Mr. President, I would like to make an opening statement, as the committee chair, on the bill that is before the Senate. This bill is a simple bill. This is a House bill that extends, reauthorizes the FISA Amendments Act. FISA is the…
Mr. President, I would like to make an opening statement, as the committee chair, on the bill that is before the Senate.
This bill is a simple bill. This is a House bill that extends, reauthorizes the FISA Amendments Act. FISA is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The House bill reauthorizes the FISA Amendments Act for 5 years, until December 31, 2017. That is all it does.
Without Senate action, these authorities to collect intelligence expire in 4 days. That is the reason it is the House bill before us, and that is the reason I urge this body to vote no on all amendments and send this reauthorization to the President where it will be signed. If it goes past the 31st, the program will be interrupted.
This is important. Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act has the support of the Director of National Security, Jim Clapper; the Attorney General, Eric Holder; and other national security officials who have made clear the importance of this legislation.
Following my remarks, I would like to enter letters into the Record from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, saying this reauthorization is the highest legislative priority of the Intelligence Community.
Let me explain what the expiring provisions of the FISA Amendments Act do. I assume that is agreeable with the President that these letters go into the Record following my remarks.
Let me describe what these provisions do and why they are necessary to reauthorize.
What will expire on December 31 is title VII of FISA, which is called the FAA, the FISA Amendments Act. This authorizes the executive branch of the government to go to the FISA Court, which is a special court-- and most people don't know this--of 11 Federal District Court judges appointed by the Supreme Court who review government requests for surveillance activities and obtain annual approval for a program to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. persons, in other words, surveillance on individuals who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and who are located outside the United States.
Under current law, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may submit an application to the FISA Court. I call this a program warrant. It identifies the category of foreign persons against whom the government seeks to conduct surveillance. This application is accompanied by targeting and minimization procedures that establish how the government will determine that someone targeted for surveillance is located outside the United States; and, secondly, how it is going to minimize the acquisition and retention of any information concerning U.S. persons who are accidentally caught up in this.
If the FISA Court finds the procedures to be consistent with both law and the fourth amendment, they enter an order authorizing this kind of surveillance for 1 year--and the judges on the FISA Court have found both--and they have authorized the program to continue.
The process that follows allows the intelligence community to collect the communications of international terrorists and other non-U.S. persons who are located outside the country by, for example, acquiring electronic communications such as phone calls and e-mails sent to or from a phone number or an e-mail address known to be used by the person under surveillance.
Without this authority, the intelligence community would need to return to the process of going to the FISA Court in every individual case involving collection directed at a non-U.S. person and to prove in each case there is probable cause to believe the individual is part of or working for a foreign power or a terrorist group.
Now, here is the question: Can the government use section 702 of FISA to target a U.S. person? The answer to that is no. The law specifically prohibits the use of section 702 authorities to direct collection against--that means target--U.S. persons. So no one should think the targets are U.S. persons.
This prohibition is codified in section 702(b), which states that surveillance authorities may not be used--and let me quote the law-- ``to intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States or to intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.''
Now, if the government wants to engage in electronic surveillance targeting a U.S. person for foreign intelligence purposes, it must go back to the FISA Court and it must get a specific order from that court. In an emergency, the surveillance can commence before the court order is issued, but the government still must have probable cause to believe the U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power.
Let me take a few moments to address the principal concerns some of my colleagues have expressed about this legislation, which is the effect this one provision--Section 702--may have on the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. And let me say that 13 members of the Intelligence Committee who have voted in favor of the extension of the FISA Amendments Act--and against previous amendments from Senator Wyden--do not believe privacy is being eliminated under the law this bill would reauthorize.
As I have discussed, section 702 establishes a framework for the government to acquire foreign intelligence by conducting electronic surveillance on non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States under a program that is annually approved by the court. The privacy concerns stem from the potential for intelligence collection directed at non-U.S. persons located abroad to result in the incidental collection of or concerning communications of U.S. persons. I understand these concerns, and I would like to explain why I believe the existing provisions are adequate to address them.
First, this section is narrowly tailored to ensure that it may only be used to target non-U.S. persons located abroad. It includes specific prohibitions on targeting U.S. persons or persons inside the United States and prohibitions on engaging in so-called reverse-targeting, which means targeting a non-U.S. person abroad when the real purpose is to obtain their communications with a person inside the United States. That is prohibited.
Anytime the intelligence community is seeking to collect the communications of an American, it has to demonstrate that it has probable cause and get an individual FISA Court order.
Second, Congress recognized at the time this amendments act was enacted that it is simply not possible to collect intelligence on the communications of a person of interest without also collecting information about the people with whom and about whom that person communicates, including, in some cases, non-targeted U.S. persons. The concern was addressed when the FAA was originally drafted. Specifically, in order to protect the privacy and civil liberty of U.S. persons, Congress mandated that for collection conducted under 702, the Attorney General adopt and the FISA Court review and approve procedures that minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublic information concerning unconsenting U.S. persons.
Third, numerous reports and assessments from the executive branch that I will describe in a moment provide the committee with extensive visibility
into how these minimization procedures work and enable both the Intelligence and the Judiciary Committees to see how these procedures are effective in protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons.
Oversight by the legislative, judicial, and executive branch of the government over the past 4 years has been very thorough. There are procedures and requirements in place under current law that provide protection for the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. Those entrusted with the responsibility to collect the oversight, the committees of jurisdiction, the FISA Court, and the executive branch agencies together remain vigilant and continue to review the operations of these agencies.
Let me give a quick summary of the 702 reporting requirements under current law.
They include a semiannual assessment by the Attorney General and the DNI. Every 6 months the AG and the DNI are required to assess compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures and the acquisition guidelines adopted under Section 702. They are both further required to submit each assessment to the FISA Court and the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.
The inspector general of the Department of Justice and the inspector general of each element of the intelligence community are also authorized review compliance with Section 702. The IGs are required to provide copies of such reviews to the Attorney General, to the Director of National Intelligence, and the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. So we have the AG reviewing, we have the IGs reviewing, and then we have separate reviews by the agency heads.
The head of each element of the intelligence community must conduct an annual review which includes the following:
First, an accounting of the number of disseminated intelligence reports containing a reference to the U.S. person's identity. As a matter of fact, Members can go into a classified room at the offices of the Senate Intelligence Committee and review these reports. Any Member has access to that review.
Second, an accounting of the number of U.S. person identities subsequently disseminated by that element in response to requests for identities that were not referred to by name or title in the original reporting. Members can review that.
Third, the number of targets who were later determined to be located in the United States and, to the extent possible, whether communications of such targets were reviewed. Members can go in the Intelligence Committee offices and review that.
Fourth, a description of any procedures developed by the head of such element of the intelligence community and approved by the Director of National Intelligence to assess the extent to which acquisitions under 702 acquire communications of U.S. persons, and the results of any such assessment.
So you see, the reporting requirements go on and on.
Then there is a semiannual report. Every 6 months, the AG is required to fully inform the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees concerning the implementation of Title VII of FISA, and there is a whole list of things that must be reviewed and recounted. Then there is a semiannual Attorney General review on FISA. There is also the provision for documents from the FISA Court relating to significant construction or interpretation of FISA.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record this list.
So, Mr. President, it is not a question of this oversight not being done. I must respectfully disagree with the Senator from Oregon on that point. There is clearly rigorous oversight, and we have done hearing after hearing, we have looked at report after report, and any Member of this body who so wishes can go and review this material in the offices of the Intelligence Committee.
Now, let me talk about a protection that does exist for privacy, but will expire if this bill is not passed. That is section 704. Under this section, the intelligence community is required to get a specific judicial order before conducting surveillance on a U.S. person located outside the United States.
Before this provision was enacted in 2008 as the product of Senators who were concerned--and they were listened to, and this was enacted-- the intelligence community could conduct intelligence collection on U.S. persons outside the country with only the approval of the Attorney General but without a requirement of independent judicial review. Section 704 provides that judicial review by the special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This will only be preserved if title VII of this act is reauthorized. If it isn't, the privacy provision goes down with it.
Now, let me talk a bit more about the oversight that we have done. If you listen to some, there has been little oversight, but that is not the case. We have held numerous hearings with Directors of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Jim Clapper; with the head of the NSA, General Alexander; and with Bob Mueller at the FBI. We have had Eric Holder appear before the committee to discuss this, and we have heard from intelligence community professionals involved in carrying out surveillance operations, the lawyers who review these operations, and, importantly, the inspectors general who carry out oversight of the program and have written reports and letters to the Congress with the results of that report.
The intelligence committee's review of these FAA surveillance authorities has included the receipt and examination of dozens of reports concerning the implementation of these authorities over the past 4 years, which the executive branch is required to provide by law. We have received and scrutinized all the classified opinions of the court that interpret the law in a significant way.
Finally, our staff has held countless briefings with officials from the NSA, the DOJ, the Office of the DNI, and the FISA Court itself, including the FBI. Collectively, these assessments, reports, and other information obtained by the Intelligence Committee demonstrate that the government implements the FAA surveillance authorities in a responsible manner, with relatively few incidents of noncompliance.
Let me say this. Where such incidents of noncompliance have arisen, they have been inadvertent. They have not been intentional. They have been the result of human error or technical defect, and they have been promptly reported and remedied. That is important. Through 4 years of oversight, from all these reports, from all the meetings, from all the hearings, we have not identified a single case in which a government official engaged in a willful effort to circumvent or violate the law.
Keep in mind the oversight performed by Congress--that is, both Houses--and the FISA court comes in addition to the extensive internal oversight of the implementation that is performed by the Department of Justice, the Director of National Intelligence, and multiple IGs.
There is a view by some that this country no longer needs to fear attack. I don't share that view, and I have asked the intelligence committee staff to compile arrests that have been made in the last 4 years in America on terrorist plots that have been stopped. There are 100 arrests that have been made between 2009 and 2012. There have been 16 individuals arrested just this year alone. Let me quickly review some of these plots. Some of these may arrests come about as a result of this program. Again, if Members want to see the specific cases where FISA Amendments Act authorities were used, they can go and look at the classified background of these cases.
First, in November, 1 month ago, two arrests for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and use a weapon of mass destruction. That was Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi. They were arrested by the FBI in Fort Lauderdale, FL. The next case is another conspiracy to provide material support. Arrested were Ralph Deleon, Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales and Arifeen David Gojali. These three men were planning to travel to Afghanistan to attend terrorist training and commit violent jihad; third, was a plot to bomb the New York Federal Reserve Bank; fourth, a plot to bomb a downtown Chicago bar; fifth, a conspiracy to provide material support to the Islamic Jihad Union; sixth, a plot to carry out a suicide bomb attack against the U.S. Capitol in February of 2012; seventh, a plot to bomb locations in Tampa, FL; eighth, a plot to bomb New York City targets and troops returning from combat overseas; ninth, a plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States; and it goes on and on and on.
So I believe the FISA Amendments Act is important and these cases show the program has worked. As the years go on, I believe good intelligence is the most important way to prevent these attacks.
Information gained through programs such as this one--and through other sources as well--is able to be used to prevent future attacks. So, in the past 4 years, there have been 100 arrests to prevent something from happening in the United States, some of these plots have been thwarted because of this program. I think it is a vital program. We are doing our level best to conduct good oversight and keep abreast of the details of the program and to see that these reports come in. I have tried to satisfy Senator Wyden but apparently have been unable to do so.
I am hopeful the Senate Intelligence Committee's 13-to-2 vote to reauthorize this important legislation will be considered by all Members.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Statement of Administrative Policy on the House bill.
It states that the administration strongly supports H.R. 5949, and it goes on to say what the bill
would do. It says it is vital and it produced and continues to produce significant information that is vital to defend the Nation against international terrorism and other threats.
I am very hopeful this bill will pass without amendment and thereupon can go directly to the President for signature.
I yield the floor.
exhibit 1
Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community,
Washington, DC, June 15, 2012.
Hon. Ron Wyden,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Mark Udall,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Wyden and Senator Udall: Thank you for your 4
May 2012 letter requesting that my office and the National
Security Agency (NSA) Inspector General (IG) determine the
feasibility of estimating ``how many people inside the United
States have had their communications collected or reviewed
under the authorities granted by section 702'' of the FISA
Amendment Act (FAA). On 21 May 2012, I informed you that the
NSA Inspector General, George Ellard, would be taking the
lead on the requested feasibility assessment, as his office
could provide an expedited response to this important
inquiry.
The NSA IG provided a classified response on 6 June 2012. I
defer to his conclusion that obtaining such an estimate was
beyond the capacity of his office and dedicating sufficient
additional resources would likely impede the NSA's mission.
He further stated that his office and NSA leadership agreed
that an IG review of the sort suggested would itself violate
the privacy of U.S. persons.
As I stated in my confirmation hearing and as we have
specifically discussed, I firmly believe that oversight of
intelligence collection is a proper function of an Inspector
General. I will continue to work with you and the Committee
to identify ways that we can enhance our ability to conduct
effective oversight. If you have any questions concerning
this response, please contact me.
Sincerely,
I. Charles McCullough, III,
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Well, wait a minute.
I object, if it is time on our side that will be used.
Mr. President, let me do something I do sometimes-- correct myself. If the Senator is offering to use the time on his side, that is fine with me. As long as it is not using the time for the bill on our side.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I wish to take a moment to clarify this question of secret law. This code book I am holding is the law. It is not secret. This is all of the code provisions which guarantees the legality of what the intelligence community does. There is a whole section on congressional oversight. There is a whole section on additional procedures regarding persons inside the United States and persons outside the United States. This, in fact, is the law. We can change the law, and Senator Wyden had something to do with adding section 704. He did, in fact, change the law to put additional privacy protections in and those privacy protections are up for reauthorization in this bill before us.
I wish to address, if I could, what Senator Merkley said in his comments. I listened carefully. What he is saying is opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should, in some way, shape or form, be made public, just as opinions of the Supreme Court or any court are made available to the public. To a great extent, I find myself in agreement with that. They should be. Why can't they be? Because the law and the particular factual circumstances are mixed together in the opinion, so the particular facts and circumstances are possibly classified. Hopefully the opinion can either be written in a certain way for public release or the Attorney General can be required to prepare a summary of what that opinion said for release to the public.
There is one part of Senator Merkley's amendment which I think we can work together on regarding the FISA Court opinions, and that is on page 5, lines 3 to 11, where the amendment says:
. . . if the Attorney General makes a determination that a
decision may not be declassified and made available in a
manner that protects the national security of the United
States, including methods or sources related to national
security, the Attorney General shall release an unclassified
summary of such decision.
I have talked to Senator Merkley about this, and I have offered my help in working to establish this. The problem is, we have 4 days, and this particular part of the law expires, the FISA Amendments Act. I have offered to Senator Merkley to write a letter requesting declassification of more FISA Court opinions. If the letter does not work, we will do another intelligence authorization bill next year, and we can discuss what can be added to that bill on this issue.
I am concerned that what is happening is the term ``secret law'' is being confused with what the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issues in the form of classified opinions based on classified intelligence programs. As I have made clear, the law is public and when possible, the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should be made available to the public in declassified form. It can be done, and I think it should be done more often.
If the opinion cannot be made public, hopefully a summary of the opinion can. And I have agreed with Senator Merkley to work together on this issue.
I ask unanimous consent that all quorum calls during debate on the FISA bill be equally divided between the proponents and opponents.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Madam President, is the Senator going to call up his amendment?
Amendment No. 3436
Madam President, I rise in opposition to this amendment. This amendment is extraordinarily broad. It is much broader than FISA, and in the course of my remarks, I would hope to address how broad it is. It essentially bars Federal, State, and local governments from obtaining any information relating to an individual that is held by a third party unless the government first obtains either a warrant or consent from the individual. This is also not germane to FISA. It has not been reviewed by the Judiciary Committee, which would have jurisdiction over this matter. For that reason alone, I would vote against it. Also, it impedes the timely reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act.
I also oppose the substance of the amendment. The amendment is titled the ``Fourth Amendment Preservation and Protection Act.'' In reality, it seeks to reverse over 30 years of Supreme Court precedent interpreting the fourth amendment.
In 1967 the Supreme Court established its reasonable expectation of privacy test under the fourth amendment, in the case of Katz v. United States. Nine years later, in a case known as U.S. v. Miller, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities.
So already you have a Supreme Court case saying that the fourth amendment does not prohibit the use of this kind of information by the government.
The Miller case involved the government obtaining account records from a bank. But in 1979, just 3 years after Miller, the Supreme Court took up the issue of third-party collection in a case involving the installation and use of pen registers, which are electronic devices that enable law enforcement to collect telephone numbers dialed from a particular phone line without listening to the content of those calls. The 1973 case is known as Smith v. Maryland, and in it the Court held:
[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All
telephone users realize that they must ``convey'' phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone
company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance
(toll) calls on their monthly bills. . . . Telephone users .
. . typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company has
facilities for recording this information; and that the phone
company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes. Although subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much
to believe that telephone subscribers, under these
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret. . . . This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.
More recently, in the Court's 2012 decision in U.S. v. Jones, some Justices have questioned whether the time has come to revisit Miller and Smith in some form. Now, perhaps they are right, but this amendment isn't the form they had in mind. And this isn't the time to do so.
This amendment is so broad that the police could not use cell phone data to find a missing or kidnapped child without a warrant or the consent of the missing child--impossible to get. Similarly, they could not ask the phone company to provide the home address of a terrorist, drug dealer, or other criminal without consent or warrant. They could not ask a bank if such criminals had recently deposited large sums of money. In fact, as written, this amendment would prohibit law enforcement from looking up the name, address, and phone number of a criminal suspect, witness, or any other person online unless they obtained a warrant or the consent of the criminal suspect. As you can see, the amendment is too broad.
As I have already stated, the FAA authorities expire in 4 days. If those authorities are allowed to lapse, our intelligence agencies will be deprived of a critical tool that enables those agencies to acquire vital information about international terrorists and other important targets overseas, plus what they may be plotting in the United States. It is imperative that we pass a clean reauthorization of these authorities without amendments that will hamper passage in the House.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
Madam President, in listening to the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee and also reading the amendment, I want to
make clear that there are parts of this amendment to which I would agree. However, the House bill is now before us, which would extend the sunset of the FISA Amendments Act 5 years versus 2\1/2\ years in the Leahy Amendment. So, before us is the 5-year authorization period which the House has already passed. We have 4 days before the FISA Amendments Act essentially end. I cannot support that shorter time but I support the 5-year extension.
The part of the amendment of the chairman of the Judiciary Committee that I do agree with is the expanded mission of the inspector general of the Intelligence Community. Since the chairman is now becoming the President in rapid promotion, I will be happy to address my remarks to him.
(The PRESIDENT pro tempore assumed the Chair.)
Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, I want you to know we have spent large amounts of time on the particular issue of Section 702 reporting. For example, the law requires semiannual Attorney General and DNI assessments of section 702. Every 6 months they assess compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures. The law also requires the inspector general of Justice and the IG of every element of the intelligence community authorized to acquire foreign intelligence information to review compliance within Section 702. In addition, the IGs are required to review the number of disseminated intelligence reports containing a reference to a U.S.-person identity and the number of U.S. person identities subsequently disseminated. The law also already requires annual reviews by agency heads of Section 702. It also requires a semiannual Attorney General report on Title VII every 6 months to fully inform the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. And there is another semiannual report on FISA required for the Attorney General to submit a report to the committees. Finally, there are requirements for the provision of documents relating to significant construction or interpretation of FISA by the FISA Court.
So it is clear that there are many reporting requirements on FISA and specifically section 702. I would also add that the Intelligence Committee has had hearings with the DNI, with Attorney General Holder, with Director of FBI Mueller on how Section 702 is carried out. I will also tell you the Intelligence Committee staff spends countless hours going over the reports in meetings with representatives of the departments. However, I would say to Chairman Leahy that what I would like to do is look at your amendment and see how it compares to what is currently being done and possibly add some parts of your amendment to our authorization bill next year.
I would urge that we have your staff and the Intelligence Committee staff work together to see what we can do. The real reason to oppose all of this at this time is that these authorities expire in 4 days. I remember the vote in the Judiciary Committee on this amendment very well. Had the bill come to the floor over the summer, after it passed out of Committee, then we might have had time to convince the House to consider these changes to current law. But here we are where we have a 5-year House bill in front of us and only 4 days to extend the sunset. As I am opposing all amendments, I would respectfully and, not quite sorrowfully but almost, have to oppose your amendment with the caveat I added, Mr. Chairman.
In deference to you and your chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee, the Intelligence Committee staff will work closely with yours to see if there is anything that needs to be added to a future intelligence authorization bill.
I thank you for that and I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.