Mr. Speaker, I rise today to offer my unwavering support for H.R. 5037, the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this bill. The rights of free speech and expression under the Constitution's…
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to offer my unwavering support for H.R. 5037, the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this bill.
The rights of free speech and expression under the Constitution's First Amendment are not absolute, and there are many U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting and explaining the right and its limits. As Chairman Buyer explained, there are several judicial precedents which make clear that H.R. 5037 is constitutional. On April 6, the Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, the subcommittee I chair, took testimony on this bill.
Said David Forte, Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, in written testimony submitted to the Subcommittee:
``There are thus two constitutional issues to be
confronted: (1) Does the ban on ``certain'' demonstrations
meet the requirement
of First Amendment law as laid down in Supreme Court
precedents, and (2) Is the discretion lodged in the cemetery
superintendent to permit exceptions fall within an acceptable
constitutional range? I conclude that the answer to both
questions is in the affirmative and that the bill is well
within constitutional limits.
Mr. Speaker, at this time I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Forte's statement be included in the Congressional Record.
I have visited the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq several times over the years.
While always moving and inspiring experiences, one time in particular stands out. It was September 2003 and we were preparing to return to the States. After quite a wait, we were told that they were loading onto the plane the casket of Sergeant Trevor Blumberg, and we would be leaving Baghdad with his body. I have had few honors as great as that one. I am pleased to say that Mrs. Blumberg has since contacted Representative Rogers' office to express her and her husband's support for this bill.
Our Nation's veterans have made the ultimate sacrifice, and it is appalling to see and hear their military service being derided. Unfortunately, throughout the country, that is indeed what is happening and it must stop.
I want to thank Mr. Rogers, Chairman Buyer, and Mr. Reyes for all their work in crafting this legislation and their continued dedication to the men and women of our armed forces.
I would also like to recognize Mr. Paul Taylor and Ms. Hilary Funk, staff on the Judiciary. Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, for working so closely with my staff and me.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill.
Testimony of David F. Forte, Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State University, in Support of H.R. 5037
Before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Subcommittee on
Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, Jeff Miller, Chairman,
April 18, 2006
I. Introduction
H.R. 5037, entitled the ``Respect for America's Fallen
Heroes Act,'' seeks to limit ``certain demonstrations'' in
cemeteries under the control of the National Cemetery
Administration or on the property of Arlington National
Cemetery. The bill defines what constitutes a demonstration
disruptive of the memorial services or funerals being held in
or within 500 feet of such cemeteries, but allows an
exception for demonstrations on cemetery grounds if
``approved by the cemetery superintendent.'' There are thus
two constitutional issues to be confronted: (1) Does the ban
on ``certain'' demonstrations meet the requirements of First
Amendment law as laid down in Supreme Court precedents, and
(2) Is the discretion lodged in the cemetery superintendent
to permit exceptions fall within an acceptable constitutional
range? I conclude that the answer to both questions is in the
affirmative and that the bill is well within constitutional
limits.
II. The Ban on Demonstrations
Demonstrations are a form of expressive conduct. In all
governmental restrictions on expressive conduct, Supreme
Court jurisprudence requires application of the O'Brien test,
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) or of the
``time, place, and manner'' test. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941). The Court has declared that both tests have
similar standards. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
Under the O'Brien test, ``a governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.'' 391 U.S. at 376. Under the ``time, place,
and manner'' test, government regulations of expressive
conduct are valid ``provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open alternative channels for
communication of the information.'' Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
It is clear from the text of H.R. 5037 that the purpose of
the bill is to assure the dignity of funerals or memorial
services held in honor of our fallen dead by preventing
demonstrations that are disruptive of those ceremonies. To
that end, the bill delineates what kind of demonstrations
shall be prohibited, viz, a demonstration within five hundred
feet of a cemetery in which a funeral or memorial service is
to be held if the demonstration takes place within a time
period from 60 minutes before until 60 minutes after the
funeral or memorial service. Furthermore, the bill requires
that only those demonstrations in which a ``noise or
diversion'' is willfully made and ``that disturbs or tends to
disturb the peace or good order of the funeral service or
memorial service or ceremony'' shall be prohibited.
Maintaining cemeteries for veterans is clearly within the
constitutional power of government. It is also clear that,
under 38 U.S.C. sect. 2403, the purpose of maintaining
cemeteries ``as a tribute to our gallant dead'' is an
important or substantial governmental interest. It is
similarly evident from the text of the bill that its purpose
is to prevent conduct that is intentionally disruptive of a
funeral or memorial service without reference to the content
of the expressive conduct. The text does not ban accidental
noises present in our modern society near to many cemeteries,
such as traffic or the sounds of children playing. Nor does
it ban only demonstrations with a particular kind of message.
A demonstration connected with a labor dispute that is
disruptive of a funeral is as violative of the law as would
be an anti-war demonstration or a ``support our troops''
march. Finally, ``the incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance'' of the interest of maintaining the dignity of a
funeral for our fallen dead. Demonstrations 60 minutes before
or 60 minutes after the ceremony are permitted. Even during
the period in which a ceremony is being held, a demonstration
beyond 500 feet of the cemetery is permitted. This is no
blanket ban at all.
The fact that H.R. 5037 prohibits disruptive demonstrations
on grounds that are not part of a national cemetery finds
support in Supreme Court precedent. The case of Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) is directly on point.
In Grayned, the Supreme Court upheld an antinoise ordinance,
which read: ``No person, while on public or private grounds
adjacent to any building in which a school or any class
thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the
making on any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to
disturb the peace or good order of such school session or
class thereof.'' 408 U.S. at 107-08. It is axiomatic in our
legal tradition that the state may take reasonable steps to
abate a nuisance that may emanate from private property. What
H.R. 5037 does is to abate a nuisance that would disturb the
good order of a federally mandated activity in our national
cemeteries, namely, to provide memorial services and
ceremonies that are ``a tribute to our gallant dead.''
It should be noted that in Grayned, the Supreme Court held
that the antinoise ordinance was good against claims of
overbreadth or vagueness. H.R. 5037's prohibition on
``willfully making or assisting in the making of any noise or
diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good
order of the funeral or memorial service or ceremony'' tracks
the language approved by the Court in Grayned.
Furthermore, the language of H.R. 5037 finds support in the
case of Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). In the case, the
Supreme Court reviewed a District of Columbia law that made
it unlawful to display any sign that brought a foreign
government into ``public odium'' or ``public disrepute''
within 500 feet of an embassy, and which banned
``congregating'' within 500 feet of an embassy. The Court
struck down the ban on displaying a sign critical of a
foreign government, but upheld the ban on congregating if, as
construed by the lower courts, the congregation was
``directed at a foreign embassy.'' H.R. 5037 bans only those
demonstrations within 500 feet of a cemetery that are
intentionally disruptive of ceremonies or funerals within
national cemeteries. The disruptive requirement does not need
judicial construction. It is made in the terms of the statute
and is fully supported by the decision in Boos v. Barry.
Under H.R. 5037, a person who displays ``any placard,
banner, flag, or similar device, unless the display is part
of a funeral or memorial service or ceremony,'' and such a
display causes a ``diversion that disturbs or tends to
disturb the good order of the funeral or memorial service''
is subject to the law. This prohibition is closely akin to
the focused picketing ordinance upheld by the Supreme Court
in Frisby v. Schultz, 484 U.S. 474 (1988). That ordinance
banned picketing ``before and about'' any residence. Although
in most public areas, people may picket and expostulate even
though others may object to the message, in certain areas the
functioning of the forum takes precedence, provided there are
alternative ways the protestor may express his message.
Schools are one forum whose functioning may not be disturbed
or diverted. Grayned. The home is another place. Justice
O'Connor noted that the picketers could still march through
the neighborhood to express their opposition to abortion and
abortionists. They simply could not disrupt the
``tranquility'' of a doctor's home. 484 U.S. at 484.
Similarly, in H.R. 5037, the bill seeks to protect the
tranquility and dignity of a memorial service. It allows the
picketer or demonstrator to display whatever kind of sign or
device he wishes one hour before or one hour after the
ceremony, or at any time if more than 500 feet distant from
the cemetery, even if it offends those who may be traveling
to the ceremony.
If, however, a person displays ``any placard, banner, flag,
or similar device, unless the display is part of a funeral or
memorial service or ceremony,'' and the display occurs within
a cemetery, there is no requirement in the bill that it be
part of a disruptive demonstration. But in that case, the
display does not take place in a traditional public forum,
such as a public sidewalk, but rather within a non-public
forum dedicated to honoring our veterans. In that situation,
the ban is a reasonable, and thereby a valid, restriction in
a non-public forum designed to preserve the appropriate
functioning of the forum, i.e., a national cemetery. I
discuss the law applying to non-public forums in Part III
below.
Thus, under either the O'Brien test or under the time,
place and manner test, the statute is drawn to be within
Constitutional standards.
Nonetheless, I find one phrase in the bill puzzling. Under
section (b)(2), a demonstration is defined as ``Any oration,
speech, use of sound amplification equipment or device, or
similar conduct before an assembled group of people that is
not part of a funeral or memorial service or ceremony.''
(emphasis added) It would see that a single individual with a
bullhorn who disrupts a ceremony might not be covered under
this section. Thus, I do not see the use of the phrase
``before an assembled group of people.'' In any event, with
such a phrase, the restriction on expressive conduct is even
less than would be permitted to be under the Constitution.
III. The discretion of the cemetery superintendent
It is a central canon of our First Amendment jurisprudence
that permission to engage in expressive conduct cannot be
left to the unbridled discretion of a governmental official.
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750
(1988). Such a discretion carries with it the dangers of
prior restraint, vagueness, overbreadth, and content and
viewpoint discrimination. Section (a)(1) of H.R. 5037
prohibits demonstrations in cemeteries under the control of
the National Cemetery Administration or in Arlington National
Cemetery ``unless the demonstration has been approved by the
cemetery superintendent.'' Nonetheless, I do not believe that
this section permits unbridled discretion in the cemetery
superintendent. Rather, I think that his discretion is well-
cabined within and defined by the administrative function the
law places upon the cemetery superintendent.
A case directly on point is Griffin v. Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Some
veterans were not permitted under federal regulations from
placing a Confederate flag at a national cemetery. Placing a
flag was interpreted as a forbidden demonstration under 38
C.F.R., sect. 1.218(a)(14). Subsection (i) declares in part,
``[A]ny service, ceremony, or demonstration, except as
authorized by the head of the facility or designee, is
prohibited.'' Petitioners asserted that the section gave
unconstitutional discretion to the administrator of the
facility.
In Griffin, the Federal Circuit Court pointed out that
cemeteries are non-public forums the regulations of which are
subject only to a reasonable basis test. However, although
the government may limit the content of expression in non-
public forums, it may not engage in viewpoint discrimination.
The question was whether the discretion given by the law to
the cemetery's administrator brought with it the danger of
viewpoint discrimination. After all, a Confederate flag
carries a different viewpoint from the Stars and Stripes.
The Federal Circuit found that the Supreme Court had
applied the viewpoint discrimination doctrine only in
traditional public forums or in designated public forums. 288
F.3d at 1321. The court zeroed in on the relevant variable in
this kind of case: ``We are obliged to examine the nature of
the forum because the restrictions in nonpublic fora may be
reasonable if they are aimed at preserving the property for
the purpose to which it is dedicated.'' 288 F.3d at 1323.
Finding that there was sufficient Supreme Court
support, citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(1990), the Federal Circuit upheld the discretion lodged
in the cemetery's administrator ``when such discretion is
necessary to preserve the function and character of the
forum.'' 288 F.3d at 1323.
The purpose of many non-public forums is normative and
preserving the function of that forum may entail restricting
opposing normative viewpoints. Schools, for example, are
nonpublic forums charged with developing students' character
for participation as well-informed and well-developed
citizens in our system of representative government. To that
end, schools may insist that students observe rules of
respect and avoid hateful or immoral language. A student with
an opposite viewpoint who fails to observe the rules of
respect and makes his point with crude language is not
protected by the First Amendment. Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1968). Accordingly, the
superintendent of a national cemetery is charged with
maintaining the cemetery and its activities ``as a tribute to
our gallant dead.'' Under H.R. 5037 he is granted reasonable
discretion to assure that all activities within the cemetery
accord with its lawfully stated purpose. He may permit
ceremonies or demonstrations or signs or programs that accord
with such purpose and forbid those that do not. In doing so,
the restriction imposed is ``reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view.'' 288 F.3d at 1321, citing, Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Del & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
IV. Conclusion
H.R. 5037 is a well-crafted bill that seeks to maintain the
decorum necessary to honor our veterans and those who have
died for our freedoms and who now rest in national
cemeteries. I find that the bill's careful limitations on
disruptive demonstrations and the limited discretion it gives
to cemetery superintendents to be well with constitutional
limits.