Consumer Financial Protection Safety And Soundness Improvement Act Of
Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is straightforward. It simply provides a sense of Congress that acknowledges the tremendous work done by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as it was originally…
Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is straightforward. It simply provides a sense of Congress that acknowledges the tremendous work done by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as it was originally conceived in Dodd-Frank and how it has been operating to this point.
The agency, Mr. Chair, has refunded $3 billion to 9.7 million victims of unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices in financial markets. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has helped people, and fraud has been curtailed. The message has been sent to the next generation of financial hustlers that there is a dedicated cop on the beat in financial markets.
The singular and dedicated mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is to protect consumers of financial products from schemes, and it inspires trust in our markets that attracts capital and promotes allocations of that capital to productive, legitimate endeavors.
My amendment affirms that the current management, oversight, and funding source, as enshrined in Dodd-Frank, are the best way to preserve the integrity and independence of the agency, and to ensure that we don't return to the bad old days and bad old ways that put the ox in the ditch by creating the 2008 financial crisis and the $700 billion bailout.
Now, H.R. 3193 openly acknowledges that it would alter and neuter the agency's mission because H.R. 3193 would rename the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to the Financial Product Safety Commission, removing, Mr. Chairman, consumers from the equation, both in name and function. It would subject the agency's funding to protect consumers to the unwieldy appropriations process, sequester, defunding amendments, instead of the outside independent funding vis-a-vis these powerful financial institutions.
Now, whether intentional or not, Republicans, Mr. Chair, have shown their hand with the omission of consumers in H.R. 3193, and despite the euphemistic name of the bill as written, this bill would alter the mission and cripple the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau by focusing on protecting financial products rather than consumers. Whatever the intent, Mr. Chairman, consumers would be thrown under the bus by removing the cop from the Wall Street beat.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I always enjoy the chairman of the Financial Services Committee and his lavish explanations.
I just want to clear up some of the confusion and bewilderment that he seems to be under with regard to minority and Latin borrowers. He has said over and over and over again, he has talked about and referred to the Qualified Mortgage standards under the new rules. The new standards have just taken place, and I think that minorities will find that 95 percent of the mortgages today will fall within the Qualified Mortgage standards.
Now having said that, I will just say that the chairman should look at something other than the PATH Act toward restoring the GSEs, if he is very concerned about minorities, and I would join him in that to be able to get mortgages.
I would say that to clear up his bewilderment here, I just want to congratulate the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau because it is a fact that they have supported the refund of $3 billion to 9.7 million victims of unfair practices.
I agree with him: the purpose of this bill and the reason that they won't accept this amendment is because they don't want to go on record that they support consumers over all of these very, very lucrative financial products that are out there, and they want no regulation, which is why we saw the 2008 meltdown, the no rules of the road. They want to return to the days when there was an ability to drive the economy over the cliff and to deceive consumers to the point that they could and would become victims. So I can understand the chairman's reluctance to accept this language.
Mr. Chairman, I enter into the Record our defense of our claims, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Response to CoreLogic Analysis of Qualified Mortgage (QM) Standards,
CRL Issue Brief; February 20, 2013
The recently released CoreLogic report ``The Mortgage
Market Impact of Qualified Mortgage Regulation'' has received
a lot of attention due to its finding that 48 percent of the
mortgage market would not qualify as a ``safe loan'' under
new Qualified Mortgage (QM) guidelines.
Corelogic uses a ``waterfall'' analysis to estimate the
proportion of 2010 mortgage originations that do not meet one
or more of the QM criteria. While a waterfall approach is a
reasonable methodology for estimating the proportion of
recent originations that fall outside of QM standards, there
are problems both with the specifics of CoreLogic's model and
its assumptions about the expiration of the GSE exemption
that significantly undercut the usefulness of its estimates
of the impact of the QM rule.
Removes Loans with Credit Scores less than 640: As part of
estimating the impact of QM, CoreLogic included a restriction
on credit scores. Specifically, the waterfall analysis first
removes loans with credit scores below 640 ``because they
resemble subprime loans.'' In fact, five percent of
originations are removed solely based on this criterion. This
exclusion is not warranted because the QM guidelines do not
place any restrictions on a borrower credit score.
Assumes that borrowers who received loan products with
prohibited QM features would not be able to access QM-
eligible loan products in the future: The other waterfall
layers used to estimate the QM impact are: total debt-to-
income (DTI) ratio over 43 percent; whether the loan was
negatively amortizing, balloon or interest only; low- or no-
documentation; and loan terms of greater than 30 years. These
restrictions result in exclusions of 24 percent, 1 percent,
16 percent, and 2 percent respectively. Based on this
analysis,
while it might be reasonable for the report to estimate that
43 percent of 2010 originations did not meet these new QM
guidelines, it is not reasonable to infer that none of these
borrowers could have received QM loans if the rule had been
in place in 2010. While having a high DTI may be a difficult
barrier that many borrowers cannot overcome, the
disqualifying loan terms, such as negative amortization
options or terms of greater than 30- years, can easily be
avoided in most cases by simply
Re-structuring the loans into amortizing 30 year loans.
Similarly, most borrowers who received no-doc or low-doc
loans in 2010, the origination year analyzed in the report,
likely could have documented their incomes. Therefore, the
inference that none of the 19 percent of borrowers that had
disqualifying loan products could have received QM loans is
unwarranted.
Assumes the GSE exemption expires: As the report
recognizes, most of the 24 percent of loans to borrowers with
high DTIs are currently being made by GSEs or insured by FHA
and these loans automatically qualify as QM under a temporary
exemption (up to seven years). Indeed, the report
acknowledges that the impact of the QM rule on loans
currently being made would be'' minor''. Given the
uncertainties concerning GSE reform and mortgage finance that
will need to be resolved over the next seven years, it is not
at all clear that the temporary exemption will in fact end in
seven years.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.