Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for up to 20 minutes. Mr. President, I rise today because I am deeply concerned…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for up to 20 minutes.
Mr. President, I rise today because I am deeply concerned that just over 1 year since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a failure that helped send us to the brink of depression, Wall Street is essentially unchanged. Congress and the SEC have not enacted any reform, and the American people remain at risk of another financial debacle--not just because the same practices that led to the crisis 14 months ago are continuing but from new practices that are leading to new problems and new systemic risks.
Last year, the financial world almost came to an end. Yet most of Wall Street then believed that no government review or additional regulation was necessary--right up until the moment government had to step in and save it.
We had been assured that the system was sound. We were assured that a host of checks and balances were in place that would suffice. We were assured that companies have to report their financial holdings with full disclosure and transparency. We were assured that accountants have to verify those assets. We were assured that due diligence is conducted on every deal and transaction. We were assured that boards of directors have a fiduciary duty to undertake prudent risk management. We were sure that management wanted their companies to thrive
over the long term. Most important, we were assured that regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies are in place to police the system. But those safeguards did not prevent the disaster.
In the past 10 years or more, one of the most important safeguards-- the regulators--had simply given up on the importance of regulation. We believed and they believed that markets could police themselves, they would self-regulate, and so in effect we pulled the regulators off the field.
We now know the confluence of events that led to the disaster, and there is blame enough to go around. We failed to regulate the derivatives market. Government-backed agencies, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, pushed to make housing available for greater numbers of people; unscrupulous mortgage brokers pushed subprime mortgages at every opportunity; and investment bankers pooled and securitized those subprime mortgages by the trillions of dollars and sold them like hotcakes. Rating agencies, left unmonitored by the SEC, incredibly stamped these pools with AAA ratings.
The SEC, which changed the capital-to-leverage ratio level for investment banks from 30-and-50-to-1, allowed these banks to buy huge pools of these soon-to-be toxic assets, and investment banks wrote credit default swaps and then hedged those risks without any central clearinghouse, without any understanding of who was writing how much or what it all meant--all of this, incredible to believe, without any regulation or oversight.
This chart conveys that banks were involved in high-risk return investments that were largely unregulated. Then, crash--the housing bubble burst and a disaster of truly monumental proportions struck. Americans lost $20 trillion in housing and equity value during the ensuing financial meltdown. The economy lurched into free fall, and the GDP shrunk by a staggering percentage not seen since the 1950s.
What happened next? The American taxpayer, the deep-pocket lender of last resort, had to ride to the rescue. We can barely even count the trillions of dollars in taxpayer money that have gone into bailing out the banks, AIG, and a number of other financial institutions. That is not including the billions of taxpayer dollars we had to spend to stimulate the economy.
We must never let this happen again. Yet here we are 1 year later, with no immediate crisis at hand, and we are falling back into complacency. The credit default swap market remains unregulated. The credit rating agencies have not yet been reformed. The banks are back to their old habits--paying out billions of dollars in bonuses for employees who are still engaged in high-risk, high-reward practices.
What is the great lesson we should have learned from the financial disaster of 2008? When markets develop rapidly and change dramatically, when they are not regulated, and when they are not fully transparent, it can lead to financial disaster. That is what happened in the credit default swap market--rapid and dramatic change in the market, no regulation, and opaqueness, which equaled disaster. This must never happen again.
I look forward to working with my colleagues to regulate the derivatives markets, to ensure that credit default swaps are traded on an exchange or at least cleared through a central clearinghouse with appropriate safeguards enforced, and to enact meaningful financial regulatory reforms.
At the same time, we need to be looking carefully to see if these three deadly ingredients--rapid technological development, lack of transparency, and a lack of regulation--are appearing again in other markets. There is no question in my mind that in today's stock markets, those three disastrous ingredients do exist.
Due to rapid technological advances in computerized trading, stock markets have changed dramatically in recent years. They have become so highly fragmented that they are opaque--beyond the scope of effective surveillance--and our regulators have failed to keep pace.
The facts speak for themselves. We have gone from an era dominated by a duopoly of the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq to a highly fragmented market of more than 60 trading centers.
Dark pools, which allow confidential trading away from the public eye, have flourished, growing from 1.5 percent to 12 percent of market trades in under 5 years.
Competition for orders is intense and increasingly problematic. Flash orders, liquidity rebates, direct access granted to hedge funds by the exchanges, dark pools, indications of interest, and payment for order flow are each a consequence of these 60 centers all competing for market share.
Moreover, in just a few short years, high-frequency trading, which feeds everywhere on small price differences in the many fragmented trading venues, has skyrocketed from 30 percent to 70 percent of the daily volume.
Indeed, the chief executive of one of the country's biggest block trading dark pools was quoted 2 weeks ago as saying that the amount of money devoted to high-frequency trading could ``quintuple between this year and next.''
Let's put the last chart back up for a second. Again, we have learned that if you have rapid and dramatic change, opaqueness, and no effective regulation, which is exactly what exists in the high frequency trading markets, we have a disaster. We should look at this in terms of high-frequency trading. We have no effective regulation in these markets.
Last week, Rick Ketchum, the chairman and CEO of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority--the self-regulatory body governing broker-dealers--gave a very thoughtful and candid speech, which I applaud. In it, Mr. Ketchum admitted that we have inadequate regulatory market surveillance.
His candor was refreshing but also ominous:
There is much more to be done in the areas of front-
running, manipulation, abusive short selling, and just having
a better understanding of who is moving the markets and why.
Mr. Ketchum went on to say:
[T]here are impediments to regulatory effectiveness that
are not terribly well understood and potentially damaging to
the integrity of the markets . . . The decline of the primary
market concept, where there was a single price discovery
market whose on-site regulator saw 90-plus percent of the
trading activity, has obviously become a reality. In its
place are now two or three or maybe four regulators all
looking at an incomplete picture of the market--
And this is important--
and knowing full well that this fractured approach does not
work.
At the same time that we have no effective regulatory surveillance, we have also learned about potential manipulation by high-frequency traders.
Last week, the Senate Banking Subcommittee for Securities, Insurance, and Investment held a hearing on a wide range of important market structure issues. At the hearing, Mr. James Brigagliano, co-acting director of the Division of Trading and Markets, testified that the Commission intends to do a ``deep dive'' into high-frequency trading issues due to concerns that some high-frequency programs may enable possible front-running and manipulation.
Mr. Brigagliano's testimony about his concerns was troubling:
. . . if there are traders taking position and then
generating momentum through high frequency trading that would
benefit those positions, that could be manipulation which
would concern us. If there was momentum trading designed--or
that actually exacerbated intra-day volatility--that might
concern us because it could cause investors to get a worse
price. And the other item I mentioned was if there were
liquidity detection strategies that enabled high frequency
traders to front-run pension funds and mutual funds, that
also would concern us.
Reinforcing the case for quick action, several panelists acknowledged that it is a daily occurrence for dark pools to exclude certain possible high-frequency manipulators. For example, Robert Gasser, president and CEO of Investment Technology Group, asserted that surveillance is a ``big challenge'' and that improving market surveillance must be a regulatory priority.
He said:
I can tell you that there are some frictional trades going
on out there that clearly look as if they are testing the
boundaries of liquidity provision versus market manipulation.
But none of the panelists, when asked, felt responsible to report any of their suspicions of manipulative activity to the SEC. That is up to the regulators and their surveillance to stop, they believe.
Finally, at the end of the hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Reed asked about the reported arrest of a Goldman Sachs employee who allegedly had stolen code from Goldman used for their high-frequency trading programs.
A Federal prosecutor, arguing that the judge should set a high bail, said he had been told that with this software, there was the danger that a knowledgeable person could manipulate the markets in unfair ways.
The SEC has said it intends to issue a concept release to launch a study of high-frequency trading. According to news reports, this will happen next year. I do not believe next year is soon enough. We need the SEC to begin its study immediately. Where is the sense of urgency?
Our stock markets are also opaque. Again, I refer to Chairman Ketchum's speech:
There are impediments to regulatory effectiveness that are
not terribly well understood and potentially damaging to the
integrity of the markets.
He went on to say:
We need more information on the entities that move
markets--the high frequency traders and hedge funds that are
not registered. Right now, we are looking through a
translucent veil, and only seeing the registered firms, and
that gives us an incomplete--if not inaccurate--picture of
the markets.
Senator Schumer echoed this theme at last week's hearing. He said:
Market surveillance should be consolidated across all
trading venues to eliminate the information gaps and
coordination problems that make surveillance across all the
markets virtually impossible today.
Let me repeat: `` . . . market surveillance across all the markets virtually impossible today.'' I totally agree with that, and none of the industry witnesses disagreed with Senator Schumer. That is why the SEC must not let months go by without taking meaningful action. We need the Commission to report now on what it should be doing sooner to discover and stop any such high-frequency manipulation.
Where is the sense of urgency?
We must also act urgently because high-frequency trading poses a systemic risk. Both industry experts and SEC Commissioners have recognized this threat. One industry expert has warned about high- frequency malfunctions:
The next LongTerm Capital meltdown would happen--
And get this--
in a five-minute time period . . .
``The next LongTerm Capital meltdown would happen in a five-minute time period.''
At 1,000 shares per order and an average price of $20 per
share, $2.4 billion of improper trades could be executed in
[a] short timeframe.
This is a real problem. We have unregulated entities--hedge funds-- using high-frequency trading programs, interacting directly with the exchanges.
As Chairman Reed said at last week's hearing, nothing requires that these people even be located within the United States. Known as ``sponsored access,'' hedge funds use the name of a broker-dealer to gain direct trading access to the exchange but do not have to comply with any of the broker-dealer rules or risk checks.
SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter has recognized this threat:
[Sponsored access] presents a variety of unique risks and
concerns, particularly when trading firms have unfiltered
access to the markets. These risks could affect several
market participants and potentially threaten the stability of
the markets.
Let me repeat that:
These risks could affect several marketing participants and
potentially threaten the stability of the markets.
This is from a member of the SEC. Even those on Wall Street responsible for overseeing their firms' high-frequency programs are not up to speed on the risks involved, according to a recent study conducted by 7city Learning. In a survey of quantitative analysts who design and implement high-frequency trading algorithms, two-thirds asserted their supervisors ``do not understand the work they do.''
And though the quants and risk managers played a central role exacerbating last year's financial crisis, 86 percent of those surveyed indicated their supervisor's ``level of understanding of the job of a quant is the same or worse than it was a year ago,'' and 70 percent said the same thing about their institutions as a whole.
I agree with the market expert and 7city director Paul Wilmott who said:
These numbers are alarming. They indicate that even with
the events of the past year, financial institutions are still
not taking the importance of financial education seriously.
Let me repeat that.
. . . They indicate that even with the events of the past
year, financial institutions are still not taking the
importance of financial education seriously.
Where is the urgency? Time is of the essence. We must act now.