Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I recently sent my colleagues a letter regarding the nomination of John Bolton. I realize that they are all busy and likely they have…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I recently sent my colleagues a letter regarding the nomination of John Bolton. I realize that they are all busy and likely they have not had an opportunity to read the letter. I will begin my remarks today by reading the letter to my colleagues so that it will be a part of the Record.
Dear colleague: Throughout my time in the Senate, I have
been hesitant to push my views on my colleagues. However, I
feel compelled to share my deep concerns with the nomination
of John Bolton to be Ambassador to the United Nations. I
strongly feel that the importance of this nomination to our
foreign policy requires us to set aside our partisan agenda
and let our consciences and our shared commitment to our
nation's best interests guide us. At a time when the United
States strives to fight terrorism globally, to build a stable
and free Iraq, to find a peaceful resolution to the nuclear
ambitions of Iran and North Korea, to spread democracy in the
place of oppressive regimes, and to enact needed reforms at
the United Nations, it is imperative that we have the support
of our friends and allies internationally. These strong
international relationships must be built upon robust and
effective public diplomacy.
I applaud our President for understanding this and for his
leadership on U.S. public diplomacy. He and Secretary Rice
have taken important steps to reach out to the international
community and strengthen relationships.
Additionally, I applaud the President's decision to appoint
Karen Hughes to enhance U.S. public diplomacy at the State
Department and recently to get even the First Lady involved
in these important efforts to promote public diplomacy [and
improve the world's opinion of the United States of America].
However, it is my concern that John Bolton's nomination
sends a negative message to the world community and
contradicts the President's efforts. In these dangerous
times, we cannot afford to put at risk our nation's ability
to successfully wage and win the war on terror with a
controversial and ineffective Ambassador to the United
Nations. I worry that Mr. Bolton could make it more difficult
for us to achieve the important U.N. reforms needed to
restore the strength of the institution. I strongly believe
that we need to reform the U.N., make it a viable institution
for world security, and remove its anti-Israel bias. However,
I question John Bolton's ability to get this job done.
I know that you are very busy, but I would appreciate it if
you would review my edited statement before the Foreign
Relations Committee as to why I think we can do much better
than John Bolton . . .
In my closing words I stated this:
Mr. Chairman, I am not so arrogant to think that I should
impose my judgment and perspective of the U.S. position in
the world community on the rest of my colleagues. We owe
it to the President to give Mr. Bolton an up or down vote
on the floor of the U.S. Senate. My hope is that, on a
bipartisan basis, we send Mr. Bolton's nomination to the
floor without recommendation and let the Senate work its
will.
I plead with my colleagues in the Senate that if this
nomination gets to the floor--
And we are here today--
to consider this decision and its consequences carefully, to
read all the pertinent material, and to ask themselves
several pertinent questions: Is John Bolton the best possible
person to serve as the lead diplomat to the United Nations?
Will he be able to pursue the needed reforms at the U.N.,
despite his damaged credibility? Will he share information
with the right individuals, and will he solicit information
from the right individuals, including his subordinates, so
that he can make the most informed decisions? Is he capable
of advancing the President's and the Secretary of State's
efforts to advance our public diplomacy? Does he have the
character, leadership, interpersonal skills, self discipline,
common decency, and understanding of the chain of command to
lead his team to victory? Will he recognize and seize
opportunities to repair and strengthen relationships, promote
peace and uphold democracy--as a team--with our fellow
nations?
I mentioned in my letter the Senate faces today a very important decision, whether to send John Bolton to New York to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I believe we can do better, and we owe it to the United States of America, the U.S. State Department, our soldiers overseas, our children, and our grandchildren to do better than Mr. Bolton. This is not my opinion alone. The overwhelming opinion of the colleagues I have talked to about John Bolton is that he is not an ideal nominee; that they are less than enthusiastic about him and many were surprised at the decision. Many of my colleagues have said that the only reason they are going to vote for him is because he is the President's nominee. I agree with my colleague, Senator Biden. I think if we had a secret vote on John Bolton, he would not get 50 votes from the Senate.
I want to explain to my colleagues here today why it is I think Mr. Bolton should not be confirmed. One of my deepest concerns about this nomination involves the big picture of U.S. public diplomacy and the President's acknowledged need to improve it. It was not too long ago when America's love of freedom was a force of inspiration to the rest of the world, and America was admired for its democracy, generosity, and willingness to help others in need of protection. Today, the United States is criticized for what the world calls arrogance, unilateralism, for failure to listen and seek support of its friends and allies. There has been a drastic change in the attitude of our friends and allies in such organizations such as NATO and the countries' leaders whom we need to rely upon for help.
I discovered this personally during a trip I took to London, Serbia, Montenegro, and Italy last year, where I met with several individuals from various international backgrounds and attended the NATO parliamentary meeting in Venice. In London I met with several individuals from the Atlantic Partnership, chaired by Lord Powell, who told me that the United States needed to do something to improve its public diplomacy with countries where leaders are under a great amount of pressure. They mentioned Tony Blair, who has put his neck on the line to support the United States and needed the United States to improve its public diplomacy to meet the concerns of his constituency.
We all know that Tony Blair lost a significant number of parliamentary seats because of these concerns. The group emphasized that we needed to do more in public diplomacy to reach out to our friends and allies so that we could work together to accomplish the daunting tasks before us.
In Venice I attended the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I could not believe some of the comments that were being made about the United States--from our allies. It was a stark contrast to the parliamentary meetings I attended in Budapest in 2000, when our allies voiced the concern: What about this Bush who is running for President? Is he an isolationist?
In Venice I heard their concerns that the United States is very much involved in international affairs but acts unilaterally, without any concern by the United States of its allies and friends.
I have traveled a great deal in my career, and I have met with leaders and academics in the international community during previous wars. There has never been as drastic a shift in the international community's perception as there has been during the last 2 or 3 years. The countries that previously admired the United States for its values and principles of democracy and freedom, encouraging other nations to develop their own democracies and speak out against injustices, now criticize the United States for its failure to respect their views and opinions.
It troubles me deeply that the United States is perceived this way in the world community. I am troubled because the United States will face a deeper challenge in achieving its objectives without their support. We will face more difficulties in conducting the war on terrorism, promoting peace and stability worldwide, and building democracies, without help from our friends to share the responsibilities, leadership, and costs.
Even as recently as last night, the former President of the Czech Republic and champion of democracy, Vaclav Havel, told me over dinner that the United States needs to improve its public diplomacy, that we have become isolated in too many instances.
If the United States wants to win the war on terrorism, win the peace in Iraq, promote freedom globally, and prevent new conflicts, we need to have the help of our friends. In order to have the help of our friends we need to have robust public diplomacy. For if we cannot win over the hearts and minds of the world community, we are not going to be able to create the team that we need and our goals will be more difficult to achieve.
Additionally, we will be unable to reduce the burdens on our own resources, the most important of which is the lives of the men and women in our Armed Forces who are leaving their families every day to serve this country overseas.
Now, 1,700 U.S. men and women--over that--have given their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan; over 12,000 have been wounded.
Nothing can compare to the cost of human lives, but the financial costs of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan are also placing a tremendous human resources burden on our country. Weeks ago we passed the $82 billion supplemental bill for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I understand that we will need at least $50 billion next year. The costs of this war are not going down anytime soon.
We need the help of other countries to share the financial burden that is adding to our national debt, and the human resource burden that our Armed Forces, National Guardsmen, contractors, and their families are bearing so heavily now. The key is public diplomacy.
As I say, I applaud the President and the Secretary of State for understanding that public diplomacy is an important objective and beginning this new term with an emphasis on repairing relationships. I applaud the President and Secretary Rice for reaching out to our friends in the world community and articulating that the United States does respect international law and protocol.
The President's recent visits to Latvia, the Netherlands, Moscow, and Georgia, underscore the priority he places on strengthening U.S. public diplomacy. The way that he embraced the Russian people will serve the country well as we negotiate with President Putin to improve nuclear security cooperation and support U.S. positions on Iran and North Korea.
The President has also enlisted the added value of the First Lady in pursuing an agenda to improve U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, an important initiative. I also applaud the President's decision to appoint Karen Hughes to help lead the public diplomacy effort at the State Department.
Let's send Karen Hughes to be the next ambassador to the United Nations. There is someone who would
really make a difference for us, and deal with the challenge that we have in public diplomacy.
The President clearly understands the importance of renewing our relationships and making clear that we want to work with our friends to achieve our many foreign policy goals. It is important to send a message that, though the United States may have differences with our friends at times, and though we may need to be firm about our positions, we are willing to sit down, talk about them, discuss our reasoning, and work for a solution.
It is my strong belief in the need to improve U.S. public diplomacy and in the efforts of the President that has caused me to pause and reflect so deeply on the nomination of Mr. Bolton because, I asked myself, what message are we sending to the world community? In the same breath we are considering a nominee for ambassador to the United Nations who has been accused of being arrogant, of not listening to his friends, of acting unilaterally, and of bullying those who do not have the ability to properly defend themselves. These are the very characteristics we are trying to dispel in the court of world opinion.
We must understand, next to the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State, the most prominent public diplomat is our ambassador to the United Nations. It is my concern that the confirmation of John Bolton would send a contradictory and negative message to the world community about U.S. intentions. I am afraid that his confirmation will tell the world we are not dedicated to repairing our relationships or working as a team but that we believe only someone with sharp elbows can deal effectively with the international community.
I want to make it clear that I do believe that the U.N. needs to be reformed if it is to be relevant in the 21st century. We need to pursue its transformation aggressively, sending the strong message that corruption will not be tolerated. The corruption that occurred under the Oil for Food Program made it possible for Saddam's Iraq to discredit the U.N. and undermine the goals of its members. This must never happen again, and severe reforms are needed to strengthen the organization. And, yes, I believe it will be necessary to take a firm position so that we can succeed. But it will take a special individual to succeed in this endeavor, and I have great concerns with the current nominee and his ability to get the job done.
To those who say a vote against John Bolton is a vote against reform of the United Nations, I say nonsense. Frankly, I am concerned that Mr. Bolton would make it more difficult for us to achieve the badly needed reforms to this outdated institution. I believe there could be even more obstacles to reform if Mr. Bolton were sent to the U.N. than if it were another candidate. Those in the international community who do not want to see the U.N. reformed will act as a roadblock, and I fear Mr. Bolton's reputation will make it easier for them to succeed.
I believe that some member nations in the U.N. will use Mr. Bolton as part of their agenda to further question the credibility and integrity of the United States of America and to reinforce their negative U.S. propaganda.
If we send Mr. Bolton to the United Nations, the message will be lost because our enemies will do everything they can to use Mr. Bolton's baggage to drown his words. The issue will be the messenger--the messenger and not the message.
Another reason I believe Mr. Bolton is not the best candidate for the job is his tendency to act without regard to the views of others and without respect to chains of command. We have heard Mr. Bolton has a reputation for straying off message. He is reported to have strayed off message more often than anyone else holding a responsible position at the State Department during Secretary Powell's years as Secretary of State.
U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard testified that Bolton rejected his request to soften the tone of a July 2003 speech on North Korea policy and stated that the speech hurt, rather than helped, efforts to achieve the President's objectives.
Here is the question from a committee staffer:
And what was your impression of the speech when you first
read it, the day before it was going to be delivered? Did you
suggest changes in it?
We are talking now of the question to Ambassador Hubbard.
I think our most important comment was that we thought the
tone was way too strong, that he used derogatory terms about
Kim Jung Il . . . throughout the speech, in virtually every
sentence. And I and my staff argued that was
counterproductive to our interest in getting the North
Koreans back into the talks [on their reducing their nuclear
threat.]
Committee staffer:
And was Mr. Bolton aware of the South Korean request to
avoid inflammatory language that might complicate the Six-
Party process?
Ambassador Hubbard:
Yes.
Committee staffer:
Did he make all the changes [in the July 2000 speech] that
had been suggested?
Ambassador Hubbard:
No, I don't believe so. You know, I think that--to be very
clear, we didn't go through the speech, scratching out the
word ``dictator'' every time we saw it--you know, that--we
made an overall comment . . . that we felt that was
counterproductive and overblown.
Committee staffer:
Did you believe the speech advanced the President's
objective of achieving a peaceful denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula through negotiations? Or, if not, why not?
Ambassador Hubbard:
No, I don't think it advanced the process . . . In my view,
the invective . . . gave the North Koreans another excuse or
pretext not to come back to the committee.
Committee staffer:
Did Bolton advance President Bush's North Korea policy?
Ambassador Hubbard:
My belief is that his actions hurt.
According to reliable sources at the State Department, it was after that speech that it was made clear to Mr. Bolton he would have to clear any future speeches through the Secretary or Deputy Secretary and that he would be put on a very short leash. This was just one of the many times he was called on the carpet.
In fairness to Mr. Bolton, the sources have said to me, once reprimanded, Bolton got back on track but that he needed to be kept on a short leash.
Who is to say that Bolton will not continue to stray off message as ambassador to the U.N.? Who is to say he will not hurt, rather than help, United States relations with the international community and our desire to reform the United Nations?
When discussing all of these concerns with Secretary Rice--John Bolton's propensity to get off message, his lack of interpersonal skills, his tendency to abuse others who disagree with him--I was informed by the Secretary of State she understood all these things and in spite of them still feels John Bolton is the best choice. She assured me she would be in frequent communication with him and that he would be supervised very closely.
My private thought, and I should have shared this with the Secretary of State, is why in the world would you want to send someone to the United Nations who requires such supervision?
I am also concerned about Mr. Bolton's interpersonal skills. I understand there will be several vacant senior posts on the staff when Mr. Bolton arrives in his new position. As a matter of fact, I understand all the top people are leaving. I understand one of the most respected and qualified people at the U.N., Anne Patterson, will be leaving her post, and others will be departing, as I mentioned.
As such, Mr. Bolton will face a challenge of inspiring, leading, and managing a new team, a staff of roughly 150 individuals, perhaps more, whom he is going to need to rely upon to get the job done. As we know, all of us are only as good as the team we have surrounding us. We are all aware of the testimony and observations related to Mr. Bolton's interpersonal and management skills.
With that record in mind, I have concern about Mr. Bolton's ability to inspire and lead a team so he can be as effective as possible in completing the important tasks before him. And I am not the only one. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee received letters from 102 U.S. diplomats who served under administrations for both sides of the aisle saying Mr. Bolton is the wrong man for the job.
Colin Powell's chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, testified before the committee that Mr. Bolton would make ``an abysmal ambassador,'' and that ``he is incapable of listening to people and taking into account their views.''
I would like to read some of Mr. Wilkerson's testimony.
Mr. Wilkerson:
I would like to make just one statement. I don't have a
large problem with Under Secretary Bolton serving our
country. My objections to what we've been talking about
here--that is, him being our ambassador at the United
Nations--stem from two basic things. One, I think he's a
lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that
have to be led; they have to be led well, and they have to be
led properly. And I think, in that capacity, if he goes up
there, you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year.
I would also like to highlight the words of another person I myself respect and who worked closely with Mr. Bolton. He told me if Bolton were confirmed, he would be ok for a short while, but within 6 months his poor interpersonal skills and lack of self-discipline would cause major problems. He told me Mr. Bolton is unable to control his temper.
I would like to read some quotes from the testimony of Christian Westermann, the analyst from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, about Mr. Bolton's patterns of losing his temper and getting angry.
Mr. Westermann:
He was quite upset that I had objected and he wanted to
know what right I had trying to change an Under Secretary's
language.
This was in a speech and Mr. Westermann had to send that speech over to the CIA and then it came back from the CIA.
And what he would say, or not say or something like that.
And I tried to explain a little bit of the same things about
the process of how we clear language. And I guess I wasn't
really in a mood to listen and he was quite angry and
basically told me I had no right to do that.
By the way, Mr. Westermann did not work in Mr. Bolton's section of the State Department. He worked in INR, another department, another department, not under his direct supervision.
And he [Mr. Bolton] got very red in the face, shaking his
finger at me and explaining to me I was acting way beyond my
position, and for someone who worked for him. I told him I
didn't work for him.
Staffer:
And when [Bolton] threw you out of the office, how did he
do that?
Committee staffer:
He just told me to get out and get Tom Fingar, he was
yelling and screaming and red in the face, and wagging his
finger. I'll never forget the wagging of the finger.
Committee staffer:
Could you characterize your meeting with Bolton? Was he
calm?
Mr. Tom Fingar:
No, he was angry.
Additionally, I want to note my concern that former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the person to whom Mr. Bolton answered over the last 4 years, was conspicuously absent from a letter signed by former Secretaries of State recommending Mr. Bolton's confirmation. Of all the people who worked with Mr. Bolton, Powell is the most qualified person to judge the man and his ability to serve as the Secretary's ambassador to the U.N. and he did not sign the letter.
In fact, I have learned that several well-respected leaders in our foreign policy community were shocked by Mr. Bolton's nomination because he is the last person thought to be appropriate for the job.
There are several interesting theories on how Mr. Bolton got the nomination. I am not going to go into them in the Senate. If anyone would like to talk to me about that, I am happy to discuss it with them; otherwise, I urge you to get in touch with senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee and ask them.
We are facing an era of foreign relations in which the choice of our ambassador to the United Nations should be one of the most thoughtful decisions we make. The candidate needs to be both a diplomat and a manager. He must have the ability to persuade and inspire our friends, to communicate and convince, to listen, to absorb the ideas of others. Without such virtues, we will face more efforts in our war on terrorism, to spread democracy and to foster stability globally.
The question is, is John Bolton the best person for the job? The administration says they believe he is the right man. They say despite his interpersonal shortcomings, he knows the U.N., he can reform the organization and make it more powerful and more relevant to the world.
There is no doubt John Bolton should be commended and thanked for his service and his particular achievements.
He has accomplished some important objectives against great odds. As the sponsor of legislation that established an office on global anti- Semitism in the State Department, I am particularly impressed by his work to repeal the U.N. legislation equating Zionism with racism. I wholeheartedly agree with Bolton that we must work with the U.N. to change its anti-Israel bias, and I applaud his work on this issue.
In 2003, I sent a letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations to express my profound concern about the appalling developments in the U.N. and the Palestinian Observer's equation of Zionism with Nazism and ask that the United Nations condemn the remarks and maintain a commitment to human rights.
Further, I am impressed by Mr. Bolton's achievements in the area of arms control, specifically on the Moscow Treaty, the G8 ``10-Plus-10- Over-10'' Global Partnership Fund, and the President's Proliferation Security Initiative.
Now, it has been suggested that we should vote for Mr. Bolton because of his achievements and qualifications despite his reputation as a ``bully'' and his poor interpersonal skills.
I agree that Mr. Bolton has had some achievements, but I am dubious that Mr. Bolton's record of performance has been so overwhelmingly successful that we should ignore his negative pattern of behavior and credibility problems with the international community.
For the last 4 years, Mr. Bolton served as the top arms control and nonproliferation official for the State Department. The most pressing nonproliferation issues affecting U.S. national security today involve the threat of Iran's nuclear ambitions, the threat of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and the need to expand and accelerate our cooperation with the Russian Federation to secure and dismantle Russia's nuclear and WMD infrastructure to keep it out of the hands of would-be terrorists or proliferant nations.
The United States has not had significant success on these issues in the last 4 years. In the case of North Korea, they have withdrawn from the Nonproliferation Treaty and the situation has become more critical during Bolton's watch. Our U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, stated that Mr. Bolton's approach on North Korea was damaging to U.S. interests. With regard to our cooperation with Russia to secure its WMD infrastructure and fissile material, I have read several reports that Mr. Bolton also hurt efforts to move beyond the legal holdup of ``liability'' that has stymied our programs.
On May 16, a Newsweek article reported that for several years, the disposal of Russia's 134-ton hoard of plutonium has been stymied by an obscure legal issue in which Washington has sought to free U.S. contractors from any iability for nuclear contamination during cleanup. It says that: Bolton bore a very heavy responsibility for festering the plutonium issue. It reports that a former State Department official said: In 2004, Bolton quashed a compromise plan by his own nonproliferation bureau, even after other agencies had approved it.
I must say I am unimpressed by Mr. Bolton's failure to secure a compromise during his 4 years that would enable us to move forward to secure this material from terrorists.
The situation in Iran is also very concerning and has only worsened in the last 4 years.
Among our accomplishments in nonproliferation, there is no doubt that Libya's decision to dismantle its WMD infrastructure was one of the largest successes of the last 4 years.
We really rejoiced over that. However, there is credible reporting that Mr. Bolton was sidelined from the negotiations by the White House and that some believed he might hurt their chances of succeeding with Libya. Additional reports indicate that Mr.
Bolton was sidelined at the request of British officials working on the issue, because they felt he was a liability during the negotiations.
Mr. Bolton has also been given a great deal of credit for his work on getting Article 98 agreements with several countries and important military partners. Article 98 agreements secure U.S. military officers from prosecution under the International Criminal Court while conducting operations or military exercises in a foreign country.
I support the efforts to secure Article 98 agreements and protect U.S. Forces against what could be a politically driven trial in a foreign country. However, I understand that Mr. Bolton worked to secure these agreements by putting a hold on all U.S. military education and training assistance to these countries--understanding that the last seven countries we brought into the United Nations never signed that Article 98 treaty.
This assistance that we provide to these countries provides education to military officials about U.S. and Western military doctrine, the importance of a civilian-run military, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights. It provides basic leadership training and other important training that enables foreign troops to interoperate with U.S. forces and international forces--such as English language training and general combat training. This is very important assistance at a time when we are fighting with a coalition in Afghanistan and a coalition in Iraq. But at the very same time that we were seeking additional supporters in Iraq, some military officials arriving at U.S. airports to receive the military education training were turned away because of Mr. Bolton's strong-arming tactics.
As I understand it, several different State Department officials asked Mr. Bolton to remove the holds because of the negative impact they were having on our allies, and he refused to listen to their views.
I ran into this when I was in Croatia a couple weeks ago. I talked to the new Prime Minister of Croatia, Ivo Sanader, and he was saying: I have to sign Article 98. If I don't get it, then we get no help whatsoever in terms of advice about how we civilianize our Army and so forth. And there are people in the Defense Department who think it is a good idea. And I think it is a good idea because we have to be concerned, in some of those countries that have gone democratic, that if things get bad, we do not want to see a coup d'etat come from the military part of their operation. So we should be doing everything we can to civilianize it. But, no, can't do it. Mr. Bolton doesn't want to do it.
Mr. President, how are we supposed to persuade our friends and allies to join us in Iraq and Afghanistan when we are cutting off the English- language training and other military training that would enable them to send troops to serve with us?
In fact, the policy is contradictory to U.S. public diplomacy efforts as well as efforts to secure support in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Mr. Bolton did not listen to the views of his staff who told him that the policy was damaging our bigger picture interests.
For this reason, I question the suggestion that Mr. Bolton's qualifications and his record of performance is so outstanding that we should vote for him, despite his negative pattern of behavior.
But this is another issue that is deeply concerning to me. We cannot deny that Mr. Bolton's record shows a pattern of behavior that is contradictory to that of an effective Ambassador.
I would like to read to you a quote by Mr. Carl Ford, who headed the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR, in the State Department from 2001 to 2003. He testified that Mr. Bolton is a ``kiss up and kick down'' leader who does not tolerate those who disagree with him and goes out of his way to retaliate for their disagreement.
Here is what Mr. Ford said:
Unfortunately, my judgment, my opinion, he's a
quintessential ``kiss-up, kick-down'' sort of guy . . . I'm
sure you've met them. But the fact is that he stands out,
that he's got a bigger kick and it gets bigger and stronger
the further down the bureaucracy he's kicking.
Others who have worked closely with Mr. Bolton have stated that he is an ideologue and that he fosters an atmosphere of intimidation and does not tolerate disagreement, does not tolerate dissent, and that he bullies those who disagree with him.
I would like to read some excerpts from the testimony of the Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, and Mr. John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of the Nonproliferation Bureau, who worked directly under Mr. Bolton.
Committee staffer. There have been press reports--one in
December of 2003, in USA Today, that--I'll just read you the
quote from that story. Quote, ``In private, Bolton's
colleagues can be scathing. One high-level coworker calls
Bolton `an anti-diplomat who tries to intimidate those who
disagree with his views.' Another diplomat says, `No one in
the Department dares to criticize Bolton on the record,
because he has support at the highest levels of the
Administration. Despite his often blunt public
pronouncements, he's never publicly chastised or
contradicted,' the diplomat says.'' Does that sound like the
John Bolton you know?
Ambassador Hubbard. It sounds, in general, like what I
experienced.
Committee staffer. Did that--did Mr. Bolton prevent those
views of debate [on policy issues from the Nonproliferation
Bureau] from getting up to the Deputy Secretary?
Mr. Wolf, [Assistant Secretary of Nonproliferation]: There
were long and arduous discussions about issues before they
got to the Secretary.
Committee staffer. And, in those discussions, how would you
characterize Mr. Bolton's demeanor and professionalism in
listening to alternative points of views or listening to
those who disagreed with his point of view? Did he have an
open mind?
Mr. Wolf. He tended to hold on to his own views strongly,
and he tended not to be--he tended not to be enthusiastic
about alternative views.
Mr. Wolf. He did not--he did not--he did not encourage
differing views. And he tended to have a fairly blunt manner
of expressing himself.
Committee staffer. Would you go so far as to say that he
discouraged alternative views through his demeanor and
through his response when people presented alternative views
to him?
Mr. Wolf. He did not encourage us to provide our views to
the Secretary . . . our alternative views.
Colin Powell's chief of staff Lawrence Wilkerson testified that Mr. Bolton tended to focus on accomplishing his own goals as a matter of ``bean-counting'' and refused to consider the repercussions of his methods on the greater policy objectives of the United States.
I would like to quote from Colonel Wilkerson's testimony:
Second, I differ from a lot of people in Washington, both
friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote,
``brilliance,'' unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who
counted beans, who said ``98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next
day,'' and had no willingness--in many cases, no capacity--to
understand the other things that were happening around those
beans. And that is just a recipe for problems at the United
Nations. And that's the only reason that I said anything.
Mr. Wilkerson again:
My prejudice and my bias will come out here, because I
think one of the number-one problems facing the country right
now--and, you know, I'm here because of my country--
This is Wilkerson. He volunteered. We didn't go out and get him. He volunteered.
--not because of anybody else--is North Korea . . . So when
people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing with that
problem in order to push their pet rocks in other areas, it
bothers me, as a diplomat, and as a citizen of this country.
And I have citations on all of this in the testimony.
Wilkerson again:
It was the same thing with nonproliferation. The statistic
I mentioned before, which I think Under Secretary Bolton
mentioned in his speech in Tokyo on February the 7th, if I
remember right--I still keep up with this stuff, Northeast
Asia--and he said the Clinton Administration, in eight years,
had sanctioned China eight times, and the Bush
Administration, in four years, had sanctioned China 62 times.
As I used to say, what's the measurement of effectiveness
here? What's it done? Is the sanctioning of 62 times an
indication that China is proliferating more? Or is it an
indication that we're cracking down? I'd love to see the
statistic for the next four years, if Bolton were to remain
Under Secretary. It would be 120 or 140. And what is the
effectiveness of this? Are we actually stopping proliferation
that was dangerous to our interest? Or are we doing it, and
ignoring other problems that cry out for cures, diplomatic?
And no one sits and says, you know, ``Okay, that's correct,
that's correct, this is correct, this is what's effective,
this isn't effective.'' The one time I had a conversation
with John about this, I asked him, ``How do you go beyond
sanctions, John? War?'' [Bolton's implied answer was:] ``Not
my business.'' [In other words, that was not his problem.]
Former Assistant Secretary of the Intelligence and Research Bureau Carl Ford testified he had never seen anyone behave as badly in all his days at
the State Department and that he would not have even testified before the Committee if John Bolton had simply followed protocol and simple rules of management.
Mr. Ford. I can guarantee you . . . that if Secretary
Bolton had chosen to come to see me, or in my absence, my
Principal Deputy, Secretary Tom Fingar, I wouldn't be here
today. He could have approached me in the same tone, and in
the same attitude--shaking his finger, red in the face, high
tone in his voice--and I wouldn't be here today. If he had
gone to Secretary Powell, or Secretary Armitage, and
complained loudly about the poor service that he was
receiving from INR and the terrible treatment that he had
been stabbed in the back by one of INR's analysts, I wouldn't
be here today. The fact is, it is appropriate, if someone is
unhappy with the service they're getting from one of the
services or organizations in a bureaucracy, that they should
complain. They should yell as loud as they want to. But,
instead of doing any of those three things, Secretary Bolton
chose to reach five or six levels down below him in the
bureaucracy--
By the way, a bureaucracy he was not in charge of
--bring an analyst into his office, and give him a tongue
lashing, and I frankly don't care whether he sang scat for
five minutes, the attitude, the volume of his tone, and what
I understand to be the substance of the conversation--he was
so far over the line . . . That is, I've never seen anybody
quite like Secretary Bolton . . . I don't have a second and a
third or fourth, in terms of the way he abuses his power and
authority with little people . . . There are a lot of
screamers that work in government, but you don't pull
somebody so low down in the bureaucracy that they're
completely defenseless. It's an 800 pound gorilla devouring a
banana. The analyst was required simply to stand there and
take it, and Secretary Bolton knew when he had the tirade
that, in fact, that was the case.
I want to note that in Mr. Bolton's testimony, he justifies his anger and retaliatory actions against Mr. Westermann by citing an apologetic e-mail from Mr. Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of the Intelligence Bureau. And when I met privately with Mr. Bolton, he said: Right after it happened, I received this apologetic e-mail from Mr. Fingar. So we asked Mr. Fingar and Mr. Ford about the e-mail.
Committee staffer. You said . . . that what Mr. Westermann
did was entirely within the procedure, he was never
disciplined, it was perfectly normal, that the only failure
of his was lack of prudence. And then here [in the e-mail to
Bolton] you say it's ``entirely inappropriate,'' and ``we
screwed up, it won't happen again.'' That seems like a rather
different assessment.
Mr. Fingar. Well, I knew I was dealing with somebody who
was very upset, I was trying to get the incident closed,
which I didn't regard as a big deal. I know John [Bolton] was
mad. I assumed, when people are mad, they get over it. So,
did I lean over in the direction of ``Sure, we'll take
responsibility?'' He thanked me for it, at least as far as
I'm concerned, in my dealings with Bolton, that closed it.
So basically it was, somebody is mad. You send them back an e-mail and say our guy didn't do what he was supposed to do. You hope they will get off your butt and it will be over with. But it wasn't over. He kept going after him. We have to move this guy. We have to bring somebody else in here. I can't deal with him. That is the way he acts.
Mr. Ford:
. . . knowing him [Fingar] well, I'm assuming it simply was,
as you said, this guy [Bolton] was furious, he could
potentially do great damage to the bureau, and he [Fingar]
was just trying to put him back in the box and keep him from
doing any more harm. And I can't fault him for that.
I also want to point out that Carl Ford, Lawrence Wilkerson, and almost all of the witnesses who came before our committee are appointees of the Bush administration. These are loyal Republicans who say: I am a conservative Republican. I am loyal to the President, that they could not abide Mr. Bolton's nomination because of their concern for his conduct and his erratic, often unprofessional, behavior.
That is what this is about.
I have to say that after pouring over the hundreds of pages of testimony and speaking with many individuals, I believe John Bolton would have been fired if he had worked for a major corporation. That is not the behavior of a true leader who upholds the kind of democracy President Bush is seeking to promote globally. This is not the behavior that should be endorsed as the face of the United States to the world community at the United Nations.
It, rather, is my opinion that John Bolton is the poster child of what the diplomatic corps should not be. I worry about the signal we are sending to the thousands of individuals under the State Department who are serving their country in foreign service and civil service, living in posts across the world and in some cases risking their lives, all so they can represent our country, promote diplomacy, and contribute to the safety of Americans everywhere.
What are we saying to these people? And I care about human capital. I have been working on it now for over 6 years. When we say to these people that we look to confirm an individual with this record to one of the highest positions in the State Department, what are we saying to these people? I was in Croatia. I was in Slovenia. They can't believe it.
I want to emphasize that I have weighed Bolton's strengths carefully. I have weighed the fact that this is the President's nominee. All things being equal, it is my proclivity to support the President's nominee, as most of us. However, in this case, all things are not equal. It is a different world today than it was 4 years ago. Our enemies are Muslim extremists and religious fanatics who have hijacked the Koran and have convinced people that the way to get to Heaven is through Jihad and against the world, particularly the United States. We must recognize that to be successful in this war, one of our most important tools is public diplomacy, more than ever before-- intelligence and public diplomacy. After hours of deliberation, telephone calls, personal conversations, reading hundreds of pages of transcripts, and asking for guidance from above, I have come to the determination that the United States can do better than John Bolton. We need an ambassador who understands the wisdom of Teddy Roosevelt's policy to walk softly and carry a big stick. The U.S. needs an ambassador who is interested in encouraging other people's points of view and discouraging any atmosphere of intimidation. The world needs an American ambassador to the U.N. who will show that the United States has respect for other countries and intermediary organizations, that we are team players and consensus builders and promoters of symbiotic relationships.
In moving forward with the international community, we should remember the words of the Scot poet Bobbie Burns who said:
Oh, that some great power would give me the wisdom to see
myself as other people see me.
And when thinking of John Bolton earlier today, I thought of one--I don't know whether it is a fairy tale, or whatever, called ``The Emperor Has No Clothes.'' We are going to vote tomorrow, and I am afraid that when we go to the well, too many of my colleagues are not going to understand that this appointment is very important to our country. At a strategic time when we need friends all over the world, we need somebody who is going to be able to get the job done. Some of my friends say: Let it go, George. It is going to work out.
I don't want to take the risk. I came back here and ran for a second term because I am worried about my kids and my grandchildren. I just hope my colleagues will take the time before they get to this well and do some serious thinking about whether we should send John Bolton to the United Nations.
I yield the floor.