Mr. Speaker, as we watch the Senate move on legislation yet again toward a cloture vote on Senator Dodd's legislation, I think it is worth noting some of the concerns that many of us have and that many economists have with the Dodd-Frank…
Mr. Speaker, as we watch the Senate move on legislation yet again toward a cloture vote on Senator Dodd's legislation, I think it is worth noting some of the concerns that many of us have and that many economists have with the Dodd-Frank approach on the legislation. I begin with focusing on a past occurrence, the rescue of investment bank Bear Stearns in the spring of 2008.
The Federal Government has committed trillions of taxpayer dollars to institutions like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America out of fear that the demise of any of these too-big-to-fail institutions would trigger a systemic crisis and collapse of the global financial system. For my own part, I'd make the observation that I thought--I voted against those bailouts with the presumption that if we move to enhance bankruptcy, it would be preferable to setting up a system which would bring the moral hazard and the eventual evolution into a system where the Federal Government was guaranteeing institutions that were too big to fail.
But that is currently the concern I have about this legislation, even though the public has rejected this approach to financial regulation, the bailouts that we have seen, and abhor bailouts of financial institutions. If you have a town hall meeting, I guarantee you, you will sense the rejection of the Dodd-Frank approach.
Still, this approach, endorsed by the administration, would guarantee the bailout authority remains a powerful tool in the government's arsenal. Now, the President is hoping to use the tactic employed in the health care debate by dismissing legitimate concerns with rhetoric but not with facts. And I would take the comments he made in New York where he said, ``What is not legitimate is to suggest that we're enabling or encouraging future taxpayer bailouts, as some have claimed. That may make for a good sound bite, but it's not factually accurate.'' Well, actually it is accurate.
And let us look at the bailout fund in the House-passed bill. On the House side, H.R. 4173, subsection 1609(o), it provides authority for the government to borrow up to $200 billion that can be used by the government for its bailout actions.
In the Senate bill, Senate bill 3217, subsection 210(n), it creates a special $50 billion fund to resolve big financial institutions, to resolve those institutions when they've failed. Behind that fund is the ability to issue government debt--in other words, to issue taxpayer obligations. It is no wonder why our colleague on the other side of the aisle from California (Mr. Sherman) recently said of the Dodd bill, ``There are serious problems with the Dodd bill. The Dodd bill has unlimited executive bailout authority. That's something Wall Street desperately wants but doesn't dare ask for. The bill contains permanent, unlimited bailout authority,'' as my colleague on the other side of the aisle mentioned, and I agree with his assessment.
There is another piece of this in the broad expansion of open bank assistance authority granted to the FDIC. The House bill, section 1109, provides the FDIC authority to ``avoid or mitigate adverse effects on systemic economic conditions or financial stability by guaranteeing obligations of solvent'' financial institutions. The FDIC's guarantees can be up to $500 billion and may be expanded an additional $500 billion with permission from Congress. That is $500 billion in potential taxpayer liabilities to solvent companies.
This is not the death panel that Chairman Frank so often claimed. This is not an ``enhanced bankruptcy process'' or an ``expedited bankruptcy'' that the administration wants people to believe. It is, in fact, a codification of the current ad hoc approach to bailouts. As Mr. Sherman has noted in the past, this amounts to TARP on steroids.
We are handing over the keys to the Treasury to unelected bureaucrats. If TARP was any indicator, regulators will always err on the side of doling out too many Federal dollars under the guise of preventing a systemic shock. If the letter of the law allows for them to guarantee $500 billion of debt for solvent companies, they will do just that.
And this is simply the wrong approach. Regulatory discretion armed with a large pool of taxpayer money will inevitably lead to political abuse.
Under the Dodd-Frank approach, government will determine which firms are too big to fail and which are too small to save. Under this bill, the government will determine which creditors and which counterparties of a failed firm should be bailed out and those that should not. And government will dismantle a healthy institution that they believe may pose a risk under the wording of the legislation.
This type of power will lead to a hyperpolitical environment where political pull will replace market discipline. Subjectivity will replace objectivity and the clearly defined rules of the road that have been a cornerstone of our capital markets. We need to expand the bankruptcy process and the clearly defined rules of the road that come with it, and we need to take out the ability for political manipulation in the process.
There are other concerns that I have with the approach in this legislation, in the Dodd-Frank approach, and one of the concerns I have is that it fails wholly to address one of the major root causes of the crisis. It is important to remember that one of the root causes of the crisis was in the junk mortgage market, subprime and Alt-A loans. Federal Government policies were responsible for the buildup of these loans. There were 27 million subprime and Alt-A loans in our economy in 2008 before the financial crisis. That's about half of all mortgages. Of those, 12 million were held or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises; $5.4 billion of FHA and about 2 million as a result of the largest banks making CRA commitments in order to get approval for mergers and expansions.
One of the other factors, of course, in the economic contraction that we've faced was the fact that the Fed set negative real interest rates; in other words, they set the interest rates that were measured against inflation at a negative sum, and when our Federal Reserve put that in place for 4 years running, it was followed by central banks in Europe that did the same thing. So central banks all over the world for 4 years set those interest rates at a negative rate.
Virtually every economist will tell you that this played a significant role in the crisis; and we're not looking at the fact that we have not addressed this issue either because, in essence, the Federal and the central banks threw fuel on the fire. These unusually low rates incentivized the financial sector to take excessive risk and they exacerbate the normal business cycle. Dr. Friedrich Hayek won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974 for explaining this phenomenon on how this causes booms and busts in the cycle.
And, of course, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the easy money policy at the Fed were central to the housing boom and bust, and they are left unaddressed in the Dodd-Frank approach. When you add things in like excessive leverage in the financial sector and the overreliance on the failed rating agencies, you have a recipe for disaster.
And I will add that the Fed came to the Congress and suggested to us in 2004 and 2005 that there was systemic risk with Fannie and Freddie, and what they asked for was an amendment to deleverage these portfolios that were being built up in Fannie and Freddie, in our GSEs, our government-sponsored enterprises. The leveraging was in excess of 100:1. These institutions were involved in arbitrage, and it was Congress that gave them the wherewithal to do this and prevented the regulators from going in and forcing these institutions, these government-sponsored enterprises, to deleverage the size of these portfolios.
You can imagine the reaction from officials at the Fed when we turned a deaf ear in Congress. As a matter of fact, I want to point out that in the Senate, we had legislation from Senator Hagel written by the Fed that would allow that authority to regulate for systemic risk, to give the regulators the ability to deregulate these portfolios. That bill went out of committee, but Senator Chris Dodd opposed it on the floor, opposed it coming to the floor, and, as a consequence, the bill never came up; although it passed committee, it never came up in the Senate.
On this side of the House, the House of Representatives, there was a bill that came to the floor, and I put in the amendment that Chuck Hagel had carried in the Senate. Again, the amendment that I introduced was written by the Federal Reserve in an attempt to give them the ability to regulate for systemic risk in Fannie and Freddie because they had warned that the consequence we faced was a systemic economic collapse. And certainly that's exactly where this collapse began. It was in the housing market. It was with the collapse of Fannie and Freddie, the loss of about $1 trillion in value.
Now I'm going to bring up one other issue that's missing on the Senate side that really gives me pause in terms of the way this is approached. Let me just make the point that the FDIC has no experience with these types of institutions. As I've said before, I have opposed the bailouts. I, instead, wanted to see a system devised. We have companies, major firms go bankrupt in the United States--airlines, railroads. These are handled instead by an expedited bankruptcy process through the courts, and that's what I wanted to see beefed up.
Let's go to the Senate bill. A major premise upon which the resolution authority was based is the notion that the FDIC uses a similar tool to unwind small commercial banks. In fact, last week before the Financial Services Committee, Secretary Geithner again reiterated this point. But this is like comparing apples to oranges, and I will share with you why.
The FDIC is liquidating very simple institutions primarily made up of insured deposits and made up of small straightforward loans. In fact, 98 percent of the liabilities of banks and thrifts unwound by the FDIC in the last 2 years were insured deposits. This is in stark contrast to the nondeposit-taking institutions likely to be covered under the resolution authority, which is going to end up creating this permanent bailout authority. And I would just give you some examples from the past.
Take Lehman Brothers, take AIG. Neither of these firms had insured depositors or depositors of any kind, and their complex assets and liabilities did not look anything like the simple small loans and residential and commercial mortgages that the FDIC deals with. The sheer size of these institutions trump anything the FDIC has touched. The $639 billion in Lehman was nearly 15 times bigger than the largest bank ever resolved by the FDIC, and AIG was over $1 trillion in assets.
This is another problem with this approach. Since nearly all of the liabilities of banks and thrifts unwound by the FDIC are insured deposits, there is a strong presumption of government backing behind these ``too big to fail'' institutions; and, by applying this model to the largest of our financial institutions, the legislation will signal that the government-provided safety net now extends to a much wider portion of our capital market.
And think for a minute what that means to the competitors of these large firms, for the smaller firms that are too small to save. Suddenly they face a differential in their borrowing costs that can reach up to 100 basis points. Some studies show 78 basis-point costs, some show 100 basis-point costs. That's the costs that small institutions have currently that is higher than the borrowing costs of institutions that face this implied government bailout or have been bailed out by the government.
You saw it with respect to the government-sponsored enterprises, how much lower their cost of borrowing was and how they were able to over leverage, and how on top of all of this, they could become a duopoly and put their competitors out of business because people presumed that the government was behind these institutions.
These are some of my concerns, and I know these concerns are shared by a colleague of mine on the committee, Mr. Scott Garrett.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.