Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, after the tragedies of September 2001, the United States Congress created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly called the 9-11 Commission. This independent, bipartisan body was charged with preparing a complete account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks and with recommending policy changes designed to prevent future attacks. I have a great deal of respect for the individuals who served on this commission and for their final work product.

America is in the midst of fighting a long, complex war against terrorism that must be fought with unconventional tools. The 9-11 Commission recognizes the unique nature of our conflict and has recommended that the United States engage Middle Eastern nations economically in order to foster development and reforms in that troubled part of the world. Economic openness requires bilateral compromise and gives America an opportunity to positively influence the region. And, importantly, economic reforms and political liberties tend to be linked.

In the Middle East, the Congress has approved trade pacts with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain. I have supported them because I feel they are critical to enhancing our economic ties to the region. Today, we are considering an agreement with Oman, and after careful consideration, I have decided to support this legislation as well.

Oman is a small, oil-exporting nation located on the Arabian peninsula at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. It is strategically important to the United States and has played a meaningful role in our efforts to defeat terrorism. As Oman's oil reserves diminish, its government has been working to liberalize and diversify its trade beyond oil and gas.

America's economic partnership with Oman carries with it great promise. Boosting our economic partnership with that country will enhance our national security standing in a strategically critical area and will open doors to agricultural trade. The agreement will lower

tariffs on U.S. agricultural commodities and products, thereby putting our Nation in a better position to increase exports and compete with other nations for market share. After full implementation, U.S. agricultural exports could reach $225 million or more.

No trade deal is ever perfect. Clearly, some improvements could be made in the bill, especially with regard to labor protection and human rights. But, as I studied the Oman Free Trade Agreement and heard from national security, agriculture, labor, and business leaders, I became convinced that this trade agreement is critical to U.S. national security and to Missouri's rural economy.

In the days leading up to today's debate on the Oman Free Trade Agreement, there has been much talk about port security. Despite the rhetoric surrounding this issue, a nonpartisan legal analysis from the Congressional Research Service has shown that Congress retains its ability to determine the national security interests of our country and to prevent port operations if need be. The CRS analysis is set forth below, as is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury on this issue:

Congressional Research Service,

Washington, DC, July 18, 2006.

memorandum

Subject: Legal Issues Related to the Proposed Oman Free Trade

Agreement and Port Security.

From: Todd B. Tatelman, Legislative Attorney, American Law

Division.

This memorandum is in response to requests for a legal

analysis of three arguments that have been advanced in

opposition to the proposed Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

Each of the arguments relate to issues surrounding port

security and, specifically, the ability of Omani companies or

companies incorporated in Oman to perform ``landside aspects

of port activities'' in the United States. This memorandum

provides a legal analysis of three questions: First, whether

the proposed Oman FTA allows Omani companies or companies

incorporated in Oman to perform ``landside aspects of port

activities'' at U.S. ports, especially in light of the

dispute over Dubai Ports World's attempt at establishing

similar business operations at various ports in the United

States. Second, whether the proposed Oman FTA provides some

type of advance clearance to Omani companies that wish to

begin landside port operations in the United States. Finally,

this memorandum provides a legal analysis with respect to the

possibility of a third-country company (e.g., Dubai Ports

World or similarly-situated foreign entity), establishing a

minimal presence within Oman for the sole purpose of taking

advantage of the benefits provided by the provisions of the

proposed FTA.

One argument that has been raised against the proposed Oman

FTA appears to stem specifically from language contained in

Annex II of the Agreement. The argument generally asserts

that the proposed Oman FTA provides a new right to both

Omani-owned companies and companies based in Oman that will

allow them to perform ``landside aspects of port operations''

at U.S. ports. Upon close inspection of the language in

Annex II, however, it appears that this claim is

misleading because it appears that Omani companies are

already presently able to perform these services.

Currently, there are no U.S. laws that prevent either an

Omani-owned company (state controlled) or any other

foreign-owned company (regardless of whether the company

is state-owned or privately owned) from contracting with

port owners to perform ``landside aspects of port

activities'' in the United States. In other words, if an

Omani company (either state or privately owned) wants to

engage in contract negotiations with port owners to

provide for the types of services envisioned in Annex II,

there is no U.S. law that would expressly prevent them

from receiving said contracts.

Annex II of the proposed Oman FTA allows the parties to

list ``the specific sectors, subsectors, or activities for

which that Party may maintain existing, or adopt new or more

restrictive, measures'' that are not in conformity with the

various obligations imposed by the Agreement, such as

National Treatment (Articles 10.3 or 11.2), Most-Favored

Nation (Articles 10.4 or 11.3), and Market Access (Article

11.4). With respect to the Transportation Sector, the U.S.

Schedule to Annex II lists 12 types of measures that the

United States has specifically reserved the right to either

maintain or adopt new more restrictive measures. These 12

types of measures generally reflect the current restrictions

placed on foreign investment and/or ownership of maritime

assets by U.S. domestic law. Phrased another way, the United

States has reserved the right to maintain our existing legal

restrictions with respect to those aspects of maritime

transportation in which we already have limitations, as well

as adopt new measures in these categories that may be more

restrictive.

Additionally, the U.S. Schedule indicates that we do not

include in our reservations either ``vessel construction and

repair'' or the ``landside aspects of port activities.'' The

noninclusion of these measures in our schedule merely

indicates that the U.S. government is not reserving the right

to impose a future restrictive measure with respect to

``landside aspects of port activities.'' It does not appear

possible to interpret this language as granting any type of

new business opportunity to Oman or Omani based companies.

Moreover, with respect to ``landside aspects of port

activities'' the language in Annex II specifically states

that the promised treatment ``is conditional upon obtaining

comparable market access in these sectors from Oman.'' As a

result of this language, it appears that the proposed Oman

FTA does not grant any new opportunities for business

investment to Oman that do not already exist, nor does it

allow Oman to establish ``landside aspects of port

activities'' unless it is determined that comparable market

access is provided to U.S. companies in Oman. Indeed, it may

be possible to argue that the language in Annex II in fact

potentially limits the opening of U.S. markets with respect

to ``landside aspects of port activities'' because it imposes

a comparable access requirement that does not currently exist

under domestic law.

Another argument raised in opposition to the proposed Oman

FTA is that it provides a type of ``pre-clearance'' to

businesses in Oman with respect to ``landside aspects of port

activities.'' It is unclear at this time precisely what the

term ``pre-clearance'' means in this context. For the

purposes of the memorandum, however, we will assume that

this language refers to the national security review

conducted by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United

States (CFIUS). CFIUS, as you may know, was the executive

branch entity responsible for reviewing national security

and other implications of the Dubai Ports World

transaction. U.S. law permits the President, at his

discretion, to investigate the national security

implications of ``mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers . .

. by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign

control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the

United States.'' In addition, domestic law requires the

President to conduct an investigation ``in any instance in

which an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a

foreign government seeks to engage in any merger,

acquisition, or takeover which could result in control of

a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United

States that could affect the national security of the

United States.'' The President, by Executive Order, has

delegated the responsibility for these investigations to

Mr. Speaker, let me take this means to recognize RADM Terry L. ``T'' McCreary on the occasion of his retirement as the Navy's Chief of Information after 28 years of dedicated service to our Navy and the Nation.

Before becoming a public affairs officer, Admiral McCreary joined the Navy as a surface warfare officer. His service to our Nation has taken him around the globe during some of the most important military operations in our recent history. As a junior officer, he completed several deployments in the Pacific Fleet onboard the USS O'Brien (DD 975). He also served on the staff of the Seventh Fleet, based in Japan, and with the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf.

I first came to know Admiral McCreary during Operation Desert Storm, when he served as the public affairs officer for the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) in the Persian Gulf. He is a student of history and a scholar, but is remarkable for his candor and insight, traits that have served him and the Navy well during his career.

Admiral McCreary has excelled in positions of leadership in the joint force. He served with skill as the public affairs officer for the U.S. Pacific Command, and also as the Special Assistant for Public Affairs to both GENs Hugh Shelton and Richard Myers in their capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, he was instrumental in accurately depicting the work and sacrifices of our men and women in uniform. He oversaw the plan to embed journalists with our forces in Iraq to bring the news from the front directly to the American people.

Rear Admiral McCreary assumed the duties as the Navy's Chief of Information in July 2003. He has provided sound counsel to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations and has ably directed the 3,500 sailors and civilian communication professionals under his care. He has skillfully built a sound foundation for the future of strategic communications in the Navy.

With his intimate knowledge of public affairs across the spectrum of military operations, his

advice has been sought by officials both inside and outside of government. Admiral McCreary has been the right person, in the right job, at the right time for the U.S. Navy.

I know Rear Admiral McCreary's contributions to our Nation will continue. As he retires, I want to offer him and his wife, Jopat, my personal appreciation for their service and wish them well as they begin this new phase of their lives together.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 5 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I want to contrast two statements for you to set the stage on what we are dealing with regarding the United States Army.

``Help is on the way.'' That is what President Bush said to our military during the 2000 campaign when they were in pretty good shape.

And ``No.'' That is what General Schoomaker, the chief of staff of the Army, answered when I asked him if he was comfortable with the readiness levels of the nondeployed Army units here in the United States.

Let me put it in very clear terms. Our Army is in a crisis. Our forces are fighting valiantly in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the strain of that continued effort has put our preparedness to deter or to fight somewhere else, if we must, at strategic risk. The crises in North Korea, Iran, the Middle East, show how quickly things can change and how they can go wrong. We must be prepared. And right now the Army is not.

President Bush, during the 2000 campaign, strongly criticized the Clinton administration because two divisions were below their appropriate readiness ratings. He said, ``If called upon by the Commander in Chief today, two entire divisions of the Army would have to report `not ready for duty, sir.' ''

Today nearly every combat brigade located within the United States would report that they are not ready for duty. They are at the lowest levels of readiness.

Most nondeployed units in the active Army are reporting that they are not able to complete the expected wartime missions. The exact numbers, of course, are classified. Army readiness for units not in Iraq has steadily declined and has fallen to levels that will limit our ability to project ground forces.

Every nondeployed National Guard combat brigade in the Army is reported at the lowest level of readiness. Forty percent of the Army's ground equipment is deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The army has depleted its prepositioned overseas war stocks of equipment. The Army is so strapped for equipment, they are planning on downloading prepositioned ships loaded with combat equipment to help fill shortages.

Mr. Speaker, the Army has lost over 1,000 wheeled vehicles, over 100 armored vehicles, and 100 helicopters since the start of the war in Iraq.

Guard units in the U.S. are suffering severe equipment shortages which will affect their ability to respond to emergencies in their home States, such as Katrina.

Equipment readiness is suffering as the priority for repair, parts and equipment is only toward the combat theater. The Army is now having a crisis funding its installations at home because of poor planning and the lack of support from the administration. The recent supplemental funding resolution increased the installation budgets by $722 million, but the Army is still short $530 million to meet minimum support levels through the remainder of the fiscal year.

Each installation is being forced to find ways to cut their operating budgets. These cuts are affecting vital training and family support, which further degrades the Army's readiness posture.

Over $290 billion has been spent in Iraq, with no end in sight. The Army requested more money in the recent supplemental, but the President's Office of Management and Budget cut $4.9 billion from the Army's request for the 2006 war supplemental before sending it over here to Congress.

During the 2000 election, the current administration told our military, help is on the way. That is clearly not the case. The administration has failed to request the funds needed for the defense of this Nation. We must give the Army what it needs. The Army will need sustained funds, $17.5 billion this year alone, to start getting well. We cannot shortchange them. We must provide a new direction for the Army, with sustained equipment and manpower, so that we can project power to protect America, wherever and whenever necessary. That is exactly what we must be prepared to do.

Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention that a distinguished career at the Naval Postgraduate School will soon come to an end. Mr. Richard Elster has announced his official retirement after 37 years of service.

After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Minnesota in 1962, Richard pursued his M.S. in Industrial Relations, and his PhD in Industrial Psychology. By 1967, Richard had finished with school and become a project scientist at Litton Industries.

Dr. Elster became associated with the Naval Postgraduate School in 1969 when he joined the faculty as an assistant professor. During his tenure, he served as an associate professor, professor, Chairman of the Department of Administrative Sciences, Dean of Instruction, and the Provost and Academic Dean.

Throughout his career at Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Elster served in several high ranking Pentagon positions. Starting in 1975, he served as special advisor to the Secretary of Defense for manpower and reserve affairs. Dr. Elster also held positions as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resource Management and Support.

Dr. Elster was recognized for meritorious civilian service as Provost and Academic Dean at the Naval Postgraduate School, from July 1995 to December 2005. Because of his leadership, the Naval Postgraduate School attained unprecedented stature in the defense establishment and the academic community. It was recognized in 2005 with the highest score for military value of all Department of Defense education commands by the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group.

The Naval Postgraduate School is respected as a world class research university due in part to Dr. Elster's leadership, strategic vision, and devotion to public service. Much of the academic work of the school's students and faculty responds directly to real world defense mission needs.

As Dr. Richard S. Elster prepares for retirement, I know the Members of the House will join me in expressing appreciation for his dedication to the Naval Postgraduate School and will wish him well in all the days ahead.

Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention that a distinguished career has come to an end. LTG Michael M. Dunn is retiring from the U.S. Air Force.

Lieutenant General Dunn received his Bachelor of Science degree in astrodynamics from the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, CO, in 1972. After graduating fourth in his class in June 1972, General Dunn flew the F-106 at Castle Air Force Base, CA. Following various duties in Washington, DC, Florida, and Alabama, he transitioned to the F-15, which he flew in the Far East. He is a command pilot with more than 2,500 flying hours.

In 1976, he went to the Squadron Officer School and later received his Master of Science degree in systems management at the University of Southern California in 1981. In 1983, he attended the Air Command and Staff College in Maxwell AFB, AL, and three years later attended the Air War College. In 1989, Lieutenant General Dunn attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General Dunn commanded the 1st Operations Group at Langley Air Force Base, VA. He was the Senior Military Fellow and is currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has served in four joint tours, including the Headquarters U.S. European Command, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Headquarters United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, and the Joint Staff. In Korea, he was the lead negotiator with the North Korean Army at P'anmunjom.

Most recently, Lieutenant General Dunn served as president of National Defense University. He has provided strong leadership, coordinating the several schools with the National Defense University. During his tenure, the professional military education of our military made great strides forward.

Lieutenant General Dunn's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, with oak leaf cluster, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, with three oak leaf clusters, and Air Force Commendation Medal, with two oak leaf clusters.

Throughout his career, LTG Michael M. Dunn has served the Nation well. I am certain that my colleagues will join me in wishing Lieutenant General Dunn all the best in all the days ahead.

Mr. Speaker, ``Help is on the way.'' That was the promise this administration made to our country and to our servicemembers before the election in 2002. And look what it has come to mean.

The Army cannot pay its utility bills, defense workers are on the unemployment lines, and equipment readiness is slipping to historic lows. So I ask, exactly who is being helped? I am sure that the administration will blame the Army's money problems on the war. There is no doubt that the $350 billion excursion into Iraq has placed stress on the Army as well as the other services.

But this Congress has continually provided these supplemental funds the administration has requested to wage the war, and has even increased the defense budget by 19 percent since 2001.

So I ask, how can it be that the Army is closing or curtailing the family support programs and laying off employees? The answer is clear. The administration is not requesting sufficient funds to provide for the national defense beyond the war in Iraq. This Congress has already provided $166 billion to the Army in 2006. That is $2 billion more than the administration requested.

Obviously it is not enough. Because I am hearing of reports in the media about bases like Fort Sam Houston where the utility bills have not been paid since March. The Army knows it has a problem. They even requested more money, but the President's Office of Management and Budget cut $4.9 billion from the Army's request for the 2006 war supplemental before it was presented to Congress.

So now the Army is trying to pinch pennies by closing libraries, reducing trash pickup, closing dining facilities, and reducing support for vital training activities. This is a move that is certain to damage morale and sends the wrong message to our troops. This is not the way to reward the courage and sacrifice of our soldiers and their families.

Several weeks ago, I spoke here on the floor about the dismal readiness posture of the Army's equipment. Readiness rates for equipment have fallen so far that I fear that they will now present a strategic risk to our ability to respond to contingencies beyond our current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to this problem, the Army is now laying off engineers working on some of the high priority modernization programs in order to pay bills elsewhere in the Army.

The needs of the current and future Army are being neglected. As a candidate in 1999, President Bush said that ``The previous administration wanted to command great forces without supporting them, to launch today's new causes with little thought of tomorrow's consequences.''

Unfortunately, it appears that the words now apply to his own administration. He is failing to request the funds the military needs to fight the war on terror, the war in Iraq, and also remain ready to defend the Nation if other needs arise.

This country is at war. Americans have a right to expect the administration to realistically budget for national defense. That is not happening, and every day it continues to put this country at greater risk.

I thank the Speaker for recognizing me this evening.

I wish to speak tonight about the United States military. I have the privilege of serving as the ranking member on the Armed Services Committee here in the House of Representatives. I wish to speak about mortgaging the future of our military.

In particular, I want to talk about the Army, the United States Army. That wonderful institution that has contributed so much to American freedom, has meant so much to us historically, and yet I feel that I must discuss and tell my colleagues this evening about the future of our military and how it is being strained in so many respects.

I want to talk about two of the elements of military. In particular, I want to talk about the Army. This is true also of the Marine Corps, but I will discuss mostly the Army.

The continuous deployment in Iraq hurts our military personnel and their families by straining the recruiting and retention; it damages our readiness for our mission skills outside those required for Iraq. As we all know, we have lost some 2,529 servicemembers killed in Iraq. We have over 18,000 wounded, with near 8,500 of those unable to return to duty.

Regarding the active duty of the United States Army, over 14 percent of the Army active duty force is currently deployed in Iraq. The quality of recruits has fallen in the United States Army, as greater numbers of high school dropouts and other category IV recruits, the lowest level of recruit, have been increasing. Additionally, the number of soldiers who score below the 50th percentile in the Armed Forces Qualification Test has been increasing.

For the past several years, the Army has reduced the minimum time-in- grade requirements for promotion to captain from 24 months to 18 months. It takes 38 months for a lieutenant to become a captain compared to 42 months just 2 years ago.

One hundred percent of the Army's available active duty combat brigades have served at least a 12-month tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. At least 50 percent of those combat brigades have completed their second tour in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Regarding the Selected Reserves, more than 20 percent of those currently deployed in Iraq are members of the Selected Reserves. That is the Guard and the Reserves. Over 39 percent of the Selected Reserves have been mobilized since September 11. Nearly 20 percent of those mobilized have been deployed two or more times. In fact, 13,800 members of the Selected Reserves have had three deployments, and 10,400 have been deployed more than three times.

Currently, 45 percent of the Selected Reserves mobilized are deployed. Ninety-seven percent of the National Guard's combat and special operation battalions have been mobilized since September 11. The average tour of duty for National Guard members is 342 days.

Regarding recruiting and retention, by 2007, the Army projects that it will be short 3,500 active duty officers, primarily captains and majors. The percentage of officers leaving the Army has been increasing since 2004. Approximately 3,500 airmen are currently performing Army missions, and the Navy is also being asked to assume greater responsibilities in the Iraq theatre.

While the majority of the service components are currently meeting their recruitment goals, last year five components failed to meet their enlistment accession goals. The Army began the fiscal year 2006 with a delayed entry program of 12 percent, which is a 5 percent reduction from fiscal year 2005, and it is significantly below the 46 percent that was at the beginning of fiscal year 2003.

The cost of recruiting has increased tremendously in fiscal year 2005. Active and Reserve components spent $3 billion on recruiting programs. The cost of retention has increased as well in fiscal year 2005. Active and Reserve components spent $1.5 billion on retention bonuses, this compared to $885 million spent in fiscal year 2004.

Next, let us discuss the equipment issues. Equipment readiness is falling, and Iraq seems to be a black hole for all available equipment. Forty percent of the Army and Marine Corps ground equipment is deployed to Iraq. Equipment in Iraq is wearing out two to nine times the peacetime rate. Some equipment has added as much as 27 years' worth of wear and tear in the last 3 years.

A Humvee designed for 14 years of operation needs overhaul or replacement in just 3 years. Additional armor added to protect troops is causing accelerated aging and has increased the number of rollover accidents. The Army has lost

over 100 helicopters since 9/11. Many of those lost helicopters have not been replaced. It took 4 years to replace the first helicopter that was lost in 2001. The Army has lost over 100 tanks and armored vehicles and over 1,000 vehicles since the start of the war.

Readiness trends for active units are falling, and nondeployed units are severely degraded.

Nearly all of the nondeployed Army units are suffering degraded readiness, with unprecedented numbers of units reporting at the lowest levels of mission capability. Units preparing to deploy for Iraq are being issued equipment. In many cases this equipment arrives right before deployment. This limits the training opportunities for units returning to combat.

Regarding their pre-positioned equipment, let us speak about that. Much of it is no longer pre-positioned. Pre-positioned equipment stocks have been seriously depleted to support the war in Iraq.

Nearly 40 percent of the Marine Corps positioned to afloat ships have been downloaded. The Army plans to download one of the two afloat brigades to supply more equipment to Iraq. These afloat brigades are used to rapidly provide heavy combat equipment to contingency missions. Afloat brigades reduce deployment time from months to days. This plan is accepting significant strategic risk that will affect force protection capability.

Let us speak about the National Guard equipment. The National Guard only has about 34 percent of its equipment on hand, down from 75 percent of its requirement in 2001. The missing equipment that has been left in Iraq is transferred to units deploying to Iraq. According to the National Guard, reserve equipment for fiscal year 2007, the Army National Guard has been directed to transfer more than 75,000 pieces of equipment valued at $1.7 billion to the Army to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.

There is no plan to replace these items. This lack of equipment at home hinders the Guard's ability to train and adversely affects their ability to be comparable with active component units. Examples of shortages, the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from Iraq in 2005. The unit had left 229 HUMVEES or 73 percent of its predeployment inventory of those vehicles in Iraq.

Regarding repairing all of this damage, it is costly. The Army has at least a $36 billion bill to repair and replace equipment. In fiscal year 2006, the Army will spend $13.5 billion this year to repair and replace battle damage and losses from Iraq.

This isn't a full accounting of all losses, because some items such as helicopters, cannot be replaced because they are no longer in production.

The Army estimates that $17 billion will be required for 2007. If the war in Iraq ended today, the Army would require 2 years of supplemental appropriations for somewhere between $24 and $36 billion. Unfortunately, it will take much more than 2 years to repair or replace that equipment. The Army will not be made whole again for many years.

General Hagee of the Marine Corps reported that it has taken 2 years to produce replacement light armored vehicles from placement of the order until delivery. Army modernization and transformation has slowed due to funding pressures of the war in Iraq. Depots are not operating at full capacity. They are capable of producing 57 million hours of direct labor but are currently estimated at providing about 19 million hours of labor.

According to the Army's Tank and Automotive Command, the Army cannot afford to do full overhauls on its ground equipment and has made a decision to perform reduced scope repairs.

By the way, the Marine Corps has incurred a bill of some $12 billion to date to reset its equipment.

In 2006, 19 brigade combat teams will return from Iraq. Their equipment is some 600 combat vehicles, 30,000 wheeled vehicles and 615 aircraft, and they will require 24 million hours of direct labor or repair. This will be quite a challenge for the Army, considering that the Army has still not repaired all of the vehicles deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which returned home in 2004.

By the way, the Marine Corps has determined that equipment deployed to air has suffered such significant damage and wear and tear and that 80 percent of it will need to be replaced.

Regarding the budget pressures affecting everything in the Department of Defense, it goes to make up for budget shortfalls.

The Army reduced its base operation support budget. Some of the cuts, such as cuts to childcare facilities, directly affect military quality of life and make it more difficult for already stressed military families to get by.

The Navy only partially funded its deployed steaming days in the President's budget. The budget included a request for only 36 of the 51 required steaming days for Navy ships, a shortfall of $120 billion.

The Navy ship program was underfunded. The shipping program was underfunded by the President's budget request by $119 million this year, bringing the total deferred maintenance bill for Navy ships to $240 million.

Army modernization is being slowed. The Air Force's fleet of aircraft is aging, and we are not replacing them fast enough. The average age for Air Force aircraft is over 23 years. Some aircraft are over 50 years old. Would one feel safe to be in a 50-year-old commercial airplane? Do we feel we want to have a 50-year-old plane defending our Nation?

Regarding readiness ratings, they continued to fall. Very few nondeployed units here in the continental United States are rated fully mission capable. Readiness in Iraq remains high, but it is coming on the back of the reset of the Army and Marine Corps. Units in the continental United States are short of equipment having to get additional parts and are sending additional equipment into the fight.

Units are training for Iraq without all of their required equipment. They are getting well only upon arrival in Iraq.

Readiness within the force services is poor across the board, and it continues to trend down. Mostly, this is due to the equipment as well as personnel issues.

When asked if he was comfortable with the readiness of the Army outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, General Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army, replied no.

Why do I make these comments? Because, under the Constitution of the United States, it is up to us to raise and maintain the military, the wonderful military of the United States. I spoke mostly, of course, this evening about the Army, the United States Army, that magnificent institution whose history is that of protecting freedom; and so much glory is due to those that wore the uniform from the days of our Revolution down to today, and I am so proud of them.

But we in Congress need to take heed of the personnel challenges. We need to take heed of the equipment challenges. We need to do so, and I bring this to the attention of this body, because it is the right thing to do for our country and for the wonderful military and those who wear the uniform of our country.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution 440, 109th Congress, I move that the House do now adjourn.

Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I announce to our colleagues today that a gentleman, a veteran from Vietnam, a member of the Armed Services Committee, is receiving an extraordinary honor tomorrow. Tomorrow afternoon, the gentleman from Georgia, Congressman Jim Marshall, will be inducted into the United States Army Rangers Hall of Fame, and we are very proud of that.

Announcement by the Chairman

Mr. Speaker, I ask to speak out of order for 5 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, before I make my remarks about the readiness of the Army and Marine Corps equipment, I would like you to share my thoughts on the recently released information of a possible plan for troop redeployment in Iraq.

Let me say I am incensed that General Casey's recommendations to the President and Secretary Rumsfeld for possible force redeployments in the coming months were leaked by someone in the administration to The New York Times.

The options presented to the President for the success of our operation there should not be on the front page of a major paper. Such a leak does not benefit considered deliberation of military operatives. It can only serve a political purpose. Members of the Congress overseeing the Department of Defense should have been kept informed of our senior military commander's best thinking in an appropriate forum.

That said, I am pleased to hear that the Iraqis and the American people may be able to begin to see a correlation between increasing numbers and capability of Iraqi battalions and some reduction in American combat power. This is something that I have suggested for some time. This apparent consideration of options could not come at a better time, given the poor readiness posture of the Army and Marine Corps equipment.

Over the last several years, we have seen readiness rates plummet as the operation tempo in Iraq has climbed. Readiness rates for equipment have fallen so far, so far that I fear that now they present a strategic risk to our ability to respond to contingencies we may have faced beyond our current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Speaker, nearly 40 percent of the Army and Marine Corps ground equipment is deployed to the Central Command theater. That equipment is suffering terribly due to battle losses and damage and increased operations and harsh climate.

Since the start of the war, the Army has lost over 1,000 wheeled vehicles and nearly 100 armored vehicles. Increased usage and the weight from extra armor are wearing out equipment in Iraq up to nine times the peacetime rate. That means that some equipment has added the equivalent of 27 years worth of wear since the start of the war in Iraq.

To keep this equipment serviceable, the Army and Marines have had to expend extraordinary effort. To their credit, the readiness rates for equipment deployed to Central Command remains high, with spare equipment and repair parts flowing quickly to the fight.

Unfortunately, theater readiness has come at the expense of equipment here in the continental United States. Readiness reporting from non- deployed Army units shows that equipment readiness continues to fall, with very few continental United States units rated as fully mission- capable.

These low mission-capable rates disturb me greatly, as they are an indicator of a military under stress. Non-deployed units are our strategic base. They are the units we will call if a crisis emerges. Looking at these readiness rates, I truly wonder if our military will be able to answer the call should it come.

The cost of all this repair and maintenance is enormous, with the Army spending $13.5 billion in 2006 alone. General Schoomaker, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee today, said that the Army will require an astounding $17 billion next year to reset equipment damaged or destroyed by the war in Iraq. Even more disturbing is that the largest bill for the reset will not come due until after combat operations end. At that point, future budget pressure may make it difficult to forward the reset, leaving us with significant shortfalls of equipment to fill a transforming military.

This Congress has a responsibility to provide for our force for the battles that they are in today and for those that they may have to fight tomorrow. To do that and to budget responsibly, we must know the true and full cost of the bill that will come due.

Mr. Speaker, the Army and Marine Corps have been involved in prolonged combat under the harshest of conditions. The combat has taken an enormous toll on troops and their equipment. Yes, we have strategic interests in Iraq, but we also have strategic interests around the world that we must be prepared to defend. We cannot allow the war in Iraq to destroy our ability to fight and win in other contingencies. Our Army and Marine Corps must have what they need to fight and win.

Mr. Speaker, let me take this means to recognize the Sacred Heart High School baseball team from Sedalia, MO, on winning the Class 1 State championship.

With their 11-4 win against Stoutland, the Sacred Heart baseball team won the first State championship in the school's 61-year history and the Kaysinger Conference's first team championship on June 1. The team has worked diligently and provided many hours of hard work and dedication to achieve such a great accomplishment.

Mr. Speaker, the Sacred Heart baseball team and their coaches can be very proud of this accomplishment. I know the Members of the House will join me in congratulating them for winning the Class 1 championship.

Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention that a long and exceptionally distinguished career in education has come to a close. Ray Sutherland retired from his position after 31 years last spring.

A graduate from Central Missouri State University, Mr. Sutherland has been highly respected in his many years of teaching and administrative duties.

Mr. Sutherland is well known for his sense of humor and ability to maintain good relationships with all of his students. During his career, he was admired by his students and has treated all before him with the same sense of justice and respect.

In 1971, Mr. Sutherland graduated from Higginsville High School. After graduating from Central Missouri State University in 1975, he began teaching Industrial Arts at Higginsville High School. In 1990, he was named Principal of Lafayette County C-1 Middle School.

Mr. Speaker, I wish Ray Sutherland all the best as he moves on to the next step in his life. I know the Members of the House will join me in wishing him all the best in the days ahead.

Mr. Speaker, it is with deep sadness that I inform the House of the death of Mr. James Lee Rackers of Jefferson City, MO.

Mr. Rackers was born in Jefferson City, on December 27, 1933, son of Lee and Helen Heislen Rackers. He attended Central Missouri State University and graduated from Lincoln University in 1956, with a Bachelor of Science degree in Secondary School Education. He earned his masters in Secondary School Administration from the University of Missouri-Columbia. He was united in marriage to Nancy Brettschneider on November 24, 1955. They were blessed with four wonderful children, three sons and one daughter.

Mr. Rackers began his career teaching at Helias High School in the fall of 1956. He was the head basketball and track coach and assistant football coach. He was the Athletic Director from 1966 until 1967, when he became Assistant Principal. In 1971 Jim became the

first lay principal at a Catholic secondary school in Missouri. Jim was principal until 1992, when he became Helias' first Chief Administrator. In 1997 he became the first Director of Development for Helias High School and Executive Director of the Helias Foundations. On May 1, 1998, the newly constructed Field House was named the James L. Rackers Field House in honor of his years of dedication and loyalty to Helias High School.

Along with his successful career, Mr. Rackers was an active member of St. Peter Catholic Church and was also a member of numerous professional and community organizations. Mr. Rackers was a member in the National Association of Secondary School Principals, Missouri Association of Secondary School Principals, North Central Association, National Catholic Education Association, Committee on Accredited Schools Non-Public, and the Missouri Council for American Private Education. He received numerous awards; including the 1991 Communicator of the Year Award from the Public Relations Society of America, 1997 Immaculate Conception Outstanding Alumni Award, 1997 Certificate of Appreciation for outstanding services to students in Support of Vocational Education at Nichols Career Center, and 25 year Silver Service Award of the Missouri Association of Secondary School Principals.

Mr. Speaker, James Lee Rackers was a valuable leader in all aspects of his life. He was a genuine human being who would do anything for anyone. I know the Members of the House will join me in extending heartfelt condolences to his family: his wife, Nancy; his three sons, Dennis, John, and Timothy; his daughter Maureen; and all of his grandchildren.

Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, through the years I have had the opportunity to visit and watch those in uniform as they trained, as they sailed aboard ship. I have visited with them in difficult places through the years, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. I must tell you how immensely proud I am of those young men and young women who wear the uniform of the United States.

We asked for a debate on the issue of Iraq. We were led to believe that we would be debating and discussing at length the issue of Iraq. Then the resolution was put forward for us, which we are discussing today, which is a shotgun blast all across the Middle East and its problems and terrorism, and a footnote is Iran.

So we should be discussing the future of our young people as they proceed in Iraq, not everywhere else, because the issue we thought was before us was that. I must tell you that I take a back seat to no one in providing for the troops, the young people in uniform and their families, because their families are so very, very important. Having members of my family in uniform, I understand the importance thereof.

Sadly, this is not about Iraq. Last year this Congress drafted, and the President signed into law, words that said calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.

That is what we should be discussing. It should be narrow, intellectual discussion, a serious discussion about that country and its future, full sovereignty transition to their government and how it is being stood up, how their security forces and Iraqi police forces are being stood up, and how we are training them and also creating conditions for the phased redeployment of American forces from that country.

That is the law of the land, signed by the President, passed by this Congress. That is in conflict with the resolution before us. As we say back home, they have done gee and haw together very well. But the law of the land is what we should be discussing today and all the parts thereof.

But what concerns me most of all is at the end of the day, what about the future of our military? Our forces will come out of this effort seriously strained, both in personnel and in equipment. The equipment in Iraq is wearing out two to nine times the peace time rate. Some equipment has added as much as 27 years' worth of wear and tear in the last 3 years in Iraq. We must continue to fund defense requirements to meet unpredictable future security needs.

I rise to speak against the rule. I take a back seat to no one in supporting our American military and their families. No one. But before us is a resolution that is not the fulfillment of a promise that we were given. We were told we would be able to have a debate on Iraq. That is not the case. This resolution covers the waterfront. Iraq is a singular war that we should discuss at length by itself.

You see, there are two ongoing wars: The war against terror, which has genesis in Afghanistan, and we did the right thing going in there. We are still chasing bin Laden, and some day we will get him. We toppled the Taliban. And then, of course, we went into Iraq based upon the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and we are there.

I sent two letters to the President of the United States warning about the aftermath, warning about what might very, very well happen after our national victory, and it came to pass. We have an insurgency there which is different and distinct from terrorists.

The insurgency is composed of Baathists, Fedayeen, and Sunni, who were basically in charge under Saddam Hussein. This is their attempt to knock down the government that is there and to establish their own, far from being the terrorists that we went after in Afghanistan.

Two wars. That is why this is a disingenuous resolution before us.