Madam President, I rise in support of the proposal my colleague Senator Levin has offered. I participated in this with him. This is a legislative proposal we have advanced in various forms for over a year. It seeks, quite simply, to…
Madam President, I rise in support of the proposal my colleague Senator Levin has offered. I participated in this with him. This is a legislative proposal we have advanced in various forms for over a year. It seeks, quite simply, to initiate a withdrawal of our forces from Iraq. I think it is interesting to note that General Petraeus announced he too is recommending a withdrawal of forces, about 5,700 troops, before the end of this year, which essentially complies with at least a portion of our proposal dating back over a year.
But it goes further than that. It would require a transition to three discrete missions from the open-ended war-based mission that today our forces are pursuing.
The first mission would be counterterrorism, which is essential not only in Iraq but across the globe. That requires attention, energy, and persistence, and we would urge and support such a mission in Iraq; not just in Iraq, but, frankly, worldwide.
The second mission would be to continue to train Iraqi security forces and provide robust training, support for those forces, because we need to provide the Iraqis the ability to defend themselves and pursue opponents of the legitimate Government of Iraq. Third, and something that is essential every time we deploy our forces, is to protect our forces, to give commanders in Iraq the ability and the forces needed to ensure that American forces will be protected. Those three missions represent not only what is in the long-term interest of the United States but also within the capacity of the United States to effectively carry out not just in the next several weeks or months but for a period of time.
My perspective has always been that the President is much more comfortable with slogans than strategies. We have a new one now, ``return on success.'' It follows a long line of slogans, ranging from ``when they stand up, we will stand down,'' ``mission accomplished,'' and many others. But what we need now at the national level, not at the circumscribed level of just Iraq, is a national strategy that in the long run will deal with the significant threats that face this country.
In the interim of our involvement with Iraq, starting several years ago, we have seen some remarkable developments which suggest very strongly that the strategy the President pursued is deeply flawed. We have seen the resurgence of al-Qaida. That is not the opinion of myself alone. It is the conclusion of the National Intelligence Estimate most recently released to the public. We are seeing a virtual--in fact, a real safe haven in Pakistan for bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others. And from that relative area of safety for them, unfortunately, they are able both to direct in a limited way actions across the globe and also to inspire other unrelated cells who are conducting these operations.
We just witnessed recently in Germany where, through good police and intelligence work, the capture of a cell comprising ethnic Germans who converted to Islam and Turks, who were contemplating a major terrorist attack against American facilities, not perhaps directly related to al- Qaida but certainly inspired. And there is evidence that suggests perhaps there was even some remote link. But they are there in Pakistan in a safe haven. It seems to me ironic that the President would talk about creating a safe haven in Iraq when, for all intents and purposes, we are at least acknowledging, recognizing, perhaps even not effectively acting against the safe haven in Pakistan.
Also, when it comes to the discussion of a safe haven for Sunni jihadists in Iraq, we have to recognize, too, that one of the benefits of the last several weeks in Iraq has been what is required and called the Sunni awakening. That has been an incidental result of our increased troop presence. It was not the purpose, but certainly it is a favorable development. That is simply the result of Sunni sheiks realizing that Sunni jihadists of al-Qaida are more a threat to them, to their families, and to their way of life than the new government in Baghdad or the presence of American forces. Through the able and effective and courageous work of American soldiers and marines, these sheiks have been enlisted to attack and are attacking al-Qaida elements. That is a positive sign and tends, in my view, to mitigate against those dire warnings that there will be an automatic and predictable reflexive creation of a safe haven for al-Qaida in Iraq.
In addition, there is a Shia government there that is committed to certainly disrupting and eliminating Sunni insurgents, particularly al- Qaida
insurgents. So we see, in terms of the strategic picture, a virtual or a real safe haven in Pakistan, arguably problems in Iraq, but certainly I think showing how our preoccupation in Iraq is taking our eye off a much more serious and potential threat.
The other very serious threat that faces us in the region and worldwide is the growth of Iran. That growth has been fueled by oil prices at $80 a barrel. That makes their bottom line look a lot better and gives them a greater sense of confidence as they look out and pursue their plans.
Second, frankly, is our vulnerabilities in Iraq, the fact that the Iranians have strong influence in that country, the fact that the government in Baghdad, the Maliki government, has not just associations but long-time associations with Iranians. They are coreligionists. I am not trying to suggest that they are agents or clones, but there certainly is a rapport and understanding and an appreciation of the proximity of the Iranians and their potential impact in Iraq. That situation has given rise to a resurgence and a strategically more empowered Iran. So you have a strategy that the President has pursued that has not mitigated these major threats against the United States but actually has enhanced them. That might be the definition of a bad strategy.
So our involvement in Iraq has taken us away from critical threats. In that term alone, we have to begin to think seriously about our approach forward. The status quo has not worked. There is scant evidence it will in the next several months.
There is another issue we have to look at. That is not only in terms of the strategic threats, but it is our capacity. The real driving factor in the proposal that General Petraeus made is not what is happening on the ground in Iraq, it is the force structure. It is the number of Army and marines that we have to commit. If you talked to anyone months ago, they could have told you essentially what General Petraeus was going to say, which is by next spring, beginning in April and going through July, we would have to reduce by 30,000 our forces in Iraq; that the surge had an end point unrelated to what was happening on the ground, to the success or lack of success. Simply we could not sustain that large a combat force on the ground. That is essentially what General Petraeus confirmed in his testimony to the Congress when he returned from his mission in Baghdad.
So we are limited in what we can do. That is not a function of success, return on success, or anything else. In fact, I was always under the impression that in a military context, when you have success, you reinforce it. You don't talk about a return on success, you reinforce it. But, quite frankly, we do not have the resources available to reinforce. So we are being driven by the constraints of our military forces more than what is happening on the ground. We have to respond to that.
It also drives the real question: In the next several months, after the surge is over and it has been announced it is over, what missions can we responsibly take on, what missions will support our national security, and what missions will be within the grasp of our manpower and personnel resources? Again, that underscores the need for change and underscores the need for adoption of limited missions as we propose in the Reed-Levin amendment.
When General Petraeus came before the committee, he made several points. First, he would recommend a redeployment of forces this year. That is something we have been arguing for and urging for over a year, many of us. Many accusations have been hurled at us that we were irresponsible and reckless. They are not being hurled at General Petraeus. But the reality is, he, too, recognizes that we have to begin to redeploy our forces. Second, he is talking about reducing the forces by 30,000. If you recall, the military premise of the surge was, if you inserted 30,000 additional troops focused on Baghdad, you would have now sufficient forces to conduct a different type of mission, population protection. You could disperse them in the localities. You could conduct more aggressive patrolling.
I think the announcement by General Petraeus that those troops are coming out begs the obvious question: How do you maintain that population protection mission without those 30,000 troops, and particularly without, as most people recognize, the ability of the Government of Iraq to replace our forces with reliable Iraqi security forces? In a sense, the progress we have seen--and there is progress on the ground; there is tactical momentum. No one should be surprised when we commit American forces to a mission that they obtain dramatic and immediate results. But the real question is, are those successes permanent or transitory? Are they reversible or irreversible?
My sense is that they are highly reversible, that as we depart, insurgents, opponents of the Government in Iraq, will move back in and try to exploit the absence. Without a sufficient and reliable Iraqi security force, that probably could be accomplished. So I think that just the numbers drive us to start thinking about missions that we can perform.
The other factor of General Petraeus's testimony is that he very clearly begged off from any suggestion of what do we do after next June or July. Frankly, we have to have a strategy, a plan that goes beyond the next 6 months. It is unsatisfactory that both, it seems, the President and, indeed, the commander on the ground will say simply they don't know. No one knows perfectly, but we have to have at least their sense of what their best guidance is beyond that in terms of troop levels, in terms of some of the questions I have raised.
Going back, again, to this notion of troop levels, if you recall, the focal point of the surge was stabilizing Baghdad, a large city, stable population. But the operations since then necessarily have taken our forces well beyond Baghdad, and the areas in dispute in Iraq are well beyond Baghdad. So the simple calculation of military forces versus population has been thrown out the window in the sense of the appropriate level of forces versus the real population and the real area that we are trying to stabilize.
In this regard, we have to recognize what is happening in the south; that is, the British forces are, for all intents and purposes, withdrawing into base camps. Their presence has shrunk dramatically, roughly 5,000 troops. That area now is becoming an area that is extremely hospitable to Shia militia, to Iranian influences, and has a long-term potential to provide further instability in the country. Yet we don't have the forces to go down there. We are not attempting to go down there, and yet that poses a real challenge to the long-run security and safety and stability of the country.
I sense, for all these different reasons, that we do have to change our course. That is at the heart of the Levin-Reed amendment, to identify, first, clearly the direction of our forces, which is to begin a phased redeployment; second, to focus on missions that are within our capacity and will, to the best of our capacity, advance our interests in the region, not just in Iraq but in the whole region.
We all were waiting for the report of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. There were other reports. General Jones and the General Accounting Office came forth almost simultaneously. We hoped these reports would provide both the President and the Congress with the information they needed to begin to change our direction in Iraq.
Unfortunately, it appears at this juncture, unless we are successful with this amendment, that change is not going to take place.
The GAO was the first to release their report, and it was sobering by anyone's standards. Of the 18 economic, security, and legislative benchmarks set by the Iraqis themselves last January, GAO found that 3 had been met, 4 had been partially met, and 11 had not been met.
I think it is important to emphasize--because now the benchmarks were being seen as, oh, just some interesting construct of the Congress unrelated to what was happening in Iraq, et cetera--but these were the points the Iraqis stressed as critical to their progress. They were the points that were deliberately embraced by the President of the United States.
In January, when he talked about the surge, part of that--a large part of it--
was to allow the Iraqis the political space, the time to achieve these benchmarks. What appears to have happened, having failed the test, the President decided the test was not worth giving, and he ignores the results. But those results, I think, speak volumes.
For example, the Iraqi Government still has not completed revisions to the constitution, or enacted legislation on de-baathification, oil revenue-sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or military disarmament.
When Ambassador Crocker was here, he said: Well, we have not done it formally out there, but they informally are distributing the oil revenues. That goes, I think, to the point I have tried to suggest in other contexts. If it is informal, then it is highly reversible. If it is informal, it is transitory. Legislation is not as reversible and transitory. We do a lot of that around here, but at least you have to go back through the legislative process. But these informal arrangements may be just temporary and expedient, and probably are temporary and expedient. But the real work, the commitment the Government of Iraq made months ago to make these changes, has not been accomplished.
The Iraqi Government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured evenhanded enforcement of the law, increased Army units capable of independent operations or ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces.
Again, we have been engaged for years in training Iraqi security forces. At the entry level of that training--to give the ability of a squad leader to read a map, to call indirect fire, to call a medevac-- we have made progress. To give the skills for an individual infantryman to low-crawl, to clear a building, we have made progress. But it is at the critical levels where politics and security intersect that there has not been the adequate progress. That is the most decisive level. Until there is a force in Iraq that is not only technically capable but can operate with a certain degree of independence, then their ability is, I think, undermined. We are making progress in that direction.
The Levin-Reed amendment calls for the continued training to achieve not just technical proficiency but we hope some day a force that is professionally capable and deployed in a way where they can secure the country of Iraq--their country--without fear or favor with respect to political or sectarian allegiance.
Now, the Iraqi Government also pledged to spend $10 billion of their own money on reconstruction. We have sent billions of American dollars over there for reconstruction. To date, only $1.5 billion of Iraqi funds has been allocated to do that. I think it raises the question among many Americans: If we are spending all these billions of dollars--and the President is going to send the supplemental up shortly asking for billions and billions of dollars more--why cannot the Iraqis spend at least their own money they have for their own people for their own needs? I think it is a question that the longer it goes unanswered, the more unsettling it is to the American public.
The GAO also noted:
It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has
decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to
measure the perpetrators intent and other measures of
population security show differing trends.
The situation, which is understandable given the chaotic nature, given the conflicting motivations that are engulfing the country and producing violence--it is hard to say what is criminality, what is a politically motivated event, what is the mixture of the two--but these measures, I think from our perspective, whether they go up or down, probably do not suggest the atmosphere which most Iraqis endure, which is an atmosphere of violence, potential violence, of fear. It is an atmosphere that has caused 2 million people to be external refugees, 2 million people, roughly, to be internally displaced.
It also is reflected in polling conducted within Iraq about the sense of security and the sense of the future the Iraqi people have. These numbers have been declining. It was at a zenith, obviously, after the operations in March 2003. But since then there has been, I think, a significant and continued deterioration. Because this violence--to us it makes a difference that it is sectarian versus criminal--but to someone on the street, it is violence. Again, the progress in stabilizing the country that the Iraqi Government said they were committed to has not materially been changed throughout the country.
Now, General Petraeus and General Jones did report improvements in the Iraqi security forces, and they should be recognized. But the progress is uneven and slow. I suggested at the zenith, where it is most critical in terms of stability of the country, where it is commanders, not squad leaders, who are making decisions, that is the most difficult to achieve, and it is, so far, lagging based upon the reports we have heard.
Now, we recognize the last 2 years have been enormously challenging for the Government of Iraq and our participation there. We recognize, too, that both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker came with great experience, great professional acumen, and great patriotic service to the country, and gave us their best report.
There is another aspect of this debate which is as important as what is going on in Iraq, and that is what is going on in the United States. Frankly, the support for our operations has rapidly faded since the heady days of March 2003. Before the September reports by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus and the speech by the President, 64 percent of Americans polled by CBS felt things were going badly in Iraq; after the reports and speech, 63 percent.
My point is, that is an important factor in the conduct of any national security policy: the support of the American people. In fact, the manual General Petraeus helped author at Fort Leavenworth, the counterinsurgency manual, makes that point specifically, that public support within the United States is a critical--critical--attribute for policy, particularly long-term policy in a counterinsurgency conflict.
We have seen, frankly, the American public being quite concerned, in fact disheartened, about what is happening in Iraq. I think that also calls--in addition to what is happening on the ground--for a change in our policy, for a change in the direction Senator Levin and I are suggesting.
It is very difficult and some would argue impossible for any administration to carry out a policy without the strong support of the United States, particularly a policy that does not seem to be matched by an equal commitment by those whom we are trying to help. I believe we do need a change of policy, not only because it is a more effective way to go forward, but it, I think, would represent to the American people a needed sense that we have heard them, we are moving forward, and we are moving forward in a way that can be sustained and be supported by the American people.
Everyone has to recognize the extraordinary contribution of our military forces. They are serving well, and they continue to serve well. But I think their effort has to be matched by a wiser policy on our part. That policy, I think, is necessary. I hope we can do that within the context of the amendment we propose.
There is another issue here, too, and that is not just public support but also the financial support. We are spending $12 billion a month in Iraq, Afghanistan, et cetera. That price keeps going up. We understand the costs are not short term. There are hundreds of thousands of veterans coming out of the gulf who for the next 50 years will require support and assistance. This is not going to be something that when we look back 5 or 10 years, even when the fighting stops, we can ignore. We have a long-term commitment to these individuals and a long-term costly commitment. We have to measure our policy against our resources, not just the brave men and women who serve, but our ability to finance their operations and finance their long-term care as they come back.
This amendment, as I indicated previously, calls for a transition which I believe is long overdue, a transition to counterterrorism, a transition to training Iraqi security forces, and protection of our forces, coalition forces. I think the transition will help us in terms of what is happening on the ground, what is happening in the country, and what should be happening in the region.
Also, our amendment talks about a very aggressive diplomatic approach, something I think has been missing. We have to engage the regional community and the world community to help us. I think there might be an opportunity, indeed, when we talk about the context of training, to go forward to our allies in NATO and say: You could help us on this training mission. This is not a direct combat operation. This is something well within the capacity of your armies across the globe. This could put an international approach to our problems, which would be very helpful not only in terms of putting men and women on the ground to assist the Iraqi security forces, but indicating this is not America's problem alone, this is an issue that should be addressed by all the nations of the world.
Now, for 5 years our military forces have fought with valor, courage, and sacrifice. Their families have borne their absences. They have supported them remarkably and magnificently, and I think that has to be recognized. But we have to provide them a diplomatic support that has been lacking all these years.
Many of my colleagues have traveled to Iraq many times. I have. Since the beginning, there has not been an adequate complement through diplomats and AID personnel and agronomists, and all the specialists you need to provide the public nonkinetic--as military people describe it--aspects of counterinsurgency. Those forces have been lacking. There have been efforts recently to improve them, but they are still significantly lacking.
So for many years--all these years--we have had an Army and Marine Corps at war, supported--I should say not just supported but it has intimately involved all our services--but we have not had the full commitment of our national resources. We have not had a full commitment of our civilian agencies that is so necessary. Today, that, I think, is not being manifested enough. So for that reason, also, I think we have to recognize a change is necessary.
I hope we can change the policy. I think in the long term it will be beneficial to the United States. I hope we will allow ourselves to begin to focus more resources on threats that are, I think, much more severe: the virtual safe haven in Pakistan from where bin Laden sends tapes to us and al-Zawahiri sends tapes to us that inspire terrorist organizations in Europe that are approaching closer and closer to the United States--that was, I think, the whole premise for our global war on terrorism, to effectively prevent another attack on our homeland-- the growing power of Iran, not only in terms of its influence in the region, its connection to other terrorist groups, but its aspirations to be a nuclear power, which we are finding very difficult to counter diplomatically.
I hope we can refocus our efforts in Iraq, and we can also refocus our efforts to meet these other emerging and very dangerous threats.
With that, I yield the floor.