Biosecure Act
Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8333) to prohibit contracting with certain biotechnology providers, and for other purposes, as amended. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5…
Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8333) to prohibit contracting with certain biotechnology providers, and for other purposes, as amended.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I am happy to support H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE Act.
This bipartisan, bicameral bill prevents U.S. tax dollars from flowing to biotechnology companies that are owned, operated, and controlled by China or other foreign adversaries.
Specifically, this bill names five genomic companies with direct ties to the Chinese Communist Party as biotechnology companies of concern.
The bill then prohibits a Federal agency from procuring any biotechnology equipment or service from such companies. The bill also prohibits Federal loan or grant dollars from being used to procure, obtain, or use biotechnology equipment or services from such companies.
The companies named in this legislation create significant risks to U.S. national security.
BGI, one of the named entities, is a CCP biotechnology company and is the world's largest collector of genetic data. BGI, alongside its subsidiaries, which are also named in the bill, have been found to conduct research alongside the Chinese military.
WuXi, through its two subsidiaries named in the bill, operates genetic testing centers established in coordination with the CCP, helps carry out research to promote the Chinese military, and has reportedly stolen U.S. firms' intellectual property.
The House Oversight Committee has worked hard with outside stakeholders and other committees of jurisdiction to ensure these national security risks are meaningfully addressed without disrupting medical and pharmaceutical supply chains.
Existing contracts are exempt from the prohibitions in the bill until January 2032, and the bill includes a targeted waiver and exception process.
The bill also exempts biotechnology equipment and services from the bill's prohibitions that were, but are no longer, produced or provided by a company of concern.
This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive healthcare data from the CCP before these companies become more embedded in the U.S. economy, university, and Federal contracting base.
I thank the bill's sponsor, Representative Brad Wenstrup, chairman of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, for his efforts in ensuring this bill continues to advance.
I also thank the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party chairman, John Moolenaar, and ranking member, Raja Krishnamoorthi, both original cosponsors, as well as the House Oversight's ranking member, Jamie Raskin, and the Senate Homeland Security Committee chairman, Gary Peters, and their staff for their hard work on this legislation over the past year.
I urge all my House Oversight colleagues to support this critical national security bill. I encourage everyone to support this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Krishnamoorthi).
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Wenstrup), who is the sponsor of the bill.
Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Moolenaar).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Dunn).
Mr. Speaker, I have two speakers left.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Oklahoma (Mrs. Bice).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Krishnamoorthi).
Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 15 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers and am prepared to close.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, we have heard here today broad consensus among my House colleagues that U.S. taxpayer dollars should not go to foreign biotechnology entities that steal Americans' genetic data, contribute to a foreign adversary's military, or support the violation of human rights.
The BIOSECURE Act addresses this national security problem by clearly prohibiting a Federal agency from procuring any biotechnology equipment or service from a company controlled by a foreign adversary, such as the CCP.
Americans saw firsthand during the COVID pandemic what happens when a foreign adversary acts irresponsibly in the biotechnology sector. China restricted the export of vital medical equipment to the United States, refused to tell the world about COVID when it first emerged, and covered up evidence related to the origins of COVID-19.
This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive healthcare data from a foreign adversary like the CCP before the U.S. biomedical and healthcare sector becomes even more dependent upon Chinese-influenced organizations. It is critical that we pass the BIOSECURE Act before more harm is done.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in support of this national security bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.