Mr. President, before my friend starts, we have other people who wish to speak who can come this afternoon. I am curious as to roughly how long the Senator wishes to speak. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, the procedure in the Senate,…
Mr. President, before my friend starts, we have other people who wish to speak who can come this afternoon. I am curious as to roughly how long the Senator wishes to speak.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, the procedure in the Senate, one of long standing, is that we as Senators have the right to keep what we believe is our ability to have our voices heard. In this instance we have said now for some time, if the majority wants to go forward on Miguel Estrada, we should have him come back before the Judiciary Committee, answer questions, and with him bring the memos from the Solicitor's office. They have been supplied on other occasions. It has been mentioned in the Record specifically how it was done.
I am not here, though, to debate the qualifications of Miguel Estrada. I am here to talk about my becoming a vocal critic of the American Bar Association rating process for judicial nominees. I have to say, frankly, I have never been a big fan of the American Bar Association. I know they do some good things. I have lost significant respect for the operation of rating judges. I do this not in any way to denigrate Miguel Estrada. My statement I make today is in no way to denigrate Miguel Estrada.
I have said before, Miguel Estrada graduated from Harvard. He could have graduated at the bottom of his class at Harvard and he still would be one of the more credible, more qualified people to go to law school. It is hard to get into Harvard. But he did not graduate at the bottom. He was one of 71 editors they had at the Law Review, and he was one of their better students. This is in no way to denigrate the academic qualifications of Miguel Estrada. It is to talk about and to criticize the American Bar Association.
What the Estrada case has done is lifted the veil on how the ratings of the American Bar Association are made, revealing partisanship that has no place in a process that should be as impartial as the judges it helps to select. My criticism goes beyond the specific Estrada case. It demonstrates that we cannot rely on the American Bar Association to give us impartial ratings.
This may surprise some, but I will say I support the Republicans' stand on what should be done with the American Bar Association as it relates to judges. I think we can and should take them out of the process. I don't think we need them. I am a convert to that.
Some asked why didn't I say I felt that way when Republicans did it initially. I didn't have enough knowledge to do that. I recognize I was wrong.
So we have this funnel for all Presidential nominees, and when we were a country of a few million people, that funnel was able to put everybody through very quickly. But the bigger the country becomes and the more judges we authorize, the more Cabinet officers, the more subcabinet people we authorize, this funnel becomes clogged.
The ABA is only one additional way of clogging that as it relates to judges. I feel we should get rid of them.
The Estrada case most starkly reveals that the ABA process is fatally flawed, that its gold seal is, indeed, tarnished. The gold seal of impartiality has been replaced by a stealth seal of partiality. In my view, the ABA rating should not be relied on until the process is fixed.
Unfortunately, as I will discuss in a moment, the ABA is defending this flawed process and its inherently flawed recommendation for Mr. Estrada. It defends both in the face of a case that very clearly violates its own conflict of interest rules.
As many of my colleagues know, the ABA delegates that review of potential nominees to one individual ABA member of the ABA committee for each circuit. In effect, one person is given responsibility to recommend to the committee this person's qualifications. That individual interviews colleagues who know the nominee, evaluates each nominee, and reports to the ABA with a recommended rating for the nominee.
The ABA has three ratings: Not qualified, qualified, and well qualified. Mr. Estrada received a well-qualified rating. The ABA Committee member who recommended Mr. Estrada for that rating was Mr. Fred Fielding. Given the sensitive nature of these recommendations, ABA rules specifically prohibit ABA committee members like Mr. Fielding from engaging in partisan activities while working for the ABA. The rules note that:
[T]he integrity and credibility of its process and the
perception of these processes are of vital importance.
The ABA rules go on to implement this important principle by providing:
No member of the Committee shall participate in the work of
the Committee if such participation would give rise to the
appearance of impropriety or would otherwise be incompatible
with the purposes served and functions performed by the
Committee.
The rules then get even more specific:
As a condition of appointment, each member agrees while on
the Committee and for at least one year thereafter not to
seek or accept [a] federal judicial appointment and agrees
while on the Committee not to participate in or contribute to
any federal election campaign or engage in partisan political
activity. Partisan political activity means that a member,
while on the Committee, agrees not to host any fund-raiser or
publicly endorse a candidate for federal office. . . .
The rule concludes:
In view of the confidence reposed in the Committee and the
vital importance of the integrity and credibility of its
processes, these constraints are strictly enforced.
These rules were not enforced in the case of Mr. Estrada. Mr. Fielding violated them. While on the ABA Committee, Mr. Fielding played a high-level role in President Bush's transition team. He helped the President and the White House counsel clear the President's highest level executive branch appointments in 2000 and 2001. Certainly these are far more partisan roles than hosting a fund-raiser or endorsing candidates for Federal office.
While on the ABA Committee, Mr. Fielding accepted an appointment from President Bush to an international center that settles trade dispute, a job that pays $2,000 a day plus expenses; $2,000 a day, $14,000 a week, that's a lot of money.
While on the ABA Committee, Mr. Fielding helped co-found the partisan Committee for Justice to run ads against Senators who oppose Mr. Estrada. Mr. Fielding's partisan activities, in fact, span back decades. He served as deputy counsel to President Nixon. He served on the Reagan-Bush campaign in 1980, the Thursday night group. He served on the Lawyers for Reagan advisory group, the Bush-Reagan transition in 1980-1981. He served as the conflict of interest counsel, ironically enough.
He served in the Office of Counsel to the President, as deputy counsel to President Reagan. He served on the Bush-Quayle campaign in 1988; as campaign counsel to Senator Quayle; as Republican National Conventional legal advisor; as campaign counsel to Senator Quayle; and as deputy director of the Bush-Quayle transition team. He served on the Bush-Quayle campaign in 1992; as senior legal advisor and conflict of interest counsel to the Republican National Committee. He served as the legal advisor to the Dole-Kemp campaign in 1996. Just from these statements it would appear he should understand something about conflict of interest.
The ABA couldn't have picked a Republican with better partisan credentials than Mr. Fielding. And Mr. Fielding didn't just give Mr. Estrada a well-qualified rating, every rating Mr. Fielding has handled for President Bush to the D.C. Circuit has resulted in a ``well- qualified.'' All of those ratings, in my view, should be held suspect.
By contrast, Mr. Fielding did not give any of President Clinton's nominees to the D.C. Circuit--nominees who had similar qualifications as Mr. Estrada--a well-qualified rating.
What has the ABA had to say about all of this? On Thursday, February 26, 2003, the head of the ABA, Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. sent a letter to Senators Frist and Daschle. I was deeply disappointed by its content.
In that letter, the ABA declares that our criticism of Mr. Estrada's case is ``unfair'' The ABA goes on to say that we seek to:
Impugn the integrity of members of the Committee and of its
process during the current Senate debate. . . .
I was also a little disappointed that Mr. Carlton failed to tell me about this letter when he met privately with me a day after the letter had been sent. I didn't ask for that meeting. He asked for it.
In that meeting, I strongly encouraged the ABA to strengthen its rules and disavow the process that led to Mr. Estrada's recommendation and possibly scores more of tainted recommendations. Mr. Carlton told me he would consider such a step.
I also encouraged Mr. Carlton to write to Senators Frist and Daschle and tell them that the ABA would clean up its act. Mr. Carlton also told me he would consider sending such a letter.
He not only failed to mention that just the day before he had sent the leaders a letter, but also that the letter was a strongly worded defense of an indefensible process.
If the head of the ABA cannot be straight with me, what hope do we have for this process? The letter he sent the leaders reveals that we shouldn't have much hope.
The ABA says in the letter that we have been critical of Mr. Fielding's role based solely on the fact that he co-founded the Committee for Justice. The ABA letter implies that this fact is not problematic because the Committee for Justice was formed after Mr. Fielding made his glowing recommendation of Mr. Estrada. The letter fails to mention several things: First, that even this post-Estrada activity violates ABA's clear rules. Second, that Mr. Fielding was engaged in the Bush transition partisan activities at the time he was making his Estrada recommendation. The letter concludes that our attacks on this process are ``baseless'' . . .
If this is so, then the ABA's own rules are baseless. The ABA cannot claim that our criticism of the way Mr. Estrada's recommendations was handled is baseless when that recommendation violates the ABA's own rules. Is the ABA disavowing its own rules? Does it find them baseless?
Conflict of interest rules such as the ones that ABA has adopted are not just designed to prevent the actual exercise of a bias in a way that influences an outcome. These rules are also adopted to prevent the appearance of a conflict. Preventing the appearance of impropriety is important to assure the Senate and the American people that the process of evaluating our judges is as impartial as people expect judges to be.
Before we rely upon the judgment of the ABA in evaluating nominees for lifetime judicial appointments, the ABA should not just pledge to enforce existing rules but should strengthen those rules. They should revise them to provide that individuals so heavily steeped in partisan activities not be permitted to serve in these crucial roles at all. That is, the rules should be expanded to prevent partisans from passing judgment on judicial nominees. This shouldn't be limited merely to the time period during which the individual is serving on the ABA Committee.
It strains credulity to believe that someone who occupied partisan roles in the last several Republican administrations could be viewed as impartial in this case. If Mr. Fielding had started the committee for Justice after he left the committee would the specter of bias really be any less? Mr. Fielding moved seamlessly from passing judgment on Mr. Estrada to becoming a leading advocate for his nomination.
The fact that the advocacy followed the judgment doesn't render the judgment any less suspect. Much has also been made of the fact that the full ABA Committee endorsed Mr. Fielding's view of Mr. Estrada's qualifications. This doesn't cleanse the Fielding recommendation of its taint. Mr. Fielding is an important person, a powerful man.
Mr. President, the hour of 12:30 is nearly here. I guess he left--I saw my friend from Kansas here. I just have a couple of more minutes and it will run past 12:30. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to finish my statement.
It is impossible for us to know one way or another whether members of the committee felt pressure to endorse Mr. Fielding's view. It is certainly possible. And that possiblity--like Mr. Fielding's clear conflict of interest--is the problem in this case.
There are thousands of lawyers in the United States, thousands who are not steeped in partisan politics--Democrat of Republican. That is every obvious because the poorest contributors to campaigns of any group in America are lawyers. So most of them are not involved at all in politics.
We rightly cast a skeptical eye on judicial nominees who are heavily involved in partisan activities. We do that because we want those who would define the breadth and depth of our constitutional protections to be impartial and without bias.
Regardless of what side of the aisle you are on--Democrats or Republican--we should be able to agree that those who occupy the most partisan roles of either party should not be part of the ABA process.
This does not, in the words of the ABA, impugn those partisans. It is to say that the fact of those partisan activities creates a clear appearance of improperity. It is that appearance that is impossible to avoid. It is that appearance--and the doubt that it creates in the underlying process--that is the heart of all conflict of interest rules.
This issue goes well beyond the nomination of Miguel Estrada. His nomination has simply brought to light a fatally flawed process that should not be relied upon in the case of any of our nominees.
As I have said before, I now agree with the majority that the ABA should be out of the process. I hope that the ABA will rethink the staunch defense it made of its flawed process and flawed recommendations. I hope that the head of the ABA will not continue to be disingenuous when he meets with Members privately. Perhaps then the ABA would merit the trusted role that it has long held by that, in my view, it no longer deserves.