Floor Statements

Mr. President, this week we solemnly observe the 103rd anniversary of the Armenian genocide.

Over a century ago, one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century began when the Young Turk leaders of the Ottoman Empire executed more than 200 prominent Armenians. What followed was an 8-year systematic campaign of oppression and massacre. By 1923, an estimated 1.5 million Armenians were killed, and over a half a million survivors were exiled.

These atrocities affected the lives of every Armenian living in Asia Minor and, indeed, across the globe. The U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during this dark time, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., unsuccessfully pleaded with President Wilson to take action and later remembered the events of the genocide, saying, ``I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915.'' Clearly, the suffering of the Armenian people must never be forgotten.

The survivors of the Armenian genocide, however, persevered due to their unbreakable spirit and steadfast resolve and went on to greatly contribute to the lands in which they found new homes and communities, including the United States. That is why we not only commemorate this grave tragedy each year, but we also take this moment to celebrate the traditions, the contributions, as well as the bright future of the Armenian people. Indeed, my home State of Rhode Island continues to be enriched by our strong and vibrant Armenian-American community.

This genocide has been denied for far too long. To honor the memory of this tragedy, I have joined with several of my colleagues on resolutions over the years to encourage the U.S. to officially recognize the Armenian genocide.

As we remember the past, we remain committed to forging a brighter future. We must continue to guard against hatred and oppression so that we can prevent such crimes against humanity.

As ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I remain committed to supporting assistance to Armenia to strengthen security, promote economic growth, and foster democratic reforms and development.

We must find a way to come together to recognize the truth of what happened and to provide unwavering support and assistance to those facing persecution today.

Mr. President, I come to the floor to continue my series of speeches about Russia's actions in the 2016 election and the threat that Russia poses for the 2018 midterm elections and our national security.

Free, fair, and open elections are the foundation of our country. The Framers created a unique system that has stood for over 200 years and served as a beacon around the world.

Regrettably, the Russian hybrid operations and malign influence against the 2016 election has put the sanctity and security of our democracy in question.

Our duty as citizens and as legislators is to recognize this crisis and take concrete steps to protect our democracy. We must foster a climate of vigilance and Federal-State cooperation when it comes to elections integrity. So today, I wanted to take a moment to review what happened and offer some steps that we should take immediately.

Some may say that there was no interference and that talking about Russia's meddling against our democratic institutions is ``fake news.'' I wish it were ``fake news'', but the facts are very clear and are acknowledged by experts of every political viewpoint. Let me take a moment to review what happened before I discuss the threat and what we should do.

Fifteen months have now passed since the intelligence community released its assessment, which concluded that the Kremlin attacked the heart of our democracy by interfering with our elections process. This operation sought to weaken our democratic institutions, amplify and exacerbate societal tensions, and generally sow chaos.

There is clear evidence that the Kremlin sought to influence the 2016 Presidential election. The key findings of the intelligence community's assessment were these:

We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an

influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential

election. Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in

the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and

harm her electability and potential presidency.

Moscow's influence campaign followed a Russian messaging

strategy that blends covert intelligence operations--such as

cyber activity--with overt efforts by Russian government

agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and

paid social media users or ``trolls.''

Russia's state-run propaganda machine contributed to the

influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin

messaging to Russian and international audiences.

In February of this year, leaders of the intelligence community appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee and reaffirmed these findings. In a related action, in February, the special counsel's office issued indictments against 13 Kremlin-linked trolls for conducting ``information warfare against the United States'' with the purpose of interfering with U.S. political and electoral processes, including the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

These tactics are aspects of a larger coordinated operation of hybrid aggression conducted by the Kremlin, using the broad spectrum of military and nonmilitary tools at its disposal. The main tenets of the Kremlin's hybrid operations are these: information operations with cyber tools, which people commonly think of as hacking; propaganda and disinformation; manipulation of social media; and malign influence, which can be deployed through political and financial channels.

Furthermore, throughout this hybrid campaign, Russia has denied its involvement and engaged in deception to hide its fingerprints.

Russia recognizes that, for now, its military capabilities are limited relative to the United States and NATO, and it will seek to avoid a direct military conflict with the West. Instead, Russian tactics leverage their strengths and exploit our open society and free markets in ways that they hope will have a strategic impact without leading to conventional war.

As laid out in the ``Russian National Security Strategy'' in 2015, the Kremlin's approach to how they respond to conflict includes weaponizing tools and resources from across their government and society.

The Russian strategy states:

Interrelated political, military, military-technical,

diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are

being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic

deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts.

This strategy describes the conventional and nonconventional use of warfare as the Kremlin sees it and how Russia has utilized all the tools of statecraft to engage an adversary without, in many cases, actually firing actual shots. These different disciplines together can be called a Russian hybrid approach to confrontation below the threshold of direct armed conflict, which has been developing and escalating since the earliest days of Putin's rise to power.

Russia's attacks have not ceased since the 2016 election. As former FBI Director James Comey so presciently stated about the Russians, ``They'll be back.''

Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper assessed that the Kremlin has ``been emboldened'' by the success of their operations to date and warned that hybrid operations ``will continue.'' At a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February, CIA Director Pompeo confirmed that the intelligence community has seen ``Russian activity and intentions'' to affect the 2018 midterm elections.

Director of National Intelligence Coats stated at this same hearing that our intelligence experts expect that Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations in the coming year. The agency heads from across our intelligence community agreed with this assessment.

The warnings from our current and former intelligence officials appear to be spot-on. There has been a steady pace of Russian hybrid operations deployed against us, our allies, and partners, with varying degrees of intensity and mixes of tools and methods. The techniques unleashed against us in the 2016 elections as laid out by our intelligence community were deployed with maximum intensity during last year's French Presidential elections. There was also evidence of hybrid operations against the German Federal elections held in September of 2017. Kremlin-linked trolls targeted the people of Spain, exacerbating divisions during the referendum on Catalonian independence. Outgoing National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said we have seen ``initial signs'' that the Kremlin is using tools from its hybrid arsenal against the upcoming Mexican elections. After last month's poisoning of the former Russian spy and his daughter on British soil, an estimated 2,800 Kremlin-linked bots were unleashed to cast doubt on Prime Minister May's assessment that Russia was responsible and to amplify divisions among the British people. While the majority of the interference appears to have come from Russia, others are catching on and deploying these tools as well.

As highlighted in the Economist last week, a coalition of Indonesian religious extremist groups used propaganda and disinformation to affect a local election in Jakarta last year. The frontrunner, a Christian, was falsely accused of insulting Islam and huge rallies were organized against him. In the end, he lost to a candidate that

held the support of Muslim groups. This more overt interference has been coupled with covert information operations, using social media to smear candidates they deem ``not Muslim enough.''

A second Christian candidate in upcoming Indonesian regional elections has been portrayed as a front for Christian domination in a country that has an estimated 90-percent Muslim population and has been featured in a video that falsely claimed that he was part of a massive church building campaign.

With voters in this area spending an average of 4 to 5 hours a day looking at social media on their phones, videos and messages have quickly gone viral. As this example highlights, these campaigns don't even have to be sophisticated. They use tactics out of the Kremlin's playbook and they indicate how ubiquitous this type of activity is becoming across the world.

We also continue to see evidence of the Kremlin and Kremlin-linked agents deploy hybrid tools to sow division, exacerbate racial and religious divides, and amplify social tensions here at home. We don't have to look far for examples.

Kremlin-linked trolls flooded Twitter with messages intended to sow division and disinformation in the wake of the tragic shootings in Las Vegas and Parkland, FL.

During the special election to fill the Alabama Senate seat vacated by now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, one candidate gained 1,100 Russian-origin Twitter followers over a 3-day period, with many of the accounts appearing to be artificial.

January press reports indicate that Fancy Bear--the Russian military- linked hackers who perpetrated attacks on the Democratic National Committee in the 2016 election--have been attempting to penetrate the emails of Senate offices in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections.

Kremlin propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik continue to try to capitalize on our open press and public debates to spread disinformation and amplify division.

In sum, Kremlin and Kremlin-linked agents are still trying to hack us, our allies, and partners to fuel their information operations. They are still using trolls and bots to manipulate social media and targeting us with disinformation campaigns and still deploying propaganda.

In the absence of strategic action to deter these kinds of attacks, Russia sees our 2018 midterm elections as another prime target.

Despite this threat and multiple warnings from across our intelligence community, Trump administration officials have testified to Congress dating back to last spring that the President has not directed his Cabinet or senior staff to work on a strategy to protect our democratic institutions. When I asked Defense Secretary Mattis on June 13, 2017, whether the President had directed him to begin intensive planning to protect our electoral system against the next Russian cyber attack, he was not able to point to any guidance indicating that the President recognizes the urgency of the Russian threat or the necessity of preparing to counter it during midterm elections.

On June 21, 2017, I asked officials from the Department of Homeland Security, who are in charge of election security, whether the President had directed them to come up with a plan to protect our critical election infrastructure. They responded no.

On October 19, 2017, I asked leading officials from the Pentagon, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, who are in charge of protecting critical cyber infrastructure, including our electoral infrastructure, if the President had directed them to counter the Russian threat. They could not point to any specific direction coming from the White House to do so.

On February 13, 2018, I asked the top directors of our intelligence community whether the President had directed them to take specific action to blunt or disrupt ongoing Russian influence activities. I received no affirmative responses. FBI Director Wray said he had not been ``specifically directed by the President.'' Admiral Rogers, who serves as head of both the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, responded: ``I can't say that I have been explicitly directed to `blunt or actively stop.' '' The other witnesses could not point to any directives from the President to confront or blunt Russian influence operations either.

On February 27, 2018, I asked Admiral Rogers whether he has the authority and the capability to disrupt hacking operations where they originate. He responded that he does not have the authority from the President to go after these perpetrators and stated that the government as a whole has so far, in his words, ``opted not to engage.''

The bottom line is that the President has not directed anyone in the intelligence community, his Cabinet, or elsewhere in his administration to develop or implement a strategy to disrupt, blunt, or retaliate against Russia for its hybrid aggression against our democracy. This threat is clear, and it only grows as we move closer to our midterm elections in November. It is past time for the President to step up and provide strategic leadership against Russian interference.

Russia has gone to school on our social and political divisions and our democratic institutions and will continue to adapt. They have learned how to exploit our vulnerabilities and are planning future operations to hit our blind spots. We are fooling ourselves if we are only looking to protect against the threats from the last Russian operation. We need to be prepared to blunt what comes next.

February testimony from the Armed Services Cybersecurity Subcommittee highlights this evolving threat. Professor Richard Harknett, a cyber security expert from the University of Cincinnati, warned that Russia's 2016 campaign against our elections was the ``stone age'' relative to the sophistication of cyber activities we are likely to see in the coming elections. Similarly, Russia expert Heather Conley from the Center for Strategic and International Studies testified at the same hearing. She said:

If we're preparing for what Russia did in 2016, it will be

very different in November. It will be very different in

2020. It will look more American. It will look less Russian.

And so this is adaptation. We are already fighting the last

war.

As an article from the May issue of ``Atlantic'' portrayed, we may soon find ourselves in an era where doctored images are used to further aspects of hybrid operations. New technology exists that can superimpose a person onto video of an activity they did not participate in. Franklin Foer, the author, wrote of this phenomenon:

The genre is one of the cruelest, most invasive forms of

identity theft invented in the internet era. . . . A casual

observer can't easily detect the hoax.

As was highlighted recently on a ``60 Minutes'' show, we know the Russians targeted election systems in 21 States in the 2016 election and that Kremlin or Kremlin-linked actors compromised websites or voter registration systems in 7 States. The fact we have not yet taken steps to correct all the vulnerabilities does not inspire confidence for the 2018 midterm elections. Former FBI agent and expert on Russian information operations, Clint Watts, said recently on ``Meet the Press,'' ``at this point we can't ensure the vote is accurate or not changed'' and that his number one priority would be protecting the elections and the vote ahead of the 2018 elections. We cannot continue to have a wait-and-see attitude with regard to the Kremlin's hybrid operations because, next time, it could and likely will be worse. They might actually be able to change ballots or tamper with voter rolls or carry out another operation entirely that we haven't even thought of.

We are behind the curve in preparing our defenses against Russian interference in 2018--these elections that are coming. Even by the administration's own admission, we are not doing enough. At an October 18, 2017, hearing, Senator Sasse asked Attorney General Sessions whether the administration had prepared to counter future interference by Russia and other foreign adversaries in the information space. Attorney General Sessions responded:

Probably not. We're not. And the matter is so complex that

for most of us, we are not able to fully grasp the technical

dangers that are out there.

This is not an acceptable response to such a pressing problem. Russia attacked the heart of our democracy, and if we do not try to find solutions and guard our infrastructure, we are derelict in our duties.

One of the last acts of the Obama administration was to deem election infrastructure critical, which put it in a priority category for assistance to guard against election interference. While appropriate and important, that is the mere beginning of a solution, and we have hardly progressed in the last 14 months.

I recently asked General Curt Scaparrotti, the head of European Command, who is on the frontline of blunting Russian aggression in Europe, whether we had a sufficient whole-of-government to combat such hybrid operations. He responded that we did not have an ``effective unification'' across the government and affirmed that additional focus was needed immediately because of the nature of the threat.

We need a whole-of-government approach with the weight of the White House behind it. We need an approach that will enable coordination across the different agencies of our government and support effective outreach and collaboration with State and local officials and the private sector, including the media. Given the nature of Russia's asymmetric aggression, conducted below the level of direct military conflict, we must deploy a range of tools, including cyber; diplomacy; economic sanctions; financial investigations to counter foreign corruption, money laundering, and malign political influence; and strategic communications.

This administration has not effectively employed the nonmilitary tools in its arsenal, and it has been slow to respond in any meaningful way. The administration's dithering is exemplified in its foot-dragging in utilizing the State Department's Global Engagement Center to counter Russian propaganda and its delay in implementing sanctions to punish Russia. While recent actions to expel Russian diplomats after the poisoning of the Russian spy and his daughter on British soil and the decision to finally implement sanctions targeted against Putin's base of power are encouraging, they do not add up to a policy of effective deterrence.

In this regard, I would note that a former senior Defense Department cyber policymaker recently testified to the Armed Services Committee that a standing joint interagency task force is required to bring to bear the right capabilities and resources spread across the government to respond effectively to Russian aggression. Such a task force would utilize expertise from across our government, including the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Treasury Department, and would allow effective coordination and collaboration on policy to counter Russia. The minority staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Russian asymmetric operations in Europe recommended a similar mechanism. I think this is a good way forward, and I intend to continue to work with my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committees and other committees of jurisdiction on how best to stand up such a capability.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member, has recently issued recommendations to improve election security. The committee urges retaining States' primacy in running elections and providing them with necessary assistance; creating effective deterrence; improving information sharing on threats; and securing election-related systems. All of these are important steps and should be implemented without delay.

Several of my Senate colleagues have thoughtfully incorporated these recommendations into legislation, the Secure Elections Act, and I strongly support this effort. This bill would improve information sharing between Federal Government and local election agencies, assist States with cyber security preparedness, and support them in replacing outdated and insecure electronic voting machines. I thank Senators Klobuchar, Lankford, Graham, Collins, and Heinrich for their work on this bill, and I look forward to working with them on further legislation to protect the institutions that are essential to our democracy.

As I laid out, these operations against our elections are part of a broad pattern of Russian hybrid attacks against us and our allies and partners. As Vice President Biden and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Carpenter reminded us in a recent article in Foreign Affairs:

More than a decade has passed since Estonia became the

first NATO country to see its government institutions and

media organizations attacked by hackers based in Russia. In

the intervening period, the risk of a far more debilitating

attack has increased, but planning for how to defend against

it has lagged.

There are countries, such as those in the Baltics, that have been dealing with these Russian threats for far longer than we have and have developed effective approaches for countering them.

Department of Defense National Guard units, which regularly deploy to Eastern Europe and the Baltics, may be uniquely positioned to share information on Russian hybrid attacks with State and local officials and explain procedures they learn from our European partners.

With regard to building credible deterrence--one of the Intelligence Committee's key recommendations--it does not appear that we have mounted an effective policy against Russia. As DNI Coats testified earlier this year, Russian influence operations in cyber space are intended to achieve ``strategic objectives'' and will continue unless and until there are clear repercussions for Russia. In February, Lieutenant General Nakasone testified to the Armed Services Committee that the Russians, amongst several other adversaries, don't fear us and have calculated that, in his words, ``not much will happen to them'' in retaliation for cyber attacks on America. Cyber Commander Admiral Rogers also testified in February to the Armed Services Committee that Vladimir Putin has concluded there is little price to pay for Russian aggression against the United States, and he has no incentive to stop these hybrid attacks. In outgoing National Security Advisor McMaster's last remarks, he even admitted ``we have failed to impose sufficient costs'' on Russia.

In the absence of Presidential leadership to set a policy to blunt Russian aggression and send the message to our foreign adversaries that we will not stand for attacks of this nature, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 requires a comprehensive plan from the administration to counter Russian malign influence. That plan is overdue. The Act also requires that the President develop a national cyber policy, including any capabilities that be used to impose costs on adversaries in response to a cyber attack or malicious cyber activity. There is no time to waste, and I urge the administration to deliver these strategies and actually implement them, which would work toward imposing costs on our foreign adversaries.

I intend to return to speak further on these issues, as I believe the American people deserve a comprehensive explanation of the threats that face our democracy. I also intend to work with my colleagues on additional measures to secure our political system and election infrastructure against malign foreign influence.

None of this is to say that States will lose their traditional primacy over elections. Rhode Island is one of the States that is taking this issue very seriously by adopting new technologies to streamline voting and guard voter information.

My State is also working with the Department of Homeland Security to shore up election security, but election security must be a national priority, and the Federal Government must be a reliable partner. I must commend our Secretary of State, Nellie Gorbea, for her great efforts.

One thing remains clear. The Russians attacked our elections process--the heart of our democracy--and are primed to do it again unless the administration provides effective deterrence. This is not a Democratic issue or a Republican issue; it is an issue of national security. As the old saying goes, ``Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.'' We have no time to waste.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern about the continued deterioration of the situation in Yemen and to share my views about the resolution that is currently before us.

The military conflict going on in Yemen has gone on for far too long and has affected tens of millions of civilians who face displacement, famine, and a widespread cholera outbreak. According to the United Nations, more than 15,000 Yemenis have been killed or injured since the war began in March of 2015. The humanitarian situation there has been described as the worst in the world, with more than two-thirds of Yemen's approximately 29 million people facing severe food shortages. An outbreak of cholera has already infected at least 1 million people, marking the worst such outbreak in decades.

Continued instability in Yemen also benefits our adversaries. While we have sought to maintain pressure on al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, and ISIS, the lack of a functioning government or state security apparatus inhibits our ability to go after these groups. Additionally, it is clear that Iran has taken advantage of the current situation to spread its malign influence and provide lethal support to the Houthis, thereby further undermining regional stability and security.

Unfortunately, we have yet to hear any strategy from the administration as to how they would propose to use U.S. diplomatic leadership to help bring about an end to the conflict in Yemen. We still do not have an Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and occasional visits by White House officials are not a replacement for sustained diplomatic efforts by our experts in the Foreign Service. I am encouraged, though, by the appointment of a new United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, and hope that the U.S. Government will seek to support his efforts wherever possible.

While the primary conflict in Yemen is between an Iranian-backed Houthi insurgency and a Saudi-led coalition, the United States is involved.

As stated in a letter sent by Secretary Mattis to congressional leadership last week, ``Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support to Saudi-led coalition military operations to restore the U.N.-recognized government of Yemen and preserve Saudi territorial integrity from Houthi aligned forces in Yemen.'' Moreover, according to Secretary Mattis, U.S. forces are not authorized to use force against the Houthis but do support the Saudi-led coalition with ``intelligence sharing, military advice, and logistical support, including air-to-air refueling.''

Last week, the commander of U.S. Central Command, General Votel, testified before the Armed Services Committee that our support to the Saudi-led coalition is ``primarily defensive'' in nature and focused on the Iranian-supported ballistic missile threat to Saudi Arabia that originates in Yemen, maritime threats to international shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, the defense of Saudi Arabia's southern border, and counterterrorism.

However, General Votel also acknowledged that when the United States provides aerial refueling to coalition aircraft, we do not know where those aircraft then go; therefore, they could be going to conduct offensive strikes against Houthi targets, which may result in civilian casualties, which is a major concern for me. Even more troubling, if these aircraft went to conduct strikes against targets outside of

Yemen, the United States would be complicit in a much more dangerous and provocative activity.

I have significant concerns about persistent reports of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure caused by the Saudi- led coalition in Yemen. Far too many of the strikes by the coalition have killed or injured civilians and resulted in the destruction of infrastructure needed to provide basic services to the population, thereby exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

It is also clear that more must be done by both the coalition and the Houthis to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into and throughout Yemen. The United Nations and humanitarian organizations continue to express concern about their ability to access seaports and airports and difficulties in distributing aid to vulnerable populations once it is inside the country.

It is important that shipments into Yemen be subject to inspection by the U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism to help prevent the transit of illicit materials in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, but all parties to the conflict in Yemen have a responsibility, including under international humanitarian law, to allow access to aid by those in need.

We are faced with a very difficult set of issues, and I certainly understand and commend my colleagues, Senators Sanders, Murphy, and Lee, for bringing this issue to the floor. The Saudi-led coalition clearly must do more to end this war and must prosecute this war in a way that limits civilian casualties and the humanitarian crises. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates, or UAE, remain important partners for the United States, and we share many common interests in the region, including in the fight against al-Qaida, ISIS, and other violent extremist groups.

The resolution before us would establish a blanket prohibition on all assistance to the Saudi-led coalition except for the purposes of countering al-Qaida and associated forces. While I understand the argument for this approach, I believe it would prevent us from exerting influence to limit and hopefully end the conflict. Indeed, it may even cause harm as both sides potentially act more violently.

We can and should engage if there is a possibility that we can help minimize collateral damage by providing the coalition with training and advice on best practices. General Votel testified last week that U.S. assistance has contributed to improvement by the coalition on these issues. Specifically, the Department of Defense told us that engagement by U.S. military personnel has resulted in the introduction of a ``no- strike'' list. That is a process which actually puts targets off-limits and ensures that pilots and others understand those targets. They also caused a cessation--an ending--of the use of cluster munitions by Saudi-led forces and the formation of a body to investigate noncombatant casualties. These are positive steps, but it is clear that much more must be done to minimize the impact of the war on Yemeni civilians. I support our continued engagement for that purpose.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE face a significant threat from Houthi rebels armed with ballistic missiles, apparently with the technical assistance of the Iranians. There have reportedly been dozens of attacks against Saudi Arabia since the spring of 2015, including against civilian targets like the international airport in Riyadh, which was attacked in December. I strongly support the right of our partners to defend themselves against these threats and believe that continued sharing of U.S. intelligence for defensive purposes is appropriate, especially in light of the fact that tens of thousands of U.S. civilians, military, and diplomatic personnel also face these threats while living and working in the region around Riyadh and throughout Saudi Arabia.

I also have concerns that ending all support to the Saudi-led coalition may cause the conflict to escalate. As Secretary Mattis wrote to congressional leadership this past week, restrictions on our ``limited U.S. military support could increase civilian casualties, jeopardize cooperation with our partners on counterterrorism, and reduce our influence with the Saudis--all of which would further exacerbate the situation and humanitarian crisis.'' Secretary Mattis also expressed concern that withdrawal of our support would ``embolden Iran to increase its support to the Houthis, enabling further ballistic missile strikes on Saudi Arabia and threatening vital shipping lanes in the Red Sea, thereby raising the risk of a regional conflict.''

Therefore, I believe that support by the U.S. military of the Saudi- led coalition in Yemen should not be absolutely prohibited but should be explicitly limited to the following objectives: No. 1, enabling counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and ISIS; No. 2, defending the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including against ballistic missile threats; No. 3, preserving freedom of navigation in the maritime environment around Yemen; and No. 4, enhancing the training and professionalism of their armed forces, with a primary focus on adherence to the law of armed conflict and prevention of civilian casualties.

Our support for the Saudi-led coalition needs to be considered in a thoughtful and deliberate manner. From a policy perspective, we should distinguish between assistance that is provided for defensive or noncombat purposes and that which could be used to enable offensive military operations in the Yemeni civil war.

Let me be clear. I am not in favor of giving the Saudi-led coalition a blank check. In fact, I believe we should no longer provide aerial refueling assistance unless it is used to enable aircraft conducting counterterrorism missions pursuant to the 2001 authorization for use of military force or countering specific identified threats to Saudi territorial integrity. Indeed, use of our military assets to support Saudi-led coalition efforts or the efforts of other nations to conduct other operations outside this narrow scope would raise very serious legal questions.

Given its comprehensive approach, I do not believe the Sanders resolution is the appropriate vehicle for these issues to receive the careful and deliberate consideration they are due. I understand the Foreign Relations Committee may soon take up this issue, and I urge them to do that. I look forward to engaging further in those discussions when presented with the opportunity.

The administration must make clear to both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis that there is no military solution to this conflict and that the time has come to reach a negotiated settlement. Congress also has an important role in setting the policy framework for the use of U.S. Armed Forces overseas and ensuring that U.S. military capabilities are only used for authorized purposes. At the same time, we should not take action that would unduly restrict our engagement with partners for legitimate purposes and, in doing so, undermine our ability to help bring an end to the conflict in Yemen, ease civilian suffering, and defend the territorial integrity of our partners.

With that Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I rise, as I have many times for nearly two decades, to shed light on the long struggle of Liberian refugees in the United States, and to make the case for this administration to extend Deferred Enforced Departure, or DED, for this population before they face potential separation from their jobs and families when their current DED designation expires on March 31.

I also call on my colleagues to take up and pass the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, which I offered in some form for as long as I have served in this body, to end nearly 30 years of uncertainty by finally giving these Liberians the opportunity to apply for permanent residency and a pathway to citizenship.

I also would like to take a moment to express my gratitude to those advocates who have stood with me as I have worked for a solution for Liberians in America, including my Rhode Island colleague, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, as well as our colleagues from Minnesota, Senators Klobuchar and Smith.

The case of these Liberians is a tragic and historically unique situation. In 1989, a seven-year civil war broke out in Liberia that would claim the lives of over 200,000 people and displace more than half of the Liberian population. This conflict devastated Liberia-- halting food production, collapsing the nation's economy, and destroying its infrastructure. By 1991, an estimated 14,000 Liberians fled to the United States seeking refuge from the conflict. In March of that year, the Attorney General granted them the opportunity to register for temporary protected status, or TPS.

Every subsequent administration has renewed TPS for Liberians each year until the end of the first civil war, but the prospects for a safe return ended when Liberia plunged into a second civil war from 1999 to 2003. This horrific conflict ended with the departure from power of former President Charles Taylor, who is currently serving a fifty-year prison sentence, issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for war crimes.

In 2014, Liberia's still poverty-stricken and recovering infrastructure faced the challenge of responding to the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa. Liberia had fewer than 200 licensed doctors to contend with the outbreak among the country's population of over 4 million people.

Throughout this succession of conflict and tragedy, Liberians who sought refuge in the United States have had the option to remain here lawfully under TPS or DED while conditions remained unstable in Liberia.

This is not amnesty. In order to participate, these Liberians are required to pass periodic background investigations, pay hundreds of dollars in fees,

and stay out of trouble with the law. Many of these Liberians who have been through this process for decades are perhaps among the most vetted and rigorously examined individuals in the United States today.

They have also received work authorizations, enabling them to work and start businesses, pay taxes, and raise families. Many have full- grown American citizen children who attend American schools and serve in our military. At the same time, they have not been afforded earned benefits available to American citizens, so they are responsible for paying their taxes, they are responsible to conduct themselves as law- abiding citizens, but they are not building up any type of Social Security benefits or any other benefits like other American workers are. In the years since 1989, they have become our neighbors, our friends, and an important community that contributes a great deal to the diversity and prosperity of States like Rhode Island.

Today, Liberia has only just completed its first democratic transfer of power in decades, and there are still serious concerns about the Nation's ability to maintain peace and deliver essential services to its population.

If the Trump administration fails to extend the DED deadline for Liberians, hundreds of Liberian American families could be separated and uprooted from their jobs and homes, and forced to return to a country that is unrecognizable to them. Moreover, at best, it is unclear how Liberia's recovery could be affected by a sudden and unexpected influx of newcomers from the United States.

This is why, each time Congress has taken up comprehensive immigration reform--and more recently discussed these issues in the context of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, Program--I have worked to ensure that any adjustment of status provision includes relief for Liberians who have become Americans in every way except on paper. Congress continues to debate the best path forward for Dreamers, TPS recipients, and comprehensive immigration reform, but Liberians cannot wait another month or another year. They have just over 2 weeks before their time is up.

At the very least, the Trump administration should extend DED for this population for 3 additional years while Congress debates a path forward on comprehensive immigration reform.

In my view, with each year that has passed since the first of these Liberians arrived, the case has grown stronger that they should have the option to adjust their status and remain in the communities where they have made their homes and raised their families. We have long since reached the point where simple justice requires that Congress extend this option to these Liberians.

On several occasions, Congress has granted temporary residents the opportunity to apply for permanent residency when their stays in the United States were prolonged by dangerous conditions in their home countries. In 1988, Congress passed a law offering permanent residency to temporary residents from Poland, Uganda, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. Following the events in Tiananmen Square in China, Congress permitted over 52,000 Chinese nationals to apply for permanent residency. The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, or NACARA, permitted the same for 259,000 nationals of Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The Syrian Adjustment Act permitted 2,000 Syrian Jews to obtain permanent residency. The list goes on. The fact is that there is ample precedent for providing relief for this relatively small Liberian population. Like past Congresses, this Congress must acknowledge the simple fact that the United States is now home to these law-abiding and taxpaying Liberians. To ignore them or to say otherwise not only threatens to break up American families, but also to turn away a group whose story is quintessentially American. They fled violence and disease to come here. They worked hard and raised families here. They followed our laws and subjected themselves to rigorous screening and vetting. They deserve the opportunity to make their own decision on whether to stay here or return to Liberia.

I can say with confidence that Rhode Island will feel their absence if this Liberian community were forced to leave after contributing to our communities for so long, and our country would be poorer for their loss.

There are many examples I could discuss of how the Liberian community has enriched our State, but I will name two: Lance Corporal Abraham Tarwoe of the U.S. Marines and Providence Police Sergeant Maxwell Dorley. Both came to Rhode Island from Liberia to start their own chapters of the American dream. They both led exemplary lives and endeavored to give back to their newfound homes through public service in the form of military service and as a member of our local police force in Providence. Both of them served with distinction, and our State tragically lost both of them in the line of duty in 2012. They are emblematic of the extraordinary contributions that Liberians have made to my State, and no fulsome discussion of what Liberians have meant to us is complete without mentioning both of these gentlemen by name.

I strongly urge President Trump to do the right thing and extend DED to Liberians living legally in the United States. I also urge my colleagues to take up and pass the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act and put an end to uncertainty for this population after decades of displacement.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, let me thank Senator Udall for his kind remarks and his great leadership.

I rise today to add my voice to his voice and to that of so many of my colleagues in calling attention to the growing threat of climate change, and to encourage the Senate to take meaningful action. First, let me join all of my colleagues in recognizing and thanking my colleague, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse from Rhode Island. His tireless work to raise awareness about the devastating impacts of climate change has truly made a remarkable difference in our country and around the world.

Senator Whitehouse comes to the Senate floor every week to tell us why it is ``time to wake up,'' and I am pleased to be able to join him as he gives his 200th such speech. These 200 speeches provide at least 200 reasons why we should be acting quickly and decisively to address climate change. Just one of those reasons, which I would like to highlight, is the impact of climate change on our national security. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, exacerbating other problems in unstable areas around the world. It is already creating conflict related to a lack of resources, whether it is access to food, water, or energy.

I was just traveling through Djibouti and Somalia--adjacent to Yemen--and one of the great crises in Yemen is not just the conflict on the ground, but it is a water crisis that is causing massive drought. Then I moved on up to Jordan, and there spoke with our representatives. There is a water crisis in Jordan also and another threatened drought.

These national security problems are climate problems, and these climate problems are national security problems. When it comes to our national security, decisions are made through a careful evaluation of risks, and we must be sure to include risks caused by climate change. It is particularly troubling to me to see that the current Administration is instead choosing to ignore the reality of scientific consensus by removing all references to climate change from documents like the ``National Security Strategy'' and the ``National Defense Strategy.''

The Department of Defense must be able to execute its missions effectively and efficiently. So it is disconcerting that climate- related events have already cost the Pentagon significant resources-- measured in both monetary costs as well as in negative impacts on military readiness.

In fact, Secretary Mattis, who understands these issues very well, and despite the official publication of the Department of Defense speaks very candidly and directly, has declared the following before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Where climate change contributes to regional instability,

the Department of Defense must be aware of any potential

adverse impacts. . . . climate change is impacting stability

in areas of the world where our troops are operating today. .

. . and the Department should be prepared to mitigate any

consequences of a changing climate, including ensuring that

our shipyards and installations will continue to function as

required.

Across the globe, we see our forces in conflict. They are in the Horn of Africa. They are there facing not just radical fighters, but drought and environmental issues. Here at home, we have shipyards and naval bases on the coast that are seeing rising waters that are going to cost us hundreds of millions of dollars to remediate so they can continue to function. If we don't respond, if we put our heads in the sand on the issues of climate change, our national security will be in endangered.

I was very pleased as the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee to support my colleagues when they included in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act a direction that the Department of Defense conduct a threat assessment and deliver a master plan for climate change adaptation. That was a bipartisan bill led by Chairman McCain and supported by vast numbers on both sides of the aisle who understand that climate change must be addressed. It also codified several findings related to climate change and expressed the sense of Congress that climate change is a threat to our national security. We are on record as a Congress saying that national security is jeopardized by climate change. That has to be embraced by the whole of government, not just the Senate or the House acting together.

I must commend our colleague--Sheldon's and my colleague--Congressman Jim Langevin of Rhode Island because he pushed for the same measure in the House of Representatives, and he was successful.

Just like other threats to our national security, it is critical that we recognize, plan for, and take steps to address climate change. Combating climate change may not seem as urgent as other threats we are facing today, but I would argue otherwise. If we don't begin to take aggressive action to protect ourselves from the effects of climate change, we will face ever increasing and severe consequences. Because of his clarion call to pay attention to climate change, Senator Whitehouse is advancing our national security interests in an important way, and I stand here to commend him and thank him.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, when we passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, we did so in response to a financial crisis that shook the foundations of our economy and devastated so many of our hard-working constituents. For example, the Dow Jones dropped from an average of 13,677.89 in July of 2007 to an average of 7,235.47 in March of 2009, resulting in a 47.1 percent loss. Nationally, the unemployment rate increased from 5 percent in January 2008 to 10 percent in October 2009, and in Rhode Island, the unemployment rate was even higher, increasing from 6.2 percent in January 2008 to 11.9 percent in December 2009.

In short, we had to do something to respond and avoid another financial crisis because behind each of these harrowing numbers were our constituents and their families, who saw their life savings, their jobs, and their homes evaporate in a flash. That something was the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, also known as the Dodd-Frank Act.

I am proud to have drafted and supported several of its provisions, such as the creation of a consumer watchdog--the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CFPB--whose primary focus has been on protecting consumers from unscrupulous financial activities; my bipartisan language calling for a dedicated Office of Servicemember Affairs at the CFPB, which helps ensure that our servicemembers and their families are protected in the consumer finance space in the same way these service men and women protect us. That is now a part of the CFPB, and it has done remarkable work protecting the men and women of our armed services, who do remarkable work protecting us.

Also , I was able to provide an additional $1 billion in funding through the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, which provided targeted emergency assistance to help local communities acquire, redevelop, or demolish foreclosed properties.

Frankly, in the wake of the crisis, every city and many rural areas were seeing foreclosed properties sitting there, reminding us all of the devastation. With these resources, they could be repurposed for families to live in, or if they were decrepit, they could be demolished for urban development and economic development in rural areas.

These are just a handful of the many good and worthwhile provisions in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, but, like any other major piece of legislation, it was not perfect.

Years ago, the custom here was that we would come together and agree on technical fixes to comprehensive legislation. It was almost predictable that after we had a complex piece of legislation, we would discover unintended consequences, and we would come together on a bipartisan basis to fix those technical issues without having to relitigate the entire bill.

Unfortunately, that moment to make needed fixes never happened, and while the legislation before us today makes changes to the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, I am concerned that this legislation may actually go too far and go beyond the needed technical fixes. For example, I worry that this legislation may actually make it tougher for community banks and credit unions to compete against the larger financial institutions despite the regulatory relief provisions in this bill for smaller financial institutions. This is because the legislation encourages large financial institutions to grow even larger--from $50 billion up to $250 billion. It does so, in part, by removing some of the extra oversight provisions we put in place with the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, such as making sure large banks undergo strong and robust stress tests to ensure that they have their own sufficient rainy day fund and that any type of problem is not funded by taxpayer bailouts.

In addition, this legislation may further encourage larger financial institutions to grow by increasing their competitive edge for the kinds of businesses and customers currently served by community banks and credit unions, which should be concerning to all who support our smaller local financial institutions. Larger institutions can absorb more costs than smaller institutions. They can have programs that cost them a lot in the short run but drive out the competition in the medium and long run. Because they can stretch costs over bigger institutions, they can provide services that might be better provided or more personally provided by smaller institutions, but these will be pushed out of the marketplace. So the potential net result of this bill, ironically, may make it more difficult for regulators to spot a threat to financial stability from a larger bank while increasing competitive pressures on community banks and credit unions.

To address some of these concerns, I have filed several amendments to improve the bill and add needed protections for consumers. Let me describe some of these amendments in greater detail.

One amendment seeks to prioritize regulatory relief for institutions with a strong history of doing right by their customers. In the legislation before us, Federal financial regulators are given the discretion to provide regulatory relief to certain financial institutions, and in so doing, to consider factors they deem appropriate. My amendment simply directs the regulators, when exercising this discretion, to also consider whether the financial institution, in the preceding 24-month period, paid any Federal fines or penalties and to consider whether there was any violation or settlement related to an alleged violation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act--the SCRA--or the Military Lending Act and if these violations could have been avoided. Again, that is a strong emphasis on protecting the men and women who protect us--our servicemembers. These two pieces of legislation, the SCRA--the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act--and the Military Lending Act, are the strongest protections our servicemen and women have against financial abuse by institutions.

In short, how well an institution serves its customers, including our servicemembers, should help determine whether certain financial institutions deserve the regulatory relief provided under the bill.

On a very strong bipartisan basis, I hope we can adopt this amendment. It just seems so clear to me that when we are giving relief, we should give it to those who have earned it--those institutions that have treated our service men and women well and have treated their customers well.

Another amendment I filed would empower the CFPB and its Office of Servicemember Affairs to enforce existing SCRA safeguards--the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act safeguards--such as those that protect our servicemembers from being overcharged. This amendment is needed because, despite the importance of the SCRA's protections to our servicemembers, enforcement of this critical law has been inconsistent and subject to the discretion

of our financial regulators, which can change with each Administration.

According to a July 2012 report from the Government Accountability Office, the estimated percentage of depository institutions that serviced mortgages that were examined for SCRA compliance varied widely, ranging from rates of 4 percent in 2007, 17 percent in 2008, 18 percent in 2009, 26 percent in 2010, and then dropping down to 15 percent in 2011. You can see that sort of tracked with the financial crisis, where at a point after 2007 and 2008, the regulators understood the threats that were being posed to service men and women in terms of their mortgage obligations. But that seems to be fading. We can't lose focus on protecting the men and women who serve us.

As someone who has had the experience and privilege of leading soldiers as an executive officer of a paratrooper company, I spent a lot of time trying to explain to people who were trying to collect from men and women in uniform that they couldn't because the law had set certain interest rates that they exceeded and that they couldn't because they were violating--back then it was called the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. We need an agency of the government, not individual members of the Armed Forces, to protect these men and women. I think that is what we are trying to do with this legislation.

Simply put, prioritizing the consumer protection of our service men and women should not be discretionary; it should be mandatory. This amendment ensures that the SCRA enforcement will be permanently a priority of the CFPB and the Office of Servicemember Affairs. It is supported by more than 30 organizations, including the National Military Family Association, Military Officers Association of America, Veterans Education Success, Student Veterans of America, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.

We also need to do more to protect student loan borrowers. There is a growing private market to refinance student loans, including Federal student loans. I filed an amendment to require lenders to disclose the benefits that borrowers might forfeit, such as income-driven repayment plans, loan forgiveness, and deferment options, when they refinance a Federal loan into a private loan.

I have also filed an amendment to clarify that the Education Loan Ombudsman at the CFPB should monitor and report student loan complaints for all education loans, including Federal student loans.

Additionally, I support Senator Durbin's amendment to strengthen student loan servicing and protections for private student loan borrowers and to provide greater transparency and accountability for campus-based banking products beyond just credit cards. We have all read about the many abuses that have taken place, and we owe it to consumers everywhere to ensure that these abuses are detected and prevented.

Continuing this focus on consumer protections, another of my amendments responds to the difficulties that Rhode Islanders face when trying to secure a loan modification by taking greater advantage of bank branches. If you are able to walk into a bank branch and get a mortgage, then you should also be able to walk into the same branch and get help to avoid preventable foreclosures. What we found in the crisis was that often this was not the case. They could get a loan at the branch, but if they needed any type of assistance, they had to call a servicer or go someplace else. My amendment, which is supported by the National Consumer Law Center and the National Association of REALTORS, establishes a pilot program to see whether this would be feasible-- whether we could get bank branches not only to make loans but also to help borrowers when they come into difficult circumstances.

I have also filed an amendment that would direct GAO to conduct a retrospective study of the impact of the provisions of this legislation on economic growth and consumer protection. Specifically, my amendment asks GAO to evaluate the bill's impact on non-managerial wages, senior executive pay, stock buybacks, the interest paid on savings or money market accounts, jobs being moved abroad, foreclosure rates, and enforcement actions.

In so doing, we will be able to determine whether the legislation actually delivers on the claims by its sponsors of economic growth and consumer protection. I think we always have to go back and check our work, and this provision would allow us, in a formal and systematic way, to check our work. I hope we can do that.

Finally, I have filed an amendment supported by the former Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, to retain and strengthen the Federal Reserve's emergency safety and soundness powers. To quote Chairman Volcker: ``It's clear that circumstances can arise where the activities of some banks with less than $250 billion in assets would pose a grave threat to financial stability. To address such a threat, regulators have certain tools in their arsenal that we wish they will never have to use. Senator Reed's amendment wisely restores and strengthens one such tool, allowing it to be deployed under limited circumstances and only upon approval of a supermajority of the [Financial Stability Oversight] Council.''

Surely, at the very least, we should agree to preserve and strengthen the ability of our financial regulators to avoid grave threats and another financial crisis.

Before I conclude, I would like to make one further observation. Ten years ago today, few of us knew ahead of time that we would see an economy that would collapse into depths that we did not anticipate, that our Nation would literally recoil due to the recklessness and unchecked greed of too many on Wall Street. We should not forget that, nationally, over 8.6 million jobs were lost between January 2008 and January 2010, with over 33,000 jobs lost in Rhode Island alone. If anything, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was a sensible and long overdue response to the reality that people are nowhere near perfect and cannot always be trusted to do the right thing.

We learned in the hardest and most painful ways that certain safeguards are necessary. Unfortunately, the bill before us today removes some of those safeguards. Absent any serious changes made to the bill during this week's debate and for all the reasons I have stated, I cannot support it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I come to the floor to give the first of several speeches on Russia's hybrid warfare operations against the West. Today, I want to highlight one aspect of this ongoing destabilization effort: the Kremlin's malign financial influence.

It is clear we need a whole-of-government approach and a comprehensive strategy to counter Russian aggression. A particular focus should be devoted to reducing secrecy in our financial system. It is a simple fact: Bad actors need money to conduct their activities. Yet our current financial system's opaqueness serves the interests of malevolent forces.

Greater transparency will make it harder for the Kremlin and its cronies to exert malign financial influence on our shores. The lack of transparency in our system is problematic for our banks here at home. The global nature of our financial system means that foreign actors can take advantage of our institutions for their own gain, which has implications for our national security.

I have looked at this issue through the lens of my work as ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, as well as my service on the Banking Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence. Money laundering and other financial crimes are among the tools deployed by Russia as part of the Kremlin's larger influence campaign, which has been used against the United States and our allies and partners to advance the strategic and political goals of Russia. These activities are being used as weapons which threaten U.S. national security.

The Kremlin's use of malign financial influence is subtle and is part of a larger, coordinated operation of hybrid aggression by the Kremlin using a broad spectrum of military and nonmilitary tools at its disposal. Russia recognizes that, for now, its military capabilities are limited relative to the United States and NATO, and it will seek to avoid a direct military conflict with the West. Instead, Russia deploys tactics that leverage its strengths and exploit our systematic vulnerabilities.

As laid out in the Russian National Security Strategy of 2015, the Kremlin's approach to conflict includes weaponizing tools and resources from across government and society. The Russian strategy states: ``Interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts.''

This describes what may be called a Russian ``hybrid'' approach to confrontation below the threshold of direct armed conflict, a method that has been developing and escalating since the earliest days of Putin's rise to power in Russia. The main tenets of the Kremlin's hybrid operations are: information operation with cyber tools--which people commonly think of as hacking--propaganda and disinformation, manipulation of social media, and malign influence, which can be deployed through political or financial channels.

As a nation, we are beginning to unpack what happened in the 2016 Presidential election with respect to certain aspects of Russian hybrid operations. For example, we are learning how the Russians combined hacking operations with the release of information timed for maximum political damage. We have also learned more about Russia's manipulation of social media with Kremlin-linked cyber armies. But we have yet to understand the depths of how the Kremlin has used money as a weapon and how it has harmed our national security and our democracy. For this aspect of its hybrid arsenal, Russia is using money as a tool of warfare to exploit the vulnerabilities of our democratic institutions to its advantage.

The Russian system of corrupt financial influence rests on Putin's domestic power structure. The Putin regime is fundamentally a kleptocracy, which is a system where corrupt leaders use their power to exploit their country's people and natural resources in order to extend their personal wealth and personal power. Putin has systemically fostered kleptocratic conditions by exploiting state funds and resources to reward a group of close associates, commonly referred to as oligarchs. Many of these associates have a personal connection to Putin and have gained their positions of power or fortune due to their relationship with him. Often these political and personal relationships were forged in childhood, early adulthood, or during Putin's days in the KGB and the St. Petersburg government.

In exchange for wealth, privilege, and often impunity, this group of Putin's cronies are readily deployed to act on behalf of Kremlin interests. As Russian scholar and journalist Joshua Yaffa detailed, ``Oligarchs finance the `black ledger,' . . . money that does not go through the budget but is needed by the state, to finance elections and support local political figures, for example.' Funds leave the state budget as procurement orders, and come back as off the books cash, to be spent however the Kremlin sees fit.''

Russia's kleptocratic system reinforces Putin's power in several ways. First, he controls who profits from state coffers, making the recipients of state largess indebted to him. Second, he can outsource projects of financial influence, which provides him with access to private wealth streams and gives him plausible deniability if the projects have a nefarious aspect. Finally, this system allows Putin to ensnare oligarchs who may have enriched themselves through a corrupt deal or committed crimes that were state-sanctioned.

Not only has Putin been able to use corruption to protect his power base at home, but he has then exported his kleptocratic system as part of his arsenal of hybrid warfare. The Kremlin has studied the gaps in Western society and leverages the oligarchs' wealth through the system of power Putin created, to buy our influence, distort our markets, and warp our democratic institutions.

As the Center for Strategic and International Studies report, ``The Kremlin Playbook,'' notes, ``Corruption is the lubricant on which this system operates, concentrating the exploitation of the state resources to further Russia's networks of influence.'' A byproduct of this malign financial influence is the use of ill-gotten gains to further fuel the cycle of corruption and fund other aspects of the Kremlin's hybrid aggression.

As I mentioned, Putin and his inner circle often deploy these financial influence tactics through an oligarch. These intermediaries are not officially affiliated with the government and appear to operate independently, which makes them harder to detect and gives the Kremlin plausible deniability.

In conventional warfare, the tools of war are implements of physical destruction, but under Putin's tactics of financial malign influence the tools are the same as any large-scale criminal organization: offshore tax havens and banking centers, shell companies, money laundering, with the addition of Russian majority-owned state banks.

Russian malign financial influence and the proceeds from this activity are harming our national security and corrupting our democratic institutions. As described in ``The Kremlin Playbook,'' ``The mechanisms of Russian influence are designed to thrive in Western democracies because they use Western rules and institutions and exploit their systematic weaknesses.''

And these tactics appear to be updated versions of similar tools used against us in the past. As Russian expert Brian Whitmore wrote, ``In many ways, Russian corruption is the new Soviet communism. The Kremlin's black cash is the new red menace.''

He further described this threat as ``a web of opaque front corporations, murky energy deals and complex money laundering schemes which ensnare foreign elites and form a ready-made Kremlin lobby.''

Let's think about that for a second. The Kremlin is buying off foreigners to do its bidding within its own societies. And the way they are buying influence is obscured through exploiting Western banking laws and international financial systems. We have no way of knowing whom this money is going to or what it is buying. Russia is using our blind spot to advance their political and strategic goals and, in the process, corrupt and warp our institutions from within.

Let's take a look at how they are doing it. One way the Kremlin is asserting malign financial influence is through personal relationships, established by oligarchs or through other Kremlin-linked business executives. As Vice President Biden and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Carpenter warned in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, this arrangement ``gives the Kremlin enormous leverage over wealthy Russians who do business in the West and over Western companies that do business in Russia. Moscow can ask (or pressure) such businesspeople and companies to help finance its subversion of political processes elsewhere.''

One oligarch who used this method is Oleg Deripaska. Deripaska has been a close Putin ally for decades. Deripaska is transparent about how his wealth was deployed as a tool for the Kremlin, stating:

If the state says we need to give it up, we'll give it up.

I don't separate myself from the state. I have no other

interests.

He served as the benefactor for a variety of political activities that advanced Kremlin interests. According to the Wall Street Journal, this financial backing included paying Paul Manafort, who later became Trump's campaign manager, $10 million a year to advance Kremlin interests in Ukraine, Georgia, and Montenegro. Investigations from NBC News and the New York Times found that Deripaska fronted Manafort an estimated $60 million for other business ventures and loans, moving the funds through shell companies in Cypress and the Cayman Islands.

A second way these influence activities can be deployed is through Russian majority state-owned banks. These banks do not function like the ones we deal with every day. In fact, these banks often don't care about making profits at all. Instead, they are using money as a weapon of influence, to advance the Russian state or enrich people who may ultimately advance the Kremlin's aims.

An example is the Vnesheconombank, commonly known as VEB. The U.S. Treasury Department described VEB as a ``payment agent for the Russian government.'' This bank is essentially controlled by Putin's inner circle as the President picks the chairman and the Prime Minister sits on its supervisory board. Foreign Policy journalist Elias Groll deemed the bank ``a precision-guided diplomatic weapon.'' As such, VEB has taken on a range of projects with one common goal--to advance Kremlin interests. VEB financed a large share of the $50 billion Sochi Olympics, attempted to shore up the troubled Ukrainian steel industry, and underwrote the losses of key Putin cronies whose financial interests were hurt by U.S. and EU sanctions.

VEB is under sanctions for its role in financing Kremlin aggression against Crimea and eastern Ukraine. VEB garnered headlines because it was used as a cover for a spying ring with efforts to recruit people such as Carter Page, who later became a Trump campaign associate. According to the Department of Justice, conversations recorded between these Russian spies reveal that they saw tactics of financial influence as a way to gain Page's cooperation. In addition, VEB Chairman Sergey Gorkov, a close Putin ally, met with Jared Kushner in December 2016, while VEB remained under sanctions. While the Trump administration said that the meeting was in Kushner's capacity as an incoming government official, a spokesman for Putin said that it was for business reasons. This bank is losing billions of dollars funding projects of political and strategic value to the Kremlin, bailing out oligarchs and being used as cover for spies. These activities don't match with those of a ``normal bank.''

Another tool of Russian financial influence is offshore banking centers or tax havens, which refers to financial institutions in a place that is different from where the depositor lives. Usually this is done for the financial and legal advantages the location provides, including secrecy and little or no taxation. The Russians have used these centers to facilitate the movement of money out of Russia. Once money finds a home in an offshore banking center, it can be relabeled as ``foreign'' and then can move back to Russia or to a third destination with the origin and ownership of the funds obscured.

The Panama Papers--a leak of over 11 million files from one of the world's largest offshore law firms--showed that between 2007 and 2013, nearly $2 billion had been funneled through offshore accounts to those in Putin's inner circle. Top centers for Russian offshore banking include Cyprus, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Switzerland, and Bermuda. Russian experts, Michael Weiss and Peter Pomerantsev, noted: ``These destinations, prized for their secrecy laws and tax havens, often make cameos whenever Russian corruption scandals are exposed in the international press.''

Cypress became a particularly important haven for the Kremlin after the United States and the European Union issued sanctions against Russia for its aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Cyprus provided a haven for Russian oligarchs and others from Putin's inner circle to keep their money safe from sanctions and served as a launching point for the money to be used to finance further malign influence activities.

Often the Kremlin and Kremlin-linked actors utilize offshore tax havens and shell companies together. Shell companies are legal entities that generally have no physical assets or operations and may be used solely to hold property rights or financial assets. Russia has exploited these shell companies as a tool to obscure true ownership, fund shady deals, launder ill-gotten gains, and further the cycle of corruption.

One Kremlin-linked money laundering operation, commonly referred to as the laundromat, moved an estimated $20 billion out of Russia through Eastern Europe and then to banks around the world. The Russian journalists who uncovered the scheme found that the beneficiaries were Russian business executives who had state contracts with Russian Government or government-owned entities worth the equivalent of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.

The money was laundered by 21 shell companies based in the United Kingdom, Cypress, and New Zealand.

While it is easy to dismiss this as a problem that occurs in other countries rather than our own, Kremlin and Kremlin-linked actors are also exploiting our own laws in the United States to deploy these tools of financial influence. They are taking advantage of laws that do not require disclosure of who really owns a company or whose money is really funding these entities. They are taking advantage of the secrecy permitted in our system to continue their corrupt practices and intertwine their money into our systems.

As Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Day testified at a recent Banking Committee hearing, ``the pervasive use of front companies, shell companies, nominees and other means to conceal the beneficial owners of assets is one of the great loopholes'' in the anti-money laundering regime of the United States. Similarly, the 2015 Treasury Department's National Money Laundering Risk Assessment estimates that $300 billion is generated annually in illicit proceeds of the United States and cites shell companies as a means to move these funds into our domestic banking system.

The global, interconnected nature of our financial system has also been manipulated by Kremlin-linked actors to hold or move illicit funds and launder their ill-gotten gains across the West. In one prime example, Deutsche Bank was revealed to be helping Russian clients illegally launder $10 billion between 2011 and 2015 in a mirror-trading scheme in which rubles were surreptitiously converted into dollars. This scheme would begin with Deutsche Bank's Moscow branch buying Russian stocks in rubles. Shortly after, sometimes on the same day, a related party would sell the same Russian stock in the same quantity and at the same price through Deutsche Bank's London office, but in dollars.

The New York State Department of Financial Services found that the parties doing the buying or selling were closely related to both sides such as through common ownership and that none of the trades demonstrated any legitimate economic rationale. The New York State Department of Financial Services concluded: ``By converting rubles into dollars through security trades that had no discernible purpose, the scheme was a means for bad actors within a financial institution to achieve improper ends while evading compliance with applicable laws.'' Deutsche Bank paid $425 million to New York State in fines and an additional $204 million to U.K. regulators for this money laundering scheme.

Kremlin-linked actors have also used real estate to launder illicit Russian funds in the United States and elsewhere. Often the purchase of real estate is done through an intermediary, which both obscures the true ownership of the property and hides the origin of the funds. These purchases are often all-cash deals, which is particularly problematic to trace and cut banks out of the process, which removes a crucial layer of oversight. Indeed, FinCEN, the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, called out all-cash real estate deals in August of 2017 as an area of particular concern due to its lack of anti-money laundering protections.

One recent example of using all-cash real estate as a means to launder funds is the case of the Russian firm Prevezon. Prevezon is a firm owned by Denis Katsyv, the son of the former Kremlin Transportation Minister and a key Putin ally. Prevezon was charged by the Justice Department in connection with laundering the proceeds of an elaborate $230 million tax refund fraud scheme, including buying real estate in Manhattan with some of the profits from this scheme.

As described, these tactics of financial influence, part of the Kremlin's hybrid arsenal, have a corrupting and destabilizing effect on our democracies. Beyond the tactic itself, which is deployed to advance Kremlin aims, the ill-gotten gains created from these tactics continue to serve to concentrate Putin's hold on power and fund other aspects of Russian hybrid warfare operations.

Profits gained from tactics of financial influence have underwritten the following malign activities: raising private militias to fight in Ukraine and Syria; assisting Russian military intelligence with conducting signals intelligence operations and other specialized technology and training against the United States in the 2016 election; funding troll operations that manipulate social media platforms in information operations against us and our allies; paying construction costs for a bridge between Crimea and the Russian mainland, which, once completed, will help the Kremlin to solidify its illegal annexation of Crimea.

The common link through all of these tools is secrecy. Putin and his kleptocratic system thrives on secrecy and on hybrid operations that blur the lines between legitimate economic activity and corruption, and between conflict and cooperation.

We need to take a serious look at how our government is organized to counter Kremlin hybrid operations in their totality. But one thing is for certain; we need to reduce secrecy in our banking system, which leaves us more vulnerable to the manipulation of our free market system by the Kremlin and Kremlin-linked actors.

We are getting a reputation around the world as a place to go if you want to hide money. This is contrary to both American values and the traditional role of the United States as the enforcer of international norms.

Starting in May of this year, many financial institutions will have to collect and verify the identity of the beneficial owners of companies at the time of an account opening as a result of Treasury's customer due diligence rule. While this is a start, we need to go further and pierce the veil of secrecy that has shrouded our system. We heard testimony in the Banking Committee on ways to improve U.S. disclosure requirements, including requiring disclosure of all beneficial owners, regardless of ownership stake.

I applaud those who have already been thinking about this issue. This includes recommendations, put out earlier this month by the Center for American Progress, that call for concrete reforms, including curbing abuses of shell companies, increasing FinCEN's budget, and amending portions of the Bank Secrecy Act and Money Laundering Control Act in a way that would provide greater transparency and regulation regarding the sale of real estate.

There are also legislative fixes that have been proposed in the Senate. I appreciate that my colleagues Senators Whitehouse, Feinstein, and Grassley have introduced legislation, the True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement Act. I also recognize my colleagues Senators Wyden and Rubio for introducing the Corporate Transparency Act in the Senate. I know similar efforts have been made in the House of Representatives.

I intend to take a close look at these legislative proposals but the key, in my opinion, is making sure that we are able to trace these shell companies back to who is specifically benefiting and directing them; that is, any serious effort to determine ownership must stop only when a specific individual or individuals have been identified. Too often we take one step and find another shell company and stop right there. That doesn't lead us to anyone. We have to find the individuals who are benefiting from and directing these activities.

The use of these shell companies, as I have said repeatedly throughout my comments, has a real effect on our national security. As the Special Counsel indictment against what is commonly called the ``troll factory'' shows, close Putin ally Yevgeny Prigohzin was funding an organization conducting what it called ``information warfare against the United States.'' Prigohzin used 14 affiliated shell companies to fund this operation as a way to hide the true source of funds. Without the full investigatory power and subpoena power of the Special Counsel's office, we probably would not have uncovered the true ownership behind this operation. The Kremlin designs it that way, and we can't let them keep getting away with it.

Part and parcel with exposing beneficial ownership would be to stand up an interagency task force led by FinCEN to follow the flow of illicit Russian money into the United States. This task force should leverage the intelligence community, the State Department, and other relevant government agencies to take a comprehensive

approach to uncovering where the money is going and how these ill- gotten gains are being spent. Remaining passive and waiting, is not going to deter, disrupt, and finally defeat these deliberate Russian efforts to undermine our basic institutions.

I will continue to work with my colleagues on the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and others to ensure that our national security apparatus has the requisite authorities.

What we need now is initiative by the administration to fully resource and to direct a comprehensive approach to detect, disrupt, and prevent this Russian interference. We need to put the appropriate resources against this threat. The heart of our democracy--our election process--was attacked by the Russians. As we learned yesterday from Admiral Rogers of Cyber Command, it is under attack as we speak today, and we can expect the attacks against the 2018 election cycle to increase with both frequency, boldness, and, unfortunately, effectiveness if we remain passive--indeed, paralyzed--as we are today. We have to recognize that the money that is being generated through these malign financial activities is being used not only to enrich Putin and his cronies but is being used to attack the United States very effectively. Putin has exploited our own laws that favor financial secrecy and has used clandestine tactics to his advantage at a relatively inexpensive cost.

Increasing, for example, resources to FinCEN in the Treasury Department or standing up and funding a task force, as I described, and devoting the necessary resources to tracing shell companies back to the people responsible would be a small fraction of what it would cost to use conventional forces to deter Russian aggression. Indeed, deploying a combat team to the Baltics is more expensive, I would suspect, than setting up a team of experts here in Washington that will go after these funding streams, and without the money, they cannot conduct their operations.

Mr. President, we often hear the expression ``follow the money'' as a way to identify the cause of a problem, and that is true here. Today, we know that our democracy and many others are under attack by the Government of Russia. Responding to this reality will require a comprehensive strategy to counter Russian asymmetric and hybrid tactics. However, as I laid out, an immediate step we can take is a concerted effort to bring greater transparency to our financial system. If we fail to do so, we will continue to have that very secrecy used against our national security interests and the interests of all of our allies.

Now is the time to act. We are being attacked. To sit back and absorb the punches will lead only to defeat, not to a final victory over our adversaries.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, last September, President Trump took it upon himself to create an economic, humanitarian, and political crisis by rescinding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program, or DACA, without proposing a serious solution for the nearly 800,000 DACA recipients who now face deportation. These people and their families have had to endure fits and starts of uncertainty as Democrats and some Republicans have worked tirelessly to advance the Dream Act and other fair and reasonable compromises authored chiefly by my colleagues, Senators Durbin and Graham, also supported by the Presiding Officer, only to have President Trump and the Republican majority find every way to say no, or to stall the process.

This week, however, the Senate has an opportunity to address the panic and stress the President caused, not just for those on DACA and their families, but also for our Nation's businesses and our broader economy. I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for this chance for an open debate on a solution for Dreamers. In particular, I again thank Senator Durbin, Senator Graham, and Senator Flake for their advocacy and efforts to find a bipartisan compromise. I thank Leader Schumer for his leadership in pushing for a resolution, and Leader McConnell for keeping his commitment to have this debate. I thank them all.

The basic facts of this debate are clear. The American people overwhelmingly support finding a solution for Dreamers that protects them from deportation and provides a pathway to citizenship for those who work hard and play by the rules. I believe that a bipartisan majority of my colleagues want the same thing. The question before us is whether the partisanship and raw feelings surrounding this debate will prevent a solution to this crisis from becoming law. So I urge my colleagues: Let us forge the bipartisan agreement that the American people want and the Dreamers deserve. Let us end this crisis. Then, after this bipartisan show of good faith, let us again take up the kind of comprehensive immigration reform that many of us in this body have already voted to pass so we can fix our broken immigration system once and for all.

I do not believe, however, that solving the DACA crisis, which President Trump in a sense created, should come at the cost of radically restructuring legal immigration. According to the conservative Cato Institute, President Trump's immigration proposals in exchange for resolving the DACA crisis would result in an approximate 44-percent reduction in legal immigration. This would be the largest cut to immigration in nearly a century. In addition to the profound effects such a cut would have on American families, culture, and opportunities, it would also level a massive blow to the American labor force and economic growth.

According to the Cato Institute and the independent research firm Macroeconomic Advisers, slashing legal immigration by about half could initially cut our projected economic growth rate by 12.5 percent in the next year or two. That would be a significant blow to our economy, and it could lead to further reduced economic growth projections down the line due to the reduction in the size of the American workforce. And, just as our Nation faces a skyrocketing deficit due to the impact of policies like the Republican tax plan, the National Academy of Sciences estimates that immigrants, on average, contribute over $92,000 more than they receive in government benefits over the course of their lives, and losing these American workers would only further shrink revenue that could help balance the budget.

If Congress decides to take on immigration reform of this magnitude, it must be in the context of bipartisan, comprehensive immigration reform, and not in the context of resolving this crisis that has been prompted by President Trump.

Nor should this discussion suggest that a desire to do the right thing by Dreamers somehow indicates a lack of appreciation for the importance of securing our borders. I believe my colleagues on both sides of the aisle agree that border security is of critical importance to our Nation. I have voted to increase the vetting of visa applicants, to heighten security on international travel, and to increase support for homeland security and border control by billions of dollars. In Fiscal Year 2000, there were 8,619 Border Patrol agents on the southwest border. Today, there are currently just shy of 20,000. The Obama administration alone added more than 3,000 Border Patrol agents on our southern Border, doubled the amount of fencing, and added technological systems, including aerial and ground surveillance systems. Unlawful immigration began lessening under President Obama, and today, fewer people are entering the country illegally across the U.S.-Mexico border than in the past 50 years. I believe in a strong border that continues to adapt the best technologies and tactics to keep our Nation safe. What I do not believe in, however, is symbolic action, like the construction of a wall that would drain taxpayer dollars without making Americans any safer.

There is a reason that Americans on both sides of the political divide have spoken out against deporting Dreamers. A great many of these young people are outstanding and accomplished, and our communities would feel the loss of all that they contribute. It is true that they were brought here as children outside the appropriate processes, but this was through no fault of their own. As they have grown up here, they have pursued higher education, started American families, worked hard and paid taxes, and stayed out of trouble with the law. They have passed background checks, been fingerprinted, paid hundreds of dollars in fees, and submitted detailed records to immigration enforcement officials whose job it is to prevent fraud and spot any criminals in the system. Indeed, DACA status is not blanket amnesty or an entitlement, but is something that must be earned and kept up.

Hundreds of DACA recipients served in the U.S. Armed Forces, like Zion Dirgantara, whose mother brought him and his brother from Indonesia to Philadelphia when they were young, and who did not know about his undocumented status until he applied for a driver's license. Last fall, Zion told the Washington Post that he was deeply affected when, at age 12, he watched the crash of United Flight 93 in his new home State of Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, but he could not join the Army out of high school because of his undocumented status. Because of DACA, he was able to enlist in the Army, but both his status and his ability to continue serving his country hang in the balance during this debate.

Many of my colleagues have spoken movingly and eloquently about the Dreamers who have come forward to tell their stories. I associate myself with their remarks, and challenge my colleagues who have not met these young people in person to listen to their stories and perspectives. Over the last few months, I, and my staff, have had the opportunity to meet several very impressive Dreamers living in Rhode Island who have illustrated what the loss of DACA means to them and their families. I met one young woman studying at Brown University who needs DACA to ensure that she can stay here to attend medical school and help fill the shortage of doctors in America. Another young man I met told me that DACA, for him, means being able to drive to school and work every day to save up for advanced education.

These young people want to live productive lives and, indeed, according to the Center for American Progress, letting DACA expire completely would

cost our Nation's economy over $460 billion over the next decade, including an annual loss to Rhode Island's economy of an estimated $60 million. Finding a solution for these people is not just the right thing to do, but it also makes smart economic sense, and I believe that is part of the reason why the American people are largely in agreement on helping Dreamers.

I also wish to note that this same moral and economic sense applies to the need to provide deportation relief and legal status for qualified recipients of Temporary Protected Status, or TPS, and Deferred Enforced Departure. These individuals came to America from devastated parts of the world seeking safety and a fresh start, and they have become integral members of our community and our economy. Like DACA recipients, they have passed rigorous and periodic background checks, paid hundreds of dollars in fees, and demonstrated that they are not risks to public safety or national security. The average TPS beneficiary has been in America for 19 years and many have been here even longer. About 70 percent to 80 percent are employed, and they are collectively parents to nearly 275,000 American citizen children.

Since 1999, I have been fighting for a pathway to citizenship for Liberians who came to States like Rhode Island to escape two bloody civil wars and the Ebola virus outbreak. Some of these Liberian refugees have been fixtures of our community for nearly 30 years but, like DACA recipients, they could face deportation in a number of weeks because of the expiration of TPS and DED protections. Congress can and should include these populations in the solutions we discuss here this week.

Mr. President, I, along with many of my colleagues, have taken the tough votes to strengthen our border and ensure immigrants play by the rules. I have voted for the DREAM Act and for comprehensive immigration reform that passed in this body. I know that we can address this crisis if we choose to, but I also know that the only true path forward is real bipartisan compromise, not posturing or legislative gamesmanship. I urge my colleagues to support compromise legislation to address the specific crisis before us and, when we have done that, to begin earnest discussions on bipartisan and comprehensive immigration reform.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, today I pay tribute to DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, on the 60th anniversary of its inception. After the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, President Eisenhower determined that the United States would never again be caught off guard by technological surprise. DARPA was established to anticipate new technological capabilities and pursue strategic technological surprise for our military forces.

DARPA works collaboratively with academic institutions, corporate and government R&D labs, and small business enterprise. While the primary focus is to discover fundamental new concepts that lead to breakthrough technologies for national security, many of DARPA's advances also benefit greater society. Some well-known examples include precision- guided weapons systems with miniaturized GPS components also found on many consumer products; the internet, used initially to link DARPA with performer partners, now widely used in commerce and every aspect of our lives; advanced antenna systems enabling more efficient warfighter communications and satellite signal reception for consumers; new breakthroughs in robotic technology for national security applications and the development of advanced prosthetic arms for wounded warriors and civilians alike. The list goes on.

By not accepting the parameters of what is widely accepted as the known possible, DARPA has proven that amazing achievements can be had by stretching to reach for what was once deemed impossible. In the realm of national defense, DARPA has pursued new systems, including unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles, hypersonic flight research, and new frontiers in biomedical research. From the giant engines of the Saturn V rocket that took Americans to the Moon to the smallest microelectronics that populate our smartphones, DARPA has been ahead of the cutting edge of technological innovation.

By focusing its efforts at the boundaries of fundamental research in physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, materials science, electronics, and engineering, DARPA has helped create new communities of scientists and engineers, both inside and beyond the traditional defense community. Along the way, new businesses and sometimes entire industries have sprung from DARPA-funded research, reflecting the Agency's commitment to pursue its ideas all the way from initial concept to demonstration of practical feasibility through prototype development.

DARPA programs are led by program managers who come from universities, industry, national laboratories, and other parts of government for limited postings that typically last 3 to 5 years--a time limit that helps drive the Agency's signature sense of urgency. Recognizing that some revolutionary goals inevitably prove unachievable, DARPA carefully manages risk by establishing appropriate milestone procedures and redirecting or discontinuing programs when further advancement stalls.

I congratulate DARPA for its many achievements over the past 60 years. The true assets that enable this kind of achievement are the men and women who work to make the visions of tomorrow become today's reality.

As DARPA moves into the future, I encourage my colleagues to join with me in recognizing this milestone and

supporting DARPA so that it can continue to keep our warfighters and citizens at the leading edge of technology and out of harm's way.

Today, I am introducing the Control Your Personal Credit Information Act, which seeks to give consumers greater control over when and how their consumer reports are shared by consumer reporting agencies.

Under existing law, the current consumer reporting system is backwards. Consumer reporting agencies collect vast amounts of personal information on consumers, often without our knowledge, in order to compile consumer reports. These reports are then shared with financial institutions and others without our consent in all cases.

In the wake of Equifax's failure to secure troves of valuable personally identifiable information it collected on over 145 million Americans, it is clear that this system must change. Indeed, the National Consumer Law Center's

Chi Chi Wu stated in her October 2017 testimony before the House Financial Services Committee that the Equifax breach ``means half of the US population and nearly three-quarters of the consumers with active credit reports are now at risk of identity theft due to one of the worst--if not the worst--breaches of consumer data in American history. These Americans are at risk of having false new credit accounts, phony tax returns, and even spurious medical bills incurred in their good names.'' To make matters worse, the risks of identity fraud may not dissipate over time because as Ed Mierzwinski, U.S. PIRG's Federal Consumer Program Director, points out ``unlike credit card numbers, your Social Security umber and Date of Birth don't change and may even grow more valuable over time, like gold in a bank vault. Much worse, they are the keys to `new account identity theft.'''

My legislation attempts to address these concerns and fix the current upside down system by giving consumers greater control, at no cost to the consumer, over when and how their consumer reports are released when applying for new credit, a loan, or insurance. Under my legislation, consumer reporting agencies must confirm a consumer's identity and obtain their written authorization before releasing consumer reports in the instances that are especially vulnerable to identity theft and fraud. In addition, my bill requires every consumer reporting agency to take appropriate steps to prevent unauthorized access to the consumer reports and personal information they maintain. These steps are designed to make it tougher for criminals to fraudulently open new credit or insurance accounts in other people's names.

I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this commonsense legislative effort, and I thank the National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients), U.S. PIRG, Americans for Financial Reform, Public Citizen, Consumer Federation of America, and Consumers Union for their support.

Today, I am introducing the Control Your Personal Credit Information Act, which seeks to give consumers greater control over when and how their consumer reports are shared by consumer reporting agencies.

Under existing law, the current consumer reporting system is backwards. Consumer reporting agencies collect vast amounts of personal information on consumers, often without our knowledge, in order to compile consumer reports. These reports are then shared with financial institutions and others without our consent in all cases.

In the wake of Equifax's failure to secure troves of valuable personally identifiable information it collected on over 145 million Americans, it is clear that this system must change. Indeed, the National Consumer Law Center's

Chi Chi Wu stated in her October 2017 testimony before the House Financial Services Committee that the Equifax breach ``means half of the US population and nearly three-quarters of the consumers with active credit reports are now at risk of identity theft due to one of the worst--if not the worst--breaches of consumer data in American history. These Americans are at risk of having false new credit accounts, phony tax returns, and even spurious medical bills incurred in their good names.'' To make matters worse, the risks of identity fraud may not dissipate over time because as Ed Mierzwinski, U.S. PIRG's Federal Consumer Program Director, points out ``unlike credit card numbers, your Social Security umber and Date of Birth don't change and may even grow more valuable over time, like gold in a bank vault. Much worse, they are the keys to `new account identity theft.'''

My legislation attempts to address these concerns and fix the current upside down system by giving consumers greater control, at no cost to the consumer, over when and how their consumer reports are released when applying for new credit, a loan, or insurance. Under my legislation, consumer reporting agencies must confirm a consumer's identity and obtain their written authorization before releasing consumer reports in the instances that are especially vulnerable to identity theft and fraud. In addition, my bill requires every consumer reporting agency to take appropriate steps to prevent unauthorized access to the consumer reports and personal information they maintain. These steps are designed to make it tougher for criminals to fraudulently open new credit or insurance accounts in other people's names.

I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this commonsense legislative effort, and I thank the National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients), U.S. PIRG, Americans for Financial Reform, Public Citizen, Consumer Federation of America, and Consumers Union for their support.

Madam President, President Trump and the Republicans have been in charge of the White House, the House of Representatives, and the Senate for nearly a year now. Under their control, these three institutions have formed a Bermuda Triangle, if you will, for any kind of meaningful legislation that will help average Americans.

They devoted most of last year to a destructive attempt to eliminate health insurance coverage for 30 million Americans before pivoting to a partisan tax bill that benefits the powerful and costs trillions of dollars that could be spent many ways, including to enhance and improve our military equipment and our military personnel; $1.5 trillion were dedicated to tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans and not to the men and women of the military. This tax legislation will also leave 13 million Americans without health insurance. So contrary to the President's declarations--or those of his campaign--that he has a great plan that will cover all Americans, 13 million Americans likely will lose their coverage.

Now, Congress is 2 days away from a government shutdown because, again, the majority and the President appear uninterested in governing, which means compromise. It means working on policy together with both Republicans and Democrats to deal with the real priorities--like jobs, education, infrastructure, and national security--that are essential to the American people.

The press has been focusing on the Trump-caused immigration crisis as the supposed cause for the Republican dilemmas at the moment. It is true that finding a solution for Dreamers is very important. Indeed, a poll cited by the Washington Post's editorial board this morning said that 82 percent of voters, including almost 70 percent of Republican voters, believe there should be a path to citizenship for Dreamers.

This immigration crisis is not the only unfinished business before Congress. We also have the Republican leadership's failure to make the effort early on to deal with some of the issues that are now facing us directly and affecting millions of Americans. Just think of some of the issues.

Since September, 9 million children who are covered by the CHIP program have essentially been going month to month on their healthcare coverage because the President, and this Congress, hasn't passed a 10- year extension that actually saves taxpayers money.

Community healthcare centers are such a vital part of our healthcare system. More than 25 million Americans use these centers. Once again, their funding is in limbo because the program has not been reauthorized.

Then there is the bipartisan Alexander-Murray bill to provide greater stability to private health insurance

markets. For a President who claimed he had a great plan to insure all Americans much better than the Affordable Care Act, there has been no movement on this important aspect of improving private healthcare insurance for Americans.

What about issues like the flood insurance program? We saw devastating floods in Florida and Texas. We know they are coming again. In fact, last year was the largest year in terms of government expenditures for storm damage that we have seen, including some of the wildfires that raged in the West. We know the floods will come again; yet a program we have for flood insurance is woefully underfunded, but that has not been dealt with.

Then, of course, at the heart of what so many talk about are the issues of the lingering sequestration caps that jeopardize defense and nondefense priorities alike. Indeed, by the way these caps are structured, our national security is jeopardized if we don't raise both defense and nondefense spending because under the category of nondefense are the State Department and other critical agencies. Without funding, they will not be able to protect the country, along with our Defense Department personnel. We have sought, over many months, a balanced solution to provide the resources necessary to cover the gamut of government programs for the benefit of all Americans.

In terms of flood insurance, we have American citizens in Puerto Rico--all American citizens--along with the people of Texas and Florida and California, because of the wildfires and recent floods, who desperately need additional help, and we should respond.

Just as an aside, one other proposal the President made on the campaign was for a really big infrastructure program, with investments up to $1 trillion. He was going to do that in the first 100 days. Well, a year later, we are still waiting, but in that time, we have seen $1.5 trillion being dedicated to tax cuts before anything else, and there is very little room left--given our fiscal situation--for the robust kinds of efforts he promised within his first 100 days.

The issue that has captured the imagination of so many is the issue of the Dreamers, as I mentioned before. The President decided he would remove protections for these individuals--as many as 800,000 of them--a few months ago, last September. He created a crisis that need not have been created.

We know the American people want these young people to get a chance to stay here. They are working. They are serving in the military. They are going to school. They are contributing to this community, and of his own volition, the President decided he was going to create a crisis. That crisis has now weighed heavily on us because, if we can't resolve this issue, there is a danger these young men and women could be immediately or very promptly removed from the country. We have been talking about this for months, but there is no progress.

I was very impressed with Senator Graham's testimony before the Judiciary Committee yesterday. As he noted, we thought last Tuesday we had a solution because, on Tuesday, the President was talking about love and comprehensive reform of our immigration laws and working together. In fact, he was flanked by Senator Durbin on one side and Representative Hoyer on the other side. That was Tuesday. Come Thursday, it seemed to be a different President--a different President in tone, a different President in terms of willingness to cooperate, a different President in terms of bipartisanship. We just hope that, before too long, the President from Tuesday returns because we don't want a shutdown. We want, in fact, a comprehensive solution to our problems.

When it comes to this particular issue of the Dreamers, as I have suggested, both Senator Graham and Senator Durbin have done a remarkable job working together in that good old-fashioned bipartisan way of finding a good middle ground in which we can provide some sense of security for the Dreamers. We can provide what the President wants: border security. We can think about a first step toward comprehensive immigration reform. That is the way we like to think this Senate, this House, and this government would operate. They have done their part, but they were met on Thursday with just unpredictable rejection and a tone that is not Presidential, but far from that. We have to get that job done, and I hope we can do that.

We have all heard the horror stories of these Dreamers. They have come in to visit us. They have talked about what they are doing. They have talked about how they want to continue to contribute to this country. Again, I think we have to do that for them, but also because they provide a significant economic contribution to this country.

The Center for American Progress has indicated that if DACA recipients lose their right to work lawfully, it could reduce our GDP by over $433 billion over the next decade. That is going to be a blow. It would be $60 million annually over this decade for my home State of Rhode Island. Not only is finding a solution the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do in terms of our economic well-being as a nation.

It is still possible to break through this deadlock. ``It is not over until it is over'' is the famous quote. We still have time--but not much time--to provide for appropriate relief for the Dreamers, to provide funding for our national security--that is defense and nondefense funding--to raise the caps so we can deal with this and do it, hopefully, not just for a short period of time but for at least 2 years. I think another kick-the-can-down-the-road measure is going to be unacceptable. Another couple more days, even with an inducement here and there--a nod at some of these policies that have not been actuated yet--I think that would be the wrong approach. I think we have to sit down and get it done.

This agenda has been the President's agenda, not the Democratic minority's agenda. That is what happens when you control the Presidency, the House, and the Senate; you set the agenda. Some argue we should have been talking about infrastructure in January--last January. Some argue we should have been talking about budget caps last January and have a situation where we would be passing budgets on time.

Some of the complaints of my colleagues--and I heard them--is it is not just the fact that the funding isn't sufficient, it is the uncertainty of the funding that affects our readiness in the military, that affects our ability in non-DOD functions to deal effectively and efficiently with problems that face Americans.

As I mentioned, this agenda has been an agenda that was preoccupied and just fixated on taking on ObamaCare, and that failed. Then it shifted not to infrastructure, not to our budget problems, not to other factors but to tax cuts, but to $1.5 trillion in deficit-funded tax cuts.

Again, if you look at some of these military programs--for example, the whole reinvigoration of our nuclear posture, which is to be the subject of a nuclear posture deal, it has been estimated, over a decade or more, to cost in the vicinity of $1 trillion.

I think people who are strong defense advocates can ask very sincerely, if we are going to borrow $1.5 trillion, why don't we use it on military equipment that we know we have to improve? Why are we giving it disproportionately to the richest Americans? I think those are questions that are resolved by the President and the leadership in the Senate and the House.

We are here because I think most Americans want to get things done. As I suggested by my polling numbers from the Washington Post, they want overwhelmingly to see the Dreamers have a path to freedom. They want to see people in Texas, in Florida, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands get the help they need because of a natural disaster. They want healthcare for children--the CHIP program. They want these children to be able to go to community health centers because that is where the vast majority of them go. They want to go ahead and ensure that these things are accomplished.

Now is the chance to govern, and the levers of the government are clearly in the hands of the Republican President, the Republican Senate, and the Republican House, and those levers should be moving for the American people.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I rise today to discuss my thoughts on recent protests in Iran and the important upcoming decisions by the President with respect to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA.

While I am mindful that we have limited visibility into Iran and continue to learn more about the circumstances and motivations of the recent protests, one thing is clear: A significant portion of the Iranian people are not satisfied with their government and are increasingly willing to make their dissatisfaction heard. It is important that we support their right to peacefully express their views and demand that the Iranian Government respond with constructive dialogue, rather than force.

It was notable that Iranian President Ruhani implicitly recognized the validity of the protests earlier this week when he reportedly said:

It would be a misrepresentation and also an insult to

Iranian people to say they only had economic demands. . . .

People had economic, political and social demands

That is according to President Ruhani.

Acknowledging the need for reform, Ruhani continued:

We cannot pick a lifestyle and tell two generations after

us to live like that. It is impossible. The views of the

young generation about life and the world is different than

ours.

Now is the time to support the Iranian people in their quest for a government that is more representative and supportive of their interests. Unfortunately, some have suggested that our response should be to withdraw from the JCPOA, an action that I believe would only serve to embolden the hardliners in Iran and leave the United States more isolated from our allies. Withdrawing from the JCPOA and reimposing nuclear-related sanctions on Iran would immediately change the narrative inside of Iran, uniting reformists and hardliners alike in their opposition to what they view as a hostile United States.

While some would argue that the recent protests in Iran are symptomatic of what they view as a flawed JCPOA, I would suggest otherwise. In reality, the nuclear deal exposed one of the Iranian regime's central vulnerabilities--namely, that the regime can no longer simply blame sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community for its economic woes at home. It is becoming clearer to the Iranian people that it is actually the regime's corruption, financial mismanagement, funding of malign activities, and hegemonic ambitions that are at the root of their government's inability to enable job creation and to ensure that necessities like food and gasoline remain affordable.

In the coming days, the President has several important decisions to make with respect to the JCPOA. In October, President Trump acknowledged that Iran is meeting its commitments under the JCPOA, but he chose not to certify that continued sanctions relief is ``appropriate and proportionate'' to the actions taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program. By the end of this week, President Trump is again required to decide whether to issue such a certification. I expect he will again choose not to do so.

The more consequential decision for the President this week will be whether to continue waivers of nuclear-related sanctions, as he is required to do under the JCPOA. Choosing not to continue such waivers would immediately snap back U.S. nuclear-related sanctions, thereby putting the United States in violation of the JCPOA. Let me be clear. This would be a unilateral action on behalf of the United States that would put us in violation of an international agreement, not just with Iran but with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, as well.

By all accounts, the JCPOA is working as intended, and Iran is verifiably meeting its commitments under the deal. It is important to remember what the JCPOA was designed to do and what it is now achieving. The JCPOA commits Iran to never seeking to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon; effectively cuts off all pathways for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon during the period covered by the agreement; and increases the time it would take for Iran to acquire enough material for one nuclear bomb from 2 to 3 months to at least 1 year. When this agreement was signed, they were within months of having that capability. It dramatically reduces Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and the number of installed centrifuges. It has prevented Iran from producing weapons-grade plutonium and has subjected Iran to robust monitoring by the IAEA to verify its compliance.

Withdrawing from the JCPOA at this point would provide no benefit and would actually leave us more isolated and less able to deal with the various challenges posed by Iran. The crippling sanctions regime that brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place only worked because the international community was united in its determination to keep Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon. If we withdraw from the JCPOA unilaterally--and in the absence of a clear violation of the deal by Iran--there is no reason to believe that our partners in the P5+1 would join us. In fact, French President Macron has said that there is ``no alternative'' to the JCPOA and told the U.N. General Assembly that ``renouncing it would be a grave error.''

General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Armed Services Committee last year:

I believe that the U.S. would incur damage vis-a-vis our

allies if we unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA. Our allies

will be less likely to cooperate with us on future military

action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and

less likely to cooperate with us on countering other

destabilizing aspects of Iranian behavior that threaten our

collective interests.

Our sanctions may snap back but not those imposed by the rest of the world, many of whom have begun building economic ties to Iran since the JCPOA was signed. Our international partners would then blame us, not Iran, for the failure of the deal.

Some, including President Trump, have argued that we can and should dissolve the JCPOA and renegotiate a better deal. This is a highly unrealistic proposal. We were only able to achieve the JCPOA after years of sustained multilateral diplomatic efforts and the imposition of aggressive international sanctions in concert with our partners. It will likely be impossible to replicate those conditions if the United States unilaterally withdraws from the JCPOA.

Contrary to President Trump's belief, threatening to walk away from the

deal actually weakens our ability to address the JCPOA's perceived flaws by alienating our partners. Instead, we should remain committed to the JCPOA and lead the international community in imposing additional sanctions, where necessary, to change other Iranian behaviors--namely, their respect for human rights, ballistic missile development efforts, and other malign activities.

We must also seek to help enable the Iranian people to make their choices heard, including by encouraging the adoption of social media and other means of communication. We could start by building upon general licenses issued by the Obama administration designed to encourage the export of communications technology to Iran.

Secretary Mattis told the Armed Services Committee at his confirmation hearing: ``When America gives her word, we have to live up to it and work with our allies.''

If the President decides this week not to continue nuclear-related sanctions relief for Iran, he will be effectively choosing to restart the Iranian nuclear program, thereby making military conflict with Iran more likely.

Withdrawing from the deal would also be a devastating blow to our efforts toward diplomacy with North Korea--and for that matter, any future diplomatic efforts to constrain aggressive behavior by our adversaries. Why would any nation engage with us in serious dialogue to resolve differences if they fear we will later withdraw unilaterally, even when the other parties are complying with the agreement?

Regardless of whether you supported the JCPOA before it was signed, the truth is that it has removed the greatest threat we faced from Iran while also preserving all other means to address Iran's malign activities. Let there be no doubt--Iran continues to be a state sponsor of terrorism and an abuser of human rights. Iran continues to destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles and support of proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much worse a nuclear-armed Iran would be.

Fortunately, our nonnuclear sanctions on Iran remain in place and are unaffected by the JCPOA. In fact, Congress authorized additional sanctions in July to help deal with these issues. The administration should work with our international partners and use all tools at its disposal, including by ramping up nonnuclear sanctions, where necessary, to counter Iran's unacceptable behavior in these other areas.

Abrogating the JCPOA only invites another nuclear crisis like the one we are currently facing with North Korea--a concern echoed by General Dunford when he appeared before the Armed Services Committee and said: ``It makes sense to me that our holding up agreements that we have signed, unless there's a material breach, would have impact on others' willingness to sign agreements.''

Many have criticized the JCPOA as a ``flawed deal.'' For example, concerns have been raised that certain provisions sunset after a period of years, thereby delaying rather than permanently preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon. If the concern is that Iran may seek to resume nuclear weapons development activities after these sunsets--a concern that I share--the appropriate course of action is not to throw out the deal but to work with our international partners to ensure that necessary restrictions on the JCPOA are appropriately extended or supplemented.

As I noted before, Iran has committed in perpetuity not to develop or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. We should not take them at their word; we should verify their adherence to this commitment, just as we are doing under the JCPOA. If at any point in the future we have evidence to suggest Iran is taking steps that would indicate a violation of that commitment, we should use that information to rally the P5+1 and other international partners to take a unified stand against such efforts. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would seriously damage our ability to exert such leadership in the future.

Again, according to General Dunford, in the absence of the JCPOA, Iran would likely resume its nuclear weapons program and ``a nuclear- armed Iran would likely be more aggressive in its actions and more dangerous in its consequences.'' General Dunford also told the committee that ``the intel community assessment is, in fact, that Iran is in compliance right now [with the JCPOA], and therefore, I think we should focus on addressing the other challenges: the missile threat they pose, the maritime threat they pose, the support of proxies, terrorists, and the cyber threat they pose.'' I wholeheartedly agree with General Dunford's assessment.

Our troops in Iraq and Syria are operating in close proximity to Iranian-aligned militias, including those who previously targeted American troops. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA could embolden these hardline militias and possibly result in Iran giving them a green light to begin targeting U.S. forces once more.

Furthermore, while I have full confidence in our military's ability to fight and win wars when necessary, we cannot escape the reality that military contingencies to respond to both a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran would result in massive loss of life and national treasure and greatly stress our military's capacity and capabilities.

In conclusion, I will return to where I began. Now is not the time to impose a self-inflicted wound upon our foreign policy and standing in the world. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would empower Iranian hardliners and dramatically undermine the reform-minded protests we should be seeking to empower. Worse still, it would leave us more isolated in the international community and, by extension, less able to address the range of national security challenges posed by Iran, North Korea, and our other potential adversaries.

We must not abdicate the JCPOA or American leadership on these issues. Therefore, I urge the President to stay the course with respect to the JCPOA, while also rallying the international community to take effective actions intended to change other unacceptable behaviors by the Iranian regime to suppress dissent at home and sow instability abroad. We must not squander this opportunity by making the story about the United States rather than the courageous Iranians who at great risk to themselves have taken to the streets to demand a better future.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Summer Lockerbie and Stephen Popick, fellows in my office, be granted privileges of the floor for the remainder of this session of the Congress.