I rise today to oppose the Barletta amendments and the Weiner-Chaffetz-Cravaack amendment to eliminate funding for the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), should they be offered during floor consideration of H.R. 1. The elimination of USIP…
I rise today to oppose the Barletta amendments and the Weiner-Chaffetz-Cravaack amendment to eliminate funding for the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), should they be offered during floor consideration of H.R. 1.
The elimination of USIP would have strong, adverse impact on America's security interests. USIP is an important national security actor. The U.S. Government must have options for resolving international conflict other than military action. USIP--created by Congress and signed into law by President Ronald Reagan--is the only independent U.S. Government actor that is dedicated solely to conflict prevention and resolution.
USIP is the critical bridge between governmental and non-governmental actors to promote peace in volatile conflicts. Their Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution conducts work in a number of critical conflict zones in Africa, Middle East, and across the globe:
USIP is addressing a series of challenges and opportunities facing the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a focus on institutional capacity to make compromises, the capacity of the Israeli and Palestinian publics to build consensus and support for a negotiated agreement, and the role of U.S. policymakers in encouraging and supporting these efforts toward a peaceful resolution.
USIP is addressing several issues in Nigeria, a country rife with conflicts over petroleum resources and religion. Amidst this situation, the Center is working on peace efforts for the Niger Delta region, including working collaboratively with local governments, oil companies, and Nigerian NGOs.
For nearly two decades, the United States Institute of Peace has been working in Sudan on peace processes. Its knowledge and expertise has helped shape the environment that has contributed, so far, to a relatively peaceful outcome of the referendum. USIP's work on prevention, power-sharing, constitutional reform and natural resources has made a critical difference in the country's local capacity.
USIP produces timely expert analysis on issues critical to policymakers and conflict prevention practitioners. Just last week USIP published the attached PEACE Brief report on the political stalemate in Cote d'Ivoire following the November 28, 2010 election and the broader issue of preventing electoral violence in Africa.
USIP is a small, agile center of innovation in support of America's national security interests in supporting peace and democracy in Africa and across the globe. USIP has been a very useful resource to policymakers for decades, we can not eliminate this critical institution.
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting ``no'' on these amendments.
[From the PeaceBrief--United States Institute of Peace, Feb. 7, 2011]
Cote d'Ivoire's Political Stalemate: A Symptom of Africa's Weak
Electoral Institutions
(By Dorina Bekoe)
Summary
The political stalemate in Cote d'Ivoire following the
November 28, 2010, presidential election continues. The
majority of the international community recognizes Alassane
Ouattara as the winner, but Laurent Gbagbo, the sitting
president, insists he won. Financial and diplomatic sanctions
imposed on the Gbagbo administration have thus far not forced
Gbagbo from power.
Maintaining international pressure and focus is critical to
resolving the Ivorian crisis, but African states are
increasingly divided on how to proceed.
The power-sharing arrangement settled on by five African
nations in recent elections sets a dangerous precedent.
Losers with a strong militia may find it easier to use
threats of violence or actual violence to retain a critical
power role, thus subverting the intent of the election.
African states will continue to experience violence during
elections until the security sector is reformed, states
refrain from holding elections while militias remain
mobilized and armed, elections can be clearly and
independently verified, institutions are politically
independent, and policies exist to discourage the violent
acquisition of power.
Following the November 28, 2010, presidential runoff
election, the United Nations, charged with validating the
electoral process, along with the Independent Electoral
Commission, proclaimed Alassane Ouattara the winner, with
54.1 percent of the vote, over Laurent Gbagbo, the sitting
president, who had received 45.9 percent of the vote.
However, the Constitutional Council, headed by a Gbagbo
supporter, annulled results in 13 departments, alleging
fraud, and proclaimed Gbagbo the winner, with 51.4 percent of
the vote; Ouattara was given 48.5 percent.\1\ Both Ouattara
and Gbagbo were sworn in as president by their supporters.
Most in the international and regional communities
recognized Ouattara as the winner, and the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU)
suspended Cote d'Ivoire from membership. Gbagbo's calls to
investigate election fraud, recount the ballots, and craft a
power-sharing arrangement have been rejected by the
international and regional institutions. Instead, ECOWAS and
AU envoys have urged Gbagbo to step down, financial and
travel sanctions have been placed on him and his associates,
and ECOWAS threatened military intervention.\2\ With the
military and the Young Patriots militia supporting Gbagbo and
the Forces Nouvelles rebels supporting Ouattara, many fear
that the failure of diplomacy and sanctions will reignite the
2002 civil war. While the central conundrum is how to
convince Gbagbo to leave office, larger questions loom about
the role of elections, the state of democratization, and the
strength of institutions in Africa.
Power sharing in response to electoral violence
In 2010, opposition candidates claimed electoral fraud and
irregularities in every presidential election in Africa--in
Guinea, Togo, Sudan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Comoros,
Tanzania, and Rwanda. Historically, in many cases of
electoral fraud, the challenger urges demonstrations or
refuses to recognize the results. In prolonged and violent
standoffs mediators have been dispatched, as occurred in
Guinea 2010, or a power-sharing agreement has been
negotiated, as occurred in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008, in
Togo in 2005, in Madagascar in 2002, and in Zanzibar in 2001.
While the power-sharing arrangements in those five cases
aimed to stop the violence and address some of its underlying
causes, such arrangements could have longlasting
implications, and shorter, transitional measures might be
considered instead. Granted, an electorate can vote for a
power-sharing or proportionally representative government.
The problems arise when power sharing is imposed as a
solution when there is a clear winner (it weakens the purpose
of an election), when the winner cannot be determined (it can
encourage fraud and other obfuscation), or when there is
postelection violence (it may demonstrate that violence
pays). In this sense, Gbagbo's power-sharing proposal is
troubling and presents a critical philosophical decision for
Africa's institutions: how to react to candidates who respond
violently to election results. More broadly, how can leaders
be encouraged to accept defeat? How should the international
community respond to leaders who use violence to hold on to
power? For the remainder of 2011, Africa faces nearly 40
elections and referenda in 23 countries, including some that
have a history of violence and weak democratic institutions,
such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. A power-sharing norm, in the event of violently
contested election results, will be a dangerous precedent.
lessons from madagascar and togo
In 2003, a disputed first-run election left Madagascar
divided between the supporters of incumbent president Didier
Ratsiraka and challenger Marc Ravalomanana. The Organization
of African Unity brokered the Dakar Agreement to pave the way
for a resolution .\3\ But when Ratsiraka refused to concede,
confrontations between the two escalated, and Ratsiraka fled
to France. \4\ Six years later the mayor of Antananarivo,
Andry Rajoelina, accused Ravalomanana's administration of
corruption and mismanagement and, with the military's
backing, assumed the presidency. Ravalomanana fled to South
Africa. Despite the absence of both Ratsiraka and
Ravalomanana, the political situation in Madagascar remains
unresolved. Efforts at resolution have floundered as the
international community, once united in bringing Rajoelina
and the former presidents together, has splintered, with
different countries considering their own national and
regional interests. Resolving the crisis is made more
difficult as the efforts of mediators are uncoordinated and
therefore weakened.\5\
The response in Togo differed markedly. After long-serving
Gnassingbe Eyadema died in 2005, the parliament swore in his
son, Faure Gnassingbe, contravening the constitution. ECOWAS
and the International Organization of the Francophonie
suspended Togo. After an enormous amount of international
pressure and mediation, Gnassingbe stepped aside to allow
elections, as required by the constitution. In this case, the
concerted pressure of the international and regional
communities provided space for the resolution of the crisis.
The Ivorian situation must not slip from international
attention. The financial and travel sanctions have begun to
constrain Gbagbo and his administration, but he remains in
place. Only resolute diplomatic pressure and adherence to
sanctions will eventually dislodge Gbagbo and avert conflict.
Yet the AU's reversal on military intervention, the refusal
by Ghana and South Africa to take a stance for one candidate
or the other, and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni's statement that
the votes should be investigated show a divided region.
Furthermore, other African countries are receiving Gbagbo's
representatives, in a break with the initial practice of
recognizing only Ouat-tara's representatives; they were
recently in Kenya to explain their reasons for rejecting
Ouattara's victory claims. These developments threaten a
swift resolution to this stalemate and portend a long period
of instability.
the role of ivorian civil society in reducing tension
Political and geographic divisions make it difficult for
Ivoirian civil society to act as a joint force for peace.
Moderate voices, willing to bridge regional and political
divides, are not being heard.\6\ It is important to note that
Ouattara did not obtain a landslide victory. A substantial
number of voters, nearly 46 percent, supported Gbagbo. Their
reasons for supporting Gbagbo reflect the existing regional,
ethnic, and religious divisions in Cote d'Ivoire. Whether
Gbagbo or Ouattara emerges as winner from the current
stalemate, the next president will face a sharply divided
electorate that challenges his rule. Thus, this election,
which was meant to repair the divisions between the north and
the south, will have failed to do so. At the very least, a
key ingredient for avoiding war in Cote d'Ivoire is to
reconcile these divided communities. Civil society's moderate
voices can play a critical role in starting the
reconciliation process.\7\ Moderates can also make joint
statements and appearances and participate in the current
mediation process between Gbagbo and Ouattara. The
international community should help by emphasizing the
importance of moderates and building their capacity and
infrastructure to succeed.
preventing violence in electoral disputes
Cote d'Ivoire's crisis, as well as others, could have been
avoided if the militias had demobilized and if clear rules
for the security services had existed, methods for verifying
elections were clear and disputes could have been credibly
resolved, and Africa's institutions had implementable tools
for discouraging electoral violence.
the role of the security forces
In many countries, security services remain politicized and
are used to crush demonstrations and intimidate the
opposition. This was clearly seen in the postelection
demonstrations in Ethiopia in 2005, where approximately
30,000 opposition members were arrested.\8\ In Cote d'Ivoire
as many as 30 demonstrators died at the hands of state
security services during a public demonstration.\9\ Reform
and depoliticization of the security forces would reduce the
chances of violence.
disarmament and demobilization of militias
Repeated attempts to disarm the militia ahead of the
elections in Cote d'Ivoire failed. The program was poorly
funded, and there were identifiable security, financial, and
political benefits for the militia to remain intact. Removing
those incentives would have spurred demobilization. Now, with
Ouattara and Gbagbo in control of arms, the prospect of
violence increases dramatically should diplomacy fail. A
similar outcome occurred in the Republic of Congo after the
1993 parliamentary elections when the three political party
leaders each claimed victory while still in charge of their
respective militias. The clashes in the ensuing several
months left 2,000 dead.\10\ Elections should not proceed
while candidates remain in control of militias.
clear, independent verification of results
The UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) was charged with
certifying the electoral process. It was to ``ensure that all
stages of the electoral process are carried out in accordance
with recognized standards . . . [and] not allow the results
to be contested in a non-democratic way or to be
compromised.''\11\ This language left room for contestation,
which is exactly what happened, when the electoral
commission, which is charged with announcing the provisional
results, and the Constitutional Council, which is charged
with verifying the electoral commission's results, disagreed.
ONUCI's role as certifier does not explicitly state that its
judgment is final. This ambiguity has been exploited in the
Ivorian crisis. Similarly, in Kenya the procedures in place
could not determine which candidate had won or whether the
electoral process had been fair, fueling the tension.
Strengthening and clarifying the processes and institutions
that verify an election will greatly reduce the chances and
claims of fraud.
fair hearings for grievances
Credible means of assessing an election should be
buttressed by independent institutions for addressing
grievances. Cote d'Ivoire's politically biased institutions
do not foster this confidence. In Kenya's 2007 elections and
Togo's 2010 elections, opposition leaders refused to use
existing institutions, which they deemed biased, to resolve
their grievances, opting instead for street protests. Without
independent institutions, public protests will increase the
chances of violence, especially when security forces are
politicized.
sanctions for violence in electoral disputes
There is currently no continental stance or policy on
discouraging electoral violence. Politicians in Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Togo, and Zanzibar were all rewarded with power-
sharing agreements when they contested elections violently.
Elsewhere, violent perpetrators were not prosecuted when the
country returned to political normalcy. This sends a message
that violence is costless and sometimes pays. Africa's
institutions must develop clear and implementable sanctions
against politicians who use violence to secure elections.
conclusion
Other, country-specific ways to increase an election's
credibility and transparency certainly exist. However, basic
measures such as depoliticizing the security services,
disarming militias, clearly and independently verifying
elections, establishing independent institutions for
redressing grievances, and discouraging the use of violence
in elections can help prevent violent responses to electoral
results. Cote d'Ivoire had none of these measures in place.
Now, with the threat of violence looming, the international
and regional communities must remain unified in their
approach and push for the inclusion of moderate civil society
voices to ensure the resolution of the crisis.
endnotes
\1\ West Africa Network for Peacebuilding--Cote d'Ivoire,
``Troisieme Rapport de l'Observatoire de la Vie Politique et
des Medias en Periode Electorale'' (Abidjan: WANEP--Cote
d'Ivoire, January 8, 2011).
\2\ This threat was reversed at the African Union's summit
on January 28-31, 2011.
\3\ Dakar Agreement, http://www.afrol.com/Countries/ Madagascar/documents/accord_
dakar.htm.
\4\ Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, ``Africa: OAU Stands Aloof on
Madagascar, Despite Departure of Ratsiraka,'' Allafrica.com,
July 5, 2002, http://allafrica.com/stories/200207050825.html.
\5\ International Crisis Group, ``Madagascar: Le Crise a un
Tournant Critique?,'' Africa Report 166, November 18, 2010,
4-6.
\6\ ``Cote d'Ivoire: Voices of Reason Sidelined in the
Crisis,'' IRINNews.org, January 26, 2011, http:// www.irinnews.org/report.spx?ReportID=91733.
\7\ Ibid.
\8\ Lahra Smith, ``Political Violence and Uncertainty In
Ethiopia,'' U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report no. 192
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2007), 7.
\9\ Amnesty International, ``Cote d'Ivoire: Injured
Protestors Denied Medical Care,'' Allafrica.com, December 20,
2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201012200899.html.
\10\ U.S. Department of State, ``Congo Human Rights
Practices, 1994'' (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State,
February 1995), sect. 1(a), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/ democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_africa/Congo.html.
\11\ UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI), ``The
Certification of Elections in Cote d'Ivoire,'' Resolution
1765, adopted by the UN Security Council on July 16, 2007,
http://www.onuci.org/pdf/faqcertificationen.pdf.