200,000.
Fitrat, the current central bank governor, has tried to
take a tougher line against Kabul Bank and its rivals, with
little luck. Before last year's presidential election, the
central bank sent a stern letter to bankers, complaining that
they squander too much money on ``security guards and
bulletproof vehicles'' and ``expend large-scale monetary
assistance to politicians.'' The letter ordered them to
remain ``politically neutral.''
Kabul Bank did the opposite: Fruzi, its chief executive,
joined Karzai's campaign in Kabul while Farnood, its poker-
playing chairman, organized fundraising events for Karzai in
Dubai. One of these was held at the Palm Jumeirah house of
Karzai's brother.
The government has returned the favor. The ministries of
defense, interior and education now pay many soldiers, police
and teachers through Kabul Bank. This means that tens of
millions of dollars' worth of public money sloshes through
the bank, an unusual arrangement, as governments generally
don't pump so much through a single private bank.
Soon after his November inauguration for a second term,
President Karzai spoke at an anti-corruption conference in
Kabul, criticizing officials who ``after one or two years
work for the government get rich and buy houses in Dubai.''
Last month, he flew to London for a conference on
Afghanistan, attended by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton and other leaders, and again promised an end to the
murky deals that have so tarnished his rule.
Also in London for the conference were Farnood, who now has
an Afghan diplomatic passport, and Fruzi, who served as a
financial adviser to Karzai's reelection campaign and also
owns a house in Dubai. ``If there is no Kabul Bank, there
will be no Karzai, no government,'' Fruzi said.
As a result, U.S. taxpayers and aid organizations are investing billions of dollars in Afghanistan, but the leaders of the country are investing in real estate in Dubai. We care about democracy. Try building democracy in a place which is rife with narcotraffic, crony capitalism, and villas in Dubai. What is this about? Why are we there? I mean, I am from Cleveland, Ohio. The people I represent are very basic people. When you tell them that the head of Afghanistan has his hands in all of these crooked deals, you start to wonder, We are going to build a democracy on this person's shoulders? I don't think so.
We are supporting a government where corruption is epidemic. Last year, USAID reported that corruption in Afghanistan is significant, a growing problem, and that pervasive, systemic corruption was at an unprecedented scope in the country's history. On November 17, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan as the second most corrupt nation in the world. And to compound the fears, in President Karzai's fraud-filled election late last year, he recently took over the country's election watchdog group. Is this the kind of person that we can trust to have a partnership with for democracy? I don't think so.
A January 2010 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reveals that Afghan citizens were forced to pay an estimated $2.5 billion a year in bribes. According to evidence collected through wiretaps and bank records, a senior border police official in Kandahar allegedly collected salaries of hundreds of ghost policemen and stole money from a government fund intended to pay orphans and widows. Is this the kind of environment where we can build a democracy?
Our troops in Afghanistan have to deal with corrupt officials on a daily basis. A commander of the Afghan border police offered to give the U.S. military prime land at a crossing with Pakistan to build a waiting area for supply vehicles needed for President Obama's troop increase. The same man, U.S. officials believe, earns tens of millions of dollars a year trafficking opium and extorting cargo truck drivers. Is this the kind of person that we can create movement toward a democracy with?
[From the Nation, Nov. 30, 2009]
How the U.S. Funds the Taliban
(By Aram Roston)
On October 29, 2001, while the Taliban's rule over
Afghanistan was under assault, the regime's ambassador in
Islamabad gave a chaotic press conference in front of several
dozen reporters sitting on the grass. On the Taliban
diplomat's right sat his interpreter, Ahmad Rateb Popal, a
man with an imposing presence. Like the ambassador, Popal
wore a black turban, and he had a huge bushy beard. He had a
black patch over his right eye socket, a prosthetic left arm
and a deformed right hand, the result of injuries from an
explosives mishap during an old operation against the Soviets
in Kabul.
But Popal was more than just a former mujahedeen. In 1988,
a year before the Soviets fled Afghanistan, Popal had been
charged in the United States with conspiring to import more
than a kilo of heroin. Court records show he was released
from prison in 1997.
Flash forward to 2009, and Afghanistan is ruled by Popal's
cousin President Hamid Karzai. Popal has cut his huge beard
down to a neatly trimmed one and has become an immensely
wealthy businessman, along with his brother Rashid Popal, who
in a separate case pleaded guilty to a heroin charge in 1996
in Brooklyn. The Popal brothers control the huge Watan Group
in Afghanistan, a consortium engaged in telecommunications,
logistics and, most important, security. Watan Risk
Management, the Popals' private military arm, is one of the
few dozen private security companies in Afghanistan. One of
Watan's enterprises, key to the war effort, is protecting
convoys of Afghan trucks heading from Kabul to Kandahar,
carrying American supplies.
Welcome to the wartime contracting bazaar in Afghanistan.
It is a virtual carnival of improbable characters and shady
connections, with former CIA officials and ex-military
officers joining hands with former Taliban and mujahedeen to
collect U.S. government funds in the name of the war effort.
In this grotesque carnival, the U.S. military's contractors
are forced to pay suspected insurgents to protect American
supply routes. It is an accepted fact of the military
logistics operation in Afghanistan that the US government
funds the very forces American troops are fighting. And it is
a deadly irony, because these funds add up to a huge amount
of money for the Taliban. ``It's a big part of their
income,'' one of the top Afghan government security officials
told The Nation in an interview. In fact, US military
officials in Kabul estimate that a minimum of 10 percent of
the Pentagon's logistics contracts--hundreds of millions of
dollars--consists of payments to insurgents.
Understanding how this situation came to pass requires
untangling two threads. The first is the insider dealing that
determines who wins and who loses in Afghan business, and the
second is the troubling mechanism by which ``private
security'' ensures that the US supply convoys traveling these
ancient trade routes aren't ambushed by insurgents.
A good place to pick up the first thread is with a small
firm awarded a US military logistics contract worth hundreds
of millions of dollars: NCL Holdings. Like the Popals' Watan
Risk, NCL is a licensed security company in Afghanistan.
What NCL Holdings is most notorious for in Kabul
contracting circles, though, is the identity of its chief
principal, Hamed Wardak. He is the young American son of
Afghanistan's current defense minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim
Wardak, who was a leader of the mujahedeen against the
Soviets. Hamed Wardak has plunged into business as well as
policy. He was raised and schooled in the United States,
graduating as valedictorian from Georgetown University in
1997. He earned a Rhodes scholarship and interned at the
neoconservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute.
That internship was to play an important role in his life,
for it was at AEI that he forged alliances with some of the
premier figures in American conservative foreign policy
circles, such as the late Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.
Wardak incorporated NCL in the United States early in 2007,
although the firm may have operated in Afghanistan before
then. It made sense to set up shop in Washington, because of
Wardak's connections there. On NCL's advisory board, for
example, is Milton Bearden, a well-known former CIA officer.
Bearden is an important voice on Afghanistan issues; in
October he was a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, where Senator John Kerry, the chair, introduced
him as ``a legendary former CIA case officer and a
clearheaded thinker and writer.'' It is not every defense
contracting company that has such an influential adviser.
But the biggest deal that NCL got--the contract that
brought it into Afghanistan's major leagues--was Host Nation
Trucking. Earlier this year the firm, with no apparent
trucking experience, was named one of the six companies that
would handle the bulk of US trucking in Afghanistan, bringing
supplies to the web of bases and remote outposts scattered
across the country.
At first the contract was large but not gargantuan. And
then that suddenly changed, like an immense garden coming
into bloom. Over the summer, citing the coming ``surge'' and
a new doctrine, ``Money as a Weapons System,'' the U.S.
military expanded the contract 600 percent for NCL and the
five other companies. The contract documentation warns of
dire consequences if more is not spent: ``service members
will not get food, water, equipment, and ammunition they
require.'' Each of the military's six trucking contracts was
bumped up to $360 million, or a total of nearly $2.2 billion.
Put it in this perspective: this single two-year effort to
hire Afghan trucks and truckers was worth 10 percent of the
annual Afghan gross domestic product. NCL, the firm run by
the defense minister's well-connected son, had struck pure
contracting gold.
Host Nation Trucking does indeed keep the US military
efforts alive in Afghanistan. ``We supply everything the army
needs to survive here,'' one American trucking executive told
me. ``We bring them their toilet paper, their water, their
fuel, their guns, their vehicles.'' The epicenter is Bagram
Air Base, just an hour north of Kabul, from which virtually
everything in Afghanistan is trucked to the outer reaches of
what the Army calls ``the Battlespace''--that is, the entire
country. Parked near Entry Control Point 3, the trucks line
up, shifting gears and sending up clouds of dust as they
prepare for their various missions across the country.
The real secret to trucking in Afghanistan is ensuring
security on the perilous roads, controlled by warlords,
tribal militias, insurgents and Taliban commanders. The
American executive I talked to was fairly specific about it:
``The Army is basically paying the Taliban not to shoot at
them. It is Department of Defense money.'' That is something
everyone seems to agree on.
Mike Hanna is the project manager for a trucking company
called Afghan American Army Services. The company, which
still operates in Afghanistan, had been trucking for the
United States for years but lost out in the Host Nation
Trucking contract that NCL won. Hanna explained the security
realities quite simply: ``You are paying the people in the
local areas--some are warlords, some are politicians in the
police force--to move your trucks through.''
Hanna explained that the prices charged are different,
depending on the route: ``We're basically being extorted.
Where you don't pay, you're going to get attacked. We just
have our field guys go down there, and they pay off who they
need to.'' Sometimes, he says, the extortion fee is high, and
sometimes it is low. ``Moving ten trucks, it is probably $800
per truck to move through an area. It's based on the number
of trucks and what you're carrying. If you have fuel trucks,
they are going to charge you more. If you have dry trucks,
they're not going to charge you as much. If you are carrying
MRAPs or Humvees, they are going to charge you more.''
Hanna says it is just a necessary evil. ``If you tell me
not to pay these insurgents in this area, the chances of my
trucks getting attacked increase exponentially.''
Whereas in Iraq the private security industry has been
dominated by US and global firms like Blackwater, operating
as de facto arms of the US government, in Afghanistan there
are lots of local players as well. As a result, the industry
in Kabul is far more dog-eat-dog. ``Every warlord has his
security company,'' is the way one executive explained it to
me.
In theory, private security companies in Kabul are heavily
regulated, although the reality is different. Thirty-nine
companies had licenses until September, when another dozen
were granted licenses. Many licensed companies are
politically connected: just as NCL is owned by the son of the
defense minister and Watan Risk Management is run by
President Karzai's cousins, the Asia Security Group is
controlled by Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the
president. The company has blocked off an entire street in
the expensive Sherpur District. Another security firm is
controlled by the parliamentary speaker's son, sources say.
And so on.
In the same way, the Afghan trucking industry, key to
logistics operations, is often tied to important figures and
tribal leaders. One major hauler in Afghanistan, Afghan
International Trucking (AIT), paid $20,000 a month in
kickbacks to a US Army contracting official, according to the
official's plea agreement in US court in August. AIT is a
very well-connected firm: it is run by the 25-year-old nephew
of Gen. Baba Jan, a former Northern Alliance commander and
later a Kabul police chief. In an interview, Baba Jan, a
cheerful and charismatic leader, insisted he had nothing to
do with his nephew's corporate enterprise.
But the heart of the matter is that insurgents are getting
paid for safe passage because there are few other ways to
bring goods to the combat outposts and forward operating
bases where soldiers need them. By definition, many outposts
are situated in hostile terrain, in the southern parts of
Afghanistan. The security firms don't really protect convoys
of American military goods here, because they simply can't;
they need the Taliban's cooperation.
One of the big problems for the companies that ship
American military supplies across the country is that they
are banned from arming themselves with any weapon heavier
than a rifle. That makes them ineffective for battling
Taliban attacks on a convoy. ``They are shooting the drivers
from 3,000 feet away with PKMs,'' a trucking company
executive in Kabul told me. ``They are using RPGs [rocket-
propelled grenades] that will blow up an up-armed vehicle. So
the security companies are tied up. Because of the rules,
security companies can only carry AK-47s, and that's just a
joke. I carry an AK--and that's just to shoot myself if I
have to!''
The rules are there for a good reason: to guard against
devastating collateral damage by private security forces.
Still, as Hanna of Afghan American Army Services points out,
``An AK-47 versus a rocket-propelled grenade--you are going
to lose!'' That said, at least one of the Host Nation
Trucking companies has tried to do battle instead of paying
off insurgents and warlords. It is a US-owned firm called
Four Horsemen International. Instead of providing payments,
it has tried to fight off attackers. And it has paid the
price in lives, with horrendous casualties. FHI, like many
other firms, refused to talk publicly; but I've been told by
insiders in the security industry that FHI's convoys are
attacked on virtually every mission.
For the most part, the security firms do as they must to
survive. A veteran American manager in Afghanistan who has
worked there as both a soldier and a private security
contractor in the field told me, ``What we are doing is
paying warlords associated with the Taliban, because none of
our security elements is able to deal with the threat.'' He's
an Army veteran with years of Special Forces experience, and
he's not happy about what's being done. He says that at a
minimum American military forces should try to learn more
about who is getting paid off.
``Most escorting is done by the Taliban,'' an Afghan
private security official told me. He's a Pashto and former
mujahedeen commander who has his finger on the pulse of the
military situation and the security industry. And he works
with one of the trucking companies carrying US supplies.
``Now the government is so weak,'' he added, ``everyone is
paying the Taliban.''
To Afghan trucking officials, this is barely even something
to worry about. One woman I met was an extraordinary
entrepreneur who had built up a trucking business in this
male-dominated field. She told me the security company she
had hired dealt directly with Taliban leaders in the south.
Paying the Taliban leaders meant they would send along an
escort to ensure that no other insurgents would attack. In
fact, she said, they just needed two armed Taliban vehicles.
``Two Taliban is enough,'' she told me. ``One in the front
and one in the back.'' She shrugged. ``You cannot work
otherwise. Otherwise it is not possible.''
Which leads us back to the case of Watan Risk, the firm run
by Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashid Popal, the Karzai family
relatives and former drug dealers. Watan is known to control
one key stretch of road that all the truckers use: the
strategic route to Kandahar called Highway 1. Think of it as
the road to the war--to the south and to the west. If the
Army wants to get supplies down to Helmand, for example, the
trucks must make their way through Kandahar.
Watan Risk, according to seven different security and
trucking company officials, is the sole provider of security
along this route. The reason is simple: Watan is allied with
the local warlord who controls the road. Watan's company
website is quite impressive, and claims its personnel ``are
diligently screened to weed out all ex-militia members,
supporters of the Taliban, or individuals with loyalty to
warlords, drug barons, or any other group opposed to
international support of the democratic process.'' Whatever
screening methods it uses, Watan's secret weapon to protect
American supplies heading through Kandahar is a man named
Commander Ruhullah. Said to be a handsome man in his 40s,
Ruhullah has an oddly high-pitched voice. He wears
traditional salwar kameez and a Rolex watch. He rarely, if
ever, associates with Westerners. He commands a large group
of irregular fighters with no known government affiliation,
and his name, security officials tell me, inspires obedience
or fear in villages along the road.
It is a dangerous business, of course: until last spring
Ruhullah had competition--a one-legged warlord named
Commander Abdul Khaliq. He was killed in an ambush.
So Ruhullah is the surviving road warrior for that stretch
of highway. According to witnesses, he works like this: he
waits until there are hundreds of trucks ready to convoy
south down the highway. Then he gets his men together,
setting them up in 4x4s and pickups. Witnesses say he does
not limit his arsenal to AK-47s but uses any weapons he can
get. His chief weapon is his reputation. And for that, Watan
is paid royally, collecting a fee for each truck that passes
through his corridor. The American trucking official told me
that Ruhullah ``charges $1,500 per truck to go to Kandahar.
Just 300 kilometers.''
It's hard to pinpoint what this is, exactly--security,
extortion or a form of ``insurance.'' Then there is the
question, Does Ruhullah have ties to the Taliban? That's
impossible to know. As an American private security veteran
familiar with the route said, ``He works both sides . . .
whatever is most profitable. He's the main commander. He's
got to be involved with the Taliban. How much, no one
knows.''
Even NCL, the company owned by Hamed Wardak, pays. Two
sources with direct knowledge tell me that NCL sends its
portion of US logistics goods in Watan's and Ruhullah's
convoys. Sources say NCL is billed $500,000 per month for
Watan's services. To underline the point: NCL, operating on a
$360 million contract from the US military, and owned by the
Afghan defense minister's son, is paying millions per year
from those funds to a company owned by President Karzai's
cousins, for protection.
Hamed Wardak wouldn't return my phone calls. Milt Bearden,
the former CIA officer affiliated with the company, wouldn't
speak with me either. There's nothing wrong with Bearden
engaging in business in Afghanistan, but disclosure of his
business interests might have been expected when testifying
on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After all, NCL
stands to make or lose hundreds of millions based on the
whims of US policy-makers.
It is certainly worth asking why NCL, a company with no
known trucking experience, and little security experience to
speak of, would win a contract worth $360 million. Plenty of
Afghan insiders are asking questions. ``Why would the US
government give him a contract if he is the son of the
minister of defense?'' That's what Mahmoud Karzai asked me.
He is the brother of President Karzai, and he himself has
been treated in the press as a poster boy for access to
government officials. The New York Times even profiled him in
a highly critical piece. In his defense, Karzai emphasized
that he, at least, has refrained from US government or Afghan
government contracting. He pointed out, as others have, that
Hamed Wardak had little security or trucking background
before his company received security and trucking contracts
from the Defense Department. ``That's a questionable business
practice,'' he said. ``They shouldn't give it to him. How
come that's not questioned?''
I did get the opportunity to ask General Wardak, Hamed's
father, about it. He is quite dapper, although he is no
longer the debonair ``Gucci commander'' Bearden once
described. I asked Wardak about his son and NCL. ``I've tried
to be straightforward and correct and fight corruption all my
life,'' the defense minister said. ``This has been something
people have tried to use against me, so it has been
painful.''
Wardak would speak only briefly about NCL. The issue seems
to have produced a rift with his son. ``I was against it from
the beginning, and that's why we have not talked for a long
time. I have never tried to support him or to use my power or
influence that he should benefit.''
When I told Wardak that his son's company had a US contract
worth as much as $360 million, he did a double take. ``This
is impossible,'' he said. ``I do not believe this.''
I believed the general when he said he really didn't know
what his son was up to. But cleaning up what look like
insider deals may be easier than the next step: shutting down
the money pipeline going from DoD contracts to potential
insurgents.
Two years ago, a top Afghan security official told me,
Afghanistan's intelligence service, the National Directorate
of Security, had alerted the American military to the
problem. The NDS delivered what I'm told are ``very
detailed'' reports to the Americans explaining how the
Taliban are profiting from protecting convoys of US supplies.
The Afghan intelligence service even offered a solution:
what if the United States were to take the tens of millions
paid to security contractors and instead set up a dedicated
and professional convoy support unit to guard its logistics
lines? The suggestion went nowhere.
The bizarre fact is that the practice of buying the
Taliban's protection is not a secret. I asked Col. David
Haight, who commands the Third Brigade of the Tenth Mountain
Division, about it. After all, part of Highway 1 runs through
his area of operations. What did he think about security
companies paying off insurgents? ``The American soldier in me
is repulsed by it,'' he said in an interview in his office at
FOB Shank in Logar Province. ``But I know that it is what it
is: essentially paying the enemy, saying, `Hey, don't hassle
me.' I don't like it, but it is what it is.''
As a military official in Kabul explained contracting in
Afghanistan overall, ``We understand that across the board 10
percent to 20 percent goes to the insurgents. My intel guy
would say it is closer to 10 percent. Generally it is
happening in logistics.''
In a statement to The Nation about Host Nation Trucking,
Col. Wayne Shanks, the chief public affairs officer for the
international forces in Afghanistan, said that military
officials are ``aware of allegations that procurement funds
may find their way into the hands of insurgent groups, but we
do not directly support or condone this activity, if it is
occurring.'' He added that, despite oversight, ``the
relationships between contractors and their subcontractors,
as well as between subcontractors and others in their
operational communities, are not entirely transparent.''
In any case, the main issue is not that the US military is
turning a blind eye to the problem. Many officials
acknowledge what is going on while also expressing a deep
disquiet about the situation. The trouble is that--as with so
much in Afghanistan--the United States doesn't seem to know
how to fix it.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr).
I yield the gentleman another 30 seconds.
I want to thank our majority leader for his participation and also for his cooperation in ensuring that this debate could happen. You and our Speaker and Mr. Berman are appreciated for your willingness to provide for this moment to happen so that the House could be heard from, so thank you.
I would ask, Madam Speaker, how much time remains in the debate? I am sure we're winding down here.
I yield myself 3 minutes.
One of the areas of concern that I have about our presence in Afghanistan that I haven't seen discussed that much deals with the role of oil and gas, particularly in Afghanistan. Paul Craig Roberts, who was an Assistant Secretary of Treasury under the Reagan administration, reported in November of last year on a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, who was fired from his job when he spoke out about documents he saw ``proving that the motivation for U.S. and U.K. military aggression in Afghanistan had something to do with the natural gas deposits in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.'' He continues, and these are his words, ``The Americans wanted a pipeline that bypassed Russia and Iran and went through Afghanistan. To ensure this, an invasion was necessary.''
I did some additional research on that and I found an article by Craig Murray where he claims that Mr. Karzai ``was put in place because of his role with Unocal in developing the Trans-Afghanistan Gas Pipeline project. That remains a chief strategic goal. The Asian Development Bank has agreed finance to start construction in spring, 2011. It is, of course, a total coincidence that 30,000 extra U.S. troops will arrive 6 months before, and that the U.S. (as opposed to other NATO forces) deployment area corresponds with the pipeline route.''
I have a map of the pipeline. It's probably not easily visible, but it starts on the west in Turkmenistan, goes through Afghanistan, south to Pakistan and India, and it touches near both Helmand and Kandahar province, which is exactly where our troop buildup is occurring. I will put this article by Mr. Murray into the Record.
Obama Is Wrong on Both Counts
(By Craig Murray)
Obama loves his rhetoric, and his speech on the Afghan
surge was topped by a rhetorical flourish:
``Our cause is just, our resolve unshaken''.
He is of course wrong on both counts.
The occupation of Afghanistan by the US and its allies is
there to prop up the government of President Karzai. Karzai's
has always been an ultra-corrupt government of vicious
warlords and drugs barons. I have been pointing this out for
years, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-469983/ Britain-protecting-biggest-heroin-crop- time.html#ixzz0VS78HVR1
The CIA is up to its usual tricks again supporting the drug
running of key warlords loyal to them. They are also setting
up death squads on the Central American model, in cooperation
with Blackwater.
Fortunately Karzai's rigging of his re-election was so
blatant that the scales have fallen from the eyes of the
public and even the mainstream media. Politicians no longer
pretend we are promoting democracy in Afghanistan.
Karzai comes directly from the Bush camp and was put in
place because of his role with Unocal in developing the Trans
Afghanistan Gas Pipeline project. That remains a chief
strategic goal. The Asian Development Bank has agreed finance
to start construction in Spring 2011. It is of course a total
coincidence that 30,000 extra US troops will arrive six
months before, and that the US (as opposed to other NATO
forces) deployment area corresponds with the pipeline route.
Obama's claim that ``Our cause is just'' ultimately rests
on the extraordinary claim that, eight years after the
invasion, we are still there in self-defence. In both the UK
and US, governments are relying on the mantra that the
occupation of Afghanistan protects us from terrorism at home.
This is utter nonsense. The large majority of post 9/11
terror incidents have been by Western Muslims outraged by our
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Put bluntly, if we keep
invading Muslim countries, of course we will face a violent
backlash. The idea that because we occupy Afghanistan a
Muslim from Dewsbury or Detroit disenchanted with the West
would not be able to manufacture a bomb is patent nonsense.
It would be an infinitely better strategy to make out
theoretical Muslim less disenchanted by not attacking and
killing huge numbers of his civilian co-religionists.
Our cause is unjust.
We are responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of
civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for the further of
radicalisation of Muslim communities worldwide. That
threatens a perpetual war--which is of course just what the
military-industrial complex and the security industry want.
They have captured Obama.
Fortunately, our resolve is shaken.
The ordinary people of the UK and US have begun in
sufficient numbers to see through this perpetual war
confidence trick; they realise there is nothing in it for
them but dead youngsters and high taxes. That is why Obama
made a very vague promise--which I believe in its vagueness
and caveats to be deliberate deceit--that troops will start
to leave in 2011.
Today's promises of 5,000 additional NATO troops are,
incidentally, empty rhetoric. I gather from friends in the
FCO that firm pledges to date amount to 670.
A well-placed source close to the Taliban in Pakistan tells
me that the Afghan Taliban
and their tribal allies have a plan. As the US seeks
massively to expand the Afghan forces, they are feeding in
large numbers of volunteers. I suspect that while we may see
the odd attack on their trainers, the vast majority will get
trained, fed, paid and equipped and bide their time before
turning en masse. This is nothing new; it is precisely the
history of foreign occupations in the region and the purchase
of tribal auxiliaries and alliances.
I will also have this article called ``Unocal and the Afghanistan Pipeline'' submitted in the Record because he talks about how ``Unocal was not interested in a partnership. The U.S. Government, its affiliated transnational oil and construction companies, and the ruling elite of the West had coveted the same oil and gas transit route for years.
``A trans-Afghanistan pipeline was not simply a business matter, but a key component of a broader geostrategic agenda: total military and economic control of Eurasia.'' This is supposedly described in Zbigniew Brzezinski's book, ``The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives'' as ``the center of world power.''
``Capturing the region's oil wealth and carving out territory in order to build a network of transit routes was a primary objective of U.S. military interventions throughout the 1990s in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Caspian Sea.''
[From Centre for Research on Globalisation, March 2002]
Unocal and the Afghanistan pipeline
(By Larry Chin)
CRG's Global Outlook, premiere issue on ``Stop the War''
provides detailed documentation on the war and the ``Post-
September 11 Crisis.'' Order/subscribe. Consult Table of
Contents
Part One of a two-part series Players on a rigged grand chessboard:
Bridas,
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Argentine oil company
Bridas, led by its ambitious chairman, Carlos Bulgheroni,
became the first company to exploit the oil fields of
Turkmenistan and propose a pipeline through neighboring
Afghanistan. A powerful US-backed consortium intent on
building its own pipeline through the same Afghan corridor
would oppose Bridas' project.
The Coveted Trans-Afghan Route
Upon successfully negotiating leases to explore in
Turkmenistan, Bridas was awarded exploration contracts for
the Keimar block near the Caspian Sea, and the Yashlar block
near the Afghanistan border. By March 1995, Bulgheroni had
accords with Turkmenistan and Pakistan granting Bridas
construction rights for a pipeline into Afghanistan, pending
negotiations with the civil war-torn country.
The following year, after extensive meetings with warlords
throughout Afghanistan, Bridas had a 30-year agreement with
the Rabbani regime to build and operate an 875-mile gas
pipeline across Afghanistan.
Bulgheroni believed that his pipeline would promote peace
as well as material wealth in the region. He approached other
companies, including Unocal and its then-CEO, Roger Beach, to
join an international consortium.
Unocal was not interested in a partnership. The United
States government, its affiliated transnational oil and
construction companies, and the ruling elite of the West had
coveted the same oil and gas transit route for years.
A trans-Afghanistan pipeline was not simply a business
matter, but a key component of a broader geo-strategic
agenda: total military and economic control of Eurasia (the
Middle East and former Soviet Central Asian republics).
Zbigniew Brezezinski describes this region in his book ``The
Grand Chessboard--American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives'' as ``the center of world power.'' Capturing the
region's oil wealth, and carving out territory in order to
build a network of transit routes, was a primary objective of
US military interventions throughout the 1990s in the
Balkans, the Caucasus and Caspian Sea.
As of 1992, 11 western oil companies controlled more than
50 percent of all oil investments in the Caspian Basin,
including Unocal, Amoco, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Exxon-
Mobil, Pennzoil, Texaco, Phillips and British Petroleum.
In ``Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia'' (a definitive work that is a primary source
for this report), Ahmed Rashid wrote, ``US oil companies who
had spearheaded the first US forays into the region wanted a
greater say in US policy making.''
Business and policy planning groups active in Central Asia,
such as the Foreign Oil Companies Group operated with the
full support of the US State Department, the National
Security Council, the CIA and the Department of Energy and
Commerce.
Among the most active operatives for US efforts:
Brezezinski (a consultant to Amoco, and architect of the
Afghan-Soviet war of the 1970s), Henry Kissinger (advisor to
Unocal), and Alexander Haig (a lobbyist for Turkmenistan),
and Dick Cheney (Halliburton, US-Azerbaijan Chamber of
Commerce).
Unocal's Central Asia envoys consisted of former US defense
and intelligence officials. Robert Oakley, the former US
ambassador to Pakistan, was a ``counter-terrorism''
specialist for the Reagan administration who armed and
trained the mujahadeen during the war against the Soviets in
the 1980s. He was an Iran-Contra conspirator charged by
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh as a key figure involved
in arms shipments to Iran.
Richard Armitage, the current Deputy Defense Secretary, was
another Iran-Contra player in Unocal's employ. A former Navy
SEAL, covert operative in Laos, director with the Carlyle
Group, Armitage is allegedly deeply linked to terrorist and
criminal networks in the Middle East, and the new independent
states of the former Soviet Union (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Kyrgistan).
Armitage was no stranger to pipelines. As a member of the
Burma/Myanmar Forum, a group that received major funding from
Unocal, Armitage was implicated in a lawsuit filed by Burmese
villagers who suffered human rights abuses during the
construction of a Unocal pipeline. (Halliburton, under Dick
Cheney, performed contract work on the same Burmese project.)
Bridas Versus the New World Order
Much to Bridas' dismay, Unocal went directly to regional
leaders with its own proposal. Unocal formed its own
competing US-led, Washington-sponsored consortium that
included Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil, aligned with Saudi Prince
Abdullah and King Fahd. Other partners included Russia's
Gazprom and Turkmenistan's state-owned Turkmenrozgas.
John Imle, president of Unocal (and member of the US-
Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce with Armitage, Cheney,
Brezezinski and other ubiquitous figures), lobbied
Turkmenistan's president Niyazov and prime minister Bhutto of
Pakistan, offering a Unocal pipeline following the same route
as Bridas.'
Dazzled by the prospect of an alliance with the US, Niyazov
asked Bridas to renegotiate its past contract and blocked
Bridas' exports from Keimar field. Bridas responded by filing
three cases with the International Chamber of Commerce
against Turkmenistan for breach of contract. (Bridas won.)
Bridas also filed a lawsuit in Texas charging Unocal with
civil conspiracy and ``tortuous interference with business
relations.'' While its officers were negotiating with
Pakistani and Turkmen oil and gas officials, Bridas
claimed that Unocal had stolen its idea, and coerced the
Turkmen government into blocking Bridas from Keimir field.
(The suit was dismissed in 1998 by Judge Brady G. Elliott,
a Republican, who claimed that any dispute between Unocal
and Bridas was governed by the laws of Turkmenistan and
Afghanistan, rather than Texas law.)
In October 1995, with neither company in a winning
position, Bulgheroni and Imle accompanied Niyazov to the
opening of the UN General Assembly. There, Niyazov awarded
Unocal with a contract for a 918-mile natural gas pipeline.
Bulgheroni was shocked. At the announcement ceremony, Unocal
consultant Henry Kissinger said that the deal looked like
``the triumph of hope over experience.''
Later, Unocal's consortium, CentGas, would secure another
contract for a companion 1,050-mile oil pipeline from
Dauletabad through Afghanistan that would connect to a tanker
loading port in Pakistan on the coast of the Arabian Sea.
Although Unocal had agreements with the governments on
either end of the proposed route, Bridas still had the
contract with Afghanistan.
The problem was resolved via the CIA and Pakistani ISI-
backed Taliban. Following a visit to Kandahar by US Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphael in the fall
of 1996, the Taliban entered Kabul and sent the Rabbani
government packing.
Bridas' agreement with Rabbani would have to be
renegotiated.
Wooing the Taliban
According to Ahmed Rashid, ``Unocal's real influence with
the Taliban was that their project carried the possibility of
US recognition, which the Taliban were desperately anxious to
secure.''
Unocal wasted no time greasing the palms of the Taliban. It
offered humanitarian aid to Afghan warlords who would form a
council to supervise the pipeline project. It provided a new
mobile phone network between Kabul and Kandahar. Unocal also
promised to help rebuild Kandahar, and donated $9,000 to the
University of Nebraska's Center for Afghan Studies. The US
State Department, through its aid organization USAID,
contributed significant education funding for Taliban. In the
spring of 1996, Unocal executives flew Uzbek leader General
Abdul Rashid Dostum to Dallas to discuss pipeline passage
through his northern (Northern Alliance-controlled)
territories.
Bridas countered by forming an alliance with Ningarcho, a
Saudi company closely aligned with Prince Turki el-Faisal,
the Saudi intelligence chief. Turki was a mentor to Osama bin
Laden, the ally of the Taliban who was publicly feuding with
the Saudi royal family. As a gesture for Bridas, Prince Turki
provided the Taliban with communications equipment and a
fleet of pickup trucks. Now Bridas proposed two consortiums,
one to build the Afghanistan portion, and another to take
care of both ends of the line.
By November 1996, Bridas claimed that it had an agreement
signed by the Taliban and Dostum--trumping Unocal.
The competition between Unocal and Bridas, as described by
Rashid, ``began to reflect the competition within the Saudi
Royal family.''
In 1997, Taliban officials traveled twice to Washington,
D.C. and Buenos Aires to be wined and dined by Unocal and
Bridas. No agreements were signed.
It appeared to Unocal that the Taliban was balking. In
addition to royalties, the Taliban demanded funding for
infrastructure projects, including roads and power plants.
The Taliban also announced plans to revive the Afghan
National Oil Company, which had been abolished by the Soviet
regime in the late 1970s.
Osama bin Laden (who issued his fatwa against the West in
1998) advised the Taliban to sign with Bridas. In addition to
offering the Taliban a higher bid, Bridas proposed an open
pipeline accessible to warlords and local users. Unocal's
pipeline was closed--for export purposes only. Bridas' plan
also did not require outside financing, while Unocal's
required a loan from the western financial institutions (the
World Bank), which in turn would leave Afghanistan vulnerable
to demands from western governments.
Bridas' approach to business was more to the Taliban's
liking. Where Bulgheroni and Bridas' engineers would take the
time to ``sip tea with Afghan tribesmen,'' Unocal's American
executives issued top-down edicts from corporate headquarters
and the US Embassy (including a demand to open talks with the
CIA-backed Northern Alliance).
While seemingly well received within Afghanistan, Bridas'
problems with Turkmenistan (which they blamed on Unocal and
US interference) had left them cash-strapped and without a
supply.
In 1997, they went searching for a major partner with the
clout to break the deadlock with Turkmenistan. They found one
in Amoco. Bridas sold 60 percent of its Latin American assets
to Amoco. Carlos Bulgheroni and his contingent retained the
remaining minority 40 percent. Facilitating the merger were
other icons of transnational finance, Chase Manhattan
(representing Bridas), Morgan Stanley (handling Amoco) and
Arthur Andersen (facilitator of post-merger integration).
Zbigniew Brezezinski was a consultant for Amoco.
(Amoco would merge with British Petroleum a year later. BP
is represented by the law firm of Baker & Botts, whose
principal attorney is James Baker, lifelong Bush friend,
former secretary of state, and a member of the Carlyle
Group.)
Recognizing the significance of the merger, a Pakistani oil
company executive hinted, ``If these (Central Asian)
countries want a big US company involved, Amoco is far bigger
than Unocal.''
Clearing the Chessboard Again
By 1998, while the Argentine contingent made slow progress,
Unocal faced a number of new problems.
Gazprom pulled out of CentGas when Russia complained about
the anti-Russian agenda of the US. This forced Unocal to
expand CentGas to include Japanese and South Korean gas
companies, while maintaining the dominant share with Delta.
Human rights groups began protesting Unocal's dealings with
the brutal Taliban. Still riding years of Clinton bashing and
scandal mongering, conservative Republicans in the US
attacked the Clinton administration's Central Asia policy for
its lack of clarity and ``leadership.''
Once again, violence would change the dynamic.
In response to the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and
Tanzania (attributed to bin Laden), President Bill Clinton
sent cruise missiles into Afghanistan and Sudan. The
administration broke off diplomatic contact with the Taliban,
and UN sanctions were imposed.
Unocal withdrew from CentGas, and informed the State
Department ``the gas pipeline would not proceed until an
internationally recognized government was in place in
Afghanistan.'' Although Unocal continued on and off
negotiations on the oil pipeline (a separate project), the
lack of support from Washington hampered efforts.
Meanwhile, Bridas declared that it would not need to wait
for resolution of political issues, and repeated its
intention of moving forward with the Afghan gas pipeline
project on its own. Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan
tried to push Saudi Arabia to proceed with CentGas (Delta of
Saudi Arabia was now the leader). But war and US-Taliban
tension made business impossible.
For the remainder of the Clinton presidency, there would be
no official US or UN recognition of Afghanistan. And no
progress on the pipeline.
Then George Walker Bush took the White House.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
I would like to speak for a moment about civilian casualties in Afghanistan.
According to the United Nations, airstrikes continue to be a leading cause of civilian casualties. Days into the Marjah military offensive, 12 Afghans died when two rockets fired by NATO forces hit the wrong house. Ten of the 12 Afghans killed were from the same family. U.S. military officials initially apologized for the death of the civilians, but later backtracked, claiming they were insurgents. An Italian aid group working at a hospital just outside of Marjah accused allied forces of blocking dozens of critically wounded citizens from receiving medical attention at the hospital. A February 21 NATO airstrike conducted by U.S. Special Forces helicopters killed over 27 civilians and wounded dozens more after minibuses were hit by helicopters ``patrolling the area hunting for insurgents who had escaped the NATO offensive in the Marjah area,'' over 100 miles outside of Marjah in the southern province of Uruzgan.
The Wall Street Journal cited Afghan and NATO representatives, explaining that the air strike was ordered because it was believed that the minibus carried fresh Taliban fighters who were sent to help those under attack. However, the source of intelligence used to determine that the minibus carried insurgents has not been made known.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed the goal of the Marjah operation was to have no civilian casualties.
I submit for the Record a Brookings Institution 2009 report estimate that 10 civilians die for every militant killed in a drone strike.
I submit for the Record an article published in The Nation, written by journalist Anand Gopal, titled ``America's Secret Afghan Prisons,'' which reveals the existence of secret detention facilities at Bagram.
The daily night raids and indiscriminate aerial bombings must stop. The alleged torture of Afghans who are accused of supporting the Taliban who are captured in such night raids and the slaughter of innocent civilians in drone attacks only serve to embolden popular support against the United States.
[From the Brookings Institution, Mar. 10, 2010]
Do Targeted Killings Work?
(By Daniel L. Byman)
July 14, 2009.--Killing terrorist leaders is difficult, is
often ineffective, and can easily backfire. Yet it is one of
the United States' few options for managing the threat posed
by al Qaeda from its base in tribal Pakistan. By some
accounts, U.S. drone activity in Pakistan has killed dozens
of lower-ranking and at least 10 mid- and high-ranking
leaders from al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Critics correctly find many problems with this program,
most of all the number of civilian casualties the strikes
have incurred. Sourcing on civilian deaths is weak and the
numbers are often exaggerated, but more than 600 civilians
are likely to have died from the attacks. That number
suggests that for every militant killed, 10 or so civilians
also died.
To reduce casualties, superb intelligence is necessary.
Operators must know not only where the terrorists are, but
also who is with them and who might be within the blast
radius. This level of surveillance may often be lacking, and
terrorists' deliberate use of children and other civilians as
shields make civilian deaths even more likely.
Beyond the humanitarian tragedy incurred, civilian deaths
create dangerous political problems. Pakistan's new
democratic government is already unpopular for its
corruption, favoritism, and poor governance. U.S. strikes
that take a civilian toll are a further blow to its
legitimacy--and to U.S. efforts to build goodwill there. As
counterterrorism expert David Kilcullen put it, ``When we
intervene in people's countries to chase small cells of bad
guys, we end up alienating the whole country and turning them
against us.''
And even when they work, killings are a poor second to
arrests. Dead men tell no tales and thus are no help in
anticipating the next attack or informing us about broader
terrorist activities. So in any country with a functioning
government, it is better to work with that government to
seize the terrorist than to kill him outright. Arresting al
Qaeda personnel in remote parts of Pakistan, however, is
almost impossible today; the Pakistani government does not
control many of the areas where al Qaeda is based, and a raid
to seize terrorists there would probably end in the militants
escaping and U.S. and allied casualties in the attempt.
When arrests are impossible, what results is a terrorist
haven of the sort present along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border today. Free from the threat of apprehension,
terrorists have a space in which to plot, organize, train,
and relax--an extremely dangerous prospect. In such a haven,
terrorist leaders can recruit hundreds or even thousands of
potential fighters and, more importantly, organize them into
a dangerous network. They can transform idealistic but
incompetent volunteers into a lethal legion of fighters. They
can also plan long-term global operations--terrorism
``spectaculars'' like the September 11 attacks, which remain
one of al Qaeda's goals.
Killing terrorist operatives is one way to dismantle these
havens. Plans are disrupted when individuals die or are
wounded, as new people must be recruited and less experienced
leaders take over day-to-day operations. Perhaps most
importantly, organizations fearing a strike must devote
increased attention to their own security because any time
they communicate with other cells or issue propaganda, they
may be exposing themselves to a targeted attack.
Given the humanitarian and political risks, each strike
needs to be carefully weighed, with the value of the target
and the potential for innocent deaths factored into the
equation. In addition, the broader political consequences
must be evaluated; the same death toll can have vastly
different political consequences depending on the context.
But equally important is the risk of not striking--and
inadvertently allowing al Qaeda leaders free reign to plot
terrorist mayhem.
We must not pretend the killings are anything but a flawed
short-term expedient that at best reduces the al Qaeda
threat--but by no means eliminates it. Even as U.S. strikes
have increased, Pakistan has suffered staggering levels of
terrorism as groups with few or limited links to al Qaeda
have joined the fray. Al Qaeda itself can also still carry
out attacks, including ones outside Pakistan in Europe and
even the United States. Thanks to the drone strikes, they are
just harder to pull off. The real answer to halting al
Qaeda's activity in Pakistan will be the long-term support of
Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. While this process
unfolds, targeted killings are one of America's few options
left.
Madam Speaker, I would like to speak about the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy.
The Brookings Institution recently reported that, in terms of raw violence, the situation is at an historic worst level with early 2010 levels of various types of attacks much higher than even last year at this time. Much of that is due to the recent Marjah campaign and, more generally, to the deployment of additional U.S. and Afghan troops to parts of the country where they have not been present before.
The President has called this war a just war. The framing of war as ``just'' is served to legitimize the slaughter of innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A 200-page report by the RAND Corporation is entitled, ``Counterintelligence in Afghanistan Deals a Huge Blow to our Ideas of Counterinsurgency.'' It reads: In many cases, a significant direct intervention by U.S. military forces may undermine popular support and legitimacy. The United States is also unlikely to remain for the duration of most insurgencies. This study's assessment of 90 insurgencies indicates that it takes an average of 14 years to defeat insurgents once an insurgency develops. Occupations fuel insurgencies. In other words, this assessment does not fit into the President's supposed rapid increase and the shaky plan to withdraw by the summer of 2011.
The Brookings report continues: Second, the United States and other international actors need to improve the quality of local governance, especially in rural areas of Afghanistan. Field research in the east and south show that development and reconstruction did not reach most rural areas because of the deteriorating security environment. Even the provincial reconstruction teams, which were specifically designed to assist in the development of reconstruction projects, operate inside pockets in east and south because of security concerns.
NGOs and State agencies, such as USAID and the Canadian International Development Agency, were also not involved in the reconstruction and development in many areas of the south and east.
The irony of this situation is that rural areas which were at most risk from the Taliban, which were unhappy with the slow pace of change, a population with the greatest unhappiness, received little assistance. The counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will be won or lost in the local communities of rural Afghanistan, not in urban centers such as Kabul, says the Brookings Institution.
Now, someone I'm not used to quoting, conservative columnist George Will, wrote in The Washington Post that the counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and level of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps, for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.
For how long are we willing to dedicate billions of dollars and thousands of lives before we realize that we can't win Afghanistan militarily? Our biggest mistake in the Afghanistan strategy is to think that we can separate the Taliban from the rest of the population. We cannot. The Taliban is a local resistance movement that is part and parcel of an indigenous population. We lost Vietnam because we failed to win the hearts and minds of local populations without providing them with a competent government that provided them with basic security and with a decent living. That message can and should be applied to Afghanistan.
The strategy for winning Afghanistan is simple: Stop killing the people and they will stop killing you.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
I yield myself 1 minute.
The more troops we send into Afghanistan, the more support the Taliban gains as resistors of foreign occupation. We say we want to negotiate with the Taliban in the future while, at the same time, conducting air strikes to take out Taliban strongholds across the country.
Just yesterday, The Washington Post published an article about the Zabul province and the pouring in of Taliban fighters following a retreat of U.S. Armed Forces from Zabul in December. If we accept the premise that we can never leave Afghanistan until the Taliban is eradicated, we may be there for a very long time.
The justification for our continued military presence in Afghanistan is that the Taliban, in the past, has provided a safe haven for al Qaeda, or could do so in the future. General Petraeus has already admitted that al Qaeda has little or no presence in Afghanistan.
We have to careful about branding al Qaeda and the Taliban as a single terrorist movement. Al Qaeda is an international organization, and, yes, they are a threat to the United States. The Taliban is only a threat to us as long as we continue our military occupation of Afghanistan.
Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
I want to thank Mr. Berman and my colleagues for this opportunity to engage in this important debate.
At the current estimated deployment rate, the number of troops in Afghanistan will increase from about 70,000 at the end of 2009 to the stated goal of 100,000 by July of this year. My resolution calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. Armed Forces from Afghanistan no later than December 31 of this year. And it can be done. Unlike Iraq, where we have significant infrastructure built in and around the country to support our presence there, prior to last year, the United States invested very little in permanent infrastructure for U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan.
President Obama has called on the logisticians for the U.S. military to triple the amount of troops we have had in the country since the war started. If the administration expects the U.S. military to figure out a way for a rapid increase of troops on the ground, we can figure out how to have a method of rapid withdrawal.
Getting supplies into Afghanistan is one of the biggest obstacles to providing adequate support for troops on the ground. Due to frequent attacks on U.S. convoys traveling to Afghanistan through Pakistan, the U.S. is forced to deliver most of the supplies by air.
Madam Speaker, we have, in the last 3 hours, talked about 1,000 troop casualties; we have talked about a cost of a quarter of a trillion dollars and rising; we have spoken of civilian casualties and about the incredible amount of corruption that is going on in Afghanistan; we have spoken of the role of the pipeline, which is sure to deserve more critical inquiry; and we have talked about the failure of doctrines of counterinsurgency. That strategy doesn't work, and there are logistics of withdrawal that we can pursue.
The question is should the United States' people continue to bear the burden of this war when we have so many problems at home, with 15 million people unemployed, with millions of people losing their homes, with so many people without health care, with so many people not being able to send their children to good schools.
We have to reset our priorities. Our priorities should begin by getting out of Afghanistan, and then we can turn to getting out of Iraq.
Thank you very much for this debate. I urge approval of the resolution.
Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.