Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. Mr. Chairman, the recent release of the Taliban Five was a potent reminder to Congress, as well as the American people, of the risk involved in detainee transfer decisions. The rising rate of…
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, the recent release of the Taliban Five was a potent reminder to Congress, as well as the American people, of the risk involved in detainee transfer decisions.
The rising rate of terrorism reengagement, the unstable security situation in Yemen, and the continuing threat posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have prompted me to introduce this amendment again this year.
One of President Obama's first acts in office was to sign an executive order to close the facility at Guantanamo.
However, the President himself suspended all detainee transfers from Gitmo to Yemen on January 5, 2010. This decision was made in the aftermath of the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt, which was the first attack on the U.S. by al Qaeda since 9/11.
The would-be bomber was radicalized and trained in Yemen. White House Press Secretary Gibbs said that:
Right now, any additional transfers to Yemen are not a good
idea.
In May of last year, the President changed his mind, lifting the moratorium on transfers to Yemen and reviewing transfers ``on a case- by-case basis.''
Unfortunately, the U.S. intelligence community reports that the number of former Gitmo detainees who reengage in terrorism has steadily increased since 2002.
In December 2007, the first public intelligence report addressing Gitmo ``reengagement'' declared the reengagement rate was ``about 7 percent.'' As of March of this year, the reengagement rate had risen to 29 percent. The majority of these individuals remain at large.
This information, which is the best, most reliable data we have, comes from the Director of National Intelligence. The March DNI report also notes that:
Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal
instability, as well as active recruitment by insurgent and
terrorist organizations, pose a particular problem.
Finally, the intel community has noted there is a lag of time of ``about 2\1/2\ years between leaving Gitmo and the first identified reengagement reports.'' Therefore, estimated historical suspected and confirmed rates may be lower than the actual current rates.
The administration should seek to ensure that the transfer process is further examined and improved before proceeding with additional transfers.
Meanwhile, the security situation in Yemen is frighteningly fragile and has gone from bad to worse. According to a 2012 HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee report on detainee reengagement, the United States has faced ``a persistent challenge'' in making certain that countries receiving transferred Gitmo detainees have ``the capacity and willingness to handle them in a way that sufficiently recognizes the dangers involved.''
Despite the commendable efforts of Yemeni President Hadi, numerous international organizations, such as the U.N. and the World Bank, have all noted the ``fragile environment'' in Yemen. Unfortunately, the country's progress is still at risk of being undermined by al Qaeda.
In fact, Yemen was recently ranked the sixth most failed state by The Fund for Peace, worse than even Afghanistan and Iraq, and the third most worsened state over the last 5 years.
It is no surprise that jailbreaks are a notorious problem in Yemen. Furthermore, press reports have characterized Yemeni prisons as ``overcrowded and under-monitored radicalization factories.''
To give one example, the Yemeni citizen who is the convicted mastermind of the USS Cole bombing escaped from prison in both 2003 and 2006 after his recapture. He was not recaptured after his second escape and remains at large.
In the most recent example, attackers mounted a bomb, grenade, and gun assault on the main prison in Yemen's capital this February, freeing 20 al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Embassy has been closed since May 7 and remains closed today due to attempted kidnappings and terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens.
Finally, and most importantly, Yemen's branch of al Qaeda, commonly known as AQAP, was founded by former Gitmo detainees. Counterterrorism experts have declared AQAP to be al Qaeda's most effective affiliate, posing the greatest danger to the American homeland.
AQAP's predecessor, al Qaeda in Yemen, came into existence after the escape of 23 al Qaeda members from prison in the Yemeni capital in February of 2006. AQAP has orchestrated numerous high-profile terrorist attacks inside the Arabian Peninsula, but it has tried on numerous occasions to strike the U.S. homeland, typically through air travel.
Analysts evaluate that AQAP is the al Qaeda group that is currently the most capable and most committed to carry out sophisticated operations against the West.
To summarize, Mr. Chairman, we cannot risk trusting one of the world's most dangerous places with its most dangerous terrorists. The fundamental question is how much risk should we take with our Nation's security? This amendment helps ensure our homeland remains safe from terrorist attacks. I urge my colleagues to support it, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the balance of my time?