Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise in strong support of S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009. The text before us is the result of negotiations between the House Foreign Affairs and the…
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in strong support of S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009.
The text before us is the result of negotiations between the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees with substantial input from the Armed Services Committees and other committees of interest as well as the Departments of State and Defense.
Last week, the consensus text was introduced as a new bill, which passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 24. While the Senate may have felt it appropriate to rush the bill through the process, many of our colleagues and I feel that a bill of this magnitude both in terms of its policy impact and the financial cost should have been considered under regular order, affording the opportunity for robust discussion, rather than being added to the suspension calendar.
Nevertheless, our focus is and must be on providing our civilian and military personnel the necessary resources and authorities to succeed in implementing a U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bill before us addresses half of that equation: Pakistan.
Like its predecessor, it attempts to focus more U.S. resources and attention to rebuilding and making more professional the civilian institutions in Pakistan by authorizing $1.5 billion annually in nonmilitary assistance through fiscal year 2014.
Reminiscent of the House Republican substitute to the House version of this bill, which passed in June, the new text requires, before any economic assistance to Pakistan can be released, that the administration submit a Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report, including a description of the principal objectives of U.S. assistance, a detailed spending plan, and a plan for program monitoring. It further stipulates that no more than half the assistance may
be released until the Congress receives a certification from the administration that this significant expenditure of taxpayer dollars is materially contributing to our multifaceted goals related to Pakistan. If need be, these limitations are subject to a national interest waiver.
Perhaps the most significant changes in the text relate to security assistance. As Members will recall, the version considered by the House in June prompted a letter from Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an associated letter from General Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command, objecting to the degree of conditionality and limitations on security assistance to Pakistan which they felt would unduly constrain their efforts given the fluid and the dynamic environment that exists in Pakistan. I'm pleased to note, however, that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen write that they now feel that the revised text ``addresses the key concerns'' that they had raised in their April 28, 2009, letter.
Specifically, Mr. Speaker, in section 202 the Department of Defense concerns with inflexibility, being overspecific, and conditionality with respect to funding for the International Military Education and Training and the Foreign Military Financing have been addressed through the use of ``such sums'' instead of specific numbers and ``a sense of Congress'' language instead of the binding percentage limitations.
In section 203, DOD concerns about inflexibility, conditionality, and potential counterproductive effects of certain limitations on security assistance have been addressed with more balanced language on nonproliferation issues as well as counterterrorism. Issues relating to the F-16 program of Pakistan have also been addressed.
In section 204, DOD concerns about the consistency of language authorizing the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund with the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental and the State/DOD agreement on transfer of funds, these issues have been addressed. The language is now consistent with that bill and prior understanding.
In section 205, DOD concerns about inflexibility and conditionality with respect to a requirement for civilian control of certain assistance have been addressed through better language and strong dual key waiver authority for Secretary of State and Defense.
I thank all of the authorities for making these changes. I thank Mr. Berman for his flexibility.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, who has been working hard on this bill from the very beginning.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Paul.
(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk), a valuable member of the Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield myself such time as I may consume.
I'm pleased that in this bill overly prescriptive reporting and related requirements have been replaced by more appropriate and time- limited provisions for Pakistan strategy reports, for accountability, and for monitoring of assistance.
Robust accountability provisions are included and are vital to reassure the American taxpayer that their moneys are being well-spent, and this is particularly the case for Pakistan, where many Pakistanis and groups, like Transparency International, are deeply concerned about the integrity of high-level officials in that country.
Mr. Speaker, of all the foreign policy challenges facing the United States, stabilizing and transforming and reforming Pakistan may be one of the most daunting. The good news is that leaders in Islamabad have shown increased willingness to confront those militants who have targeted the Pakistani State from bases in the Northwest Frontier Province and from South Waziristan.
A number of militant leaders have been killed or captured, most prominently the leader of the Pakistani Taliban.
SWAT and other conflict-affected areas of the Northwest Frontier Province are stabilizing. Although some progress has been achieved, much remains to be done.
Pakistan and Afghanistan are part of a wider theater of operations and, despite important differences, must be considered jointly, as the administration itself suggested following the conclusion of a comprehensive strategic review of Af-Pak policy this March.
Suddenly, however, President Obama has apparently decided to rethink the entire strategy in Afghanistan after his hand-picked new commander there, General Stanley McChrystal, warned that the war could be lost if he doesn't get more troops in the next 12 months.
The stunning magnitude of this reversal was highlighted in an article, an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal of September 22.
The author Leslie Gelb, a former Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter, columnist and president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote:
``I'm lost on President Barack Obama's Afghanistan policy, along with most of Congress and the U.S. military. Not quite 8 months ago, Mr. Obama pledged to `defeat' al Qaeda in Afghanistan by transforming that country's political and economic infrastructure, by training Afghan forces and adding 21,000 U.S. forces for starters.
``He proclaimed Afghanistan's strategic centrality to prevent Muslim extremism from taking over Pakistan, an even more vital Nation because of its nuclear weapons. And a mere 3 weeks ago, he punctuated his commitments by proclaiming that Afghanistan is a `war of necessity,' not one of choice. White House spokesmen reinforced this by promising that the President would `fully resource' the war.''
Leslie Gelb goes on, ``Yet less than 1 week ago, Mr. Obama said the following about troop increases: `I'm going to take a very deliberative process in making those decisions. There is no immediate decision pending on resources, because one of the things that I'm absolutely clear about is you have to get the strategy right and then make a determination about resources.' ''
Gelb points out, ``Americans are now confused and caught somewhere between remembering the President's insistence on Afghanistan's importance to U.S. security and rapidly rising pressure from his party to bring the troops home.''
Mr. Speaker, if the U.S. is going to prevail against al Qaeda and the Taliban and win in Afghanistan, the administration must take immediate steps to fully implement the strategy without any further vacillating or delays.
Thus, while today we prepare to vote strongly in support of S. 1707 and, in the words of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, ``strongly signal to the Pakistani people our long-term commitment to partnering with them to combat terrorism and extremism,'' I must ask: What about Afghanistan? How much more time will pass before General McChrystal is provided the resources and the personnel that he deems necessary to succeed in Afghanistan?
As for Pakistan, we join with the executive branch on a bipartisan basis to support policies that will help our friends there transform their country into a stable and prosperous democracy that will support U.S. interests in the region, that opposes militancy within and outside its borders, commits to a secure Afghanistan, and will maintain responsible controls over its nuclear weapons capability.
This bill helps us to achieve those objectives, and I urge its support.
And with that, I yield back the balance of our time.