Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act Of 2013
Madam Speaker, as I stand under the ``E Pluribus Unum,'' I pray that this body will do as the Senate has done and come together as one to protect all women from violence. As I think about the LGBT victims that are not here, the native…
Madam Speaker, as I stand under the ``E Pluribus Unum,'' I pray that this body will do as the Senate has done and come together as one to protect all women from violence.
As I think about the LGBT victims that are not here, the native women that are not here, the immigrants who are not included in this bill, I would say, as Sojourner Truth would say, Ain't they women? They deserve protections. And we talk about the constitutional rights. Don't women on tribal lands deserve the constitutional right of equal protection and not to be raped and battered and beaten and dragged back onto native lands because they know they can be raped with impunity? Ain't they women?
Once again we stand at an important moment in history, when the House stands poised to choose between the Republican ``alternative'' to the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act and the bipartisan, comprehensive Senate bill.
We can choose the real VAWA--which is the Senate bill--that will take positive steps towards ensuring the safety of all women. Or we can choose the House GOP VAWA bill. Now this bill may look good on the surface, bearing the same bill number as the Senate bill. But it is really a wolf in sheep's clothing and would exclude victims and weaken the strong, bipartisan Senate bill.
The choice is ours to make, and the choice is clear.
It pains me to say that House Republicans took the Senate bill, which received such a strong bipartisan vote--winning the support of all Democrats, all female Senators, and a majority of Republicans--and transformed it into something nearly unrecognizable.
I have been a proud sponsor of the House version of the Senate bill-- H.R. 11--and it has truly been rewarding to work to advance this legislation in the House. This bill reflects years upon years of analysis and best practices, and input from law enforcement, victims, service providers, and many more.
But beyond the updates that have been recommended by the experts--the Senate bill is meaningful to me because of the people it will allow us to reach. I know how it feels to survive a traumatic experience and not have access to services. It is simply heart-breaking to think that every day we delay, there are women, and men, across this country who have nowhere to turn.
The Senate version of the VAWA bill, which we will thankfully have the opportunity to consider on the House floor today, would be the one that actually offers hope--to: LGBT victims, tribal victims, women on college campuses, immigrants, rape survivors waiting for justice, and human trafficking victims.
The Republican alternative, on the other hand, is a shadow of the bill these victims need.
I have a number of concerns about the House alternative. Several of the advocacy groups have determined that this legislation rolls back existing protections for victims, much like the bill we considered last year here in the House.
But I'm also concerned about the reality that this House bill further marginalizes the most vulnerable populations of victims. It amazes me, that my Republican colleagues would rather be exclusive than inclusive.
The House bill removes protections for LGBT victims, who face domestic and sexual violence at rates equal to or greater than the rest of us, but who often face barriers to receiving services. Are LGBT women not worthy of protection?
The House bill fails to offer meaningful protections for tribal victims, though domestic violence in tribal communities is an epidemic. Are tribal women not worthy of protection?
The House bill does not include protections for our students on college campuses, though we know that college campuses--which are supposed to be the site of learning and transformation and personal growth--are all too often the site of horrifying assaults against vulnerable young women. Are our young college women students not worthy of protection?
The House bill removes the human trafficking legislation that passed with the support of a whopping 93 Senators. Are we unwilling to protect our women who are being sold throughout this country and abroad like chattel? Are they not worthy of protection?
The House bill is weaker in almost every way, for every group of victims. They even pared down the pieces that have not gained much attention, perhaps assuming we wouldn't notice--like the housing protections that allow victims of violence to quickly get out of dangerous homes and into homes that will keep them safe from further abuse and harm.
Implementing the House GOP VAWA bill would set the plight of women and our country as a whole back indefinitely. But we have a choice and the right choice would be to support the strong, bipartisan Senate version of VAWA--S. 47.
S. 47, the Senate bill. The Senate bill:
Renews successful programs such as STOP Grants and Transitional Housing Assistance Grants, legal assistance for victims, and many others that have helped law enforcement, prosecutors, and victim service providers assist women in need and hold perpetrators accountable.
Includes a new focus on sexual assault--due to the ongoing reality of inadequate reporting, enforcement, and services for victims--including a requirement that STOP grant recipients set aside 20 percent of their funds for sexual assault-related programs.
Includes new tools and best practices for reducing homicide by training law enforcement, victims service providers, and court personnel to intervene more effectively and quickly when they connect with higher-risk victims.
And, of course, the bill improves protections for immigrant survivors, Native American women, and LGBT victims.
As we have debated this bill over the past year or so, I have felt like I was in the Twilight Zone. Some alternate reality, where the passage of a bill; a bill that is supposed to protect all women; a bill that not too long ago would just seem like common sense; a bill that has previously enjoyed broad bipartisan support would be held up and watered down for purely partisan reasons. I found myself asking, ``when will it end?''
The answer to that question is that it ends today. Right now. It is time to put up or shut up. On behalf of all victims and survivors of sexual or domestic assault, I challenge all of my colleagues to make the right choice. We all know that the Senate bill is the real comprehensive Violence Against Women Legislation that will protect all women. And we must vote against the House GOP VAWA and pass the Senate version of VAWA now. Women won't wait any longer. Now is the time to show the people of this country that we value the lives of all women.
Why Section 904 of S. 47 Is Constitutional Under the Supreme Court's
Precedent in United States v. Lara
Based upon Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 112-489, at 129-34(2011) (responses to questions for the record of
Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General)
Section 904 of S. 47, the Senate-passed version of the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, is
constitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent in
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). In Lara, the
Supreme Court addressed a Federal statute providing that
Indian tribes' governmental powers include ``the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,'' including
Indians who are not members of the prosecuting tribe (i.e.,
``nonmember Indians''). Id. at 210 (appendix, quoting the
statute). The Court held generally that Congress has the
constitutional power to relax restrictions on the exercise of
tribes' inherent legal authority, id. at 196, and more
specifically that ``the Constitution authorizes Congress to
permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal
authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians,'' id. at 210.
The Senate VAWA reauthorization bill, S. 47, uses language
that is nearly identical to the statutory language at issue
in Lara: Specifically, Section 904 of the Senate bill
provides that a tribe's governmental powers
``include the inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons,'' including
non-Indians. As Lara strongly suggests, Congress has the
constitutional authority to enact this statute.
The central question raised in Lara was whether Congress
has the constitutional power to recognize Indian tribes'
``inherent'' authority to prosecute nonmembers. The Court's
conclusion that Congress did indeed have this power under the
Federal Constitution rested on six considerations, all of
which apply to Section 904 of the Senate bill as well:
(1) ``the Constitution grants Congress broad general powers
to legislate in respect to Indian tribes,'' id. at 200;
(2) ``Congress, with this Court's approval, has interpreted
the Constitution's `plenary' grants of power as authorizing
it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn,
relaxes those restrictions on tribal sovereign authority,''
id. at 202;
(3) ``Congress' statutory goal--to modify the degree of
autonomy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a
State--is not an unusual legislative objective,'' id. at 203;
(4) there is ``no explicit language in the Constitution
suggesting a limitation on Congress' institutional authority
to relax restrictions on tribal sovereignty previously
imposed by the political branches,'' id. at 204;
(5) ``the change at issue here is a limited one, . . .
[largely concerning] a tribe's authority to control events
that occur upon the tribe's own land,'' id.; and
(6) the Court's ``conclusion that Congress has the power to
relax the restrictions imposed by the political branches on
the tribes' inherent prosecutorial authority is consistent
with [the Supreme Court's] earlier cases,'' id. at 205.
Each of these six considerations also applies to Section
904 of the Senate bill. That is self-evident for the first
four of those six considerations.
As to the fifth consideration, like the statute at issue in
Lara, Section 904 of the Senate bill would effectuate only a
limited change. Section 904 would touch only those criminal
acts that occur in the Indian country of the prosecuting
tribe and therefore would not cover off-reservation crimes.
Section 904 would affect only those crimes that have Indian
victims. Tribal courts could not try cases involving only
non-Indians. Unlike the statute at issue in Lara, which
covered all types of crimes, Section 904 is narrowly focused
on a particular subset of crimes: those involving domestic
violence, crimes of dating violence, and criminal violations
of protection orders. The term ``domestic violence'' is
expressly defined in Section 904 to deal with violence
committed by the victim's current or former spouse, by a
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, or by a
person who is cohabiting or has cohabited with the victim as
a spouse. Similarly, Section 904 expressly defines the term
``dating violence'' to mean violence committed by a person
who is or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or
intimate nature with the victim, as determined by the length
of the relationship, the type of relationship, and the
frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the
relationship. Likewise, protection orders typically involve
spouses or intimate partners.
In combination, these three features of Section 904--being
limited to narrow categories of crimes such as domestic
violence and dating violence, the requirement that the crime
occurred in the prosecuting tribe's Indian country, and the
requirement that the victim be an Indian--will confine
prosecutions to conduct that seriously threatens Indians'
health and welfare and is committed by persons who, though
non-Indian, have entered into consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members. The paradigmatic example of a crime
covered by Section 904 would be an assault by a non-Indian
husband against his Indian wife in their home on the
reservation. Section 904 would not cover crimes involving two
non-Indians, two strangers, or two persons who lack ties to
the Indian tribe.
Section 904 is also limited in its impact on non-tribal
jurisdictions. Under Section 904, tribes would exercise
criminal jurisdiction concurrently, not exclusively. The Act
would not create or eliminate any Federal or State criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country. Nor would it affect the
authority of the United States or any State to investigate
and prosecute crimes in Indian country.
In most respects, then, Section 904 of the Senate bill is
far narrower than the statute upheld by the Supreme Court in
Lara.
As to the sixth consideration analyzed by the Lara Court,
concerning the Supreme Court's precedents, it is noteworthy
that in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978), the key precedent here, the Court suggested that
Congress has the constitutional authority to recognize and
thus restore Indian tribes' inherent power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 195 & n.6,
210-12. Indeed, the Oliphant Court expressly stated that the
increasing sophistication of tribal court systems, the Indian
Civil Rights Act's protection of defendants' procedural
rights, and the prevalence of non-Indian crime in Indian
country are all ``considerations for Congress to weigh in
deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be authorized
to try non-Indians.'' Id. at 212.
As the Lara Court explained, the Oliphant decision ``did
not set forth constitutional limits that prohibit Congress
from changing the relevant legal circumstances, i.e., from
taking actions that modify or adjust the tribes' status.''
Lara, 541 U.S. at 205 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-10).
Oliphant ``make[s] clear that the Constitution does not
dictate the metes and bounds of tribal autonomy,'' and the
Federal courts should not ``second-guess the political
branches' own determinations'' about those metes and bounds.
Id. In short, under both Oliphant and Lara, it is
constitutional for ``Congress to change 'judicially made'
federal Indian law through [the] kind of legislation'' that
the Senate is currently considering. Id. at 207.
After analyzing the six considerations listed above and
concluding that Congress can recognize tribes' inherent
authority to prosecute nonmembers, the Court responded to
three ancillary arguments that Mr. Lara had raised. Each of
those arguments is also well addressed by Section 904 of the
Senate bill.
First, Mr. Lara argued that the Indian Civil Rights Act
does not protect an indigent defendant's constitutional right
to appointed counsel in cases imposing a term of
imprisonment. Id. at 207. But under the Senate bill, in any
case in which a term of imprisonment of any length may be
imposed, the tribe must provide to an indigent defendant--at
the tribe's expense--the effective assistance of a licensed
defense attorney at least equal to that guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.
Second, Mr. Lara argued that the statute at issue there
made ``all Indians'' subject to tribal prosecution while
excluding all non-Indians, which he claimed violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court did not address the
argument because it would not have altered the outcome of Mr.
Lara's case. But in any event, no such argument could be made
against Section 904 of the Senate bill, because Section 904
recognizes tribes' ``inherent power . . . to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons''
(emphasis added). So the plain text of this legislation,
unlike the statute at issue in Lara, does not distinguish
nonmember Indians from non-Indians.
Third, Mr. Lara argued that United States citizens cannot
be tried and convicted by a political body that does not
include them unless the citizens are provided all Federal
constitutional safeguards. This, too, is addressed in the
Senate bill. Under Section 904, a non-Indian citizen of the
United States would effectively have at least the same rights
in tribal court that he would have in state court. For
example, in any case involving imprisonment, the following
rights would all be protected:
The right not to be deprived of liberty or property without
due process of law.
The right to the equal protection of the tribe's laws.
The right against unreasonable search and seizures.
The right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
tribal offense.
The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself in
a criminal case.
The right to a speedy and public trial.
The right to a trial by a jury of not fewer than six
persons.
The right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn
from sources that reflect a fair cross-section of the
community and do not systematically exclude any distinctive
group in the community, including non-Indians.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation in a criminal case.
The right to be confronted with adverse witnesses.
The right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
one's favor.
The right to have the assistance of defense counsel.
The right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal
to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
The right of an indigent defendant to the assistance of a
licensed defense attorney at the tribe's expense.
The right to be tried before a judge with sufficient legal
training and who is licensed to practice law.
The rights against excessive bail, excessive fines, and
cruel and unusual punishments.
The right to access the tribe's criminal laws, rules of
evidence, and rules of criminal procedure.
The right to an audio or other recording of the trial
proceeding and a record of other criminal proceedings.
The right to petition a Federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus, to challenge the legality of one's detention by the
tribe.
The right to petition a Federal court to be released
pending resolution of the habeas corpus petition.
Finally, one last constitutional concern was aired in Lara,
although it was not discussed in the Court's majority
opinion. Writing only for himself, Justice Kennedy suggested
that the Constitution's structure, based as it is on ``a
theory of original, and continuing, consent of the
governed,'' forbids a tribe from prosecuting any U.S. citizen
who never consented to be subjected to the tribe's
jurisdiction. Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment). Of course, the majority of the Court in
Lara--including Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the
Court's opinion in Oliphant--implicitly rejected Justice
Kennedy's view, since Mr. Lara himself was a U.S. citizen who
had never consented to be subjected to the jurisdiction of
the tribe that prosecuted him. Id.
Moreover, the majority correctly rejected Justice Kennedy's
originalist argument because most treaties that the United
States
entered into with Indian tribes between 1785 and 1795--that
is, both immediately before and immediately after the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution--expressly
provided for tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
residing in Indian country. For example, the very first
Indian treaty ratified by the United States Senate under the
Federal Constitution--the 1789 Treaty with the Wyandot,
Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Sac Nations--
provided that, ``[i]f any person or persons, citizens or
subjects of the United States, or any other person not being
an Indian, shall presume to settle upon the lands confirmed
to the said [Indian tribal] nations, he and they shall be out
of the protection of the United States; and the said nations
may punish him or them in such manner as they see fit''
(emphasis added). Similar language appeared in the last
Indian treaty ratified before the Constitutional Convention--
the 1786 Treaty with the Shawnee Nation. It is difficult,
then, to say that allowing non-Indian citizens of the United
States to be tried and punished by Indian tribes for crimes
committed in Indian country is somehow contrary to the
Framers' understanding of the Constitution's design. Thus,
the Lara Court's holding that Indian tribes' status as
domestic dependent nations does not prevent Congress from
recognizing their inherent authority to prosecute nonmembers
is solidly grounded in our constitutional history. And with
Congress's express authorization, an Indian tribe can
prosecute a non-Indian U.S. citizen, regardless of whether he
has consented to the tribe's jurisdiction.
It is important to note that while the elements of Section
904 discussed above are more than sufficient to address the
considerations raised by the Lara Court, we do not mean to
suggest that each of these elements is required in order to
address these considerations.
Thank you, distinguished ranking member of the Judiciary Committee.
I've listened very carefully and very patiently to all of my colleagues in the House, and it seems that everyone in the Chamber is against violence against women. It's just which women we want to protect that remains the question.
For the last 18 months, it appears that I have lived in some sort of twilight zone, like that program on TV, ``Sliders,'' where there are alternate realities. This debate recalls that alternate reality when we hear support of the House amendment over the Senate amendment, and we hear that all women are protected.
For example, the Senate bill supports LGBT victims but the House bill strikes LGBT women as underserved communities. It also strikes the language that would have them as a protected group to not be discriminated against.
The distinguished floor leader has asked us to find areas in the legislation that are wanting, and I would submit that that is one area that is wanting.
The distinguished floor leader has asked us to find ways that the substitute is wanting and the Senate bill is superior.
We give lip service to wanting to support tribal women. But when you stop and think about it, in 1978, the Supreme Court in the Oliphant case decided that Federal laws and policies divested tribes of criminal authority over non-Indians, and the substitute seeks to affirm that, even though that was modified and overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Lara, which said that, in fact, if this body voted, we could, in fact, confer upon Native Americans the authority to give--we have plenary power to enact legislation to relax restrictions on tribal sovereign authority, that we have the power to allow them to enforce domestic violence laws and rape laws on their land.
We so need it, Madam Speaker, because if you are a member of a tribe--say, for example, the Bad River Chippewa band of Chippewa in my State--and you are raped on native land, tribes don't have any authority over that perpetrator if he is a non-Indian, even if he's your husband. The local police in that area don't have any authority. The county sheriff doesn't have any authority. The State trooper can't come in and arrest him. The only person that has any authority over that non-Indiana is some Federal agent in Madison, Wisconsin, 500 miles away, which is why there has been a 67 percent declination of prosecutions of sexual assault.
Susanville Indian Rancheria,
Susanville, CA, February 4, 2013.
Re Support for S. 47, VAWA Reauthorization
Hon. Patrick Leahy,
U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Leahy: I write on behalf of the Susanville
Indian Rancheria to voice our strong support for S. 47, the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2013.
This bill will provide local tribal governments with the
long-needed control to combat acts of domestic violence
against Native women and children on Indian lands regardless
of the status of the offender.
The current justice system in place on Indian lands
handcuffs the local tribal justice system. Non-Native men who
abuse Native women hide behind these federal laws and court
decisions, walking the streets of Indian country free of
consequences, while denying justice to Native women and their
families.
Nationally, Native women are raped and assaulted at 2.5
times the national average. More than 1 in 3 Native women
will be raped in their lifetimes, and more than 3 in 5 will
suffer domestic assault. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
has found that the current system of justice, ``inadequate to
stop the pattern of escalating violence against Native
women.'' Tribal leaders, police officers, and prosecutors
have testified to the fact that when misdemeanor acts of
domestic and dating violence go unaddressed, offenders become
emboldened and feel untouchable, and the beatings escalate,
often leading to death or severe physical injury. A National
Institute of Justice-funded analysis of death certificates
found that, on some reservations, Native women are murdered
at a rate more than ten times the national average. S. 47
will crack down on reservation based domestic violence by all
offenders at the early stages before violence escalates.
While the problem of violence against Native women is
longstanding and broad, the jurisdictional provisions
proposed in S. 47, Section 904, are well-reasoned and limited
in scope. They extend only to misdemeanor level crimes of
domestic and dating violence. They are limited to enforcement
of reservation-based crimes involving individuals that work
or live on an Indian reservation and who are in a serious
relationship with a tribal citizen from that reservation. S.
47 also provides the full range of constitutional protections
to abuse suspects who would be subject to the authority of
tribal courts.
In June of 2010, the United States Senate, by unanimous
consent, passed the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA). On July
27, 2010, the House of Representatives passed the measure
under suspension of the rules. The tribal provisions in S. 47
are subject to a more narrow set of crimes, are limited to
misdemeanor level punishments, and would provide a broader
range of protections to suspects of abuse than those required
under TLOA. With such broad support for TLOA, it is troubling
that some Members of Congress now claim that the narrowly
tailored proposal in S. 47 raises constitutional concerns.
Such concerns are unfounded.
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a similar
restoration of tribal government authority through an
amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act. Congress has this
authority, and Native women throughout the United States
desperately need us to act so that they can be afforded
similar access to justice that many others take for granted.
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding to divest
Indian tribes of authority over local reservation-based
crimes, made the following statement:
``We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have
become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many
respects their state counterparts. . . . We are not unaware
of the prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's reservations
which the tribes forcefully argue requires the ability to try
non-Indians. But these are considerations for Congress to
weigh.'' Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
211 (1978) (emphasis added).
This statement and resulting gaps in criminal jurisdiction
on Indian lands have haunted Native women and tribal
communities nationwide for more than 35 years. Time has come
for Congress to act. S. 47 takes reasonable well-tailored
measures to fill the gap in local authority, and will go far
in helping to prevent future acts of violence against Native
women nationwide. Thank you for again including these vital
provisions in your VAWA Reauthorization.
Sincerely,
Mr. Stacy Dixon,
Tribal Chairman.
Madam Speaker, in a letter written by our friend and colleague Tom Cole, a Member of Congress, he says that he does not support the House substitute to VAWA because it does not adequately recognize sovereignty or give them the tools that they need to combat violence against women.
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Why I'm Voting Against the House Substitute Amendment to S.
47
Dear Republican Colleague: I want to let you know why I
will vote against the House substitute to S. 47, the Violence
Against Women Act (``VAWA''). While the House substitute to
VAWA has improved tremendously over what this body passed
last Congress, it falls short of giving tribes what they need
to keep their women safe.
Unlike the Senate version, the House substitute fails to
recognize existing tribal sovereignty that is enshrined in
the Constitution by requiring tribes to seek DOJ
certification before exercising jurisdiction over non-Indian
offenders, and waives tribes' sovereign immunity. It doesn't
make sense to force tribes to abdicate part of their
sovereignty to exercise another part of their sovereignty.
Like most Republicans, I believe in moving control away
from the federal government towards local governments. Tribal
governments are local governments, and tribes do a good job
of taking care of tribal citizens when they have the
resources to do so. Tribes do not support the House
substitute to VAWA because it does not adequately recognize
sovereignty or give them the tools they need to combat
violence against Indian women. I trust the tribes to
understand their needs best, and that is why I will vote
against the House substitute and in favor of the Senate VAWA
bill, S. 47.
Sincerely,
Tom Cole,
Member of Congress.