Floor Statements

Mr. President, I am pleased to be joined by Senator Blunt in reintroducing the Building a Health Care Workforce for the Future Act.

According to the Association of American Medical Colleges, by 2030, there will be a shortage of up to 120,000 physicians. Over one third of the shortage, up to 49,300, will be in primary care. Individuals and families living in underserved areas--urban and rural--will continue to be those most disadvantaged by this shortage.

The passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 ushered in an expansion of access to health insurance for millions of Americans. While we fight to protect these gains and work to improve the system further, many Americans are going to the doctor for preventive health care for the first time. In order for this to be successful, we must expand our health care workforce to ensure that we have enough health care professionals to seamlessly accommodate the newly insured as they join the ranks of those who already have coverage. In addition, as the baby boomers age, we will need health care professionals to care for them as well. According to the Pew Research Center, roughly 10,000 baby boomers will become eligible for Medicare every day through 2030.

The Building a Health Care Workforce for the Future Act would authorize programs that would grow the overall number of health care providers, as well as encourage providers to pursue careers in geographic and practice areas of highest need.

Building on the success of the National Health Service Corp (NHSC) Scholarship and Loan Repayment Program and the State Loan Repayment Program, our legislation would establish a State scholarship program. Like the NHSC State Loan Repayment Program, States would be able to receive a dollar-for-dollar match to support individuals that commit to practicing in the state in which the scholarship was issued after completing their education and training. At least 50 percent of the funding would be required to support individuals committed to pursuing careers in primary care. The States would have the flexibility to use the remaining 50 percent to fund scholarships to educate students in other health care professions with documented shortages with the approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

The Building a Health Care Workforce for the Future Act would also authorize grants to medical schools to develop primary care mentors on faculty and in the community. According to the Association of American Medical Colleges, graduating medical students consistently say that one of the most important factors affecting the career path they choose is role models. Building a network of primary care mentors in the classroom and in a variety of clinical settings will help guide more medical students into careers in primary care.

The legislation would couple these mentorship grants with an initiative to improve the education and training offered by medical schools in competencies most critical to primary care, including patient-centered medical homes, primary and behavioral health integration, and team-based care.

It would also direct the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to study and make recommendations about ways to limit the administrative burden on providers in documenting cognitive services delivered to patients. Primary care providers treat patients in need of these services almost exclusively, and as such, spend a significant percentage of their day documenting care. That is not the case for providers who perform procedures, such as surgeries. This IOM study would help uncover ways to simplify documentation requirements, particularly for delivering cognitive services, in order to eliminate one of the potential factors that may discourage medical students from pursuing careers in primary care.

Providers across the spectrum of care recognize that this bipartisan legislation is part of the solution to addressing the looming health care workforce shortage and have lent their support, including: the Alliance for Specialty Medicine, the American Association of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine, the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, the American Osteopathic Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Society of General Internal Medicine.

I look forward to working with these and other stakeholders as well as Senator Blunt and our colleagues to pass the Building a Health Care Workforce for the Future Act in order to help ensure patients have access to the health care they need.

Mr. President, as we approach the vote on final passage of the fiscal year 2019 national defense authorization bill, I would like to make a few closing remarks.

At the completion of floor debate on the NDAA last year, I remarked in my closing statement that I was disappointed in the lack of cooperation in the Senate. Senator McCain and I both hoped that last year we would be able to return to regular order, but in the end, we were disappointed.

Unfortunately, this year, I and I know many of my colleagues are frustrated in the inability to bring up, debate, and vote on worthy amendments. For comparison, during consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, there were 16 rollcall votes on amendments. In 1995, during consideration of the fiscal year 1996 NDAA, there were 20 rollcall votes and amendments. In the following year, the fiscal year 1997 NDAA, there were 19 rollcall votes and amendments. On this bill, there was a single up-or-down vote on an amendment.

I was one of the few Senators who was able to debate an amendment. It was on the congressional oversight of nuclear weapons, which I believe is one of the most important and seminal issues not only of this bill but of our defense policy today, but the only vote I was able to have on this critical issue was a motion to table.

Despite the deep differences among us, it is my hope that this Chamber can return to the collegial ways of the past--and I think that is a belief and a hope shared by my colleague Senator Inhofe from Oklahoma--and that we can hold an open amendment process that guarantees every Senator a right to a full and wholesome debate on amendments and those issues that matter most to those Senators. There are critical issues that pertain to our national security and the welfare of our servicemembers, and they must be addressed through bipartisan dialogue and compromise. It is my hope that moving forward we can return this Chamber to regular order and hold an open amendment process.

Despite my frustrations with this process, I am pleased with the overall

result of this bill. We successfully incorporated 46 amendments from both Republicans and Democrats into the bill. These amendments further strengthen the bill and provide additional resources to the Department of Defense which allows them to carry out their important mission.

Looking ahead, the budget agreement that covered the fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 NDAAs will expire next year, meaning a return to sequestration and budget caps, unless a new agreement is reached. At this time when our military is facing readiness shortfalls and numerous global threats, we cannot afford a budgetary retrenchment. We must continue to work together to address these issues, and I am confident and hopeful we will find a way forward.

I would like to particularly thank Senator Inhofe for his leadership throughout the committee markup and throughout this floor process. He has ably shepherded this bill and provided invaluable leadership by emphasizing a return to regular order, the same note I am sounding today. The achievement of this bill would not have been possible without him, and I thank him.

I would also like to thank my staff and the staff of the ranking member for their terrific work. They worked tirelessly. They made a commitment both of time and intellectual energy that was extraordinary. The majority staff, and Senator Inhofe's staff in particular, was diligent, bipartisan, thoughtful, and cooperative. They were everything you could ask for collegial activity in the Senate.

Of course, I would like to thank my staff for their invaluable expertise and dedication to creating the best bill possible. I would like to specifically thank Jody Bennett, Carolyn Chuhta, Jon Clark, Jonathan Epstein, Jorie Feldman, Jon Green, Creighton Greene, Ozge Guzelsu, Gary Leeling, Kirk McConnell, Maggie McNamara, Bill Monahan, Mike Noblet, John Quirk, Arun Seraphin, and Elizabeth King--and also wish her a happy birthday.

I would like to thank the floor staff. They have been exceptionally helpful to us. I thank them all on both sides for their insights and for their calmness in the face of difficulties and tensions. Without them, nothing would be possible.

Finally, I would like to particularly recognize Chairman John McCain, after whom this bill is so aptly named. Senator McCain has provided this committee with leadership during difficult times and served as a moral compass when considering challenging issues. He has been a bulwark for the defense of our country and the men and women of the military, and I know he is proud of the passage of this bill.

John McCain is probably the most demanding person I have ever met, but the key to his greatness is, he demands more of himself than anyone else, and he gives more of himself than anyone else. That has made him not only one of our great Senators, not of this moment but of our history, but one of our great American heroes. He is an extraordinary gentleman, and today this legislation bearing his name represents, once again, his extraordinary contributions to the Nation.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I am proud to reintroduce the Career and Technical Education for Adult Learners or the CTE for All Act with my colleague, Senator Baldwin.

Our legislation addresses the critical need to expand educational opportunities for working adults with low academic skills. The need for strengthening the skills base for working adults continues to grow. Increasingly, middle-skill and sustainable wage jobs require education beyond high school. Yet, according to U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey data, 12 percent (24 million) of working age adults have less than a high school diploma. Recent Department of Education data show that only 5 percent of adults with less than a high school diploma have any type of postsecondary certificate, certification, or license compared to 27 percent of adults overall. Moreover, an estimated 36 million adults in the U.S. have low skills with nearly one in six having low literacy skills and one in three having low numeracy skills.

Our ability to grow the economy and decrease income inequality will depend, in large part, on our commitment to providing education and training programs to low-skilled adults. These workers are concentrated in fields such as construction, health care, manufacturing, and hospitality. Expanding career and technical education opportunities to these workers could enhance their career trajectories and strengthen their earning potential, fueling economic productivity and growth for the future. Unfortunately, according to the U.S. Department of Education, roughly half of low-skilled workers are not engaged in formal or non-formal learning opportunities. The CTE for All Act aims to change that by ensuring that there are pathways for adult learners in career and technical education programs.

Specifically, our legislation will ensure that programs funded under the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act align with adult education programs and industry sector partnerships authorized under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. The CTE for All Act requires consultation with the state director for adult education in the development of the statewide plan for career and technical education. The bill calls for career and technical education programs to include low-skilled adults among the special populations targeted for outreach and support and allows states to report separate performance indicators for adult career and technical education students. The legislation makes adult education providers that offer integrated education and training programs eligible to receive career and technical education funding. Additionally, the legislation encourages career and technical education programs to include work experiences for their students of all ages.

We have worked with the adult education community and other stakeholders in developing this legislation. We are pleased to have the support of the National Council of State Directors of Adult Education, the Commission on Adult Basic Education, the National Skills Coalition, and the National Coalition for Literacy.

As a Nation, we are at our best when every person--no matter their starting point--has the opportunity to develop their skills and reach their potential. The CTE for All Act will strengthen the ladder of opportunity for adult learners who work hard every day to provide for their families. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and work with us to include these provisions in the reauthorization of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act.

Mr. President, I am proud to reintroduce the Career and Technical Education for Adult Learners or the CTE for All Act with my colleague, Senator Baldwin.

Our legislation addresses the critical need to expand educational opportunities for working adults with low academic skills. The need for strengthening the skills base for working adults continues to grow. Increasingly, middle-skill and sustainable wage jobs require education beyond high school. Yet, according to U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey data, 12 percent (24 million) of working age adults have less than a high school diploma. Recent Department of Education data show that only 5 percent of adults with less than a high school diploma have any type of postsecondary certificate, certification, or license compared to 27 percent of adults overall. Moreover, an estimated 36 million adults in the U.S. have low skills with nearly one in six having low literacy skills and one in three having low numeracy skills.

Our ability to grow the economy and decrease income inequality will depend, in large part, on our commitment to providing education and training programs to low-skilled adults. These workers are concentrated in fields such as construction, health care, manufacturing, and hospitality. Expanding career and technical education opportunities to these workers could enhance their career trajectories and strengthen their earning potential, fueling economic productivity and growth for the future. Unfortunately, according to the U.S. Department of Education, roughly half of low-skilled workers are not engaged in formal or non-formal learning opportunities. The CTE for All Act aims to change that by ensuring that there are pathways for adult learners in career and technical education programs.

Specifically, our legislation will ensure that programs funded under the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act align with adult education programs and industry sector partnerships authorized under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. The CTE for All Act requires consultation with the state director for adult education in the development of the statewide plan for career and technical education. The bill calls for career and technical education programs to include low-skilled adults among the special populations targeted for outreach and support and allows states to report separate performance indicators for adult career and technical education students. The legislation makes adult education providers that offer integrated education and training programs eligible to receive career and technical education funding. Additionally, the legislation encourages career and technical education programs to include work experiences for their students of all ages.

We have worked with the adult education community and other stakeholders in developing this legislation. We are pleased to have the support of the National Council of State Directors of Adult Education, the Commission on Adult Basic Education, the National Skills Coalition, and the National Coalition for Literacy.

As a Nation, we are at our best when every person--no matter their starting point--has the opportunity to develop their skills and reach their potential. The CTE for All Act will strengthen the ladder of opportunity for adult learners who work hard every day to provide for their families. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and work with us to include these provisions in the reauthorization of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act.

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 2885 to amendment No. 2276.

I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to address the Senate for 1 minute.

Mr. President, the Reed amendment would name a fellowship program on behalf of Senator John McCain. I can't think of anything more fitting, in addition to the naming of this bill, than naming this fellowship program on behalf of Senator McCain.

I hope all of my colleagues will join me in voting unanimously for Senator McCain's fellowship program.

Thank you.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. President, I believe Senator Markey of Massachusetts is here to speak.

Mr. President, let me first thank Senator Markey and Senator Warren for their comments and just state that this amendment is very straightforward and simple. It ensures that Congress has an oversight role in authorizing the development of new or modified nuclear weapons, including low-yield nuclear weapons. It reiterates what Congress does every year in the National Defense Authorization Act. I consider the oversight role of this institution essential for the Defense Department and, in particular, for nuclear weapons.

There are many devastating weapons of war in the world, but nuclear weapons are different. Thankfully, it has been over 70 years since the only time nuclear weapons have been used in war, but because it has been so long, I think many are not fully aware of the awful power of nuclear weapons. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. In the immediate aftermath, approximately 70,000 people--mostly civilians--were killed. Tens of thousands more would die of radiation poisoning within weeks. Approximately 80 percent of the city of 350,000 people was destroyed. The second nuclear weapon, dropped on Nagasaki 3 days later, killed 40,000 immediately and approximately 40,000 more people from radiation poisoning in the following weeks. A weapon that can kill more people in an instant than the United States lost in the entire Vietnam conflict deserves close congressional scrutiny.

To provide perspective on the size of these weapons, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 13 to 15 kilotons. The bomb dropped on Nagasaki was 18 to 20 kilotons. A low-yield nuclear weapon is defined as a nuclear weapon whose yield is less than 5 kilotons of explosive yield. For comparison, the Massive Ordinance Air Blast bomb, or MOAB, used on an Afghanistan tunnel network in 2017--and featured all across the media as a devastating explosion--is 11 tons, or 0.01 kilotons, about 500 times less powerful than a 5-kiloton, low-yield nuclear weapon. So we are talking about an extremely powerful weapon that will result in thousands of casualties if used.

Two weeks ago, I visited General Hyten, who is the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. We participated in a classified exercise, involving the use of nuclear weapons. Again, the loss of life and destruction was truly sobering. I recommend that all of my colleagues participate in such a war game because it truly brings home the complexity and the essential role the Congress has in overseeing the development of nuclear weapons.

I would like to convey one point that General Hyten made to me at the conclusion of the war game--that his No. 1 job is to ensure that nuclear weapons never be used in the first place and that they act as a deterrence to their use.

With that, let me make a few observations on the amendment before us and why we are having this debate today.

The 2018 ``Nuclear Posture Review,'' released in February, recommends that the United States undertake deployment of a submarine-based, low- yield nuclear weapon. At present, the United States has several low- yield nuclear weapons, but they are deployed from the air.

The principle reasons advanced for this recommendation in the ``Nuclear Posture Review'' are, first, the development of the Russian doctrine to use low-yield nuclear weapons to ``escalate to de- escalate''; second, the inclusion of this doctrine not only in Russian plans but in repeated Russian war games; third, the significant expansion of the number of Russian nonstrategic, low-yield nuclear weapons that are not subject to arms control agreements, together with the Russian deployment of a land-based intermediate cruise missile that violates the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement, or INF Agreement; and, fourth, finally, the development of extensive air defense systems over key Russian areas that could deny access to our current aircraft that would deploy a low-yield nuclear weapon.

The ``escalates to de-escalate'' strategy presumes that Russia has initiated hostilities in Europe and, after initial Russian success, either NATO forces regain the momentum and the conventional fight is turning decisively against Russia or Russia has secured its desired limited objective and anticipates a decisive counterattack by NATO. In either case, this Russian doctrine calls for a first strike with the use of a low-yield nuclear device to freeze NATO forces. The Russian logic

is that we will not respond with high-yield weapons for fear of initiating an all-out nuclear exchange, and we lack the ability to strike key targets with our airborne low-yield weapons because of their area denial air defenses. Their doctrine assumes that we will accept the existing status of Russian forces, even if they occupy NATO territory, while nonmilitary measures are pursued. This conclusion is contrary to our longstanding commitment to NATO expressed at the NATO Summit in 2016. In the words of that summit, ``no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members is threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.''

Now, given this threat posed by the Russian doctrine, the Nuclear Posture Review proposes that the development of a submarine-based, low- yield nuclear weapon will strengthen deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and make Russia refrain from a first use of nuclear weapons since we will be capable of responding in kind to hold all of their critical targets at risk. In short, it will stabilize rather than destabilize nuclear deterrence.

The inherent difficulty in evaluating this recommendation is the realization that deterrence is based upon the perceptions of both parties and the implicit and explicit communication between both parties--in other words, what we are signaling with our words and actions, and whether the adversary is accurately interpreting those signals.

This is an extraordinarily difficult question. I and many of my colleagues have struggled with it throughout our service in the Senate and, in many cases, service in our previous careers. Indeed, experts in the field of nuclear deterrence honestly disagree with respect to the recommendation of this submarine launched, low-yield weapon. Some feel it is needed; others do not.

I am increasingly skeptical that a response to a low-yield Russian attack by an American low-yield counterattack will result in both sides refraining from future use of nuclear weapons. In other words, I am skeptical that we will avoid moving upward on the escalatory ladder leading to a larger nuclear exchange.

One important issue is the selection of targets and how that affects our interpretation of Russian objectives and, alternatively, how it will affect Russian interpretations. If the initial Russian target is integral to our military operations, will we see it as ``escalate to de-escalate'' or ``escalate to prevail.'' And if we respond in a way that is interpreted by the Russians as something more than a quid pro quo, will the Russians respond again, assuming we are beginning a nuclear campaign?

Moreover, will we cease conventional operations while allied territory is being held by Russia? This is the logic behind the Russian doctrine, but it contradicts our obligations under NATO. If we press these conventional attacks, especially if we are gaining advantages, the temptation to use additional nuclear weapons by the Russians may be irresistible.

Proponents may suggest that the simple possession of this seaborne low-yield weapon will be sufficient to deter the Russians, but that assertion seems to ignore existing airborne weapons that may be directed at critical targets that are accessible to our air attack and, as such, would accomplish the limited counterresponse that seems to be behind the current proposal. In addition, much of the investments we are making in modernizing our triad--particularly with long-range standoff weapons to replace our aging air-launched cruise missiles, the B-21 and the F-35 with the life extended B61-12 gravity bomb--should by 2030 offset the increasingly complex anti-access/anti-denial environment Russia is capable of.

There are no easy answers to these questions, and answers will change over time as political, military, and economic factors change. That is why I believe it is essential that Congress maintain a central role in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and why I strongly urge this amendment. This is about Congress's role, not about a particular nuclear weapon.

In this bill, the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the request for the development of the submarine-launched, low- yield nuclear weapon is authorized. An amendment, offered in the Armed Services Committee, to require certain reports by the Defense Department before its deployment failed. It was offered by one of our colleagues on the Democratic side. Moreover, the funds are already appropriated for this weapon in the recent Energy and Water appropriations bill. An amendment to eliminate the funding at the full Appropriations Committee failed. So we are on track this year to go ahead with the development of this system, but the question is this: In the future, will Congress retain the right to make critical decisions about the development and the deployment of nuclear weapons?

So the debate today is not about whether the low-yield, submarine- launched ballistic missile will proceed. The debate today is about congressional oversight of the steps ahead on this new nuclear weapon and any other new or modified nuclear weapon.

Back in 1993, during consideration of the fiscal year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Congressmen Spratt and Furse included a provision that prohibited research and development that could lead to a low-yield nuclear weapon. Then, in 2002, President George W. Bush conducted a nuclear posture review, which concluded that the Spratt- Furse provision should be repealed because it purportedly had a chilling effect on the science in the DOE weapons laboratories and might be needed to destroy bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons. As a result, the fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, reported out of committee by Chairman John Warner with Ranking Member Carl Levin, included section 3116, which repealed the Spratt-Furse provision.

When the fiscal year 2004 NDAA came to the floor for consideration in May of 2003, there was an exhaustive debate on the issue of this repeal, and several amendments were offered. The first amendment was an amendment by Senator Feinstein and Senator Ted Kennedy that proposed to strike the repeal, and it lost. I, then, offered the next amendment, which allowed research and development to occur but prohibited the final development and production of a low-yield nuclear weapon.

Senator John Warner then offered a second-degree to my amendment, which allowed research and development to occur but required specific authorization for final development and production, and that is the law today. Senator Warner was very clear about the necessary role of Congress. On the floor, John Warner stated:

In the second degree amendment, it is clear that the

Congress is fully in charge, working with the Executive

Branch. The Congress, and only the Congress, can authorize

and appropriate the funds necessary to go one step beyond

what the earlier [Reed] amendment has provided.

Well, now, while my amendment failed, the second-degree amendment offered by Senator John Warner passed 96 to nothing. Indeed, there are Members here today--our colleagues in the Chamber--who were there at the time and who voted for the modified amendment, the Warner-Reed amendment.

The John Warner amendment has been uncontested until this year in the fiscal year 2019 Defense authorization bill. An amendment offered in committee--and this is the amendment offered by the Presiding Officer-- eliminates the John Warner language requiring congressional authorization for development and deployment of the low-yield nuclear weapon.

Instead, now the administration simply has to submit funding in the Department of Energy budget for new or modified nuclear weapons, not the Department of Defense budget. As such, this could be done through the Secretary of Energy, not necessarily through the Secretary of Defense. Indeed, in a strictly legal interpretation, the Secretary of Defense would have no role in this budget request. In addition, once the information appears in the budget sent to Congress, the executive branch can immediately begin using prior year's monies, subject to reprogramming guidelines approved informally by the four defense committees and not the full Senate, to begin work on a low-yield nuclear weapon.

I think it is important to note this: Under the present language in the bill

before us, it is the Secretary of Energy who could, at the request of the White House, indeed, conceivably--not likely, but conceivably, even over the objection of the Secretary of Defense--propose in his budget that we begin to develop a new nuclear device. Simply submitting that budget would authorize him to begin reprogramming funds, which would be approved, at best, by a handful of Senators. That is not the kind of consideration we must apply to develop a new nuclear weapon. It is the role of the Senate--all of us--to stand up and to state where we believe this country should be headed.

The threat and power of nuclear weapons has not changed. In fact, in the complex and unstable times of present day, with so many more states seeking nuclear weapons, I think it is imperative that Congress be more involved, not less, in the development and deployment of our country's nuclear arsenal.

Therefore, my amendment simply puts Congress back in the loop, restoring the oversight put in place by the John Warner amendment in 2003.

It is our fundamental duty to review, authorize, and appropriate, if necessary, the programs the executive branch will execute. I would contend that this is especially true, given the nature of nuclear weapons and their capability for destruction. Some may agree with the need for a new, modified, or low-yield weapon and some may not, but everyone in Congress should have a say on the issue.

My amendment simply ensures that Congress is involved every step of the way in the development of any new or modified nuclear weapon. I believe it is critical, considering the awesome destructive powers of this weapon, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment so we can continue to exercise appropriate guidance on an issue that is existential to the survival not only of the country but of the world.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, first, let me thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his graciousness in allowing me to respond.

As I read the language of the bill, the language we had in place since 2004 was stricken. That language prohibited, essentially, the production and development of a low-yield nuclear device without congressional authorization. In addition to that, the language that was inserted in the bill that is before us now creates a process, whereby in order to begin work in production and development of a low-yield or perhaps even any type of nuclear weapon, the Secretary of Energy simply must submit the request in the budget, at which point they can begin reprogramming funds that already had been appropriated to start moving forward with the development of not only the low-yield nuclear weapons we are talking about now but in the future, additional ones. The essence of my amendment is clearly to get to the point where we are considering going forward with any new proposal by the administration. I will emphasize, too, the way this language is crafted in the bill, it is the Secretary of Energy--it is not the Secretary of Defense--that puts it in his budget. Once it is in his budget, then they can begin to move money around. It could be for this submarine launch system or it could be for a system we have had in the past. We had nuclear field artillery in 1950s and 1960s. It might not be, frankly, the Secretary of Defense or anyone else. It might be the President or the NSC that decides to do that. I am simply saying we have had for a decade or more the responsibility, the obligation, to authorize new nuclear weapons and specifically low-yield weapons. That is why we have to include in this bill a specific authorization for this proposed submarine low- yield nuclear weapon.

If the language existed as is in the bill now, next year I don't think we would have that requirement. The Secretary of Energy could simply put it in his budget and then say: It is ready to go. I am moving money around. I am going to get ahead and create a new low-yield device--maybe not a submarine device, maybe a short-range rocket for the U.S. Army or a field artillery piece, which the chairman from Oklahoma understands because we were both in the service when they had those. This simply says, we as the Congress have the obligation and responsibility to say the provide oversight and authorize any such system. That is why we are on the floor today with respect to this low- yield submarine weapon system, because if we did not stand up and authorize it, it could not be constructed.

As we go forward, I think we still would have to have that congressional responsibility, particularly in a world that is becoming increasingly complicated by nuclear weapons not just from the major powers but by rising powers by many countries.

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. It simply maintains the status quo and says, if we are going to develop a new weapons system, come to us. We can debate it. We approve it or we don't approve it, but the American people can rest assured that this is not something that has been simply moved through the administrative channels of any Executive, this President or any other President.

With that, I will ask for support.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, let me thank the Senator from Oklahoma for being very thoughtful and informing us all of the current procedural status. We both hope to be able to work through another package of managers' amendments that could be submitted.

Looking at the amendments we have seen so far, regardless of what position you take on their disposition, they all seem to be serious, substantive and, in our view, worthy of a vote. We just have to work out the procedure to get to those votes. There may be something in the future that is offered that seems to be very difficult, and I will not say we have not, in the past, on our side stood up and said we object. That is one of the prerogatives.

At this juncture, Senator Inhofe and I seem to be in harmony trying to find ways to vote for the proposals we have seen presented to us and ask and request votes on the proposals by our colleagues.

With that, I know Senator Inhofe and I will continue to work to see if we can move this process forward.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 2842 to the Lee amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this amendment is a technical correction to the previous amendment I offered, and I ask that it be accepted for consideration.

Mr. President, I believe the amendment is pending.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Thank you, Mr. President. Let me also extend my thanks to the Senator from Oklahoma for his cooperation and leadership.

As he indicated very accurately, on a bipartisan basis, we considered numerous amendments. We were virtually unanimous at the conclusion of the committee deliberations in terms of bringing this bill to the floor.

His staff and the Democratic staff were working all weekend to prepare a package of amendments, which we think can be accepted unanimously as an initial step in the process, the managers' package. Then, like Senator Inhofe, I would like to see a process where we have a series of amendments from both sides, adequate time to debate the amendment, and then a vote on the amendment as we move forward. Then we are hoping to be able to do so in a very deliberate and thoughtful way, and reach, we hope, in a timely manner, a point where we have discussed the major concerns of all of our colleagues, voted on many of them, and then ask for final passage of a bill that is worthy of passage. Each year we have done so. This will begin to set us on a path to conference with the House of Representatives and then a final conference report here.

Once again, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma and concur that we would like to see--and so far, his cooperation and his leadership has engendered cooperation so we can have a series of amendments on the floor.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I couldn't concur more with the Senator from Oklahoma. We have both, in our careers in the Senate, seen debates on the floor on the NDAA that were very open, that proceeded over the course of several days, and that produced very sound legislation. Then we have seen situations in which, frankly, no amendments could be offered because almost immediately we were in a position of deadlock. The majority leader, Republican or Democratic, filed the final cloture motion and suddenly we were on final passage without amendments.

I think the bill is good. I think there are many important issues we can debate. We might disagree on the outcome of the vote, but that debate and that vote is very critical to the national security of the United States.

So I do, in fact, concur with the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

I call up amendment No. 2756 to amendment No. 2700.

I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, first, this is an opportunity for me to commend and thank the Senator from Oklahoma for extraordinary leadership on the committee. Obviously, we were all inspired by Chairman McCain and his incredible leadership over the last many,

many years, but the Senator from Oklahoma has stood up there and really set a tone--and I think the Presiding Officer understands because he was there--of very purposeful, very deliberate, very collegial activity to bring everyone involved into the process. We were operating basically under the rules of appropriateness for the committee and a close connection to the Department of Defense because, as Chairman Inhofe said, this is ultimately about the men and women wearing the uniform of the United States.

Always, every year--we will pass this bill; I am confident of that because of the chairman's leadership and because of colleagues like the Presiding Officer. But each and every year, people see this as the only train leaving town, and we have to be able to keep in balance that this is about the Department of Defense and related agencies, like the National Nuclear Security Administration, for example, and the DOE and other agencies. We would like to be able to open up the floor to amendments that are closely connected and have a clear nexus to the Department of Defense, and the men and women in the Department of Defense, and then have votes. That is the ideal, and we hope we can do that.

We might have to spend some time procedurally getting to the bill. We will get to the bill, and under the leadership of Chairman Inhofe, we will get the bill done. We hope to be able to accommodate our colleagues as much as possible with amendments, and I hope these amendments will be directed once again to the activities, priorities, and critical needs of the men and women of the Armed Forces and related agencies. If we do that, I think we will have a very successful and very productive floor debate, as we did in the committee.

Again, let me thank the Senator from Oklahoma. We both stand ready to work and get this bill done for the men and women wearing the uniform of the United States.

Thank you.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, let me again thank Chairman Inhofe. I, too, will comment that the collaboration and cooperation was superb in the committee. A great deal of that was the result of his work, and, as I mentioned before, the inspiration of Chairman McCain.

Mr. President, I join the Senator from Oklahoma to rise and discuss the fiscal year 2019 national defense authorization bill, which passed out of the Armed Services Committee on May 23 with a very strong bipartisan vote.

First, I would like to recognize Chairman McCain, after whom this bill was named. Senator McCain has guided this committee through several NDAAs with a steady hand and unyielding leadership. His commitment to a bipartisan process has been an example of the way Congress should function, and I am pleased to say this bill, again, follows in that tradition.

I also want to thank Senator Inhofe, who has ably and graciously led the committee this year through many hearings and an extremely efficient markup, which produced the bipartisan bill we are beginning to consider. We would like to have begun considering it and taking amendments today, but we will consider it, we will pass it, and we will continue the outstanding record of annually passing a national defense act for the men and women in the Armed Forces.

The committee has thoughtfully considered the President's budget request, held hearings on national security challenges, and received briefings on emerging threats. The result of this hard work is a bill, I believe, that will improve the readiness and capability of our Armed Forces, push back on our adversaries that threaten the democratic system and the global order, and improve the quality of life for our servicemembers and their families.

This bill reflects the strategic shift toward prioritizing the strategic competition with Russia and China. It supports the President's budget request for resources to deter, and, if necessary, defend against aggression from near-peer competitors. This includes $6.3 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative as a continuing demonstration of our commitment to the security of our European allies and the deterrence of Russian expansionism. It also requires a 5-year plan from the Department for the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative on the necessary resources and activities to counter China's destabilizing behavior in the region.

The bill also includes a provision calling on the administration to urgently complete a comprehensive strategy to counter Russian malign influence below the level of direct military conflict. Russia attacked the heart of our democracy in 2016, and our intelligence experts warn of even more sophisticated Russian attacks targeting this year's midterm elections. Yet the administration has failed to bring together our military and nonmilitary tools of national power to counter this Russian aggression, despite a requirement in last year's NDAA to submit to Congress a whole-of-government strategy to counter Russian malign influence.

This bill expresses the sense of the Senate that the administration should complete a counter-Russian influence strategy without delay.

Over the course of the past year, the committee has held numerous hearings in which witnesses have told us, in no uncertain terms, that the President has not tasked the Department of Defense to prepare to respond to a repeat of Russia's influence campaign. Their ongoing campaign of misinformation has largely been conducted through cyber space--a domain that the Department of Defense has specially trained cyber forces designed to disrupt significant cyber attacks.

It is my belief that the ongoing attacks on our democratic process constitute such a significant attack. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the bill includes a provision that would directly and clearly authorize the Secretary of Defense to employ our cyber mission forces to defend against Russian attacks on our democracy.

With respect to countering the continued threat by ISIS, the bill extends the Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Programs at the requested funding level, while requiring appropriate information with respect to the partner forces to be trained and the expected level of engagement with U.S. forces. This is a prudent approach that recognizes the continued threat from ISIS while ensuring appropriate oversight of these authorities in a dynamic environment.

I am pleased the bill also includes provisions designed to incorporate lessons learned from the campaign against ISIS that can be used to more effectively account for and respond to allegations of civilian casualties going forward.

As the tip of the spear of our efforts to counter violent extremist groups like ISIS across the globe, our Special Operations forces require the best equipment and training possible. The bill authorizes full funding for the Special Operations Command and includes important provisions to enhance the ability of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to act as the service Secretary-like civilian responsible for the oversight and advocacy for all our Special Operations forces.

For the Navy and Marine Corps, I believe the bill represents a continuation of the efforts that are so important for improving our Armed Forces. The proposals would begin significant efforts to improve the readiness of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, ships, tanks, and other weapons systems.

I am pleased the bill, for the second year, authorizes funds to help reduce the risk for ramping up submarine construction as we start the Columbia-class program to replace the Ohio-class strategic missile submarines.

While I support many of the provisions of the bill regarding the Navy and Marine Corps, I do have some concerns that the bill makes sizable reductions in the Marine Corps request for the upgraded amphibious assault vehicle that will remain the backbone of the Marine Corps' amphibious assault capability for years to come. I believe this is shortsighted, and I plan to continue to work with my colleagues on this issue throughout the process.

For the Air Force, this bill authorizes the A-10 wing replacement program to ensure the readiness of our A-10 fleet. Additionally, the bill authorizes $350 million for the Air Force to procure light attack aircraft and $2.3 billion for 14 KC-46 tankers. It also provides multiyear procurement authority for the C-130J program.

The bill also has provisions to begin to address the growing challenge of operating and supporting the F-35 fleet for all services. I believe this challenge will be with us for a long time, and we have to take additional actions in the future. We have begun this process.

Finally, JSTARS is the command-and-control aircraft for ground forces. Presently, the Air Force plans to retire JSTARS with the hope-- not the plan, but the hope--of replacing it in the future with a new concept. I believe the bill takes a very responsible position by preventing the Air Force from retiring the current fleet of JSTARS aircraft, and it provides additional resources to help the Air Force accelerate developing and fielding new capabilities to replace the current ground moving target indicator capability provided by JSTARS. In short, we shouldn't take JSTARS away until we have something very credible and capable to replace it.

As the Department of Defense prioritizes long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, the Army will be required to balance the high-end, near-peer fight while seeking more efficient approaches to counterterrorism activities. This will be a significant shift for the Army, given that

for nearly the past 17 years, they have focused on combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and, most recently, in Syria.

In addition, the Army has had a spotty track record in recent decades with major acquisition programs. Coupled with the effects of the Budget Control Act and sequestration, the Army has had to defer modernizing platforms aimed at conflict with a peer adversary.

Recognizing the need to overhaul Army acquisition processes, the Army has created a number of cross-functional teams tasked with breaking down acquisition stovepipes so that new technologies and modernized platforms could be delivered to the force in a more effective manner. I commend the senior leadership of the Army for making acquisition reform a priority, and I believe the bill that we are considering today supports investments for critical weapons systems and research and development activities.

For example, the bill authorizes full funding for the Army's request for Abrams battle tanks, as well as Army helicopters to include AH-64 Apache helicopters and UH-60M Black Hawks. The bill also makes targeted investments to improve the range and lethality of Army artillery systems, and it supports the fielding of active protection systems on our combat vehicles in order to better protect our soldiers.

Again, there is much in this area that I support, but I am concerned that some programs were not fully funded, most notably the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program. While the Senate must always closely review the President's annual budget request, we must also be mindful of the impact to the force. Ensuring that our soldiers have the equipment and resources they need on the battlefield is our highest priority.

In the area of space, this committee has taken in-depth briefings on the threats we face to the use of our space systems. While many of the details are classified, I am satisfied with the investments we are now making in this area, given that space is increasingly becoming a contested domain upon which our ground, sea, and air forces rely upon worldwide. I would only comment to my colleagues that in the last year's National Defense Authorization Act, we made substantial changes to the Department's space governance--the way they operate and the policy development within the Department of Defense--and we should give the Department the time it needs to implement these new proposals before we consider additional tasks for the Department.

In the area of acquisition and technology, I am pleased to see that the bill continues efforts at acquisition streamlining and reform and tries to strengthen DOD's STEM and acquisition workforces. We continue to take steps to improve the Pentagon's ability to deploy information technology systems and embrace modern commercial software production practices. We also included a number of provisions that will strengthen the U.S. defense manufacturing industrial base, which is so critical to our ability to deal with threats around the world.

The committee's bill authorizes significant increases in funding for science and technology programs, above the President's requested levels, including supporting critical research areas, like quantum computing, artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and directed energy. We are in a full-scale technological race with China, with implications to both our national security and economic success, and many provisions in this bill are aimed to help us win that race.

This bill includes efforts to drive the Pentagon to engage more with our world-leading universities and small businesses to leverage their innovation and create the technologies that will shape the future battlefield and drive the economy. Among other things, the bill establishes a DOD venture capital program to invest in high-tech startups, as well as permanently reauthorizing the successful Small Business Innovation Research Program.

In the area of personnel, the bill includes a number of provisions designed to modernize the military officer personnel management system by giving the services greater flexibility to commission and promote individuals with the training and experience in specialized areas needed by the services.

The bill also addresses domestic violence and child abuse by establishing a new punitive article in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, prohibiting domestic violence and requiring programs to address child abuse and domestic violence on military installations.

The bill addresses the issue of opioid abuse by military personnel and their families by requiring a pilot program to minimize early opioid exposure and creating a new program for sharing information about opioid prescriptions with state prescription-drug monitoring programs.

The bill also supports a high quality of life for servicemembers and their families. It authorizes the full 2.6 percent basic pay increase for all servicemembers, as well as $40 million in Department of Defense supplemental impact aid and an additional $10 million in impact aid for military children with severe disabilities.

Additionally, the bill would apply the protections of title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to all DODEA schools, closing a loophole in coverage of these protections, and it would require a new comprehensive sexual harassment policy for students in DODEA schools that provides protections at least equal to those afford by title IX.

I remain concerned, however, that the military services do not receive the full end-strength increases in this bill that they have requested. I understand the desire for quality over quantity and agree that quality is paramount, but I believe the services can achieve the increases they requested without sacrificing service standards.

I look forward to hearing from the services as we move forward in the legislative cycle about these provisions and whether they continue to believe that they can achieve the requested increases without sacrificing quality.

In the area of strategic systems, this bill continues to support the modernization of all three legs of the triad: the B-21 bomber, the ground-based strategic deterrent, and the Columbia-class submarine. These are all major acquisition programs that will take decades to field. Bipartisan support is essential for their success as we move forward, and this bill continues that bipartisan support.

The B-21 will replace the B-52 bomber, which was fielded in 1962 and will be required to operate well into the 2040s. The ground-based strategic deterrent will replace the current Minuteman III, which was fielded in the 1970s and uses electronics that, in many cases, predate the earliest personal computers. Finally, the Columbia-class submarine fleet will replace the current fleet of 14 Ohio-class submarines, starting in 2027, due to the potential for full fatigue. By then, the first Ohio-class submarine will be 46 years old--the oldest submarine to have ever sailed in our Navy in its history.

Perhaps the biggest policy issue to be debated in the coming days is the development and deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons. This bill authorizes the Defense Department's request for funding for a new low- yield submarine-launched ballistic missile. The request for this weapon is in response to a revanchist Russia with a military doctrine of ``escalate to de-escalate,'' which means that if Russia were losing a conventional war or had attained their objectives and wanted to prevent counterattacks that would displace them, they would launch a low-yield weapon and force us to choose between suspension of our military efforts or deployment of high-yield nuclear weapons, heightening the possibility of escalation and all-out nuclear war.

This low-yield system raises questions of policy that I believe require more time to fully analyze and understand. I have spent countless hours on this issue, and I am not alone. My colleagues in the committee and many Members of the Senate have spent hours thinking about the potential issues that could be caused by these proposals. I am concerned that we have not fully grasped all of the complex implications inherent to the deployment of such a system. Indeed, there is an honest disagreement among experts in the field on this issue.

While General Hyten, the commander of Strategic Command and one of our most prominent, effective, and distinguished officers, makes the case for

this system, others, like former Secretary Ernie Moniz, who is also an expert in the field, says the system is not necessary.

No matter where you fall on the issue, to develop this weapon is a major change in U.S. policy, and I believe Congress needs to have a say each step of the way.

Under a law passed on a bipartisan basis in 2003, which I crafted with Senator John Warner, the administration could do research on a low-yield weapon but could not develop, produce, or deploy it without congressional authorization. This bill removes that restriction going forward and virtually all congressional input on these weapons and other potential weapons.

Given the policy ramifications of development and submarine deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons--and, indeed, of any type of nuclear weapon--I believe that Congress should be involved every step of the way. So we will be offering an amendment to ensure congressional oversight of this issue and to continue the process which we are using today, where Congress will actually debate and vote and consider the development and deployment of a new nuclear weapon.

Finally, this bill authorizes $639.2 billion in base funding for the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, and $68.5 billion in funding for overseas contingencies operations. I am glad that the bill remains within the caps set by the Bipartisan Budget Act, which we passed in February. This will enable the Department to continue to restore readiness and modernize our forces. However, I will remind my colleagues that the budget deal only covers fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019. Sequestration and the original caps will be back next year unless we again reach an agreement for both defense and nondefense accounts.

I think all of us have acknowledged that our national security is broader than simply the accounts in the Department of Defense. Customs and Border Patrol, the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, the State Department, and many other agencies also contribute to our national security. The investments we propose in this bill before us will be short-lived if we cannot provide sufficient resources and stability in years to come for all of these critical funds in our government.

Let me conclude by, once again, thanking Senator Inhofe and my colleagues on the committee for working thoughtfully and on a bipartisan basis to develop this important piece of legislation. I also thank the staff who worked tirelessly on this bill throughout this year and will continue to work tirelessly throughout many days ahead.

I look forward to a thoughtful debate on the issues that face our Department of Defense and our national security.

Finally, I can think of no more appropriate title for this bill than the John McCain National Defense Authorization Act, to symbolize the leadership, the inspiration, and the direction that he is still providing us and will provide us as we move forward.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Marta Aparicio, a fellow in my office, be granted privileges of the floor until August 3, 2018.

Mr. President, I would like to discuss my decision to vote against the President's nomination of Gina Haspel to be the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA.

First, let me state that I have immense respect for the men and women of the CIA. I have had the opportunity to meet many of them and to personally offer my thanks in some of the world's most dangerous locations. Their work is difficult and demanding but critical to helping safeguard our nation.

I do not question Ms. Haspel's patriotism, intellect, or dedication to the CIA. She has ably served the agency and several Administrations, both Democratic and Republican. Ms. Haspel is clearly a committed professional.

I welcome Ms. Haspel's statement of support for the ``stricter moral standard'' legislatively imposed by Congress with respect to interrogation policies and her admission that, in hindsight, the use of coercive interrogation techniques was a mistake. However, I remain troubled that Ms. Haspel failed to clearly articulate a view that the use of coercive interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, was immoral.

As discussed in a 2008 report by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the CIA's so-called enhanced interrogation techniques were based on Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape, or SERE, techniques used to train members of our military to resist torture. There are those who defend the use of such techniques by the CIA because similar techniques were previously used on our own troops during training activities. However, this argument ignores the fact that coercive interrogation techniques were never intended to be used by U.S. interrogators to gain actionable intelligence. Rather, the SERE techniques, which are based on Communist Chinese interrogation methods used during the Korean War to elicit false confessions, were developed to expose U.S. soldiers to the abusive treatment they might be subjected to if captured by our enemies.

There is simply no comparison between the use of such SERE techniques in a controlled environment to train U.S. military personnel to resist torture by an immoral enemy and their use by the CIA to interrogate detainees after 9/11. There is also no basis for any assertion that they are an effective means to gather intelligence, given their original purpose.

Some have suggested that Ms. Haspel is being held to a higher standard than that of former Director Brennan, who similarly served in leadership positions at the CIA at the same time as the creation and operation of the detention and interrogation program. During his confirmation process, former Director Brennan stated that he was aware of the program during his time at the CIA, but ``did not play a role in its creation, execution, or oversight.'' He also testified, under oath, that he raised significant concerns and ``personal objections'' to colleagues at the time and stated that waterboarding is ``reprehensible'' and inconsistent with American values.

Unfortunately, the same can't be said for Ms. Haspel. There is a lot the public doesn't know about Ms. Haspel due to the CIA's selective declassification of her record, but we do know that she joined the CIA's Counterterrorism Center soon after 9/11 and held various leadership positions in the Directorate of Operations that oversaw the detention and interrogation program. We also know that Ms. Haspel continues to be unwilling to make statements similar to those of former Director Brennan condemning the use of torture.

Lastly, we know that Ms. Haspel supported the destruction of evidence, namely 92 videotapes documenting waterboarding and other coercive interrogation techniques by CIA officers and contractors, despite known objections from superiors at the CIA and the White House. That alone should cause serious, bipartisan concern. Ms. Haspel's claim that she was just following orders is deeply flawed. It may be true that there was no legal prohibition on the destruction of the interrogation tapes, but that does not mean it was moral and ethical, particularly in light of known objections from various senior stakeholders.

At the hearing, I asked Ms. Haspel if she believed the destruction of the tapes was insubordinate, and she declined to describe it as such. Her refusal to clearly acknowledge and repudiate that error, even in retrospect, sets a troubling precedent that could be cited by other CIA officials to justify their own questionable behavior in the future, including those under her supervision.

Never has it been so important to have a Director of the CIA that is willing and capable of speaking truth to power. Ms. Haspel was nominated to lead the CIA by a President prone to misinformation and who, repeatedly, has advocated for the use of U.S. power and capabilities in ways that are inconsistent with U.S. values, including killing the families of terrorists.

I am glad that Ms. Haspel has committed not to restart a detention and

interrogation program under her leadership, but I retain serious doubts that she would stand up to President Trump if he directed her to carry out another legal, but morally questionable activity in the future. Taken together, Ms. Haspel's lack of transparency, unwillingness to repudiate torture, and inability to learn from past mistakes do not give me confidence that she is the right person to lead the CIA. I, therefore, voted no on her nomination.

Madam President, I would like to address the nomination of Director Pompeo to be the next Secretary of State. I intend to vote against this nomination, and I would like to explain how I reached this conclusion.

This was a difficult decision. I supported Director Pompeo's nomination to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Director Pompeo is a talented individual who has spent his life in public service, but the job of Secretary of State requires different skill sets and experiences than that of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As such, the Senate has a constitutional responsibility to review Director Pompeo's qualifications anew with respect to this specific nomination. As I indicated, the role of the Secretary of State is significantly different from that of the CIA Director. The question before us is whether Director Pompeo has the right background, judgment, and independence to faithfully execute the duties of America's top diplomat. Using those criteria, I have to oppose this nomination.

One of the first tasks for the next Secretary of State will be to rebuild the capabilities and morale of the Department of State. Over the last year and a half, the Department has struggled with widespread vacancies, drastic proposed budget cuts, a Foreign Service treated with contempt by the White House, and a failed reorganization effort under Secretary Tillerson. The result has been the hemorrhaging of decades of foreign policy expertise, the demoralization of those who continue to serve at State, and the marginalization of diplomacy as an instrument of national power.

I question whether Director Pompeo is right for the task of reversing the damage wrought at the State Department. During his time in the House, then-Congressman Pompeo was a staunch supporter of Tea Party proposals to slash the very State Department programs that are critical for advancing our foreign policy and national security interests. During his confirmation hearing earlier this month, Director Pompeo declared his commitment to end the ``demoralizing'' vacancies at the State Department and strengthen the diplomatic corps. Even if Director Pompeo has had a late conversion on the road to his nomination for Secretary of State, it is not clear whether he will be any more successful than Secretary Tillerson was in gaining White House approval for his desired candidates for senior positions or convincing this President to listen to the advice of our experts at Foggy Bottom.

My deeper concern is whether Director Pompeo is the right choice to carry out the Secretary of State's role as the lead advocate for diplomacy as a means of advancing our national interests.

The need for effective diplomacy to solve our most pressing security challenges has never been greater. Today's national security threats are complex, including the reemergence of near-peer competitors Russia and China who seek to undermine the rules-based international order, regional challenges from rogue regimes in North Korea and Iran, and the continuing threat from violent extremist groups that seek to exploit ungoverned spaces to spread their destructive ideologies. Such challenges to our national security require a comprehensive strategy that coordinates military and nonmilitary tools of national power.

I am concerned that President Trump's bellicose rhetoric and budgetary priorities indicate a predisposition for choosing military action over diplomatic solutions. Since September 11, we have asked our men and women in uniform to go above and beyond in addressing security and stability challenges globally, and they have responded magnificently. As we face expanding threats below the level of armed conflict and insecurity arising from regional destabilization, we need an increased focus on nonmilitary tools and diplomacy to prevent or mitigate these challenges. The next Secretary of State needs to be an effective counterpart for Defense Secretary Mattis in finding diplomatic solutions to the complex crises we face in Syria, the Middle East, North Africa, the South China Sea, and North Korea.

Based on his record, I am not convinced that Director Pompeo will serve as the strong voice for diplomacy that our military and our country need to counter these pressing threats. Time and again, Director Pompeo has chosen to reject negotiations and call for the use of force. His track record calls into question his ability to be an effective advocate for diplomatic solutions that are in U.S. national interests.

With regard to the nuclear deal with Iran, known as the joint comprehensive plan of action, or JCPOA, Director Pompeo has called for ``rolling back'' this multilateral agreement that was carefully negotiated alongside the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. Director Pompeo's opposition to the Iran nuclear deal runs counter to views of Defense Secretary Mattis and most senior military leadership. As a congressman, Director Pompeo sought to undermine negotiations with Iran and advocated for military airstrikes to destroy its nuclear program. During his confirmation hearing, Director Pompeo indicated that he would not push back against President Trump's reckless impulse to withdraw from the JCPOA in mid-May, saying instead that he would ``recommend to the President that we do our level best to work with our allies to achieve a better outcome and a better deal.'' This response is in spite of the fact that, by all accounts, the JCPOA is working as intended and Iran is verifiably meeting its commitments under the deal.

Withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal would also have a profoundly harmful effect on our nuclear negotiations with North Korea. North Korea has little reason to engage with us in a serious dialogue if it suspects that we may later withdraw unilaterally from any agreement without cause. During the Trump administration, the risk of conflict with North Korea has increased to unprecedented levels, and the diplomatic preparations over the coming weeks will be critical to the success of President Trump's upcoming summit with the North Korean leader. However, should that summit fail to produce meaningful constraints on North Korea's nuclear ambitions, I am concerned that the administration will use this failure as a pretext for pivoting to a preemptive strike against North Korea, and I am not confident that Director Pompeo will be effective in urging restraint by President Trump in opposing military action while seeking to redouble efforts to find a negotiated solution.

Perhaps the most difficult role of any Secretary of State is being an independent voice willing to say no to the President. I recognize that some say that one of Director Pompeo's highest qualifications for Secretary of State is his close relationship with the President because foreign leaders will know that, when Director Pompeo speaks, he has the backing of President Trump. Director Pompeo's alleged ``rapport'' with President Trump raises concerns that he will only tell the President what the President wants to hear and will not provide objective, nuanced policy recommendations based on U.S. foreign policy interests. I believe we are already seeing this dynamic with respect to the JCPOA.

Unfortunately, we have seen this scenario before. Early in the George W. Bush administration, the President surrounded himself with like- minded advisers who were predisposed to distorting the intelligence on Iraq, and, as a result, they failed to present nuanced policy options on the march to war against Saddam Hussein. I am concerned that we will find, in hindsight, that Director Pompeo's closeness to President Trump will prove less an asset and more a shared blind spot that will lead to simplistic policy recommendations, an unwillingness to stand up to the President when he is wrong, and an indulgence of the President's impulsive preference for strategy-free displays of military force.

The President needs a top diplomat who will provide independent foreign policy recommendations, will press to exhaust all possible diplomatic avenues for the safety of our military and citizens, and will boldly represent our core American values. While I believe that Director Pompeo is an honorable and decent man, who has provided life- long service to our country, he is not the right nominee for Secretary of State at this time. As such, I will oppose Director Pompeo's nomination for Secretary of State.

Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues and to associate myself with their remarks on the critically important issue of unlimited and unaccountable money in our political system. I would like to thank my colleague from Rhode Island, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, for organizing this speaking series and for being a national leader on the issue of campaign finance reform.

While my colleagues make important points about how our rigged campaign finance system can and does serve as a channel for anonymous billionaires and special interests to exert undue influence across our political system, I would like to focus my remarks on a related issue: how our broken campaign finance system also threatens our national security.

There is no serious dispute that malign foreign actors like Russia are working to subvert our democratic processes and sow chaos in our political system. As we have seen, their strategies depend not on direct conventional attacks upon our Nation, but an

asymmetric approach that exploits the existing divisions and vulnerabilities of our open society, our democratic institutions, and our free markets.

Even though we are now aware of this, we have not taken the necessary steps to repair the situation. Indeed, our Nation retains a campaign finance system that empowers anonymous donors to funnel unlimited amounts of money to influence public policy at every level of government, and to hide their actions behind corporations.

This misguided system, which fell into place in the wake of the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision in 2010, allegedly has been exploited by foreign adversaries to advance their agendas on our soil.

How does this threat work? Prior to Citizens United, an incorporated entity did not have the same right as a flesh-and-blood human being to make contributions and expenditures in elections. This distinction makes sense. Corporations typically are permanent legal entities. They can amass outsized sums of wealth and, critically, they can shield the human beings behind them from scrutiny and liability. It is easier for those who wish to circumvent the laws protecting our democratic system to do so from behind a corporate mask. Thus, when the Supreme Court gave corporations the right to make unlimited independent expenditures in elections, it also opened the door for those who wish to hide their election spending to cover their tracks with shell companies and other entities that only exist on paper.

Our Nation historically has sought to safeguard our system of government from foreign influence. The Constitution requires the President to be a natural-born citizen. Early lobbying disclosure reforms were crafted with the threat of foreign propaganda in mind. And it remains a Federal crime for a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to spend money to influence our elections. But how can we know that authorities have the tools they need to enforce the law consistently when the law permits donors to funnel unlimited sums into elections and cover their tracks with shell corporations?

There are serious allegations that foreign actors have taken advantage of this vulnerability in our system. CNN reported in early April that Special Counsel Mueller is investigating whether Russian oligarchs used donations to think tanks, political action committees, and straw donors to cover their illegal campaign spending in the 2016 cycle.

One figure who is suspected of this type of malign influence-peddling is Alexander Torshin. Torshin is the deputy governor of the Central Bank of Russia, a close Putin ally, and was recently sanctioned by the Trump administration, along with other oligarchs and high-ranking Russian Government officials. Multiple press reports stemming from documents turned over to congressional investigations by Trump campaign associates detail how Torshin allegedly cultivated people associated with the NRA to influence the 2016 election. His ultimate goal allegedly was to arrange a meeting during the campaign between then- Candidate Trump and Putin. Press reports indicate that the FBI is currently investigating whether Torshin illegally funneled money to the NRA to assist the Trump campaign in particular.

Indeed, if Russia did use the NRA to circumvent public scrutiny of its electoral meddling, it would have been following the same pattern as the Koch network. Robert McGuire from the Center for Responsive Politics stated: ``We've seen some of the groups in the Koch network give large, six and seven figure grants to the NRA--knowing that the NRA is going to spend the money on ads in an election. . . . The Russians could easily have funneled money into the NRA coffers using a similar pathway. . . . A legal, ostensibly apolitical donation to the NRA by Russia could have freed up other restricted funds to spend on politics.''

While money is fungible, it is quite striking that the NRA spent over $30 million to assist the Trump campaign--two-and-a-half times more than what it spent in 2012 to assist Mitt Romney.

These allegations regarding links between Russia and the NRA are among the most widely reported, but there is evidence of other instances where Kremlin-linked oligarchs and their allies allegedly directed money into American elections. For example, Viktor Vekselberg, another close Putin ally and oligarch who made billions from a government-sanctioned oil deal, allegedly funneled over $250,000 through a U.S. corporation run by his cousin to spend on the 2016 election. The cousin had no prior history as a major political donor before the last election cycle. Vekselberg was also recently sanctioned by the Trump administration for his close ties to Putin and alleged role in advancing Russia's malign influence activities. Special Counsel Mueller is also reportedly investigating whether Vekselberg funneled money into the 2016 election.

These are two illustrations of how those from Putin's inner circle may have sought to influence our elections. Some of these methods may appear legal because the source of the money on paper was a person who is legally allowed to make expenditures on American elections. But experts, like Louise Shelley, director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at George Mason University, doubt that these sums could have entered our political process without approval from the Kremlin. As she puts it: ``If you have investments in Russia, then you cannot be sure that they are secure if you go against the Kremlin's will. You can't be an enormously rich person in Russia, or even hold large holdings in Russia, without being in Putin's clutches.''

If sophisticated special interest groups in our country rely on dark money to pursue their political agendas, and the Kremlin and Kremlin- linked actors can exploit this vulnerability, then it stands to reason that other foreign actors can also manipulate our system. As long as we maintain a system wherein a political spender can be a corporation that received money from another corporation, which, in turn, received money from yet another corporation, there will be no accountability in our campaign finance system.

Even if it cannot be proved that illegal campaign spending is changing electoral outcomes, I believe it is unacceptable for our Nation to knowingly permit an open conduit for foreign meddling in our elections, which has an effect on our national security. Our system of government depends on public faith that election results reflect the will of the American people.

Going forward, I intend to speak further on this topic and work on ways to give authorities much stronger tools to prosecute the laundering of foreign money in our campaign finance system. In my view, this is not just an administrative or an election issue; this is a national security and international criminal issue, and as such, there should be investigations and prosecutions on that scale. I invite my colleagues to work with me on this important issue, and I thank my colleagues again for highlighting the need to take unaccountable money out of our politics.

With that, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.